

AFF K TOOLBOX 09 INDEX

**Important Note: The 09 Michigan 7 Week Seniors Risk Assessment Toolbox is a very useful supplement to this file—it has many more cards defending empiricism, predictions, other truth claims.**

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**\*\*AGAMBEN\*\***

AT AGAMBEN: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

Agamben's "coming community" is too weak to be sustainable.

**Gordon 04** (Andrew, Lee and Juliet Folger Fund Professor of History at Harvard University, "Review Study: Rethinking Area Studies, Once More," Journal Of Japanese Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2004, pg. 424-425)

Okada draws on Giorgio Agamben to argue for "singularities to form a community without affirming an identity." Such a community would be premised on a belief "that humans co-belong without any representable condition of belonging" (p. 200). This is an ambitious but doomed quest. The sort of community here envisioned is devoid of the emotional attachments that reinforce strong communities in real life. The sad part—and here I agree with Okada entirely—is that these emotions so easily rest on feelings of exclusion or essentialist notions of identity; the sadder part is that I don't see how the community he seeks could generate loyalties sufficient to allow its survival.

**AT AGAMBEN: LINK OVER SIMPLIFIED**

**Agamben's biopower is over-simplified and prevents us from confronting specific political circumstances.**

**Virno 02** (Paolo, PhD and Italian philosopher, "General intellect, exodus, multitude," Archipelago No. 54, June 2002, <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpvirno2.htm>)

Agamben is a thinker of great value but also, in my opinion, a thinker with no political vocation. Then, when Agamben speaks of the biopolitical he has the tendency to transform it into an ontological category with value already since the archaic Roman right. And, in this, in my opinion, he is very wrong-headed. The problem is, I believe, that the biopolitical is only an effect derived from the concept of labor-power. When there is a commodity that is called labor-power it is already implicitly government over life. Agamben says, on the other hand, that labor-power is only one of the aspects of the biopolitical; I say the contrary: over all because labor power is a paradoxical commodity, because it is not a real commodity like a book or a bottle of water, but rather is simply the potential to produce. As soon as this potential is transformed into a commodity, then, it is necessary to govern the living body that maintains this potential, that contains this potential. Toni (Negri) and Michael (Hardt), on the other hand, use biopolitics in a historically determined sense, basing it on Foucault, but Foucault spoke in few pages of the biopolitical - in relation to the birth of liberalism - that Foucault is not a sufficient base for founding a discourse over the biopolitical and my apprehension, my fear, is that the biopolitical can be transformed into a word that hides, covers problems instead of being an instrument for confronting them. A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with an exclamation point, a word that carries the risk of blocking critical thought instead of helping it. Then, my fear is of fetish words in politics because it seems like the cries of a child that is afraid of the dark.... the child that says "mama, mama!", "biopolitics, biopolitics!". I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics sometimes is a consolatory use, like the cry of a child, when what serves us are, in all cases, instruments of work and not propaganda words.

AT AGAMBEN: NAZIS UNIQUE

**Not all politics turn to Nazism—modern power structures are incredibly diverse.**

**Rabinow & Rose 03** (Paul, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Nikolas, Professor of Sociology @ the London School of Economics, “Thoughts On The Concept of Biopower Today,” December 10, 2003, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/sociology/pdf/RabinowandRose-BiopowerToday03.pdf>, accessed July 07, pg. 8-9)

The interpretation of contemporary biopolitics as the politics of a state modeled on the figure of the sovereign suits the twentieth century absolutisms of the Nazis and Stalin. But we need a more nuanced account of sovereign power to analyze contemporary rationalities or technologies of politics. Since these authors take their concept and point of reference from Foucault, it is worth contrasting their postulate of a origin and beneficiary of biopower to Foucault’s remarks on sovereignty as a form of power whose diagram, but not principle, is the figure of the sovereign ruler. Its characteristic is indeed ultimately a mode of power which relies on the right to take life. However, with the exception of certain ‘paroxysmal’ moments, this is a mode of power whose activation can only be sporadic and non-continuous. The totalization of sovereign power as a mode of ordering daily life would be too costly, and indeed the very excesses of the exercise of this power seek to compensate for its sporadic nature. Sovereignty, in this sense, is precisely a diagram of a form of power not a description of its implementation. Certainly some forms of colonial power sought to operationalize it, but in the face of its economic and governmental costs, colonial statecraft was largely to take a different form. The two megalomaniac State forms of the twentieth century also sought to actualize it, as have some others in their wake: Albania under Hoxha, North Korea. But no historian of pre-modern forms of control could fail to notice the dependence of sovereign rule in its non-paroxysmal form on a fine web of customary conventions, reciprocal obligations, and the like, in a word, a moral economy whose complexity and scope far exceeds the extravagance displays of the sovereign. Sovereign power is at one and the same time an element in this moral economy and an attempt to master it.

**Not all biopolitics bring about genocide—it trivializes Nazism to say that all enactments of the state of exception are equivalent.**

**Rabinow & Rose 03** (Paul, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Nikolas, Professor of Sociology @ the London School of Economics, “Thoughts On The Concept of Biopower Today,” December 10, 2003, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/sociology/pdf/RabinowandRose-BiopowerToday03.pdf>, pg. 8-9)

Agamben takes seriously Adorno’s challenge “how is it possible to think after Auschwitz?” But for that very reason, it is to trivialize Auschwitz to apply Schmitt’s concept of the state of exception and Foucault’s analysis of biopower to every instance where living beings enter the scope of regulation, control and government. The power to command under threat of death is exercised by States and their surrogates in multiple instances, in micro forms and in geopolitical relations. But this is not to say that this form of power commands backed up by the ultimate threat of death is the guarantee or underpinning principle of all forms of biopower in contemporary liberal societies. Unlike Agamben, we do not think that : the jurist the doctor, the scientist, the expert, the priest depend for their power over life upon an alliance with the State (1998: 122). Nor is it useful to use this single diagram to analyze every contemporary instance of thanato-politics from Rwanda to the epidemic of AIDS deaths across Africa. Surely the essence of critical thought must be its capacity to make distinctions that can facilitate judgment and action.

AT AGAMBEN: BARE LIFE

**The concept of bare life over-determines the power of the state—theories that emphasize resistance are more powerful.**

**Cesarino & Negri 04** (Cesare, associate professor of cultural studies, Antonio, professor emeritus @ the Collège International de Philosophie, “It’s a Powerful Life: A Conversation on Contemporary Philosophy,” Cultural Critique, Vol. 57, Spring 2004, pg. 172-173)

I believe Giorgio is writing a sequel to *Homo Sacer*, and I feel that this new work will be resolute for his thought—in the sense that he will be forced in it to resolve and find a way out of the ambiguity that has qualified his understanding of naked life so far. He already attempted something of the sort in his recent book on Saint Paul, but I think this attempt largely failed: as usual, this book is extremely learned and elegant; it remains, however, somewhat trapped within Pauline exegesis, rather than constituting a full-fledged attempt to reconstruct naked life as a potentiality for exodus, to rethink naked life fundamentally in terms of exodus. I believe that the concept of naked life is not an impossible, unfeasible one. I believe it is possible to push the image of power to the point at which a defenseless human being [un povero Cristo] is crushed, to conceive of that extreme point at which power tries to eliminate that ultimate resistance that is the sheer attempt to keep oneself alive. From a logical standpoint, it is possible to think all this: the naked bodies of the people in the camps, for example, can lead one precisely in this direction. But this is also the point at which this concept turns into ideology: to conceive of the relation between power and life in such a way actually ends up bolstering and reinforcing ideology. Agamben, in effect, is saying that such is the nature of power: in the final instance, power reduces each and every human being to such a state of powerlessness. But this is absolutely not true! On the contrary: the historical process takes place and is produced thanks to a continuous constitution and construction, which undoubtedly confronts the limit over and over again—but this is an extraordinarily rich limit, in which desires expand, and in which life becomes increasingly fuller. Of course it is possible to conceive of the limit as absolute powerlessness, especially when it has been actually enacted and enforced in such a way so many times. And yet, isn't such a conception of the limit precisely what the limit looks like from the standpoint of constituted power as well as from the standpoint of those who have already been totally annihilated by such a power—which is, of course, one and the same standpoint? Isn't this the story about power that power itself would like us to believe in and reiterate? Isn't it far more politically useful to conceive of this limit from the standpoint of those who are not yet or not completely crushed by power, from the standpoint of those still struggling to overcome such a limit, from the standpoint of the process of constitution, from the standpoint of power [potenza]?

AT AGAMBEN: THE CAMP

**Suggesting that the camp is everywhere is silly—government power may be expansive but it does not always produce corpses—Nazism was unique.**

**Levi & Rothberg 03** (Neil, Professor of English @ Drew University, Michael, Professor of English @ the University of Sydney, "Auschwitz and the Remnants of Theory: Towards an Ethics of the Borderlands," (11: 1/2), 2003, pg.30-31)

At the same time, Agamben's formulations strike us as problematic and inadequate in several respects. First, by restructuring the "zone of the human" to conform to the condition of the Muselmann, Agamben removes the figure of the Muselmann from the context—the camps—in which he or she is "produced." The Muselmann becomes an isolated figure floating, like a Giacometti sculpture, in an otherwise apparently empty abstract space that Agamben calls "humanity." The Muselmann is meant to bear a certain truth about the nature of ethics "after Auschwitz," but is it not important when trying to articulate such an ethics to reflect on what Auschwitz was?<sup>4</sup> Surely such an account should attend to the historical, legal, and political conditions that led to the development of the camp system, including the kinds of features that Zygmunt Bauman focuses on in *Modernity and the Holocaust* - such as a massive, morally indifferent bureaucratic apparatus that dehumanized its "objects" and distanced its agents from a sense of responsibility for their actions, as well as the obsessive hatred of the Jews that Saul Friedländer has recently dubbed "redemptive antisemitism."<sup>5</sup> If the Muselmann would not have existed without these factors, shouldn't an ethics focused upon this figure also take account of them? Interestingly enough, in *Homo Sacer* Agamben himself argues that "the camp" is the "nomos" (definitive political element) of the modern. In remarking that "[w]hat happened in the camps so exceeds the juridical concept of crime that the specific juridico-political structure in which those events took place is often simply omitted from consideration" (1998, 166), Agamben could be preparing a critique of what is omitted from *Remnants of Auschwitz*. *Homo Sacer* argues that the camp is the space where the state of exception becomes normal and where "whether or not atrocities are committed depends not on law but on the civility and ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign" (1998, 174). This line of argument produces an antinomy in the Agamben oeuvre: for the Agamben of *Homo Sacer* a camp is a camp if anything is possible within it, no matter whether or not it actually produces Muselmänner and corpses, while for the Agamben of *Remnants of Auschwitz* the important fact about the Muselmann is simply that such a figure happened, not where and how he became possible. What links the positions of his two works is a level of abstraction that deliberately brackets features of each paradigm ordinarily understood as essential: for the camp, figures such as the Muselmann; for the Muselmann, the conditions of the camp. Both moves permit Agamben to dismantle the boundary between the Nazi camps and the modern world. We have already seen this in relation to the Muselmann, in the wake of whose existence all previously existing moral concepts must be revised. It can be seen also in the examples of modern camps Agamben offers, including, "[t]he soccer stadium in Bari into which the Italian police in 1991 provisionally herded all illegal Albanian immigrants," the zones d'attentes in French international airports where foreigners requesting refugee status are held, and even, he suggests in an earlier version of the essay, gated communities in the USA (1998, 174).<sup>6</sup> At such moments Agamben seems to be suggesting that Auschwitz is potentially everywhere, a suggestion that ends up eliding the specific challenges posed both by the Muselmann and the camp system.

AT AGAMBEN: MUSELMANN

**Agamben's claim that the Muselmann is the 'complete witness' undermines the historical importance of other positions within Auschwitz. This must be rejected.**

**Levi & Rothberg 03** (Neil, Professor of English @ Drew University, Michael, Professor of English @ the University of Sydney, "Auschwitz and the Remnants of Theory: Towards an Ethics of the Borderlands," (11: 1/2), 2003, pg.31-32)

We would also identify a second problem with Agamben's approach: the grounds for Agamben's selection of the Muselmann as the "complete witness" are not clear. Ethics after Auschwitz must take account of the Muselmann, but that does not justify transforming him into a fetish, the sole site of the truth of the camps. If Levi's own testimony is on his own account unrepresentative, that surely does not mean that it has no truth content. The fact that Levi himself distrusts the testimony of, say, former members of the Sonderkommando (the camp inmates who were forced, under threat of death, to operate the crematoria) is no reason to disqualify such testimony out of hand. The power of Claude Lanzmann's astonishing film Shoah derives in no small part from the testimony of a former "crematorium raven" (P. Levi 60). Despite his attempt to develop a complex theory of testimony premised on the relationship between the Muselmann and the surviving witness, Agamben ultimately homogenizes the site of witness by polarizing those positions. While there is warrant for such a reading in Levi's texts (e.g., Levi's notion of "the drowned and the saved"), those texts also include the hypothesis of "the gray zone," a zone of ethical uncertainty in which figures such as the Sonderkommando are paradigmatic. In fact, testimony from the gray zone may prove as illuminating about the ethical challenges of the Nazi genocide as that derived from an understanding of Levi's paradox. Despite the serious reservations expressed by Levi about the testimonies of figures who were forced into the most terrible complicity with the Nazis, such testimonies have been shown to be of great value in understanding the Nazi genocide, and, indeed, in making clear the need for theoretical innovation in order to do so.<sup>7</sup> In what remains one of the most profound attempts to "think" the Nazi genocide, historian and social theorist Dan Diner proposes that Nazi action can be most effectively illuminated from the perspective of the gray zone, and particularly that of the Judenräte - the Jewish councils who ran the ghettos and were charged to make decisions about who would be allowed to work and who would be sent to the camps (130-137). The councils negotiated on the assumption that the Nazis were rational - specifically, that they would not want to exterminate a productive labor source while at war. The Nazis utilized this assumption to facilitate the killing process, with which the councils found themselves unsuspectingly cooperating. It is the Jewish councils' experience of participating in their own destruction while acting according to the logic of self-preservation that Diner terms the counterrational. And it is in reflecting on the Jewish experience of Nazi counterrationality that Diner says we encounter the limits of historical understanding. Only at this limit point, according to Diner, can we begin to "think the Nazis" via what he calls negative historical cognition. While we wouldn't want to generalize the standpoint of the Judenräte as the essence of the Holocaust any more than we would that of the Muselmann, when read alongside each other the arguments of Agamben and Diner strongly suggest the importance of multiplying the epistemological standpoints from which we approach the Nazi genocide.



## AT AGAMBEN: IMPACT TURNS

**Turn: liberal democratic protections prevent military action and the slide to totalitarianism—Agamben ignores the actual practice of humanitarianism.**

**Heins, 05** (Volker, visiting professor of political science at Concordia University and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, 6 German Law Journal No. 5, May, <http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598>)

According to this basic Principle of Distinction, modern humanitarian action is directed towards those who are caught up in violent conflicts without possessing any strategic value for the respective warring parties. Does this imply that classic humanitarianism and its legal expressions reduce the lives of noncombatants to the "bare life" of nameless individuals beyond the protection of any legal order? I would rather argue that humanitarianism is itself an order-making activity. Its goal is not the preservation of life reduced to a bare natural fact, but conversely the protection of civilians and thereby the protection of elementary standards of civilization which prevent the exclusion of individuals from any legal and moral order. The same holds true for human rights, of course. Agamben fails to appreciate the fact that human rights laws are not about some cadaveric "bare life", but about the protection of moral agency.<sup>[33]</sup> His sweeping critique also lacks any sense for essential distinctions. It may be legitimate to see "bare life" as a juridical fiction nurtured by the modern state, which claims the right to derogate from otherwise binding norms in times of war and emergency, and to kill individuals, if necessary, outside the law in a mode of "effective factuality."<sup>[34]</sup> Agamben asserts that sovereignty understood in this manner continues to function in the same way since the seventeenth century and regardless of the democratic or dictatorial structure of the state in question. This claim remains unilluminated by the wealth of evidence that shows how the humanitarian motive not only shapes the mandate of a host state and nonstate agencies, but also serves to restrict the operational freedom of military commanders in democracies, who cannot act with impunity and who do not wage war in a lawless state of nature. Furthermore, Agamben ignores the crisis of humanitarianism that emerged as a result of the totalitarian degeneration of modern states in the twentieth century. States cannot always be assumed to follow a rational self-interest which informs them that there is no point in killing others indiscriminately. The Nazi episode in European history has shown that sometimes leaders do not spare the weak and the sick, but take extra care not to let them escape, even if they are handicapped, very old or very young. Classic humanitarianism depends on the existence of an international society whose members feel bound by a basic set of rules regarding the use of violence—rules which the ICRC itself helped to institutionalize. Conversely, classic humanitarianism becomes dysfunctional when states place no value at all on their international reputation and see harming the lives of defenseless individuals not as useless and cruel, but as part of their very mission.<sup>[36]</sup> The founders of the ICRC defined war as an anthropological constant that produced a continuous stream of new victims with the predictable regularity and unavoidability of floods or volcanic eruptions. Newer organizations, by contrast, have framed conditions of massive social suffering as a consequence of largely avoidable political mistakes. The humanitarian movement becomes political, to paraphrase Carl Schmitt,<sup>[37]</sup> in so far as it orients itself to humanitarian states of emergency, the causes of which are located no longer in nature, but in society and politics. Consequently, the founding generation of the new humanitarian organizations have freed themselves from the ideals of apolitical philanthropy and chosen as their new models historical figures like the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who saved thousands of Jews during the Second World War. In a different fashion than Agamben imagines, the primary concern in the field of humanitarian intervention and human rights politics today is not the protection of bare life, but rather the rehabilitation of the lived life of citizens who suffer, for instance, from conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder. At the same time, there is a field of activity emerging beneath the threshold of the bare life. In the United States, in particular, pathologists working in conjunction with human rights organizations have discovered the importance of corpses and corporal remains now that it is possible to identify reliable evidence for war crimes from exhumed bodies.<sup>[39]</sup>

AT AGAMBEN: TOTALITARIANISM IMPACTS

**Agamben ignores the actual differences between democracy and totalitarianism—his failure to engage in cost-benefit assessment means he's a fanatic who only thinks in absolutes.**

**Heins, 05** (Volker, visiting professor of political science at Concordia University and Senior Fellow at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, 6 German Law Journal No. 5, May, <http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=598>)

Agamben is not interested in such weighing of costs and benefits because he assumes from the outset that taking care of the survival needs of people in distress is simply the reverse side of the modern inclination to ignore precisely those needs and turn life itself into a tool and object of power politics. By way of conclusion, I will indicate briefly how his view differs from two other, often no less shattering critiques of modern humanitarianism. Martti Koskenniemi warned that humanitarian demands and human rights are in danger of degenerating into "mere talk." [47] The recent crisis in Darfur, Sudan, can be cited as an example for a situation in which the repeated invocation of human rights standards and jus cogens norms, like those articulated in the Genocide Convention, might ultimately damage those norms themselves if states are unwilling to act on them. [48] This criticism implies that human rights should be taken seriously and applied in a reasonable manner. Both David Kennedy and Oona Hathaway have gone one step further by taking issue even with those who proved to be serious by joining treaties or engaging in advocacy. In a controversial quantitative study, Hathaway contended that the ratification of human rights treaties by sets of given countries not only did not improve human rights conditions on the ground, but actually correlated with increasing violations. [49] In a similar vein, David Kennedy radicalized Koskenniemi's point by arguing that human rights regimes and humanitarian law are rather part of the problem than part of solution, because they "justify" and "excuse" too much. [50] To some extent, this is an effect of the logic of legal reasoning: marking a line between noncombatants and combatants increases the legitimacy of attacking the latter, granting privileges to lawful combatants delegitimizes unlawful belligerents and dramatically worsens their status. On the whole, Kennedy is more concerned about the dangers of leaving human rights to international legal elites and a professional culture which is blind for the mismatch between lofty ideals and textual articulations on the one side, and real people and problems on the other side. [51] Whereas these authors reveal the "dark sides" of overly relying on human rights talk and treaties, the moral fervor of activists or the routines of the legal profession, Agamben claims that something is wrong with human rights as such, and that recent history has demonstrated a deep affinity between the protection and the infringement of these rights. Considered in this light, the effort of the British aid organization Save the Children, for instance, to help children in need both in Britain and abroad after World War I—faithful to George Bernard Shaw's saying, "I have no enemies under seven"—is only the flip side of a trend to declare total war on others regardless of their age and situation. This assertion clearly goes far beyond the voices of other pessimists. Agamben's work is understandable only against the backdrop of an entirely familiar mistrust of liberal democracy and its ability to cultivate nonpartisan moral and legal perspectives. According to Agamben, democracy does not threaten to turn into totalitarianism, but rather both regimes smoothly cross over into one another since they ultimately rest on the same foundation of a political interpretation of life itself. [52] Like Carl Schmitt, Agamben sees the invocation of human rights by democratic governments as well as the "humanitarian concept of humanity" [53] as deceptive manouvers or, at least, as acts of self-deception on the part of the liberal bourgeois subject. The difference between Agamben and Schmitt lies in the fact that Schmitt fought liberal democracy in the name of the authoritarian state, while Agamben sees democracy and dictatorship as two equally unappealing twins. Very much unlike Schmitt, the Italian philosopher confronts us with a mode of thinking in vaguely felt resemblances in lieu of distinctly perceived differences. Ultimately, he offers a version of Schmitt's theory of sovereignty that changes its political valence and downplays the difference between liberal democracy and totalitarian dictatorship—a difference about which Adorno once said that it "is a total difference. And I would say," he added, "that it would be abstract and in a problematic way fanatical if one were to ignore this difference." [54]

AT AGAMBEN: TOO TOTALIZING

**Agamben's critique is too totalizing—accepting appeals to some sovereign power does not cause the negative impacts of sovereignty in every instance. The plan is a justified use of sovereign power to prevent a catastrophe. Hussain, 2000** (Department of History at Berkeley Nasser, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 495, lexis).

Here once again we are forced to question Agamben's teleological mode of thought. Is this sovereign power represented in the concentration camps really a constitutive feature of sovereignty tout court? Even limiting ourselves to the remarks above, we can imagine a liberal critique of this position that asks from where come the limitations that Agamben concedes previous Weimar governments had observed. Surely, one does not have to accept in its entirety a normative liberal conception of sovereign power in order to appreciate that the demand for a factual accounting for the decision on the exception, and institutional checks upon the totalization of the space of exception, can nonetheless - at least in certain instances - be effective. Indeed, one could go further and suggest that a liberal theory of sovereign power understands full well the paradoxical relation between law and fact, norm and exception; and, precisely in light of such an understanding constructs an institutional system that cannot resolve the paradox but nonetheless attempts to prevent it from reaching an intensified and catastrophic conclusion. Given that Agamben is a nuanced and fair-minded thinker, one must wonder about why he largely ignores such a system. We think that one possible answer is that, just as for Agamben the source of the problem is not the institutional operation of sovereign power, but its object - bare life - so too the solution is not a proliferation of institutional safeguards but a rethinking of that mode of being. In this regard, we find his concluding musings on Heidegger to be suggestive.

AT AGAMBEN: UNVERIFIABLE

**Agamben's methodology is flawed—his argument is a giant assertion with no proof.**

Lewis, 99 (Stephen, "Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Review)", *Modernism/Modernity* 6.3, p. 165, Project MUSE, Humanities Professor at Chicago.)

There are a number of objections one could raise to specific aspects of the book, particularly its premise that concepts such as "sovereign power" and "bare life" describe realities that remain more or less constant over twenty-four centuries of history. I will focus here, however, on what I think is the most fundamentally objectionable aspect of the book: its methodology, or the set of assumptions about what constitutes a good argument that governs its "historico-philosophical" approach to its subject matter. The best way to demonstrate these assumptions is by considering Agamben's adoption of the term "biopolitics." He takes up the term from Michel Foucault with the intent of moving beyond Foucault's thinking of the "double bind" exerted upon the political subject by, on the one hand, "subjective technologies" and, on the other, "political technologies" (5-6). Agamben's claim is that his approach to biopolitics clarifies the precise nature of this "point at which the voluntary servitude of individuals comes into contact with objective power" because he grounds it in an analysis of the juridico-institutional structure of sovereign power, a realm of political reality that Foucault refused to take seriously (119). Agamben's rhetoric when explaining why Foucault did not see the structural nature of modern power in the more complete and illuminating way that Agamben does is interesting. For Agamben, any failings in Foucault's thinking arise not from a problem with Foucault's methods of research or from deficits in his command of evidence, but, rather, from the assumption that Foucault could not have thought otherwise than as he did because he was thinking at the very limits then of Western thought. The "blind spot" in the "double bind" Foucault locates constitutes, says Agamben, "something like a vanishing point that the different perspectival lines of Foucault's inquiry (and, more generally, of the entire Western reflection on power) converge toward without reaching" (6). Unfortunately, yet perhaps unsurprisingly, Agamben intimates that he, too, is thinking at the very limits of current thought (presumably he finds himself able to think beyond Foucault's horizon because he is alive and thinking now, after Foucault). Agamben's use of what Thomas Pavel has called the "rhetoric of the end" calls attention to the problems that occur when a book is structured by apocalyptic claims about the end (and thus the inaccessibility) of certain modes of being or of thought rather than by empirically or historiographically grounded argument. <sup>2</sup> There is nothing inherently objectionable about claiming that the end of a certain era has occurred; the point is simply that, to my mind, the reader ought to be able to decide from evidence-based argumentation whether the claim is reasonable. <sup>3</sup> Agamben says that his intent in describing the hidden connection between totalitarianism and democracy on an "historico-philosophical" plane rather than through detailed historiographical inquiry is not to "[level] the enormous differences that characterize [the] history and [. . .] rivalry" of democracy and totalitarianism (10). Instead, his intent is to make the structure of this hidden connection known so that it can one day be surpassed through a new form of politics. The problem, however, is that the rhetoric of the end he employs in lieu of historiographical argument prevents him from saying precisely what this new form of politics could be and thus makes its attainment seem mysteriously difficult. Indeed Agamben tends to fall back on impossible-to-prove categorical assertions rather than reasonable explanations when he tells why, for instance, the categories of classical politics, or, alternatively, religion-based ethical systems, cannot be "returned to" in any sense. Functioning hand-in-hand with such categorical assertions about the inaccessibility of the past are equally unsupported gestures towards a future politics articulated in what reads at times like a language of secularized apophatism, which in the present book Agamben tends to employ in conjunction with discussions of Benjamin's messianism.

AT AGAMBEN: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Agamben's alternative is utopian and impossible.**

**Cmiel, 96** (Kenneth, "The Fate of the Nation and the Withering of the State", *American Literary History*, Spring, p. 196, JSTOR, Professor of Cultural History at Iowa)

If community cannot be a closed thing, if it is forever open to the potentially new, then the dream of a national community is simply impossible. In Agamben's community, the idea of some- thing being "un-American" makes no sense, for there is no defining essence in a "whatever singularity." Yet Agamben is also aware that capitalism and the state will continue. Indeed, he recognizes that after the fall of Communism they are sweeping the globe. Politics, in the future, Agamben argues, will not be community building but the perpetual project of communities against the state" a struggle between the State and the non-state (humanity), an insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State organization" (84). I doubt Agamben's new community is actually coming. It remains far from clear that communities without identities are emerging anywhere except in the febrile imaginations of a few philosophers. It is not that I dislike the dream. It is for me the most attractive dream there is. It is that I am skeptical that such "whatever singularities" are possible on more than the level of personal behavior. Politics is too clunky for such subtlety. Even the new social movements seem far more down-to-earth and prone to defining themselves than Agamben's theorizing. Politics, alas, demands more leaden language. Still, the image of the state fighting communities is one worth pondering. Its distance from earlier welfare state thinking could not be more dramatic. Instead of the state embodying the will of the nation we have a picture of numerous communities at war with the state. It is, and I say this with no relish, a far more plausible picture of our emerging politics than Walzer's happy pluralism. Just think of insurance companies, Perotistas, and gay and lesbian activists-all communities distrustful of the states all committed to struggling with the state. Agamben does not ask what this perpetual warfare will do to government. Like Walzer, he assumes that the state will trudge on as before. Yet if this warfare between humanity and the state is constant, is it not plausible to surmise that hostility to the state will become permanent?

AT AGAMBEN: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Agamben's criticism does nothing—it is totalizing, empirically false—we must make reforms to solve.**

**Daly, 04** (Frances, Australian National University, "The Non-citizen and the Concept of Human Rights", *borderlands*, Research Fellow in Philosophy, [http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1\\_2004/daly\\_noncitizen.htm](http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm))

It is always possible to suppose that a self-fashioned potentiality is simply available to us, and in some senses it is, but not because a type of theory merely posits the social and the historical as completely open to our manipulation or 'perforation'. Likewise, we cannot merely assume that changing 'forms of life' necessarily amount to types of refusal. Such a claim would only make sense if it were put forward on the basis of an appreciation of an impulse to freedom from particular types of constraint and oppression. It would also require a sense of how this impulse takes place within a variety of conditions, some of which might be easily altered and some of which might not. In the absence of an engaged sense of what this impulse means, and of the context in which elements of freedom and unfreedom do battle, it is impossible to speculate on the nature of the subjectivity or potentiality which might be emerging or which might be in stages of decomposition. Agamben merely presumes that a strategy by which we all identify as refugees will renew a politics and thereby end the current plight of the refugee, as if no other reality impinges on this identification. This is also assumed on the basis that the State – in Agamben's theorizing, the abstraction of an all-encompassing, leviathan State – is equally, readily and easily liable to perforation. This contradiction is indicative of a wider problem where what we encounter is a form of critique that is oddly inappropriate to the type of issue it addresses. 29. Much can be said in criticism of the doctrine of right, of the limited nature of the understanding of freedom and rights in documents on rights, of the assumption of the place of citizen rights as the locus of the fundamental rights of the human, and most significantly, the absence of any sense of the undetermined nature of what being might mean. But what must be stated, I feel, is that it would be a serious impoverishment of the ethical problem that we currently face to deny any potential value of rights in carrying forth traces of an impetus towards human dignity, of the ideals of freedom and equality, and to thus reduce rights to what might be termed an absolute politics. Rights cannot be reduced to citizenship rights as if the ideas of rights and citizenship are coterminous. What most critically needs to be understood is, firstly, why values of freedom and equality have such a limited and fragile place within conditions of such inordinate legalism, and, secondly, what the absence of freedom, which the cause of human rights inevitably suggests, means for the installation of any such rights. Without such an understanding we are left with a gestural politics that contains a posture of radicalism but one which fails to connect the aspirations of those who are struggling to achieve elementary rights with a vision of a world that could accord them a degree of dignity. To acknowledge this is not to be seduced by concepts of right or law, but is rather to refuse the denial of a radical questioning of the possibilities with which a discourse presents us. Benjamin's understanding of a genuinely messianic idea is something that is "not the final end of historical progress, but rather its often failed and finally accomplished interruption" (Benjamin, 1974: 1231). We find this in values that resist exploitation and assaults upon human dignity. And it is this realm that currently requires urgent, emphatic and significant renewal.

AT AGAMBEN: NO IMPACT

**Biopolitics is an empty term that is deployed in the place of actual analysis of material conditions—their impact representations block useful criticism.**

**Virno, 02** (Paolo, University of Cosenza, 'General intellect, exodus, multitude. Interview with Paolo Virno', *Archipelago* number 54, published in English at <http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpvirno2.htm>) professor of linguistic philosophy

Agamben is a problem. Agamben is a thinker of great value but also, in my opinion, a thinker with no political vocation. Thus, when Agamben speaks of the biopolitical he has the tendency to transform it into an ontological category with value already since the archaic Roman right. And, in this, in my opinion, he is very wrong-headed. The problem is, I believe, that the biopolitical is only an effect derived from the concept of labor-power. When there is a commodity that is called labor-power it is already implicitly the government over life. Agamben says, on the other hand, that labor-power is only one of the aspects of the biopolitical; I say the contrary: over all because labor power is a paradoxical commodity because it is not a real commodity like a book or a bottle of water, but rather is simply the potential to produce. As soon as it is transformed into a commodity the potential, then, it is necessary to govern the living body that maintains this potential, that contains this potential. Toni (Negri) and Michael (Hardt), on the other hand, use biopolitics in a historically determined sense, basing it on Foucault, but Foucault spoke in few pages of the biopolitical - in relation to the birth of liberalism - but that Foucault is not a sufficient base for founding a discourse over the biopolitical and my apprehension, my fear, is that the biopolitical can be transformed into a word that hides, covers problems instead of being an instrument for confronting them. A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with the exclamation point, a word that carried the risk of blocking critical thought instead of helping it. Then, my fear is of fetish words in politics because it seems like the cries of a child that has fear of the dark..., the child that says "mama, mama!", "biopolitics, biopolitics!". I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics some times is a consolatory use, like the cry of a child, when what serves us are, in all cases, instruments of work and not propaganda words.

AT AGAMBEN: AT REFUGEE ALTERNATIVE

**Refugees are exploited and persecuted not empowered—their varied circumstances deny their usefulness as a paradigm for the alternative.**

**Daly, 04** ([http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1\\_2004/daly\\_noncitizen.htm](http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm),

The non-citizen and the concept of 'human rights', Frances Daly, Australian National University 2004).

Agamben's use of the paradigm of the refugee is, as is well known, derived from Hannah Arendt's belief that a banished European Jewish people represented "the avant-garde of their people" because they did not particularly want to be assimilated to a new identity (Arendt in Feldman, 1978: 67). Certainly, a theoretical understanding of the mass phenomenon of refugees is important because, despite the shifting and yet constant presence of the mass refugee for the last hundred years, issues of persecution and exploitation, of displacement, loss and suffering, continue to mark the lived experience of the refugee. And yet there is something problematic with this particular characterization of refugees, for there is no necessary equation between the experience of exile – for either the 'wandering Jew' or refugees today – and empowerment. And given the shifting circumstances of present-day refugees, it is also difficult to argue that the condition of exile can be taken as a wider signification of a type of enabling permanent unfulfilment that is then assumed to be the basis of an effective witnessing. Drawing out the radical consequences of phenomena such as 'exodus' and the existence of the refugee is crucial, but the context of this cannot be ignored. This is only all the more the case if the shift that Agamben would have us think possible is to take place – to a generalized acknowledgement that we are all refugees (Agamben, 1995; 119).



AT AGAMBEN: AT WHATEVER BEING ALT

**Whatever being is impossible to realize—we can only empty out the concept of rights if there is a concrete alternative.**

**Daly, 04** ([http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1\\_2004/daly\\_noncitizen.htm](http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm)).

The non-citizen and the concept of 'human rights', Frances Daly, Australian National University (2004).

What it is that we might want a human potentiality to mean is, of course, a complex, difficult and open-ended issue. But it is important for us to ask whether a human potentiality must start from emptiness. Agamben repeatedly refers to the need to begin from a place of 'amorphousness' and 'inactuality', assuming that there is something that will necessarily follow from the simple fact of human existence – but why should we assume this? What might constitute or form this potentiality is surely concerned with what is latent but as yet unrealized. For Agamben, there is nothing latent that is not already tainted by a sense of a task that must be done (Agamben, 1993: 43). There is no ability to achieve any displacement with what is present within values of community and justice, there is only an immobilizing nothingness that assumes a false essence, vocation or destiny. If the 'whatever' being that he contends is indeed emerging, and it possesses, as he argues, "an original relation to desire", it is worthwhile asking what this desire is for (Agamben, 1993: 10). If it is simply life itself, then it is not clear why this should be devoid of any content. Any process of emptying out, of erasing and abolishing, such as that which Agamben attempts, is done for a reason - it involves critique and rejection, on the basis, necessarily, that something else is preferable. But Agamben provides us with very little of what is needed to understand how we might engage with this option.

AT AGAMBEN: RIGHTS GOOD FOR REFUGEES

**The real answer to the denial of rights to refugees is to grant them rights—not to abandon the concept. Agamben is too dismissive of the political realities faced by refugees.**

**Daly, 04** ([http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1\\_2004/daly\\_noncitizen.htm](http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm)).

The non-citizen and the concept of 'human rights', Frances Daly, Australian National University (2004).

Agamben's second argument is that the existence of rights stands in contradiction to the denial of these rights to refugees, and that this is the result of the State's most fundamental contradiction – the promotion of the idea of inalienable human rights - and the failure to protect this idea when it is no longer possible to conceive of human rights as rights of a citizen (Agamben, 2000: 20). This contradiction is not, for him, something inherent within the State itself, but is the outcome of the existence of rights in a world in which they are not granted equally (Agamben, 2000: 21). What we are not then given is an examination of what it is about this world that gives rise to these inequalities. Being told that contemporary existence is completely spectacularized does not provide us with sufficient insight to know why some refugees are denied rights, or why proclamations on rights do not always lead to their enactment. Agamben's analysis of rights is too cursory and dismissive for us to be able to draw any relation between his critique of alienation and his understanding of the place of the refugee. As a result, any basis for seeing within rights concerns for what it might mean to be human or for what community might entail, is discarded. For example, Agamben discerns an ambiguity within the 1789 Declaration on the Rights of Man and of the Citizen because it is not possible to know whether the different rights mentioned – those of 'man' and those of 'the citizen' - refer to two distinct realities or are somehow subsumed within each other (Agamben, 1995: 116). But with this he both discerns an ambiguity and then neutralizes the tension underpinning its significance, by inferring from it that humans are reduced to 'bare life' in the State through the very existence of principles of freedom and equal respect. We are then led by him to conclude that this ambiguity is in fact the occlusion of human potentiality from rights. A number of problems could be raised with this dismissal of ambiguity. Why, for example, should we not view this problem as the real asymmetry that ambiguity entails, an ambiguity which might, under different circumstances, animate rather than annihilate a sense of being human? It is surely up to us to claim a complex sense of humanity or being human within rights, and there would seem to be some basis for this via the unresolved tensions and incompletions that the affirmations of equality and liberty signify. Might we not consider, then, that rather than the problem being that rights continue to fail our expectations or attempted realizations, it is perhaps us who have not yet arrived at a place where we might answer the appeal set down by the 'liberty, equality, fraternity' impulse of natural rights?

**\*\*BADIOU\*\***

**AT BADIOU: ETHICS GOOD**

**Badiou's concept of ethics fails because it is impossible to make qualitative distinctions between different sorts of evil—leading to absurd results.**

**Brown, 04** (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

This apparatus is a powerful lens, and there can be no doubt that Badiou is describing something important; perhaps it is even an aspect of evil. But is it really Evil (Mal) itself? Badiou's evil, like his truth, is indifferent to content, a merely formal label. In its formalism, its insistence on fidelity to any Event whatever—on "ethical consistency" itself as a value—Badiou's good is almost an aesthetic rather than an ethical category. (At one point, in an echo of Kant's purposeless purpose, ethical consistency is even described as "disinterested interest.") While there is something undeniably attractive in ethical consistency (and something ugly in its lack), the most important thing for a modern ethics may be to push these sentimental considerations aside. The value of ethical consistency is authorized by Lacan's well-known dictum not to give up on one's desire [ne pas céder sur son désir]. But we should not forget that this maxim derives from the reading of Antigone in Séminaire VII. Yes, Sophocles' Antigone, in her awful ethical consistency, is a captivating figure. Brecht's Galileo, on the other hand, in his opportunism and wavering inconsistency, is a bit distasteful. But Antigone is a reactionary, and Galileo invents physics. Further, Badiou has no way of sorting out different evils beyond his tripartite division. Ethics tells us what Nazism and scientific obscurantism have in common. But an ethics would have to be able to tell them apart. The distinction between, say, the abandonment of a social movement by its leader and the abandonment of a poem by its author cannot be made without some kind of qualitative supplement. Since, as we shall see, Badiou's philosophy is predicated precisely on the subtraction from consideration of all qualitative predicates, this supplement can only be vulgar, non-philosophical. Perhaps the supplement it requires is the language of human rights, which, whatever its faults, can tell the difference between a concentration camp and a creationist textbook.

AT BADIOU: POLITICS FAIL

**Badiou is not politically useful because his alternative is too vague—he says that the event side steps the state but any alternative politics must be able to reform the state to succeed.**

**Brown, 04** (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

Badiou's ontology cannot usefully displace the dialectic. Because the Event must descend like a grace, Badiou's ontology can only describe situations and never History. Since the event emerges from outside of the state of the situation, it is rigorously untheorizable: as we saw above, it is theorized as untheorizable. Despite every protestation to the contrary, Badiou's system cannot address the question "What is to be done?" because the only thing to do is to wait for the Event. What happens when the precipitation of the Event is precisely what needs to be done? Yes, we can be faithful to a previous event, as Badiou says Lenin was to the Paris Commune. But surely this solution mitigates the power of the Event as the irruption of the void into this situation. The dialectic, on the other hand, conceives the void as immanent contradiction. While both contradiction and void are immanent to the situation, contradiction has the tremendous advantage of having movement built in, as it were: the Event does not appear out of an immanent nowhere, but is already fully present in itself in the situation, which it explodes in the movement to for-itself. Meanwhile, the question of the dialectic leads us back to the twofold meaning of "state": both the law and order that govern knowledge, and law and order in the everyday sense. This identification authorizes Badiou's antistatism, forcefully reflected in his own political commitment, the Organisation Politique (whose members do not vote), which has made limited [End Page 306] but effective interventions into the status of immigrant workers. In Badiou's system, nothing can happen within the state of a situation; innovation can only emerge from an evental site, constitutively excluded from the state. But can a principled indifference to the state ground a politics? The state surely has the function of suppressing the anarchic possibilities inherent in the (national) situation. But it can also suppress the possibilities exploited by an anarchic capitalism. It is well known that the current rightist "small-government" movement is an assault on the class compromise represented by the Keynesian state. To be sure, one should be suspicious of that compromise and what it excluded. But it also protected workers against some of capitalism's more baleful effects. As with Ethics, Badiou is certainly describing something: the utopian moment of a total break with the state may be a part of any genuine political transformation. But, unless we are talking about the sad old interplay of transgression and limit—which posited the state as basically permanent, with transgression as its permanent suspension—this anarchic moment says nothing about the new state of affairs that will ultimately be imposed on the generic set it constructs. Surely the configuration of that state will be paramount—in which case state power has to be fought for, not merely evaded.

AT BADIOU: POLITICS FAIL

**Badiou's system fails—he has no way to overcome the enormous power he attributes to capitalism.**

**Brown, 04** (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

But what is strange is the vehemence with which Badiou maintains his distance from the economic—from what classical Marxism called the "base," the elements of a situation that pertain to its own reproduction. It is perfectly orthodox to say that there can be no purely economic intervention in the economy: even with the best intentions, the World Bank could not solve the problem of Third World poverty. However, in Badiou's system the economy is not merely reduced to one aspect among many, but actively dismissed from consideration. Material reproduction is reduced to the sneering Lacanian contempt for "le service des biens," the servicing of goods which pertains to the human animal beneath good and evil. Why should Badiou fully endorse Marx's analysis of the world economy ("there is no need for a revision of Marxism itself," [Ethics, 97]) while keeping Marx's entire problematic at arm's length? In fact, capitalism is the point of impasse in Badiou's own system, the problem which cannot be actively thought without grave danger to the system as a whole. Capital's great power, the tremendous ease with which it colonizes (geographic, cultural, psychic) territory, is precisely that it seizes situations at their evental site. In their paraphrase of a brilliant but much-maligned passage in Marx's Grundrisse, Deleuze and Guattari insist that "capitalism has haunted all forms of society, but it haunts them as their terrifying nightmare, it is the dread they feel of a flow that would elude their codes."<sup>2</sup> Is this flow that eludes every society's codes not identical with generic multiplicity, the void which, eluding every representation, nonetheless haunts every situation? Does not capitalism make its entry at a society's point of impasse—social relations already haunted by variously dissimulated exploitation—and revolutionize them into the capital-labor relation? A safely non-Orientalist version of this would be the eruption from modernist art's evental site—the art market, which belonged to the situation of modernism while being excluded from its represented state—of what we might call the "Warhol-event," which inaugurates the transition from the formal to the real subsumption of (artistic) labor under Capital. It makes perfect sense to say that this transition is the truth of the [End Page 308] Warhol-event. As we saw earlier, the real subsumption of labor under Capital, the conversion of every relation into a monetary relation, is the origin of formal equality: that is, the foundation of universalism. And far from pertaining to mere animal life beneath the level of the truth-procedure, capitalism itself fits perfectly the form of the revolutionary Event. It would then appear that capitalism is, like religion, eliminated from the art-politics-science-love series only by fiat. And why is this? Because the economic, the "servicing of goods," cannot enter Badiou's system without immediately assuming the status of a cause. Excluded from direct consideration, capitalism as a condition of set theory is perfectly innocuous; its preconditional status belongs to a different order than what it conditions. It opens up a mode of presentation, but what is presented existed all along: look at Paul, for example. But included as the product of a truth-procedure, capitalism immediately appears as the basis for all the others: it is, in fact, the revolutionary irruption of Capital (in whatever society) that conditions any modern process of science, art, love, or politics. If Badiou's system were to consider capitalism directly, some elements, those pertaining to the "base," would appear to have more weight than others—the "superstructure." The effects of such an inclusion of capitalism in Badiou's system—an inclusion which nothing prevents—would be catastrophic. Radical universality (as opposed to the historically conditioned universality imposed by the emergence of capitalism) would become unthinkable. The "eternity" of truth would yield to historicism.

**AT BADIOU: POLITICS FAIL**

**Unfortunately for Badiou, his great enemy of capitalism fits perfectly within what he considers a truth event—the alternative merely re-creates the status quo.**

**Brown, 04** (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

Badiou cannot think Capital precisely because Capital has already thought Badiou. And let's face it: despite Badiou's inspiring presentation, nothing is more native to capitalism than his basic narrative matrix. The violent seizure of the subject by an idea, fidelity to it in the absence of any guarantee, and ultimate transformation of the state of the situation: these are the elements of the narrative of entrepreneurial risk, "revolutionary innovation," the "transformation of the industry," and so on. In pushing away material reproduction, Badiou merely adapts this narrative to the needs of intellectuals, who, in Badiou's conception, have a monopoly over much of the field of truth.

**Failure to cope with the power of capitalism dooms any ethical system to failure.**

**Brown, 04** (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

The problem with this ethics—as Brecht showed us, with ethics in general—is that, under capitalism, the only fully consistent ethical position is ruthless self-interest. There is no ethical position that is both minimally compassionate and fully ethically consistent. Mauler in Saint Joan is doomed to make money from all of his generous impulses; the good woman of Szechwan can only help her neighbors by taking advantage of them. In fact, this split constitutes part of capitalism's dynamism. The ideological force of capitalism is that so many people are given a subjective interest in maintaining the stability of capitalism, even if this interest involves competing with neighbors who share an "objective" interest in ending it. Any "opting out" is at present simply quixotic, and only possible on the basis of substantial privilege. Plainly, professors want tenured positions, for the same reason the unemployed want jobs: because they exist. (As for playing the stock market, this criticism buys neoliberal rhetoric hook, line, and sinker: most academics who "play the stock market" do so because universities, like many other U.S. employers, have shifted the burden of risk from their own retirement systems onto the individual employees.)

AT BADIOU: PERMUTATION

**The state and the revolutionary political subject can cooperate in Badiou's conception of the alternative.**

**Hallward, 03** (*Badiou: a subject to truth*, Peter Hallward, University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis / London 2003, Professor of Modern European Philosophy, Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, Middlesex Univeristy).

We know that Badiou's early and unequivocally hostile attitude to the state has considerably evolved. Just how far it has evolved remains a little unclear. His conception of politics remains resolutely anticonsensual, anti-“re-presentative,” and thus antidemocratic (in the ordinary sense of the word). Democracy has become the central ideological category of the neo-liberal status quo, and any genuine “philosophy today is above all something that enables people to have done with the 'democratic' submission to the world as it is.” 66 But he seems more willing, now, to engage with this submission on its own terms. La Distance politique again offers the most precise points de repère. On the one hand, the OP remains suspicious of any political campaign—for instance, an electoral contest or petition movement—that operates as a “prisoner of the parliamentary space.” 67 It remains “an absolute necessity [of politics] not to have the state as norm. The separation of politics and state is foundational of politics.” On the other hand, however, it is now equally clear that “their separation need not lead to the banishment of the state from the field of political thought.” 68 The OP now conceives itself in a tense, nondialectical “vis-à-vis” with the state, a stance that rejects an intimate cooperation (in the interests of capital) as much as it refuses “any antagonistic conception of their operation—a conception that smacks of classism.” There is no more choice to be made between the state and revolution; the “vis-à-vis demands the presence of the two terms and not the annihilation of one of the two.” 69



**AT BADIOU: ALTERNATIVE UNWORKABLE AND COMMUNIST**

**Badiou's alternative of radical egalitarianism is unworkable and is based on a failed model of communism.**

**Hallward, 03** (*Badiou: a subject to truth*, Peter Hallward, University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis / London 2003, Professor of Modern European Philosophy, Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, Middlesex Univeristy).

Badiou's politics have always been about “collective emancipation, or the problem of the reign of liberty in infinite situations” (DO, 54; cf. TC, 60). His political goals have remained consistent over the years, since “every historical event is communist, to the degree that 'communist' designates the transtemporal subjectivity of emancipation, the egalitarian passion, the Idea of justice, the will to break with the compromises of the service des biens, the deposition of egoism, an intolerance of oppression, the wish to impose a withering away of the state. The absolute preeminence of multiple presentation over representation.” 84 What has changed is communism's mode of existence. In Badiou's earlier work, the practical (if ultimately unattainable) goal was always to effect the actual, historical achievement of stateless community. Today, in order to preserve politics' “intrinsic relation to truth” (DO, 48), Badiou has had to let go of almost any sort of political engagement with the economic and the social. He continues to declare a wholly egalitarian politics, but as reserved for a strictly subjective plane. The unqualified justice of a generic communism, first proposed in Marx's 1844 Manuscripts and conceived in Badiou's own terms as the advent of “pure presentation, ” as the “undivided authority of the infinite, or the advent of the collective as such” (AM, 91), remains the only valid subjective norm for Badiou's political thought. This subjective norm has become ever more distant, however, from the day-to-day business of “objective” politics: the programmatic pursuit of the generic ideal is itself now dismissed as a “Romantic” dream leading to “fraternity terror” (AM, 101).

**\*\*BATAILLE\*\***

AT BATAILLE: THEORY OF EXPENDITURE BAD

**Bataille's theory of expenditure doesn't apply to postmodern consumer capitalism, which is based on massive amounts of consumption and waste – exactly what Bataille advocates.**

**Yang 2000** (Mayfair Mei-hui, Professor of Anthropology at the University of California Santa Barbara, has held fellowships at the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of Michigan, the Chicago Humanities Institute, University of Chicago, and the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, "Putting Global Capitalism in Its Place: Economic Hybridity, Bataille, and Ritual Expenditure," Current Anthropology, University of Chicago Journals)

Scholars such as Jean- Joseph Goux (1998) have pointed to a troubling overlap between Bataille's views on luxury and sacrificial expenditure and postmodern consumer capitalism. Consumer capitalism is also predicated on massive consumption and waste rather than on the thrift, asceticism, and accumulation against which Bataille directed his theory of expenditure. It exhibits potlatch features in the tendency for businesses to give goods away in the hope that "supply creates its own demand"; it collapses the distinction between luxury and useful goods and between need and desire (Goux 1998). Unlike modernist capitalism, postmodern consumer capitalism is driven by consumption rather than production. Thus, Bataille's vision of the ritual destruction of wealth as defying the principles of accumulative and productive capitalism does not address this different phase of consumer capitalism, whose contours have only become clear since his death in 1962. It seems to me that despite their overt similarities, the principles of ritual consumption and those of consumer capitalism are basically incompatible. If Bataille had addressed our consumer society today, he would have said that this sort of consumption is still in the service of production and productive accumulation, since every act of consumption in the world of leisure, entertainment, media, fashion, and home décor merely feeds back into the growth of the economy rather than leading to the finality and loss of truly nonproductive expenditure. Even much of modern warfare is no longer truly destructive but tied into the furthering of military- industrial production. Nor, despite its economic excesses, does our consumer culture today challenge the basic economic logic of rational private accumulation as a self- depleting archaic sacrificial economy does.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, capitalist consumption is very much an *individual* consumption rather than one involving the whole community or social order.

AT BATAILLE: NO LINK TO MODERN CAPITALISM

**Bataille doesn't apply to modern capitalism, which is already based on excessive consumption and desire.**

**Goux et al 90** (Jean-Joseph, the Lawrence Favrot professor of French and chair of French studies at Rice University, Kathryn Ascheim, PhD and editor of *Nature Biotech*, Rhonda Garelick, taught at Yale, University of Colorado at Boulder, and Columbia, critic of literature and politics, PhD in comparative literature, "General Economics and Postmodern Capitalism," Yale French Studies No. 78 On Bataille, pp. 206-224)

Where do we situate Bataille's claim? What happens to the demand of the sacred in capitalist society? How do we reconcile the affirmation that capitalism represents an unprecedented break with all archaic [precapitalist] forms of expenditure and the postulate of the necessary universality of spending as pure loss? This is the difficulty Bataille wants to maintain as a general anthropological principle the necessity of unproductive expenditure while simultaneously upholding the historic singularity of capitalism with regard to this expenditure. Bourgeois society corresponds to a "general atrophy of former sumptuary processes" (41). An anomaly whereby loss is not absent (which would contradict the general principle) but virtually unreadable: "Today, the great and free social forms of unproductive expenditure have disappeared. Nevertheless, we should not conclude from this that the very principle of expenditure is no longer situated at the end of economic activity" (37). So what happens to ostentatious expenditure in capitalism? And can we really believe, furthermore, that the even more radical desacralization effected by communism could become a libertarian affirmation of sovereignty – the feast of self-consciousness, without divinities and myths? Everything suggests that Bataille was unable to articulate the mystical tension toward sovereign self-consciousness "without form and mode," "pure expenditure" (224) with a utopia of social life that would make it possible, nor to explain in a *developed* capitalist society the consumption of the surplus beyond its reinvestment in production. Now it is quite clear that today's capitalism has come a long way from the Calvinist ethic that presided at its beginning. The values of thrift, sobriety, and asceticism no longer have the place that they held when Balzac could caricature the dominant bourgeois mentality with the characters of père Grandet or the usurer Gobseck. It is doubtful that the spirit of capitalism, which according to Weber is expressed with an almost classical purity in Benjamin Franklin's principles ["he who kills a five shilling coin assassinates all that it could have produced: entire stacks of sterling pounds"] [cited by Bataille, 163], could today be considered the spirit of the times. Undoubtedly, the pace at which all residual sacred elements inherited from feudalism are eliminated has quickened. but hasn't contemporary society undergone a transformation of the ethic of consumption, desire, and pleasure that renders the classical [Weberian] analyses of the spirit of capitalism [to which Bataille subscribes] inadequate? If the great opposition between the sacred and the profane no longer structures social life, if communal, sacrificial, and glorious expenditure has been replaced by private expenditure, it is no less true that advanced capitalism seems to exceed the principle of restricted economy and utility that presided at its beginning. No society has "wasted" as much as contemporary capitalism. What is the form of this waste, of this excess?

AT BATAILLE: NO ALT SOLVENCY

**Bataille believes human sacrifice is the ultimate form transgression- this proves his alt is awful.**

**Pavlovski 2005** (Linda, editor for the database Enotes and of multiple academic collections, "Bataille, Georges: Introduction," *Twentieth-Century Literary Criticism*, <http://www.enotes.com/twentieth-century-criticism/bataille-georges>)

Bataille sought "sovereignty" through loss of self, which is achieved through transgression and excess, notably through laughter, religious ecstasy, sacrifice, eroticism, death, and poetry. Considering human sacrifice the ultimate transgression, Bataille was fascinated by religious feast days that included rites of sacrifice. This fascination led Bataille to the work of the anthropologist Marcel Mauss and to a particular interest in the cultures of the Aztecs and North American Indians. In their use of human sacrifice and potlatch, respectively, Bataille saw an excessive, generous spirit which he admired. As a direct result of this, Bataille wrote an unconventional theory of economics that promoted waste and excess, rather than acquisition. Believing that transgression existed beyond mere words, Bataille constantly battled with the problem of writing the inexpressible.

**Bataille's reasoning justifies atrocities and death.**

**Boldt-Irons, 2000** (Leslie Anne, Associate Professor of French at *Brock University*, "*Military discipline and revolutionary exaltation: the dismantling of 'l'illusion lyrique' in Malraux's L'Espoir and Bataille's Le Bleu du Ciel,*" *Romantic Review*, vol. 91 issue 4, p. 481)

In 1933, Bataille contributed a review of André Malraux's novel *La Condition humaine* to the ultra left-wing journal *La Critique sociale*.<sup>1</sup> In this article, Bataille questions the place that revolution occupies in the larger and more general context of "human agitation." He asks, for example, whether the convulsive movements of revolt, social upheaval, and revolution should be situated outside of, or above, what is normally experienced as life in its quotidian expressions of tenderness, enthusiasm or even hate. In the name of what authority, for example, might one be justified in placing the fascination with pleasure, torture and possible death outside the limits of acceptable social practice – extreme states often linked to revolutionary upheaval outside the limits of acceptable social practice? Another way of situating the convulsion of revolutionary movements – an approach clearly endorsed by Bataille – is to place it squarely within the framework of any activity marked by agitation. From this perspective, the acts of torture and murder would arise from an excitability or arousal similar in nature to that intensifying the fury of the revolutionary impulse. This impulse, writes Bataille, is a means by which the proletariat – who had for a long time been deprived of the possibility of attributing any value to suffering and to life – is able to gain access to value itself, a value linked to states of excitation unsubordinated to any simple political means or end. This value, and the state of agitation to which it is linked, gives the proletariat both life and hope, for which even death in all its atrocity might be the payment required.

AT BATAILLE: FASCIST

**Bataille celebrates and glorifies war for war's sake—his ideas are the foundation of fascism.**

**Wolin, 2006** (Richard, Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center, "Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology" Constellations vol. 2 issue 3, pp. 397-428)

In the worldview of both Bataille and that of German young conservatives, war plays an essential, positive role. It serves as a means of dissolving the *principium individuationis*: the principle of a bourgeois subjectivity, on which the homogenous order of society - a world of loneliness and fragmentation - depends. For, according to Bataille, "the general movement of life is... accomplished beyond the demands of individuals."<sup>32</sup> It is in precisely this spirit that he celebrates the non-utilitarian nature of "combat" or "war" as a type of aestheticist end in itself: "Glory...expresses a movement of senseless frenzy, of measureless expenditure of energy, which the fervor of combat presupposes. Combat is glorious in that it is always beyond calculation at some moment."<sup>33</sup> For the same reasons, Bataille eulogizes those premodern "warrior societies in which pure, uncalculated violence and ostentatious forms of combat held sway."<sup>34</sup> For under such conditions, war was not made subservient to the vulgar ends of enterprise and accumulation, as is the case for modern-day imperialism, but served as a glorious end in itself. Yet in the early 1930s, it was precisely this aestheticist celebration of "violence for violence's sake," or "war for war's sake," that Benjamin viewed as the essence of modern fascism. As he remarks in a well known passage: "*Fiat ars - pereat mundus,*" says fascism, and, as Marinetti admits, expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a sense perception that has been changed by technology...Mankind, which in Homer's time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which fascism is rendering aesthetic."<sup>35</sup> In Bataille's thought war serves as the harbinger of a cultural transfiguration in which the primacy of self-subsistent subjectivity would be replaced by the values of an "unavowable" or "ecstatic community": that is, a community that would no longer be governed by the goals of a "visual culture" - transparency, self-identity, etc. - but instead, those of self-laceration, difference, and finitude. In fact this Bataille-inspired program of an ecstatic community has been quite explicitly carried forth and explored in the political writings of Maurice Blanchot (*La Communauté inavouable*; 1983) and Jean-Luc Nancy (*La Communauté desœuvree*; 1985).

**Bataille's philosophy emphasizes the destruction of war and conflict**

**Wolin, 2006** (Richard, Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center, "Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology" Constellations vol. 2 issue 3, pp. 397-428)

Moreover, the cultural attitudes of both Spengler and Bataille are linked by an aesthetics of violence that is highly characteristic of the "front generation." In a key passage in *The Decline of the West*, Spengler, depicting the "life-world" of blood and instinct that had been repressed by the Faustian spirit of modernity, observes: "War is the primary politics of everything that lives and so much so that in the depths battle and life are one, and being will-to-battle expire together."<sup>28</sup> Similarly, for Junger, "War is an intoxication beyond all bonds. It is a frenzy without cautions and limits comparable only to the forces of nature."<sup>29</sup> Bataille (the meaning of his name in French should be recalled), too, is convinced that "conflict is life. Man's value depends on his aggressive strength. A living man regards death as the fulfillment of life; he does not see it as misfortune. ...I MYSELF AM WAR."<sup>30</sup> As Jay observes in this connection: "on a deeper level, the war [World War I] seems to have exercised a certain positive fascination [on Bataille]. For it is striking that many of Bataille's obsessive themes would betray an affinity for the experiences of degradation, pollution, violence, and communal bonding that were characteristic of life in the trenches."

<b>AT BATAILLE: FASCIST</b>
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**Bataille was an admirer of fascism and believed it was the noblest form of political rule.**

**Wolin, 06** (Richard, Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center, "Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology" Constellations vol. 2 issue 3, pp. 397-428)

Here, the analysis must begin with an examination of Bataille's essay, "The Psychological Structure of Fascism," often rightly hailed as a theoretical breakthrough in our understanding of the mass psychological appeal of modern authoritarian rule. Yet, the essay also contains a barely veiled admiration for the vitality and energy of the existing fascist states, especially when contrasted with the decadence and inertia of the contemporary European democracies. Bataille purveys a critique of parliamentarianism that is as zealous as anything one finds in the work of Carl Schmitt. Parliamentary decision-making, he claims, partakes wholly of the order of the homogenous. It aims solely at co-optation, the elimination of difference. As such, it is purely instrumental and serves primarily to suppress the breakthrough of heterogeneous elements that threaten to explode the normative bases of the given economic and political order. As Bataille observes, in a striking anticipation of Jean-Francois Lyotard's association of "consensus" and "terror": "The reduction of differences in parliamentary practice indicates all the possible complexity of the internal activity of adaptation required by *homogeneity*."<sup>60</sup>

Bataille can perceive no fundamental differences between the conduct of political and economic life in modern democratic societies, insofar as both are examples *par excellence* of homogeneity – this despite the fact that discussion aims at mutual understanding, whereas economic activity is goal-oriented and utilitarian. Given this curt dismissal of the institutional bases of democracy, it comes as little surprise that Bataille glorifies the role played by fascism in modern political life as a type of breakthrough of the heterogeneous. For Bataille, "the fascist leaders are incontestably part of heterogeneous existence. Opposed to democratic politicians, who represent in different countries the platitude inherent to *homogeneous* society, Mussolini and Hitler immediately stand out as something *other*."<sup>62</sup> What he admires about these men and the movement they represent is that they embody "a force that situates them above other men," which accounts for their "sovereignty." Yet, he also esteems greatly their thoroughgoing antagonism to law: "the fact that laws are broken is only the most obvious sign of the transcendent, *heterogeneous* nature of fascist action."<sup>63</sup>

Here, the parallels with Schmitt's critique of bourgeois legal positivism are of course profound. Both Schmitt and Bataille view the institution of law as the consummate embodiment of the spirit of bourgeois rationalism. It symbolizes everything they detest about the reigning social order: its prosaic longing for security, its unrevolutionary nature, its abhorrence of "transcendence," its anathematization of the vitality and intensity one finds in the "exception" (Schmitt) or "transgression" (Bataille). Moreover, for Bataille the system of law merits especially harsh treatment insofar as it signifies a type consecration of the profane order of things, as such, it stands as an impediment to contact with the heterogeneous or the sacred. Bataille concludes his endorsement of fascist politics with the following encomium: "*Heterogeneous* fascist action belongs to the entire set of higher forms. It makes an appeal to sentiments traditionally defined as *exalted* and *noble* and tends to constitute authority as an unconditional principle situated above any utilitarian judgment." As opposed to the bourgeois order of life, which, with its utilitarianism and its legalism, merely sanctifies "the prose of the world," fascism offers a new political aesthetic, the return, as it were, of an *aesthetic politics*: a type of politics that reintroduces the long lost elements of charismatic leadership (in Bataille's terms, "sovereignty"), violence, and martial glory. It is, moreover, a politics that facilitates a great emotional cathexis between leaders and masses, a point which Bataille emphasizes repeatedly. For one of fascism's great attributes is that it "clearly demonstrates what can be expected from a timely recourse to reawakened affective forces" – forces capable of guaranteeing a measure of *collective solidarity*, which have been banished from a society in which the division of labor and rationalization reign supreme. In sum, fascism serves to reintroduce a type of *ecstatic politics* into the forlorn and disenchanting landscape of political modernity, a politics that aims at the creation of a quasi-Nietzschean *ecstatic community*.

AT BATAILLE: FASCIST

**The sacrificial practices Bataille celebrates sustain existing power relations.**

**Wolin, 2006** (Richard, Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center, “Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology” Constellations vol. 2 issue 3, pp. 397-428)

Yet, in his celebratory discussions of sacrifice, potlach, and so forth, Bataille fundamentally misconstrues the historical and contextual parameters of such ritual practices. One could even go so far as to say that, in a certain measure, Bataille’s understanding of these phenomena succumbs to a type of “primitivism”: he decontextualizes the cultural practices he analyzes in order the better to incorporate them within his own theoretical agenda of his own critique of modernity. Here, Bataille seeks nothing less than “an anthropology that will itself provide a living – and orgiastic – myth to overturn, through its experience on a collective level, ‘modern’ sterile bourgeois society.”<sup>51</sup> Bataille chooses to view sacrifice and gift-giving in the first instance as gratuitous, non-utilitarian, or, as he puts it, “having no ends beyond themselves” – but this is far from the case. While he is correct in characterizing such practices as related to the production of wealth, they are very much oriented toward the reproduction of existing relations of power. The act of human sacrifice as practiced among the Aztecs redounds to the credit of the sacrificer(s): it reinforces existing relations of authority, viz., the authority of those who are empowered to commission a sacrifice (in this case, the priests and aristocracy). It provides those in authority with a quasi-divine power to preside over life and death. In this sense, it is misleading to claim that sacrifice has no end beyond itself.



**AT BATAILLE: ENERGY IS FINITE**

**Bataille is wrong - the world's supply of energy and resources is finite and is being consumed rapidly now, risking extinction.**

**Tverberg, 07** (Gail E., fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society and a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries, writes for Contingency magazine and TheOilDrum.com, "Our world is finite: Is this a problem?" Energy Bulletin/Our Finite World, <http://www.energybulletin.net/node/29117>)

We all know the world is finite. The number of atoms is finite, and these atoms combine to form a finite number of molecules. The mix of molecules may change over time, but in total, the number of molecules is also finite.

We also know that growth is central to our way of life. Businesses are expected to grow. Every day new businesses are formed and new products are developed. The world population is also growing, so all this adds up to a huge utilization of resources. At some point, growth in resource utilization must collide with the fact that the world is finite. We have grown up thinking that the world is so large that limits will never be an issue. But now, we are starting to bump up against limits. Where are we reaching earth's limits? 1. Oil Oil is a finite resource, since it is no longer being formed. Oil production in a given area tends to increase for a time, then begins to decline, as the available oil is pumped out. Oil production in the United States has followed this pattern (Figure 1), as has oil production in the North Sea (Figure 2). This decline has taken place in spite of technology improvements. There is now serious concern that world oil production will begin to decline

("peak"), just as it has in the United States and the North Sea. I discussed this earlier in Oil Quiz - Test Your Knowledge . A congressional committee was also concerned about this issue, and asked the US Government Accountability Office to study it. The GAO's report, titled CRUDE OIL: Uncertainty about Future Supply Makes It Important to Develop a Strategy for Addressing a Peak and Decline in Oil Production confirmed that this is an important issue. Exactly how soon this decline will begin is not certain, but many predict that the decline may begin within the next few years. 2. Natural Gas Natural gas in North America is also reaching its limits. United States natural gas production reached its peak in 1973. Each year, more and more wells are drilled, but the average amount of gas produced per well declines. This occurs because the best sites were developed first, and the later sites are more marginal. The United States has been importing more and more natural gas from Canada, but this is also

reaching its limits. Because of these issues, the total amount of natural gas available to the United States is likely to decline in the next few years - quite possibly leading to shortages. 3. Fresh Water

Fresh water is needed for drinking and irrigation, but here too we are reaching limits. Water from melting ice caps is

declining in quantity because of global warming. Water is being pumped from aquifers much faster than it is being replaced, and water tables are dropping by one to three meters a year in many areas. Some rivers, especially in China and Australia, are close to dry because of diversion for agriculture and a warming climate. In the United States, water limitations are especially important in the Southwest and in the more arid part of the Plains States. 4. Top soil The topsoil we depend on for agriculture is created very slowly - about

one inch in 300 to 500 years, depending on the location. The extensive tilling of the earth's soil that is now being done

results in many stresses on this topsoil, including erosion, loss of organic matter, and chemical degradation. Frequent

irrigation often results in salination, as well. As society tries to feed more and more people, and produce biofuel as well,

there is pressure to push soil to its limits—use land in areas subject to erosion; use more and more fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides; and remove the organic material needed to build up the soil. Are there indirect impacts as well? Besides

depleting oil, natural gas, fresh water, and top soil, the intensive use of the earth's resources is resulting in pollution of air

and water, and appears to be contributing to global warming as well. Can technology overcome these finite world issues?

While we have been trying to develop solutions, success has been limited to date. When we have tried to find substitutes,

we have mostly managed to trade one problem for another:

**AT BATAILLE: EXPENDITURE WITHOUT RESERVE → EXTINCTION**

**Excessive consumption will cause extinction – it's already at an unsustainable level.**

**Trainer, 07** (Ted Trainer, Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Work at the University of New South Wales. "Renewable Energy Cannot Sustain a Consumer Society" p. 128-29)

It is of the utmost importance to recognize that whether or not renewable energy can sustain consumer-capitalist society is not a matter of whether it can meet present energy demand. The essential question is whether it can enable constant increase in the volume of goods and services being consumed and the associated increase in energy demand. Energy demand is rising significantly, although estimates of future demand vary. ABARE's *Energy Outlook 2000* shows that the average annual rate of growth in energy use in Australia over the decade of the 1990s was around 2.5% p. a. The *Australian Yearbook* shows that between 1982 and 1998 Australian energy use increased 50%, an arithmetical average growth rate of 3.13% p.a., and the rate has been faster in more recent years. (Graph 5.12.) However ABARE estimates that Australian energy demand will slow, reaching about 1.9% p.a. by 2040, meaning more than a doubling in annual use by then. In July 2003 Australian electricity authorities warned that blackouts are likely in coming years due to the rapid rate of increase in demand, estimated at almost 3% pa for the next five years. (ABC News, 31 July.) Robbins (2003) reports NEMMCO predicting electricity growth over the next 10 years in NSW, Queensland and Victoria as 3.1%, 3.5% and 2.6% p.a. respectively. Poldy (2005) shows that over the past 100 years Australian energy consumption has followed GDP growth closely, and he estimates that in recent years it has approximated a growth rate of 3.6% p.a. In 2004 world energy use jumped, growing at 4.3% p.a. (Catan, 2005.) Thus the commitment to growth greatly exacerbates the problem, and in turn all of the other resource supply problems, because all involve an energy component. For instance if the cost of fuel increases significantly, then so will the cost of food and minerals, and even university courses, because fuel is needed to produce them. It has been argued above that renewables are not likely to be capable of meeting present electricity and liquid fuel demand, but given the inertia built into growth trends, the demand to be met will probably be three or four times as big as it is now by mid century...and doubling every approximately 35 years thereafter. To summarise regarding Fault 1, consumer-capitalist society is obviously grossly unsustainable. We have far overshoot levels of production, consumption, resource use and affluence that are sustainable for ourselves over a long period of time, let alone extended to all the world's people. Yet our top priority is to increase them continuously, without limit. This is the basic cause of the many alarming sustainability problems now threatening our survival.

**\*\*BAUDRILLARD\*\***

AT BAUDRILLARD: BAUDRILLARD → NIHILISM

**Baudrillard is too nihilistic to apply to politics.**

**Butterfield 02** (Bradley, Assistant Professor of English at University of Wisconsin at La Crosse, "The Baudrillardian Symbolic, 9/11, and the War of Good and Evil" *Postmodern Culture*, volume 13, September, Project MUSE)

From Princess Diana to 9/11, Jean Baudrillard has been the prophet of the postmodern media spectacle, the hyperreal event. In the 1970s and 80s, our collective fascination with things like car crashes, dead celebrities, terrorists and hostages was a major theme in Baudrillard's work on the symbolic and symbolic exchange, and in his post-9/11 "L'Esprit du Terrorisme," he has taken it upon himself to decipher terrorism's symbolic message. He does so in the wake of such scathing critiques as Douglas Kellner's *Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond* (1989), which attacked Baudrillard's theory as "an imaginary construct which tries to seduce the world to become as theory wants it to be, to follow the scenario scripted in the theory" (178). Did Baudrillard seduce 9/11 into being--is he terrorism's theoretical guru?--or did he merely anticipate and describe in advance the event's profound seductiveness? To Kellner and other critics, Baudrillard's theory of postmodernity is a political as well as an intellectual failure: Losing critical energy and growing apathetic himself, he ascribes apathy and inertia to the universe. Imploding into entropy, Baudrillard attributes implosion and entropy to the experience of (post) modernity. (180) To be sure, Baudrillard's scripts and scenarios have always been concerned with the implosion of the global capitalist system. But while Baudrillard's tone at the end of "L'Esprit du Terrorisme" can certainly be called apathetic--"there is no solution to this extreme situation--certainly not war"--he does not suggest that there are no forces in the universe capable of mounting at least a challenge to the system and its sponsors (18).

**Relegating human suffering to the realm of simulation is just nihilism, crushing politics.**

**Kellner, 89** *Phil. Chair @ UCLA, 1989, Jean Baudrillard, p. 107-8, Douglas*

Yet does the sort of symbolic exchange which Baudrillard advocates really provide a solution to the question of death? Baudrillard's notion of symbolic exchange between life and death and his ultimate embrace of nihilism (see 4.4) is probably his most un-Nietzschean moment, the instant in which his thought radically devalues life and focuses with a fascinated gaze on that which is most terrible — death. In a popular French reading of Nietzsche, his 'transvaluation of values' demanded negation of all repressive and life-negating values in favor of affirmation of life, joy and happiness. This 'philosophy of value' valorized life over death and derived its values from phenomena which enhanced, refined and nurtured human life. In Baudrillard, by contrast, life does not exist as an autonomous source of value, and the body exists only as 'the carnality of signs,' as a mode of display of signification. His sign fetishism erases all materiality from the body and social life, and makes possible a fascinated aestheticized fetishism of signs as the primary ontological reality. This way of seeing erases suffering, disease, pain and the horror of death from the body and social life and replaces it with the play of signs — Baudrillard's alternative. Politics too is reduced to a play of signs, and the ways in which different politics alleviate or intensify human suffering disappears from the Baudrillardian universe. Consequently Baudrillard's theory spirals into a fascination with signs which leads him to embrace certain privileged forms of sign culture and to reject others (that is, the theoretical signs of modernity such as meaning, truth, the social, power and so on) and to pay less and less attention to materiality (that is, to needs, desire, suffering and so on) a trajectory will ultimately lead him to embrace nihilism (see 4.4).

**AT BAUDRILLARD: BAUDRILLARD → TERRORISM**

**Baudrillard's philosophy justifies terrorism.**

**Butterfield 02** (Bradley, Assistant Professor of English at University of Wisconsin at La Crosse, "The Baudrillardian Symbolic, 9/11, and the War of Good and Evil" Postmodern Culture, volume 13, September, Project MUSE)

In *Simulacra and Simulations* (1981), Baudrillard wrote that systemic nihilism and the mass media are to blame for the postmodern human condition, which he describes as a combination of "fascination," "melancholy," and "indifference." Against the system and its passive nihilism, Baudrillard proffers his own brand of what might be termed active nihilism, a praxis that includes theoretical and aesthetic "terrorism," but not, in the end, the bloody acts of actual violence his theory accounts for. The terrorist acts of 9/11, as his theory predicted, were destined to be absorbed by the system's own narrative, neutralized by the very mass media they sought to exploit. In "L'Esprit," Baudrillard nevertheless attempts to explain again the logic, the spirit, of terrorism and to account for its power. Two of the three letters written to Harper's Magazine after its February 2002 printing of "L'Esprit" would, predictably, take Baudrillard to be an apologist for the terrorists' means and ends. Edward B. Schlesinger and Sarah A. Wersan of Santa Barbara, California, write: Embedded in Jean Baudrillard's almost incomprehensible prose is the shocking assertion that terrorism is justifiable, that the threat of globalization, as visualized by Baudrillard, justified the World Trade Center attack. (Kelly et al. 4)

**Baudrillard justifies the use of violence and terrorism.**

**Butterfield 02** (Bradley, Assistant Professor of English at University of Wisconsin at La Crosse, "The Baudrillardian Symbolic, 9/11, and the War of Good and Evil" Postmodern Culture, volume 13, September, Project MUSE)

Baudrillard's postmodern-primitive symbolic, on the other hand, aimed to obliterate the difference in value between the imaginary and the real, the signifier and the signified, and to expose the metaphysical prejudice at the heart of all such valuations. His wager was that this would be done through aesthetic violence and not real violence, but having erased the difference between the two, there was never any guarantee that others wouldn't take such theoretical "violence" to its literal ends. Graffiti art, scarification and tattooing are just the benign counterparts of true terrorism, which takes ritual sacrifice and initiation to their extremes. Literalists and extremists, fundamentalists of all sorts, find their logic foretold in Baudrillard's references to the primitives. What the terrorists enacted on 9/11 was what Baudrillard would call a symbolic event of the first order, and they were undeniably primitive in their belief that God, the dead, and the living would somehow honor and benefit them in the afterlife. Unable to defeat the U.S. in economic or military terms, they employ the rule of prestation in symbolic exchange with the gift of their own deaths. But Americans are not "primitives"--we do not value death symbolically, but rather only as a subtraction from life. Capitalism's implicit promise, in every ad campaign and marketing strategy, is that to consume is to live. We score up life against death as gain against loss, as if through accumulation we achieve mastery over the qualitative presence of death that haunts life. Our official holidays honoring the dead serve no other function than to encourage consumption.

## AT BAUDRILLARD: CONFORMISM TURN

**Baudrillard's politics are deeply conformist. Playing with the pieces of hyper-reality shuts down real alternatives. Donahue, (Department of English, Gonzaga University), 01 (Brian, "Marxism, Postmodernism, Žižek," Postmodern Culture, 12.2, Project Muse).**

According to Žižek, theorists of postmodern society who make much of the usurpation of the Real by the simulacrum either long nostalgically for the lost distinction between them or announce the final overcoming of the "metaphysical obsession with authentic Being," or both (he mentions Paul Virilio and Gianni Vattimo, and we might add Baudrillard to the list). In either case they "miss the distinction between simulacrum and appearance": What gets lost in today's plague of simulations is not the firm, true, nonsimulated Real, but *appearance itself*. To put it in Lacanian terms: the simulacrum is imaginary (illusion), while appearance is symbolic (fiction); when the specific dimension of symbolic appearance starts to disintegrate, imaginary and real become more and more indistinguishable.... And, in sociopolitical terms, this domain of appearance (that is, symbolic fiction) is none other than that of politics.... The old conservative motto of keeping up appearances thus today obtains a new twist.... [it] stands for the effort to save the properly political space. ("Leftist" 995-96) Making the same argument about a slightly different version of this problem, Žižek writes that the standard reading of "outbursts of 'irrational' violence" in the postmodern "society of the spectacle" is that "our perception of reality is mediated by aestheticized media manipulations to such an extent that it is no longer possible for us to distinguish reality from its media image" (*Metastases* 75). Violent outbursts in this context are thus seen as "desperate attempts to draw a distinction between fiction and reality... [and] to dispel the cobweb of the aestheticized pseudo-reality" (75). Again with reference to the Lacanian triad of Imaginary-Symbolic-Real, Žižek argues that this analysis is "*right for the wrong reasons*": What is missing from it is the crucial distinction between imaginary order and symbolic fiction. The problem of contemporary media resides not in their enticing us to confound fiction with reality but, rather, in their "hyperrealist" character by means of which they *saturate the void that keeps open the space for symbolic fiction*. A society of proliferating, promiscuous images is thus not overly fictionalized but is, on the contrary, not "fictionalized" enough in the sense that the basis for making valid statements, the structure guaranteeing intersubjective communication, the order permitting shared narratives and, to use Jameson's term, "cognitive mapping"11--in short, the realm of the Symbolic--is short-circuited by an incessant flow of images, which solicit not analysis and the powers of thought but rather nothing more than blank, unreflective enjoyment. The kind of subjectivity that corresponds to this hyperreal, spectacularized society without a stable Symbolic order is what Žižek calls in *Looking Awry* the "pathological narcissist" (102). That is, following the predominance of the "autonomous" individual of the Protestant ethic" and the "heteronomous 'organization man" who finds satisfaction through "the feeling of loyalty to the group"--the two models of subjectivity corresponding to previous stages of capitalist society--today's media-spectacle-consumer society is marked by the rise of the "pathological narcissist," a subjective structure that breaks with the "underlying frame of the ego-ideal common to the first two forms" (102). The first two forms involved inverted versions of each other: one either strove to remain true to oneself (that is, to a "paternal ego-ideal" or looked at oneself "through the eyes of the group," which functioned as an "externalized" ego-ideal, and sought "to merit its love and esteem" (102). With the stage of the "pathological narcissist," however, the ego-ideal itself is dissolved: Instead of the integration of a symbolic *law*, we have a multitude of *rules* to follow--rules of accommodation telling us "how to succeed." The narcissistic subject knows only the "rules of the (social) game" enabling him to manipulate others; social relations constitute for him a playing field in which he assumes "roles," not proper symbolic mandates; he stays clear of any kind of binding commitment that would imply a proper symbolic identification. He is a radical conformist who paradoxically experiences himself as an outlaw. (102)

**The impact is extinction, the refusal to engage in traditional politics is an abdication of social responsibility that makes all social crises inevitable**

**Boggs, 97** (Carl, National University, Los Angeles, Theory and Society, "The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America", December, Volume 26, Number 6, <http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/content/m7254768m63h16r0/fulltext.pdf>)

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here – localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post-modernism, Deep Ecology – intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved – perhaps even unrecognized – only to fester more ominously in the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. 74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites – an already familiar dynamic in many lesser-developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a *reassertion* of politics in more virulent guise – or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society. 75

**AT BAUDRILLARD: ALTERNATIVE FAILS**

**Baudrillard's alternative is politically paralyzing.**

**Wolin, 06** (The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, Richard Wolin, Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center, City University).

In the epitome of postmodern political fatalism, the only strategy Baudrillard has to recommend is "death" solely by aping the information society's own lifelessness and inertia—a practice he refers to as "crystal revenge" does one stand a chance, argues Baudrillard, of escaping its enervating clutches. Thus, according to Baudrillard, the implosions of media society portend the collapse of the emancipatory project in general. His verdict on the impossibility of progressive historical change reiterates one of the commonplaces of reactionary rhetoric: the so-called futility thesis, according to which attempts to transform society are condemned a priori to failure. The nihilistic implications of Baudrillard's approach have been confirmed by the unmitigated schadenfreude with which he responded to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In his view the assault represented a justified response to the challenge of American global hegemony. Although terrorist groups based in the Middle East may have been nominally responsible for executing the attacks, in truth it was an act that fulfilled the longings and aspirations of people all over the world. As Baudrillard observes, "haven't we dreamt of this event, hasn't the entire world, without exception, dreamt of it; no one could not dream of the destruction of a power that had become hegemonic to such a point. . . . In essence, it was [the terrorists] who committed the deed, but it is we who wished for it.

**Baudrillard's theories depoliticize politics**

**Boggs, 97** (Carl, National University, Los Angeles, Theory and Society, "The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America", December, Volume 26, Number 6, <http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/content/m7254768m63h16r0/fulltext.pdf>)

The problem is that the main thrust of postmodernism so devalues the common realm of power, governance, and economy that the dynamics of social and institutional life vanish from sight. Where the reality of corporate, state, and military power wind up vanishing within a post-modern amorphousness, the very effort to analyze social forces and locate agencies or strategies of change becomes impossible. In its reaction against the comprehensive historical scope of Marxism, the micro approach dismisses in toto macropolitics and with it any conceivable modern project of radical transformation. An extreme "micro" focus is most visible in such theorists as Baudrillard who, as Steven Best and Douglas Kellner put it, in effect "announce the end of the political project in the end of history and society 51 - a stance that replicates the logic of a profoundly depoliticized culture.

**Baudrillard's alternative fails to confront real world politics.**

**Best & Kellner, 98** Department of Philosophy at University of Texas-El Paso, 1998 [Steven & Douglas, <http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/illuminations/kell28.htm>, "Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future"]

In the aftermath of the 1960s, novel and conflicting conceptions of postmodern politics emerged. Postmodern politics thus take a variety of forms and would include the anti-politics of Baudrillard and his followers, who exhibit a cynical, despairing rejection of the belief in emancipatory social transformation, as well as a variety of efforts to create a new or reconstructed politics. On the extreme and apolitical position of a Baudrillard, we are stranded at the end of history, paralyzed and frozen, as the masses collapse into inertia and indifference, and simulacra and technology triumph over agency. Thus, from Baudrillard's perspective, all we can do is "accommodate ourselves to the time left to us."

**Baudrillard is just a fashionable source of cynicism—not a political strategy.**

**Rojek 93** (Chris, Deputy Director, Theory, Culture & Society Centre, Professor of Sociology and Culture at Nottingham Trent University, Forget Baudrillard? Edited by Chris Rojek, pgs 109)

His lacerating nihilism, his readiness to prick any cause, his devotion to experience for experience's sake, are all recurring tropes of at least one type of modernism. To be sure, modernism is a multi-faceted concept. Rather than speak of the project of modernism it is perhaps more accurate to speak of projects of modernism. These projects work around a central dichotomy: reflecting the order of things and exposing the fundamental disorder of things. In the political realm the keynote projects designed to reflect the order of things have been (a) providing a theory of liberal democracy which legitimates the operation of the market; (b) the socialist critiques of capitalism and the plan for the reconstruction of society; and (c) the feminist transformation of the male order of things. These are all constructive projects. They either aim to give shape to people's lives or they seek to replace the easing set of politico-economic conditions with a state of affairs that is judged to be superior on rational or moral grounds. Baudrillard it might be said, traces the dispersal of these projects. He relishes being the imp of the perverse, the ruthless exponent of the disorder of things. His work exposes the posturing and circularities of constructive arguments. But in doing this Baudrillard is not acting as the harbinger of a new postmodern state of affairs. Rather he is treading the well worn paths of one type of modernist scepticism and excess – a path which has no other destiny than repletion. His message of 'no future' does not transcend the political dilemma of modernism, it exemplifies it.

**AT BAUDRILLARD: MACRO-POLITICS GOOD**

**Baudrillard leaves the masses to collapse, only engaging in macro-politics solves**

**Best and Kellner 02** \_prof phil @ UT el paso and Kellner prof phil @ UCLA 2k2 (Steven, Doug, "Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future" <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/Illumina%20Folder/kell28.htm>)

A postmodern politics begins to take shape during the 1960s, when numerous new political groups and struggles emerged. The development of a new postmodern politics is strongly informed by the vicissitudes of social movements in France, the United States, and elsewhere, as well as by emerging postmodern theories. The utopian visions of modern politics proved, in this context, difficult to sustain and were either rejected in favor of cynicism, nihilism, and, in some cases, a turn to the right, or were dramatically recast and scaled down to more "modest" proportions. The modern emphasis on collective struggle, solidarity, and alliance politics gave way to extreme fragmentation, as the "movement" of the 1960s splintered into various competing struggles for rights and liberties. The previous emphasis on transforming the public sphere and institutions of domination gave way to new emphases on culture, personal identity, and everyday life, as macropolitics were replaced by the micropolitics of local transformation and subjectivity. In the aftermath of the 1960s, novel and conflicting conceptions of postmodern politics emerged. Postmodern politics thus take a variety of forms and would include the anti-politics of Baudrillard and his followers, who exhibit a cynical, despairing rejection of the belief in emancipatory social transformation, as well as a variety of efforts to create a new or reconstructed politics. On the extreme and apolitical position of a Baudrillard, we are stranded at the end of history, paralyzed and frozen, as the masses collapse into inertia and indifference, and simulacra and technology triumph over agency. Thus, from Baudrillard's perspective, all we can do is "accommodate ourselves to the time left to us."



**AT BAUDRILLARD: HYPER-REALITY NONSENSE**

**We do, in fact, know the difference between simulation and reality—the media plays a healthy role in the public sphere.**

**March, 95** James Marsh, Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University, 95, Critique, Action, and Liberation, pp. 292-293

Such an account, however, is as one-sided or perhaps even more one-sided than that of naive modernism. We note a residual idealism that does not take into account socioeconomic realities already pointed out such as the corporate nature of media, their role in achieving and legitimating profit, and their function of manufacturing consent. In such a postmodernist account is a reduction of everything to image or symbol that misses the relationship of these to realities such as corporations seeking profit, impoverished workers in these corporations, or peasants in Third-World countries trying to conduct elections. Postmodernism does not adequately distinguish here between a reduction of reality to image and a mediation of reality by image. A media idealism exists rooted in the influence of structuralism and poststructuralism and doing insufficient justice to concrete human experience, judgment, and free interaction in the world.<sup>4</sup> It is also paradoxical or contradictory to say it really is true that nothing is really true, that everything is illusory or imaginary. Postmodernism makes judgments that implicitly deny the reduction of reality to image. For example, Poster and Baudrillard do want to say that we really are in a new age that is informational and postindustrial. Again, to say that everything is imploded into media images is akin logically to the Cartesian claim that everything is or might be a dream. What happens is that dream or image is absolutized or generalized to the point that its original meaning lying in its contrast to natural, human, and social reality is lost. We can discuss Disneyland as reprehensible because we know the difference between Disneyland and the larger, enveloping reality of Southern California and the United States.<sup>5</sup> We can note also that postmodernism misses the reality of the accumulation-legitimation tension in late capitalism in general and in communicative media in particular. This tension takes different forms in different times. In the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, social, economic, and political reality occasionally manifested itself in the media in such a way that the electorate responded critically to corporate and political policies. Coverage of the Vietnam war, for example, did help turn people against the war. In the 1980s, by contrast, the emphasis shifted more toward accumulation in the decade dominated by the “great communicator.” Even here, however, the majority remained opposed to Reagan’s policies while voting for Reagan. Human and social reality, while being influenced by and represented by the media, transcended them and remained resistant to them.<sup>6</sup> To the extent that postmodernists are critical of the role media play, we can ask the question about the normative adequacy of such a critique. Why, in the absence of normative conceptions of rationality and freedom, should media dominance be taken as bad rather than good? Also, the most relevant contrasting, normatively structured alternative to the media is that of the “public sphere,” in which the imperatives of free, democratic, nonmanipulable communicative action are institutionalized. Such a public sphere has been present in western democracies since the nineteenth century but has suffered erosion in the twentieth century as capitalism has more and more taken over the media and commercialized them. Even now the public sphere remains normatively binding and really operative through institutionalizing the ideals of free, full, public expression and discussion; ideal, legal requirements taking such forms as public service programs, public broadcasting, and provision for alternative media; and social movements acting and discoursing in and outside of universities in print, in demonstrations and forms of resistance, and on media such as movies, television, and radio.<sup>7</sup>

AT BAUDRILLARD: HYPER-REALITY NONSENSE

**Baudrillard is wrong about hyper-reality. We are very aware of differences between real life and media images. Just imagine how horrified you would be if you were watching a horror movie and found out that the actors were really being killed.**

**Žižek, 2000** (University of Ljubljana), 2000 (Slavoj, March/April "The Cyberspace Real,"

<http://www.egs.edu/faculty/Žižek/Žižek-the-cyberspace-real.html>).

Are the pessimistic cultural critics (from Jean Baudrillard to Paul Virilio) justified in their claim that cyberspace ultimately generates a kind of proto-psychotic immersion into an imaginary universe of hallucinations, unconstrained by any symbolic Law or by any impossibility of some Real?

If not, how are we to detect in cyberspace the contours of the other two dimensions of the Lacanian triad ISR, the Symbolic and the Real? As to the symbolic dimension, the solution seems easy — it suffices to focus on the notion of authorship that fits the emerging domain of cyberspace narratives, that of the "procedural authorship": the author (say, of the interactive immersive environment in which we actively participate by role-playing) no longer writes detailed story-line, s/he merely provides the basic set of rules (the coordinates of the fictional universe in which we immerse ourselves, the limited set of actions we are allowed to accomplish within this virtual space, etc.), which serves as the basis for the interactor's active engagement (intervention, improvisation). This notion of "procedural authorship" demonstrates the need for a kind of equivalent to the Lacanian "big Other": in order for the interactor to become engaged in cyberspace, s/he has to operate within a minimal set of externally imposed accepted symbolic rules/coordinates. Without these rules, the subject/interactor would effectively become immersed in a psychotic experience of an universe in which "we do whatever we want" and are, paradoxically, for that very reason deprived of our freedom, caught in a demonic compulsion. It is thus crucial to establish the rules that engage us, that led us in our immersion into the cyberspace, while allowing us to maintain the distance towards the enacted universe. The point is not simply to maintain "the right measure" between the two extremes (total psychotic immersion versus non-engaged external distance towards the artificial universe of the cyber-fiction): distance is rather a positive condition of immersion.

If we are to surrender to the enticements of the virtual environment, we have to "mark the border," to rely on a set of marks which clearly designate that we are dealing with a fiction, in the same way in which, in order to let ourselves go and enjoy a violent war movie, we somehow have to know that what we are seeing is a staged fiction, not real-life killing (imagine our horrible surprise if, while watching a war scene, we would suddenly see that we are watching a snuff, that the actor engaged in face-to-face combat is effectively cutting the throat of his "enemy" ...). Against the theorists who fear that cyberspace involves the regression to a kind of psychotic incestuous immersion, one should thus discern in today's often clumsy and ambiguous improvisations about "cyberspace rules" precisely the effort to establish clearly the contours of a new space of symbolic fictions in which we fully participate in the mode disavowal, i.e. being aware that "this is not real life."

## AT BAUDRILLARD: AUTHORITARIAN

**Baudrillard's simulation argument plays into the hands of power. His Gulf War example is proof of the authoritarian results of his argument—the Real is still being constructed but the Pentagon is doing it.**

**Rectenwald, (Citizens for Legitimate Government), 03** (March 11, Michael, "Gulf War II: The New 'Real'," [http://legitgov.org/mike\\_essay\\_the\\_new\\_real4\\_031103.html](http://legitgov.org/mike_essay_the_new_real4_031103.html)).

In his book *Simulations* (1983), Jean Baudrillard introduced the notion of a new social order based on simulacra without originals. Malls, neighborhoods, amusement parks, even the political left and right—simulations of originals that no longer exist, imitations without real models. Baudrillard engaged academics and enraged Marxists and other social realists, when he later announced, with seeming blitheness, that the first Gulf War 'wasn't real.' 'Tell that to the estimated 15,000 Iraqi civilians killed in the war, or the estimated 100,000 dying in its aftermath, or the Gulf War veterans, suffering from Gulf War Syndrome.' But despite the critics of postmodernism's dissolution of the 'real', there is something to what Baudrillard claimed: the first victim of the video war, the simulation, the reportage censored by Israel, was the notion of 'reality.' 'The real suffered a mortal blow. The video representation of the Gulf War became the war itself, supplanting any kernel of reality with simulation. So that film could finally announce: "Welcome to the desert of the real!"—deserted because no one sees it, the *desert* of the real because for all practical purposes, it doesn't exist. It appears from the previews we are receiving regarding the media coverage of Gulf War II, that the real, now dead, is to be declared alive-and-well, dressed up, camouflaged, and paraded around by the Pentagon itself: a remediation of the real. The media becomes the proxy purveyor of newsreels—the new real being supplied by the Pentagon. Reporters are to be fully approved instruments of the war machine itself, like additional scopes fastened to the instruments of death, pointing only at acceptable targets, with a simulated vision not unlike the video version of the jet fighters and scopic filters of the combatants (on one side). The notion of 'bias' is decimated in the very act of killing—in *media res*—military *perspectivalism* serves as a placebo. Any remaining memory of "real" differing perspectives is thereby satisfied, if not obliterated in advance; *perspectivalism* becomes a multiplication of staged effects. Like cable television with its endless splintering of sameness into a reputed 'variety', the multiple 'perspectives' of gunmen will supplant all other standpoints. Independent reporters, the Pentagon now reputedly warns, will be fired upon. "Death to Realism!" was the perhaps more apropos cry in that other, more ironic cyber film, *eXistenZ*. Thus, it appears that Baudrillard was only partly right. The real is indeed under fire, but like the repressed in Freud's version of the psyche, it threatens to return. Likewise, measures must be taken against it. The Pentagon promises to take such measures. Slavoj Žižek suggested that 9-11 threatened to shatter "the borderline which today separates the digitized First World from the Third World 'desert of the Real,'" yielding, with its crashing of the simulation, an "awareness that we live in an insulated artificial universe which generates the notion that some ominous agent is threatening us all the time with total destruction." This awareness may be too painful for the denizens of the Matrix. Gulf War II (whose 'moralistic/poetic' name is still being debated by the Pentagon) is an attempt to reconstruct that Matrix, to re-inscribe the borderline, to reclaim the real and reissue it as military rations. The real is parceled out. The media asks us incredulously: "Do you think that the Pentagon (or Powell, or Bush, or Rumsfeld) would actually lie to the American people?" We cannot answer, simply, "yes." Not only are they lying, they are actually producing the new real.

**Baudrillard concedes the alt can never solve – he no means of creating political change.**

**Kellner 03** (Douglas, George Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education at UCLA, "Jean Baudrillard," The Blackwell companion to major contemporary social theorists, p. 315)

Baudrillard's focus is on the "logic of social differentiation" whereby individuals distinguish themselves and attain social prestige and standing through purchase and use of consumer goods. He argues that the entire system of production produces a system of needs that is rationalized, homogenized, reification, domination, and exploitation produced by capitalism. At this stage, it appeared that his critique came from the standard neo-Marxian vantage point, which assumes that capitalism is blameworthy because it is homogenizing, controlling, and dominating social life, while robbing individuals of their freedom, creativity, time, and human potentialities. One the other hand, he could not point to any revolutionary forces and in particular did not discuss the situation and potential of the working class as an agent of change in the consumer society. Indeed, Baudrillard has no theory of the subject as an active agent of social change whatsoever (thus perhaps following the structuralist and poststructuralist critique of the subject popular at the time). Nor does he have a theory of class or group revolt, or any theory of political organization, struggle, or strategy.

**\*\*BOOKCHIN/BIOREGIONALISM\*\***

## AT BOOKCHIN: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Bookchin's alternative fails—small societies force conformity that prevent innovation and undermine cooperation.**  
**diZerega, 92.** PhD in Political Theory and Visiting Assistant professor in the Department of Government, St. Lawrence University. Gus, Spring/Summer, "SOCIAL ECOLOGY, DEEP ECOLOGY, AND LIBERALISM," Critical Review, <http://www.dizerega.com/papers/socecol.pdf>.

From a neoliberal perspective I will develop two basic criticisms of Bookchin's argument. First, he does not understand problems of scale. Bookchin ignores differences between face-to-face interactions among people who know one another and those involving strangers, and he appears unaware of the "coordination problem" and how it applies to his praise of a decentralized society. Second, his view of competition and cooperation, both as they occur in the market and in nature, is much too simplistic. As a consequence, he understands neither markets nor ecosystems. The virtues of organic societies are quite real, and modernity has brought a great loss by diminishing their role in our lives. But to a significant degree the virtues of premodern organic society grow from its small scale. Informal means for keeping the peace and preserving social mores can easily operate in such an environment. Help for those who are poorly off through no fault of their own can also flourish under such circumstances, as can friendliness and interest in the well being of known others. Garret Hardin points out that the Hutterites, a growing group of small religious communities now numbering more than 50,000 members in the United States, deliberately limit the size of their communities to 150, for they have discovered that whenever a group grows larger than that, shirking of community work begins to increase faster than population. When population growth within a Hutterite community exceeds 150, it splits into two communities.<sup>39</sup> On the other hand, strong pressure for social conformity is often the dark side of premodern society. This pressure, and the power of gossip and ostracism against the deviant, helped maintain behavior in accordance with group norms, and enabled such societies to dispense with the more impersonal means for enforcement characteristic of larger societies. In such societies ostracism and exile were often severe punishments for those who met with widespread disapproval. Moreover, it has usually been in large cities (relative to their societies) that creativity in the arts and sciences best flourishes. In the relative anonymity of big cities, people who march to the beat of different drummers can more easily find kindred souls and avoid social disapproval than in small homogeneous communities. In a word, the good things about small communities stem from everyone's knowing and being interested in one another – and so do the bad things. Failing to appreciate this connection is a consistent problem among communitarian thinkers.<sup>40</sup> Not all small face-to-face societies appear inclined to breed conformism. Many, though not all, Native American cultures, such as the Lakota, honored individuality. But those that did so were also frequently highly competitive, which I doubt would please Bookchin. In fact, the wide variety of modes of life among Native American peoples suggests that Bookchin's idealized image of organic societies is based at best on selective extrapolation from some peoples while ignoring the experience of others.<sup>41</sup> For an analyst who continually writes of the advantages of holistic reasoning and an ecological perspective, Bookchin displays a peculiar inclination to pick and choose the social features he likes and dislikes, without any apparent awareness that societies cannot be constructed simply by combining together all the things we happen to like and eliminating those we dislike. There is a deeper shortcoming in Bookchin's one-sided praise of the virtues of small societies. They have traditionally been hostile to or indifferent toward strangers. This is even true of the more individualistic Native American cultures. Bookchin acknowledges that they rarely made provision for the needs of strangers, but never pauses to ask why this "oversight" occurred. When our relationships are intensely face-to-face we tend to mistrust those about whom we know little. Bookchin never wonders whether relationships depending upon personal knowledge of one another can be duplicated for humanity as a whole, where our knowledge of particulars must necessarily be small to nonexistent. All this has been discussed by F. A. Hayek, and it is a great pity that Bookchin appears unaware of Hayek's work.<sup>42</sup> Face-to-face relationships, in contrast to impersonal market processes, promote intense human interactions. When friendly or loving, this is the greatest of blessings. But intensity is not always enjoyable because it is not always friendly. Wisdom and compassion, which would make it consistently so, are rare. Historically a world of small face-to-face communities or tribes has been a world of countless feuds and petty wars. We cannot know that this was so in prehistoric times, but the archaeological evidence is not encouraging. Bookchin argues that we advance over the past "when we relate on the basis of a simple affinity of tastes, cultural similarities, emotional compatibilities, sexual preferences, and intellectual interests."<sup>43</sup> He apparently means that we choose these relations, rather than taking them for granted as in the case of small tribes. Is not such "freedom to choose" the bourgeois ideal? Is it not attained most readily within a large impersonal city, where those seeking different modes of life can locate kindred spirits? In large cities we can choose our friends. Such circumstances are extremely unlikely in the face-to-face societies he advocates. The large-scale achievement of intimacy he advocates within a small group would require intolerable conformity. Bookchin appears unable to perceive the existence of any type of relationship that falls between the extremes of deep intimacy and impersonal hostility. Buyers and sellers in market orders are supposedly "polarized against each other," while it would be better for them "to care for each other's well-being, for them to feel deeply responsible to each other, and for them to be cemented by a deep sense of obligation for their mutual welfare."<sup>44</sup> This attitude goes well beyond respect and compassion for others. It is also impossible among people who do not know one another. Further, the great gift liberal civilization gave to humanity, as Hayek and Popper so clearly explain, is that by making cooperation possible along purely abstract and procedural grounds, the scope for peaceful interaction was extraordinarily broadened. People no longer needed to agree about many specifics in order to benefit from peaceful cooperation.<sup>45</sup> This extension of the scope of cooperation came at the necessary cost of reducing the intensity of human relations. This observation brings me to a fatal weakness in Bookchin's analysis. In any society needing to provide for more than the needs of a relatively small population, widespread impersonal coordination of goods and services becomes necessary. Bookchin would presumably not want to do without railroads to move food in times of localized crop failure or antibiotics to cure bubonic plague. But to build a rail line or manufacture vaccines requires a very widely integrated economic sphere. An autarkic county in Kansas, or even Vermont, could not do it. Anything like a modern economy cannot be based upon face-to-face relationships. It is simply too complex. Here enters the calculation problem first raised by Mises, a problem that has undermined every attempt to create a nonmarket economy more complex than a village. Bookchin appears unaware that such a problem exists – even though Mises, echoed by Max Weber, first called attention to the matter in the 1920s, subsequently generating an enormous literature, and even though the problem has now become manifest in the fall of communist societies.<sup>46</sup> What, then, of Bookchin's proposal for replacing the nation state with a federation of small independent city republics? I agree with him, and with writers going back to Aristotle, that the polis provides a framework where citizenship, that is, membership in a community of political equals, can be easily expressed. Nor is civic localism necessarily anachronistic. Jane Jacobs argues convincingly that cities, not nations, are the fundamental political and economic units of the modern world. Larger units, such as states and nations, have essentially arbitrary political boundaries.<sup>47</sup> There would be nothing objectionable about Bookchin's project if its purpose were to envision viable institutions able to encompass small-scale self-government, while simultaneously preserving the advantages made possible by modern institutions.

Bookchin's error lies not in his advocacy of municipal values, for in this regard he may well be right (even if they are not quite the cure-all he seems to suggest). Rather, his shortcoming is in failing to discuss the framework wherein small communities could cooperate together. What institutional ties would help them coordinate their activities? In this regard his apparent ignorance of the market's role in coordinating intricate relationships among independent entities is a fatal weakness.

## AT BOOKCHIN: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Bookchin's alternative is flawed—oppression of humans and oppression of nature are not connected—better management of nature is superior to anarchy.**

James J Hughes, 89. Assistant Director of Institutional Research and Planning, and Lecturer in Public Policy Studies, at Trinity College in Hartford. "Beyond Bookchinism: A Left Green Response," *Socialist Review* 89.3, <http://www.changesurfer.com/Bud/Bookchin.html>.

SINCE CONSCIOUSNESS plays such a central role in Bookchin's ethics, this appears to be in contradiction to his assertion that humans oppress nature. A key (apparently psychodynamic) point in Bookchin's politics seems to be that we humans began "oppressing" nature because we were oppressing each other. But the "oppression" of nature is fundamentally different from the oppression of sentient beings. It is, in fact, meaningless, since "oppression" only has meaning in reference to sentient beings with conscious intents. It's not wrong to put radioactive waste in the ground because we "oppress" the dirt, but because we and other sentient life forms are threatened by those toxins, and because we, humans, aesthetically value a non-irradiated environment. We don't "oppress" nature, but rather impact on it in a way that causes us, and other sentient beings, harm or displeasure. Bookchin seems confused on this basic point. Walter Truett Anderson's adamantly "managerial" Green line, articulated in *To Govern Evolution* is an example of an ecological politics that is more compatible with the anthropocentrism of democratic left thought than Bookchin's metaphorical eco-anarchism. Anderson points out that humans have been impacting on the ecosystem for tens of thousands of years, and that our challenge is not to withdraw from nature altogether (as deep ecologists suggest), or to get into organo-anarchic harmony with it (as Bookchin suggests), but to start managing it responsibly. The basic thrust of Bookchin's "social ecology" is the assertion that ecological destruction is a direct result of "social hierarchy." Thus, an anarchic society is the only answer to ecological destruction. While it is probably true that social hierarchies make it more difficult to reorient ourselves toward ecological protection, this seems to be another major weakness of Bookchin's analysis. It seems quite possible that an egalitarian society could be ecologically destructive, and vice-versa. In fact, Bookchin contradicts himself when he points out that feudalism was not ecologically destructive, and acknowledges the possibility that corporate capitalist or bureaucratic collectivist societies could institute ecological policies. If social hierarchy and ecocide are relatively autonomous, the left can only strive to understand how they interact, reinforce, and undercut one another, and build a set of values and movements to change them both. What Bookchin tends toward is the reduction of the struggle against one to the struggle against the other.

**The alternative is vague and unsupported by any evidence—hierarchy is inevitable.**

Damian Finbar White, 03. Lecturer at Goldsmith College. "Hierarchy, Domination, Nature," *Organization and Environment*, Sage Journals.

One immediate problem that arises is that it is difficult to avoid being struck by the sheer vagueness and imprecision that seem to linger around this whole enterprise. So although "organic society" is not presented as a hypothetical "state of nature" but postulated as a historical actuality, as Mary Mellor (1992, p.124) has noted, it is never made very clear by Bookchin when or where this early form of human association actually existed. At points in *The Ecology of Freedom*, one can find references to an "early Neolithic" village society and get the impression that organic society consequently can be located at a crossover moment when hunter-gatherers first began to settle down into a horticultural society. Elsewhere, in other writings, one can gain the distinct impression that this society stretched well up to the emergence of the early cities.<sup>11</sup> Bookchin's narrative does seem further problematic by the manner in which his expositions wings rather dramatically between a "reflexive voice," which appears to accept he is embarking on a highly speculative exercise to a much more confident tone, which at times seems to virtually claim a God's eye view. Thus, one encounters persistent examples of a carefully qualified and tentative insight being quickly reworked into a substantive proposition a few sentences later, where a speculation on "preliterate" practises, values, or institutions is then suddenly transformed into an implausibly detailed account of "how things really were back then."<sup>12</sup> Given the time scales that are being dealt with here, and the manner in which these speculations are often unsupported by evidence or supported by one or two case studies, it is difficult to avoid an immediate sense that a certain creative embellishing is going on. Additional problems emerge when it becomes evident that Bookchin's own understanding of what he has demonstrated does, at times, seem at odds with the actual narrative he provides. For example, as we have seen, one of the boldest claims that Bookchin makes of his account of historical development is that it "radically reverses" central features of historical materialism. Thus, Marx and Engels, Adorno and Horkheimer, are all chastised for their Victorian image of "stingy nature" and the view that freedom from material want necessitated the "domination of nature." Indeed, at various points, Bookchin (1990b) has emphatically rejected the view "that forms of domination . . . have their sources in economic conditions and needs" (p. 45). On the contrary, we are told the idea of domination initially arose from within societies as part of the development of social hierarchies, "which are not necessarily economically motivated at all" (p. 46). However, an implicit recognition of the role that material factors played in the development of hierarchy, and even a certain sense that the development of hierarchy is inevitable, can also be unearthed from Bookchin's work.

AT BOOKCHIN: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Hierarchies are natural and inevitable—Bookchin's utopian alternative destroys the Left.**

**Hughes, 89.** James J, Assistant Director of Institutional Research and Planning, and Lecturer in Public Policy Studies, at Trinity College in Hartford. "Beyond Bookchinism: A Left Green Response," *Socialist Review* 89.3, <http://www.changesurfer.com/Bud/Bookchin.html>.

FINALLY BOOKCHIN SEEMS to lead himself back into one of the same errors that he so eloquently critiques in deep ecology: the separation of the social order from "the natural." On the one hand, Bookchin insists that, since humans are naturally evolved, anything we do is natural. On the other hand, he insists that nature abhors hierarchy, and that once we get back in touch with our continuity with the natural order we will eschew hierarchy, and vice versa. This is again the problem of the leap from IS to OUGHT. Hierarchies exist in the ecosystem, including animal class and gender systems, and our hierarchies are just as "naturally" evolved as theirs. The reason for us to oppose hierarchy has to do with an existential human ethical decision, not with its "unnaturalness." Bookchin's equation of nonhierarchical organization with ecology leads us astray not only philosophically, but also politically; it leads us into a utopian rejection of engagement with the actual existing (albeit hierarchical) political structures, such as the Democratic Party and Congress. A complex social order, like a complex organism, requires some degree of specialization, centralization and hierarchy. But the range of possibilities within the human social niche is very broad and we need to ethically decide which of these possible adaptations will ensure the survival of the species and the ecosystem, while satisfying our ethical goals. Some historical periods allow only slow and cumulative change, while other "transformative crisis" periods, when the social equilibrium is "punctuated," allow rapid and revolutionary change. Our challenge is discerning when the window of opportunity is open for radical change, and when we must wage a more modest "war of position." The project of the left is to recognize the ever-changing limits of this window, and to position ourselves within it without either extinguishing ourselves in utopian and apocalyptic projects, or blending into the dominant gene-pool of possibilities.

**Bookchin's ideological focus alienates the public and prevents a broad-scale movement.**

**Clark, 98.** John, Professor of Philosophy at Loyola. "Municipal Dreams: A Social Ecological Critique of Bookchin's Politics," [http://raforum.info/article.php?id\\_article=1039](http://raforum.info/article.php?id_article=1039).

While "the People" are identified by Bookchin as the emerging subject of history and agent of social transformation, he also identifies a specific group within this large category that will be essential to its successful formation. Thus, in the strongest sense of agency, the "agent" of revolutionary change" will be a "radical intelligentsia," which, according to Bookchin, has always been necessary "to catalyze" such change. [17] The nature of such an intelligentsia is not entirely clear, except that it would include theoretically sophisticated activists who would lead a libertarian municipalist movement. Presumably, as has been historically the case, it would also include people in a variety of cultural and intellectual fields who would help spread revolutionary ideas. Bookchin is certainly right in emphasizing the need within a movement for social transformation for a sizable segment of people with developed political commitments and theoretical grounding. However, most of the literature of libertarian municipalism, which emphasizes social critique and political programs very heavily, has seemed thus far to be directed almost exclusively at such a group. Furthermore, it has assumed that the major precondition for effective social action is knowledge of and commitment to Bookchin's theoretical position. This ideological focus, which reflects Bookchin's theoretical and organizational approach to social change, will inevitably hinder the development of a broadly-based social ecology movement, to the extent that this development requires a diverse intellectual milieu linking it to a larger public. Particularly as Bookchin has become increasingly suspicious of the imagination, the psychological dimension, and any form of "spirituality," and as he has narrowed his conception of reason, he has created a version of social ecology that is likely to appeal to only a small number of highly-politicized intellectuals. Despite the commitment of social ecology to unity-in-diversity, his approach to social change increasingly emphasizes ideological unity over diversity of forms of expression. If the "radical intelligentsia" within the movement for radical democracy is to include a significant number of poets and creative writers, artists, musicians, and thoughtful people working in various professional and technical fields, a more expansive vision of the socially-transformative practice is necessary.

AT BOOKCHIN: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Bioregionalism is too isolated to solve—international solutions are needed.**

**Taylor, 2000** – Oshkosh Foundation Professor of Religion and Social Ethics, and Director of Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin (Bron, Beneath the Surface, 2000, pg. 282)/NHH

Bioregionalism generally fails to grapple adequately with the problem of power. Consequently, it has little "answer to specifically global environmental problems," such as atmospheric depletion and the disruption of ocean ecosystems by pollution and overfishing. Political scientist Paul Wapner argues that this is because bioregionalism assumes "that all global threats stem from local instances of environmental abuse and that by confronting them at the local level they will disappear." Nor does bioregionalism have much of a response to the "globalization" of corporate capitalism and consumerist market society, apart from advocating local resistance or long-odds campaigns to revoke the corporate charters of the worst environmental offenders. These efforts do little to hinder the inertia of this process." And little is ever said about how to restrain the voracious appetite of a global-corporate-consumer culture for the resources in every corner of the planet. Even for the devout, promoting deep ecological spirituality and ecocentric values seems pitifully inadequate in the face of such forces. Perhaps it is because they have little if any theory of social change, and thus cannot really envision a path toward a sustainable society, that many bioregional deep ecologists revert to apocalyptic scenarios. Many of them see the collapse of ecosystems and industrial civilization as the only possible means toward the envisioned changes. Others decide that political activism is hopeless, and prioritize instead spiritual strategies for evoking deep ecological spirituality, hoping, self-consciously, for a miracle.

**Engaging institutions is essential to protect the environment – bioregionalism and localized activism does not provide not a lens for substantive social change**

**Harvey, 99** – Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the City University of New York (David, Global Ethics and Environment)

But the content and spirit of any such 'revolutionary' movement is a very much more open question. I am certainly prepared to listen, for example, to some of the more radical decentralizing and communitarian, even bioregionalist proposals that circulate within green politics. But as I seek to translate such potentially fecund ideas into my own language, I find myself wanting to transform them through that dialectical conception of the relations between universality and particularity with which I began. For example, mediating institutions play a vital role in giving shape and permanence, solidity and consistency to how we relate with others and with the natural world we inhabit. To give up on some version of the central state apparatus, for example, is to surrender an extraordinarily powerful instrument (with all of its warts and wrinkles) for guiding future socio-ecological transformations. To opt out of considering global forms of governance is similarly to abandon not only hope about but also real concern for a wide range of global environmental issues (or to presume, without evidence, that acting purely locally will have the desired global effect). We cannot cease to transform the world any more than we can give up breathing, and it seems to me neither feasible nor desirable that we try to stop such a process now, though there is much to be said about what directions, such transformations might take and with what risks and socio-political effects. I also find myself questioning the ways in which many environmental groups imagine the future geography of the world to be. Of course, we have to recognize that socio-environmental relations vary geographically, that structures of feeling and cultural understandings understood as whole ways of life exist both in a state of uneven geographical development (a somewhat, unilinear conception of a singular developmental process) and in a world differentiated historically and geographically by radical differences in what the language of 'development' might mean. But, being a geographer, I did not need the environmentalists to tell me this (it has been a focus of my own attempts to create a more geographically aware historical materialism for many years now). The bioregionalists and social ecologists, as well as many of those drawn to more communitarian aspects of environmentalism, certainly reinforce the important idea that place-based or regionally based politics are more often than not a significant seed-bed for radical socio-ecological politics as well as key sites for radical change, but in so doing they do not really provide an adequate framework for thinking about how future geographies of production, distribution, consumption and exchange might be produced.

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## AT BOOKCHIN: ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITARIAN

**Bookchin's bioregionalism would result in small, oppressive communities.**

**Carter, 07.** Senior Lecturer in Politics @ University of York. "The Politics of the Environment," p. 59, Neil.

Decentralization may be a necessary condition for participatory democracy, but there is no guarantee that a decentralized society will be democratic. Sale (1980) concedes that a society based on a natural bioregion may not always be characterized by democratic or liberal values because another 'natural' principle, diversity, implies that bioregional societies should boast a wide range of political systems, some of which, presumably, might be authoritarian. Even if the political system is democratic, there may be drawbacks about life in a small community. Social control mechanisms may prove oppressive if, as Goldsmith et al. (1972) suggest, offenders are brought to heel by the weight of public opinion. Discrimination against minorities or non-conformist opinion may be rife. Small parochial societies may also be intellectually and culturally impoverished, perhaps reducing innovation in clean technologies (Frankel 1987). So, ironically, the homogenous decentralized society may lack the diversity that ecologists value.

**Bioregionalism would cause more rapid environmental destruction.**

**White, 03.** Lecturer at Goldsmith College. "Hierarchy, Domination, Nature," Organization and Environment, Sage Journals, Damian Finbar.

More substantial difficulties with organic society can be found at the methodological level. One central problem here would seem to be that evidence for Bookchin's speculations is not drawn in the main from paleo-anthropological research but rather from 20th-century ethnographic studies of tribal societies and historical accounts of European encounters with the non-European. Thus, his speculation on gender differentiation in organic society is informed by Elizabeth Thomas's studies of the Bantu. Discussions of animism make reference to Edward B. Tylor's observation of the practises of Native Americans. Various other accounts of the ecological embeddedness of humanity at the dawn of civilisation draw from Dorothy Lee's studies of the Hopi and Wintu tribes. Now, this practise is justified in The Ecology of Freedom on the basis that the cultural facts of dress, technics, and environment that link prehistoric peoples with existing "primitives" is so striking that it is difficult to believe that Siberian mammoth hunters of yesteryear ... were so dissimilar from the Arctic seal hunters of de Poncin's day. (Bookchin, 1982, p. 57) Yet reservations could immediately be voiced here given that the implicit (and highly questionable) assumption underlying this is that tribal people have lived in a permanently static state, without change or social development. Given the growing recognition among social anthropologists that many supposedly isolated small-scale societies have been part of wider, often global systems of exchange for many millennia, such an approach would seem to be increasingly problematic (see Ellen, 1986, p. 9). More generally, establishing the exact nature of human-nature relations among tribal people would seem further complicated by the fact that as the historical geographer Ian Simmons (1996) has noted, "The ethnographic picture is rather spotty on this particular topic so it does not seem possible to give a complete picture for all groups even for near-recent times, let alone the past" (p. 66). Indeed, if we turn to the anthropological record, problems with Bookchin's account of organic society would seem to become even more entrenched. Notably, there would now seem to be growing paleo-anthropological evidence that early humans were involved in substantive reshaping of their natural environment, even to the point where they produced substantive environmental degradation.<sup>14</sup> Thus, although Bookchin (1982) in The Ecology of Freedom may claim that "Neolithic artefacts seem to reflect a communion of humanity and nature that patently expressed the communion of humans with each other: a solidarity of the community with the world of life that articulated an intense solidarity within the community itself" (p. 61), elsewhere we can find substantive evidence that points directly to the contrary.<sup>15</sup> It could also be noted that even if we accepted the notion that anthropological data on more recent "tribal societies" provide a legitimate basis for speculation about early humanity, these studies would similarly seem to suggest that the development of early human societies was probably marked by much more complex and variable social patterns, practises, and institutions than are found in the composite account provided in The Ecology of Freedom. Thus, concerning Bookchin's (1982) claim that relations in organic society were "distinctly ecological" (p. 5), it could simply be noted here that the anthropological evidence on "tribal" people and hunter-gatherers hardly lends unqualified support to such a generalisation.<sup>16</sup> The claim that organic society was "strikingly non-domineering not only in its institutionalised structure but in its very language" (Bookchin, 1990b, p. 47) similarly could meet any number of contrary examples from small-scale societies,<sup>17</sup> as could the related claim of an egalitarian sexual division of labour,<sup>18</sup> and so on. There would seem to be substantive reasons, then, to doubt the whole account of organic society found in The Ecology of Freedom and Remaking Society. By the early 1990s, it increasingly appeared that Bookchin himself had become less and less comfortable with many aspects of this period of his work. Initially responding to certain currents in deep ecology, committed to what Bookchin (1991) now saw as "atavistic celebrations of a mythic Neolithic and Pleistocene" (p. xxx),<sup>19</sup> the second edition of The Ecology of Freedom provided a new introduction that qualified and revised many earlier commitments. Now ceding to the anthropological evidence that early humanity's relations with the natural world may well have been much less harmonious than previously presumed and warning against romanticising early humanity's interconnectedness with nature, one can find an uncomfortable attempt to hang on to certain elements of his own organic society thesis. Thus, we are told, "as humanity began to emerge from first nature, possibly in the Pleistocene and certainly in the Palaeolithic, their relations to animals as other was largely complementary" (p. xlvii).

**AT BOOKCHIN: TRANSITION WARS TURN**

**The transition to bioregionalism will cause major wars.**

**Taylor, 2000** – Oshkosh Foundation Professor of Religion and Social Ethics, and Director of Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin (Bron, *Beneath the Surface*, 2000, pg. 282)//NHH

It is not clear, however, that in the long run and on every continent and during every era, violence and conflict would be greater under bioregional forms of political organization than under political units drawn according to bioregional differences. Fear of balkanization raises important concerns, but a universal condemnation of bioregional polity does not logically follow. Gary Snyder, for example, would likely point to anthropologist A. L. Kroeber's work which shows that Native Americans have usually lived peacefully, largely in differing bioregional provinces. 58 A more trenchant problem is how bioregionalists (and the anarchists who influenced their most influential theorists) often assume that people are naturally predisposed (unless corrupted by life in unnatural, hierarchical, centralized, industrial societies) \_ to cooperative behavior. W This debatable assumption appears to depend more on radical environmental faith, a kind of Paul Shepard-style mythologizing, than on ecology or anthropology. Unfortunately for bioregional theory, evolutionary biology shows that not only cooperation promotes species survival; so also, at times, does aggressive competitiveness. 60 Based on its unduly rosy view of the potential for human altruism, it is doubtful that bioregionalism can offer sufficient structural constraints on the exercise of power by selfish and well-entrenched elites. It should be obvious, for example, that nation-state governments will not voluntarily cede authority, " Any political reorganization along bioregional lines would likely require "widespread violence and dislocation." Few bioregionalists seem to recognize this likelihood, or how devastating to nature such a transitional struggle would probably be. Moreover, making an important but often overlooked point about political power, political theorist Daniel Deudney warns:

AT BOOKCHIN: PERMUTATION

**Bookchin thinks that a wide variety of political strategies need to be tried simultaneously.**

**Bookchin and Foreman, 91** – Murray, founder of the social ecology movement within a libertarian/ecological thought, and Dave, US environmentalist and founder of Earth First! (*Defending the Earth: a dialogue between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman*, South End Press @ Boston, Ed. 1, Pg. 39-40) // AK

We were pretty clear from the beginning, however, that we were not the radical environmental movement. We only saw ourselves as one slice of the radical environmental movement. I know I have no absolute, total, and complete answer to the worldwide ecological crisis we are in. My path is not the right path; it's the path that works for me. I think there are dozens and dozens of other approaches and ideas that we will need in order to solve the crisis we're in right now. We need that kind of diversity within our movement. In Earth First!, we have tended to specialize in what we're good at: wilderness preservation and endangered species. That doesn't mean the other issues aren't important; it just means that we mostly talk about what we know most about. We work on what moves us most particularly. It doesn't mean that we're the whole operation, or that we're covering all the bases. We need all the approaches and angles.

AT BOOKCHIN: THESIS INCORRECT

**Bookchin is wrong—there is no correlation between hierarchy and domination of nature.**

**White, 03.** Lecturer at Goldsmith College. “Hierarchy, Domination, Nature,” *Organization and Environment*, Sage Journals, Damian Finbar.

It would seem evident, though, that the historical sequence Bookchin (1995b) defends is simply not very convincing. Bookchin’s starting point here that “the domination of nature first arose within *society* as part of its *institutionalisation* into gerontocracies ... not in any endeavour to control nature or natural forces” (p. 142) would appear completely untenable. The whole strength of this claim is clearly dependent on the rosy image of a singular organic society that we can find in his earlier work. Now, given (a) the criticisms of this that have been offered above, (b) the cautionary words offered by Kuper about recognising the huge spatial variation that was very likely a central feature of the relationship between human societies and their natures, and (c) the manner in which Bookchin himself later retreats from this position, this claim would seem to fall apart. Indeed, if we follow the view of the later Bookchin (1995c), who states, “In the band and tribe societies of pre-history, humanity was *almost completely at the mercy of uncontrollable natural forces*” (p. 122), such an assertion would seem to suggest that if anything, central elements of the basic Marxian thesis are more convincing as an existential statement of the human condition. That is, as Marx argues in Volume 3 of *Capital*, “the associated producers” need to rationally regulate their interchanges with nature, bring it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and most worthy of, their human nature. (as cited in Smith, 1996, pp. 48-49) Bookchin’s ecocentric critics have flagged a second line of argument that needs to be considered here. Fox (1989, p. 15) and Eckersley (1992) have argued that Bookchin does not fully recognise that there is not a straightforward relationship between hierarchical forms of social organisation and the actual domination of nature. Thus, Fox has argued that historical examples can be offered of hierarchical societies (e.g., ancient Egypt) that had relatively benign relations with nature. Equally, Eckersley has argued that it is possible to conceptualise a relatively nonhierarchical society that is nevertheless extremely exploitative ecologically. 22

## AT BOOKCHIN: THESIS INCORRECT

**There is no correlation between hierarchy and social domination—the alternative is more likely to increase social domination.**

**White, 03.** Damian Finbar , Lecturer at Goldsmith College. “Hierarchy, Domination, Nature,” Organization and Environment, Sage Journals.

To move on from the organic society issue then, how plausible is the rest of Bookchin’s social hierarchy thesis? The concept of social hierarchy clearly denotes the most striking and interesting conceptual innovation that can be found in social ecology, delineating Bookchin’s position from the preoccupations of classical critical theory. If we consider this issue at the synchronic level for the moment, one considerable advantage of this demand to place “hierarchy” at the centre of critical social theory is that it clearly opens up the possibility of examining multilayered forms of domination, exclusion, and silencing that are not simply reducible to epiphenomena of class relations. Moreover, Bookchin’s claim that it is likely forms of social hierarchy based on gerontocracies, patriarchies, priest cults, and warrior groups probably provided the precursors to the latter development of class and proto-state structures would seem reasonably uncontroversial (see Giddens, 1981; Mann, 1986). An issue that does need further examination though is that it is not clear that the complexities that play out in the relationships between social hierarchy and social domination are fully theorised by Bookchin. For example, as numerous critics have observed (Eckersley, 1992; Fox, 1989; Kovel, 1998), there is clearly a range of social relations that are in certain senses hierarchical yet do not self-evidently contribute to social domination. Temporary quasi-hierarchical relations based on the acceptance of certain forms of authority such as parent-child relations (Kovel, 1998) can be socially enabling. Student-teacher relationships (Eckersley, 1992) also invariably contain elements of hierarchy and if freely chosen can be enabling. Indeed, one could think of a range of socially stratified relations that are emergent from functionally differentiated social roles and that are hierarchical in a certain sense but that also alleviate social domination. In this latter category, it could well be argued that any socially complex and politically pluralistic society seeking to avail itself of the gains of high technology is going to be marked by certain forms of social stratification through task differentiation. As long as these “hierarchies” are open and subject to democratic recruitment, rotation, and control, and influence in one sphere of social life is not allowed to cumulate in other spheres (Waltzer, 1985), it is simply not given that such relations necessarily contribute to social domination. Indeed, contra certain currents of libertarianism, it clearly needs to be recognised that certain democratically controlled representative structures or socially differentiated roles might actually relieve social domination. Conversely, one could imagine certain nonhierarchical societies (perhaps most strikingly the kind of neo-primitivist fantasies advocated by some eco-anarchists) that would surely exacerbate social domination of humans by nature and perhaps through the “tyranny of structurelessness” (Freeman, 1970) further facilitate domination of some humans by others. It would seem important, then, for a credible critical social theory to be able to distinguish more carefully between coercive and oppressive social-stratified social relations and representative political forms—which clearly give rise to social domination—and such relations based on “legitimate authority” or “democratic authority,” which perhaps do not. 21 What can we make though of the further diachronic link that Bookchin has sought to forge: between social hierarchy, social domination, and the “idea” of dominating nature?

**\*\*BORDERS\*\***

**AT BORDERS: NO IMPACT**

**Boundaries are not tied to colonization or state control- they are merely a means for re-identification**

**Radcliffe and Westwood 96**– Radcliffe is a lecturer in Geography at the University of Cambridge, Westwood is a professor in sociology at the University of Leicester- 1996 (Sarah and Sallie, “Remaking the Nation” p. 129)

The topographic work carried out by indigenous confederations the malleability of cartography’s use, and some of the politics in its usage. Cartographies are not tied immutably into colonizing and projects of control, but can offer ambiguous spaces for re-identification. Since the late 1980s, the mobilization of indigenous groups for landclaims reveals the shifting political agendas around cartography and the possibility for its subversive appropriation. Yet such appropriation (occurring within the context of the state legal system, the state’s sovereignty over subsoil, and the increasing globalized economy of the region) is restricted by the meanings powers and increasingly de-centred nature of control over land. Amazonian land surfaces have been nominally allocated to indigenous villages and nationalities.

**AT BORDERS: ALT DOESN'T SOLVE**

**Alt doesn't solve--- the opening of borders does not result in a redefinition of identities – they are irrelevant because populations will always identify with their ethnic category**

**Newman, 06** - Department of Politics and Government, Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheba, Israel (David, Progress in Human Geography, April, "The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our 'borderless' world," vol. 30, no. 2, p. 147)

The opening of borders does not, automatically, result in the hybridization of ethnic and national identity. Separate identities are dependent on the existence of group categorization, be they religious, cultural, economic, social or ethnic. Ethnicity remains a key determinant of group affiliation, inclusion and exclusion, while the removal, or opening, of the borders does not necessarily or automatically transform a member of a national State into a European, or global, citizen. Even if we have become more mobile and find it easier to cross the boundaries that previously hindered our movement, most of us retain strong ethnic or national affiliations and loyalties, be they territorial-focused or group affiliations (Sigurdson, 2000). The global access to cyberspace and the unhindered spatial dissemination of information and knowledge has, paradoxically, engendered a national identity among diaspora populations which have previously been remote and dislocated from their places (or parents' places) of origin, but who are now possessed with more information, and greater ease of access, to the ancestral (sic) homelands, and identify with the causes and struggles of the ethnic or national groups in faraway places.



**AT BORDERS: PERM SOLVES**

**The permutation solves- borders theory should not be considered in a vacuum without regard for specific policies**  
**Johanson 04** (Marta C., "SELF DETERMINATION AND BORDERS: The Obligation to Show Consideration for the Interests of Others," pg. 172-173)

Choices between principles have been argued above to constitute a problematic response to colliding principles, and the remaining legal options therefore available are harmonisation, reconciliation or 'weighing' of principles against one another in specific contexts. How then is reconciliation, balancing or weighing to be effected? The primary way in which harmonisation or reconciliation possibly could be achieved is by interpretation. It is debatable, however, whether balancing, weighing or harmonising really falls within the scope of interpretation. If interpretation is limited to a dogmatic activity seeking only to clarify the meaning of norms, then application of the rules or principles in a situation where they come into conflict cannot fall within the definition. Balancing goes beyond this, as additional decisions and valuations are required when the issue is not of the priority of a rule over another rule. For interpretation to be useful as a tool in norm conflicts where, for example, the necessity of limiting the extent of principles seems a distinct possibility, it would have to determine the meaning of the norms in the context in which they are to be applied. It is clearly impossible to conduct such an interpretation without regard to the situation at hand. The logical conclusion is that interpretation of the UN Charter Purposes, at least in relation to issues of territory and boundaries, cannot be conducted in a vacuum.

**The regional approach taken by the plan makes the permutation possible – we don't reify borders**  
**Laitinen – 01** Professor of Political Science at Oulu University in Finland – (Kari, International Journal of Peace Studies 6.2, "Reflecting the Security Border in the Post Cold War Context," [www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol6\\_2/Laitinen.htm](http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol6_2/Laitinen.htm))

In the context of post-positivist (constructivist) security thought the notion of socio-spatial consciousness is essential and meaningful. Then, the specific security border reveals how it is not the question of certain physical borderlines as such, but the practical and mental traditions, practices and continuums which, quite often, prevent us from seeing and imagining a certain space or border in a different way. For instance, the eastern border of Finland and the Cold War demarcations of the western borders of Russia are such border continuums which still very much dominate the present security thinking. However, we should see how political spaces are being rearticulated to constitute new forms of community. We should understand the security border zones as a multifaceted dimension where each aspect reflects a different function or idea. Hence, we could detach ourselves from those traditional security border practices which so often dominate. During the Cold War the stability of borders seemed eternal. But, as we have witnessed, they are in a state of flux. Now, in an integrating Europe the main task is to find such political solutions which can be transformed into such socio-spatial consciousness which does not include the element of violence. Consequently, it would be possible to construct borders of co-operation (based on critical and comprehensive security thinking) instead of the borders of traditional exclusive security.

**AT BORDERS: INEVITABLE**

**Borders are inevitable because states use them for security.**

**Starr, 06** (Harvey, Dag Hammarskjold Professor in International Affairs and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of South Carolina. "International Borders: What They Are, What They Mean, and Why We Should Care" SAIS review vol. XXVI no.1, Winter-Spring, Project Muse).

In a recent article on the nature of borders and their relationship to international conflict, this author noted:

The location of states, their proximity to one another, and especially whether or not they share "borders," emerge time and again as key variables in studies of international conflict phenomena: from major power general war, to the diffusion of international conflict, to the analysis of peace between pairs of democracies... From Boulding's (1962) ideas of "behavior space," "loss-of-strength gradient" and "critical boundary" to the simple but profound concern of geographers that humans interact most with those to whom they are closest (Zipf 1949), there are powerful theoretical reasons to be interested in borders and how they affect international relations.<sup>1</sup> Broadly, the concept of "border" has been an important one throughout world history. The concept of a border as the demarcation of two sovereign states was essential to the Westphalian state system that developed following the Thirty Years War. This example illustrates two related aspects of borders derived from realism's approach to international relations: borders as legal phenomena and borders as related to security. [End Page 3] International law and legal matters have never been key concerns of realism. However,<sup>2</sup> territoriality is a central component of state security and is fundamental to the (more or less deterministic) geopolitical setting that also affects the security of states.

**Borders are inevitable**

**Newman, 06** - Department of Politics and Government, Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheba, Israel (David, Progress in Human Geography, April, "The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our 'borderless' world," vol. 30, no. 2, p. 143)

We live in a world of lines and compartments. We may not necessarily see the lines, but they order our daily life practices, strength-ening our belonging to, and identity with, places and groups, while- at one and the same time - perpetuating and reperpet-uating notions of difference and othering. For some, the notion of a 'borderless' and 'deterritorialized' world has become a buzz word for globalization (Kuper, 2004; Caney, 2005), but it is not possible to imagine a world which is borderless or deterritorialized. Even the globalization purists would accept that the basic ordering of society requires categories and compartments, and that borders create order (Albert et at, 2001; van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002).

**AT BORDERS: INEVITABLE**

**Borders have an enormous and inevitable impact on international affairs.**

**Starr, 06** (Harvey, Dag Hammarskjold Professor in International Affairs and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of South Carolina. "International Borders: What They Are, What They Mean, and Why We Should Care" SAIS review vol. XXVI no.1, Winter-Spring, Project Muse).

Borders matter. Even in today's "turbulent," post-Cold War world of growing democracy, ever-extensive interdependence, and globalization, borders still serve a wide variety of functions across the areas of security, economics, politics, and social interactions. Even as some aspects of international law challenge or erode traditional notions of sovereignty, borders delineate areas of legal competence. Borders provide one key element in the structure of the global system: mapping the number and arrangement of the territorial units upon which all humans live. Borders permit a spatial approach to international or global politics by setting out the location of states and their absolute and relative distances from each other. Borders act as factors of constraint on human interaction, as well as factors that facilitate human interaction. Borders have significant effects on international politics, both by their presence and by their meaning to humans (either peoples, policymakers, or scholars). In turn, the internal and external politics of peoples, sub-state organizations, and states affect the creation, dissolution, and meaning of borders. As I have argued in earlier work, analysts of international politics cannot ignore the spatial dimension of human relations.

**The critique can't solve – attempts at deterritorialization will only lead to reterritorialization.**

**Tuathail – 96** Assistant professor of Geography at Virginia Polytechnic Institute- 1996 (Gearoid, "Visions and Vertigo: Postmodernity and the Writing of Global Space" Critical Geopolitics p.230)

While it is important not to exaggerate the degree of globalization and deterritorialization, these and other material transformations have rendered the rigidities of the modern sociospatial triad of the interstate system (state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and community identity) increasingly problematic. This heavily mythologized triad of state-territory-community was never perfectly set and stable in any country, but its instability and precariousness are becoming more and more pronounced as places are denationalized and globalized by transnational flows. These tendencies were occurring well before the dramatic collapse of Communism and subsequent disintegration of the territorial organization of the Eastern bloc and Soviet empire after 1989. This implosion of the geopolitical order of the Cold War starkly foregrounded the degree to which the post—World War II world order had come apart and placed the meaning of the "West," "Europe," and the "United States" as sociospatial identities in crisis, thus provoking the experience of vertigo we have noted. But every deterritorialization creates the conditions for a reterritorialization of order using fragments of the beliefs, customs, practices, and narratives of the old splintered world order. Out of the experience of vertigo, newly imagined visions of state, territory, and community are projected in an effort to restabilize and reterritorialize identity amid global flux. As one order of space unravels, new orders are deployed to retriangulate local foregrounds against global backgrounds into new productions of global space.

**AT BORDERS: PREVENTS WAR**

**Respect for borders has prevented major wars.**

**Zacher, 01** (Mark, *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 2. (Spring, 2001), pp. 215+ Jstor).

The decline of successful wars of territorial aggrandizement during the last half century is palpable. In fact, there has not been a case of successful territorial aggrandizement since 1976. Furthermore there have been important multilateral accords in support of the norm and frequent interventions by international organizations to force states to withdraw from foreign countries. Clearly, a central source of the norm has been the industrialized world's fear that territorial revisionism could ignite a major war that would cause great human suffering. Several scholars have observed that this revision against the imposition of physical pain has been central to the strengthening of a variety of security and human rights regimes. The experiences of the two world wars, a general understanding of territorial revisionism's encouragement of major wars, and a fear of nuclear weapons drove the development of the territorial integrity norm at key points in its multilateral legitimization.

**The lack of national identity created after the Post-Colonial era will exacerbate and accelerate state collapse**

**Gordon 97** - Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law- 1997 (Ruth, "Saving Failed States: Sometimes A Neocolonialist Notion" *American University Journal of International Law & Policy*)

If we define a nation as a "group that shares a common history and identity and [\*922] is aware of [the fact that its citizens] are a people and not just a population," n101 perhaps none of the post-colonial African states emerged as nation-states because none possessed the element of "nation," n102 Rather, each of the new states contained more than one nation, and thus the newly designated nation had to be created. n103 **This lack of national identity, coupled with weak state systems or structures destroyed in the wake of civil strife, may exacerbate and accelerate state collapse.** In summary, state disintegration is attributed to the destruction of state structures by civil war and the destruction of such structures is so extensive that the emerging power structure finds it difficult, if not impossible to rebuild these bodies. In the absence of widespread and purposeful physical destruction, state collapse is found in weak states that cannot provide for the basic needs of their citizens and, thus, gradually become irrelevant and useless to the citizenry. The debate is whether this state of events is rooted in an authoritarianism that is no longer able to function, a disconnection or lack of a "nation" within these nation-states, or simply an unpreparedness or inability to govern. n104

**Borders do not cause war—legal disputes are the root cause.**

**Starr 06** — 2006- (Harvey, Professor in International Affairs and Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of South Carolina. He specializes in international relations theory and method, international conflict, and geopolitics. He is co-author of *World Politics: The Menu for Choice*, 8th edition. (2006), "International Borders: What They Are, What They Mean, and Why We Should Care") [http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\\_review/v026/26.1starr.htm](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v026/26.1starr.htm)

Liberal and pluralist challenges to realist theory have developed various models over the past 50 years—models of integration, international interaction, and economic interdependence. Paired with the current attention to globalization, these models question the existence or utility of sovereignty, territoriality, and significant borders in this highly interdependent, globalized world. Yet, as noted, borders continue to play an important legal role in world politics. Given the "democratic peace" theory, which observes that pairs of democracies have not fought wars against each other, borders have far less to do with conflict or militarized conflict than legal issues. Indeed, for neighboring democracies, debates about borders revolve around issues of legal jurisdiction regarding commerce, the movement of people or ideas, and other ideas.

**AT BORDERS: PREVENTS RACISM**

**Opening the borders would create a racist, violent backlash of epic proportions**

**Zizek**, professor at the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, **2001** (Slavoj, Rethinking Marxism, v.13 n. 3/4, [http://coyote.kein.org/pipermail/generation\\_online/2002-May/000351.html](http://coyote.kein.org/pipermail/generation_online/2002-May/000351.html))

Nevertheless, one immediately gets a sense of the boundaries to Hardt and Negri's analysis. In their social-economic analysis, the lack of concrete insight is concealed in the Deleuzian jargon of multitude, deterritorialization, and so forth. No wonder that the three "practical proposals with which the book ends appear anticlimactic. The authors propose to focus our political struggle on three global rights: the rights to global citizenship, a minimal income, and the reappropriation of the new means of production (i.e. access to and control over education, information and communication). It is a paradox that Hardt and Negri, the poets of mobility, variety, hybridization, and so on, call for three demands formulated in the terminology of universal human rights. These demands is that they fluctuate between formal emptiness and impossible radicalization. Let us take the right to global citizenship: theoretically, this right of course should be approved. However, if this demand is meant to be taken more seriously than a celebratory formal declaration in typical United Nations Style, then it would mean the abolition of state borders; under present conditions, such a step would trigger an invasion of cheap labor from India, China and Africa into the United States and Western Europe, which would result in a populist revolt against immigrants-a result of such violent proportions that figures like Haider would seem models of multicultural tolerance. The same is valid with regard to the other two demands: for instance, the universal (worldwide) right to minimal income-of course, why not? But how should one create the necessary social-economic and ideological conditions for such a shattering transformation?

**AT BORDERS: PREVENTS TERRORISM**

**Turn – Terrorism**

**A. Border control is key to preventing terrorism – uncontrolled Immigration risks national security**

**Genenberg, 2009** (Herb – The Bulletin, April 16, 2009, The Bulletin, Immigration Myths To Be Avoided When Coming Up With Reforms, [http://thebulletin.us/articles/2009/04/16/herb\\_denenberg/doc49e6c910cc15d402232884.txt](http://thebulletin.us/articles/2009/04/16/herb_denenberg/doc49e6c910cc15d402232884.txt))

Myth One Immigration always produces good results for the economy and the country. Because of our history, because we are a nation of immigrants, and because immigration seems to have turned out so well, many believe that more immigration will produce good results. For most of the last three centuries, America has accepted more immigrants than any other country. Even as late as 2007, there were 38 million people living in the U.S. that were not born here. That's about 20 percent of the migrants of the world. All you have to do is look at Europe to find out what results immigration can produce. The influx of Muslims runs the real danger of turning Europe into what has been called Eurabia — a new Europe with majority control in the hands of Muslims and whole nations becoming subject to Sharia. Some of the most insightful observers of the European scene believe that Europe is already lost and will continue to slide into Muslim domination and Sharia as its legal system. Europe not only has a problem for itself because of Muslim immigration but that also poses a serious problem to the United States. Listen to this warning from American Intelligence Officials, as reported by Robert S. Leiken in an article, "The Menace in Europe's Midst" that appeared in Current History (April 2009): "American intelligence officials have told President Barack Obama that British jihadists now constitute the chief terrorist threat to the United States ..." Britain is a visa waiver country meaning these terrorists are only an e-ticket away from the United States. This February the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, in his first Annual Threat Assessment, emphasized that "Al Qaeda has used Europe as a launching point for external operations against the homeland on several occasions since 9/11, and we believe that the group continues to view Europe as a viable launching point." There are some legitimate concern even about Muslims and Muslim immigrants in the U.S. An often-cited poll, found that one out of four respondents under the age of 30 accepted suicide bombings.

**B. Nuclear terrorism will cause extinction**

**Sid-Ahmed, 4** (Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, "Extinction!" August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm>)

A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagasaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded. What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a [third world war], from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

**AT BORDERS: AFRICA**

**Their description of African borders as only products of colonialism ignores numerous other factors that went into their construction.**

**Mbembe, 2000** (Achille, *Public Culture* 12.1 (2000) 259-284, Visiting Professor of History at Yale University "At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa" Project Muse).

Moreover, to state that current African boundaries are merely a product of colonial arbitrariness is to ignore their multiple geneeses. In fact, their establishment long antedated the Congress of Berlin held in 1884, whose objective was to distribute sovereignty among the different powers engaged in dividing up the continent. Their protogenesis goes back to the period of the trading-post economy, when Europeans set up agencies on the coasts and began to trade with the natives. The establishment of this economy explains, in part, some of the physical characteristics of African states, and first of all the distinction between the littoral areas and the hinterland that so deeply marks the geographical structure of various countries, or again the enclosure of vast enclaves situated far from the oceans. Boundaries gradually crystallized during the period of "informal empire" (from the abolition of the slave trade up to the repression of the first resistance movements), thanks to the combined action of traders and missionaries. The rise of boundaries took a military turn with the construction of forts, the penetration of the hinterland, and the repression of local revolts. Far from being simple products of colonialism, current boundaries thus reflect commercial, religious, and military realities, the rivalries, power relationships, and alliances that prevailed among the various imperial powers and between them and Africans through the centuries preceding colonization proper. From this point of view, their constitution depends on a relatively long-term social and cultural process. Before the conquest, they represented spaces of encounter, negotiation, and opportunity for Europeans and Africans. At the time of conquest, their main function was to mark the spatial limits that separated colonial possessions from one another, taking into account not ambitions but the actual occupation of the land.

**Even if African borders are arbitrary, they have become part of the social landscape and are not going to change.**  
**Atzili, 07** (Boaz, Research Fellow in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict", *International Security*, 31.3 page 139-173 Project Muse).

Africa's borders are particularly intriguing. Despite the arbitrariness with which many state borders in Africa were drawn, they have remained largely fixed. From its inception in 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has endorsed the norm in accordance with the principle of preserving the colonial territorial status quo. In practice, as Jeffery Herbst notes, "the vast majority of [African borders] have remained virtually untouched since the late 1800s, when they were first demarcated." The OAU's determination to uphold the norm was demonstrated, for instance, in the 1967-70 civil war in Nigeria, when the organization sought to prevent Biafra's attempts to secede.

**AT BORDERS: AFRICA**

**Status quo solves – Regions are already transcending boundaries and reidentifying themselves**

**Mbembe** - research professor in history and politics at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.-2000 (Achille, "At the edge of the world: boundaries, territoriality, and sovereignty in Africa" p. 261-2)

Over the past two centuries the visible, material, and symbolic boundaries of Africa have constantly expanded and contracted. The structural character of this instability has helped change the territorial body of the continent. New forms of territoriality and unexpected forms of locality have appeared. Their limits do not necessarily intersect with the official limits, norms, or language of states. New internal and external actors, organized into networks and nuclei, claim rights over these territories, often by force. Other ways of imagining space and territory are developing. Paradoxically, the discourse that is supposed to account for these transformations has ended up obscuring them. Essentially, two theses ignore each other. On one hand, the prevailing idea is that the boundaries separating African states were created by colonialism, that these boundaries were arbitrarily drawn, and that they separated peoples, linguistic entities, and cultural and political communities that formed natural and homogeneous wholes before colonization. The colonial boundaries are also said to have opened the way to the Balkanization of the continent by cutting it up into a maze of microstates that were not economically viable and were linked more to Europe than to their regional environment. On this view, by adopting these distortions in 1963 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adhered to the dogma of their intangibility and gave them a kind of legitimacy. Many of the current conflicts are said to have resulted from the imprecise nature of the boundaries inherited from colonialism. These boundaries could not be changed except in the framework of vigorous policies of regional integration that would complete the implementation of defense and collective security agreements.<sup>7</sup> The other thesis claims that **a kind of regional integration is already taking place "from below."** It seems to be occurring on the margins of official institutions, through sociocultural solidarities and interstate commercial networks. This process is the basis for the emergence of alternative spaces that structure the informal economy, contraband, and migratory movements. Far from being merely regional, these interstate exchanges are connected with international markets and their dynamics. The commerce for which they provide the moving force is favored by a fundamental characteristic of African states, namely the relative lack of congruence between the territory of a state and areas of exchange. Powerful religious and commercial networks with multiple ramifications have taken advantage of complementarities between areas of production, as well as legislation and monetary zones that differ from one country to another, in order to create markets that elude the states themselves.<sup>9</sup>

**Map redrawing would just recreate the same problems in Africa**

**Mbodj, 02** Manhattanville College (Mohamed, Contested Terrains and Constructed Categories: Contemporary Africa in Focus, ed: Bond, questia)

It is legitimate to ask how historical forces have generated the current political map of Africa and to ask if a better map could be produced that would be more beneficial for Africa. But to redraw the map of Africa is a fairly dubious proposition and would not resolve many current borders disputes, which are generally just an extension of internal problems. In fact, any redrawn map would have the same character because it would arbitrate among claims and even bases for making claims. The process would be based on power rather than ideals. Post-colonial mapmaking would be just as arbitrary as colonial mapmaking, just an exercise of power, opening all sorts of questions about who would and who should have what sort of influence in such a project. The legitimacy problems of many African governments raise questions about who should negotiate each country's place on the map. Considering their overall poor performance, it is doubtful that these governments would do a good job.



**\*\*BUTLER\*\***

AT BUTLER: PERM

**Perm solves best – even Butler agrees strategically using gender categories is politically effective**

**Baldwin, 97** Margaret A. Baldwin, Assoc. Prof Law @ FSU, Spring 1997, “Public Women and the Feminist State,” 20 Harv. Women’s L.J. 47, p ln

However salutary the postmodern goal of de-essentializing women, postmodern theory ultimately effaces the specific situation of public women, and forfeits altogether any account of gender along the way. This difficulty, and its implications for political strategy, is often spoken of but rarely addressed seriously within postmodern feminism. Denise Riley offers the diktat that at such junctures women can know amongst themselves "that 'women' don't exist -- while maintaining a politics of [\*160] 'as if they existed' -- since the world behaves as if they unambiguously did." 434 Judith Butler makes the same tactical concession when she affirms the continued necessity of asserting "a generally shared conception of 'women'" 435 as a political strategy: Within feminism, it seems as if there is some political necessity to speak as and for women, and I would not contest that necessity. Surely, that is the way in which representational politics operates, and . . . lobbying efforts are virtually impossible without recourse to identity politics. So we agree that demonstrations and legislative efforts and radical movements need to make claims in the name of women. 436

**\*\*CAPITALISM\*\***

**AT CAPITALISM: CEDE THE POLITICAL**

**Capitalism is utterly inevitable—the left only looks crazy when they focus on Marxism over practical reforms.**

**Wilson, 2000** – Author of many books including ‘The Myth of Political Correctness’ – 2000 (John K. Wilson, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People” p. 7- 10)

Socialism is dead. Kaput. Stick a fork in Lenin's corpse. Take the Fidel posters off the wall. Welcome to the twenty-first century. **Wake up and smell the capitalism.** I have no particular hostility to socialism. But nothing can kill a good idea in America so quickly as sticking the "socialist" label on it. The reality in America is that socialism is about as successful as Marxist footwear (and have you ever seen a sickle and hammer on anybody's shoes?). **Allow your position to be defined as socialist** even if it isn't (remember Clinton's capitalist health care plan?), **and the idea is doomed.** Instead of fighting to repair the tattered remnants of socialism as a marketing slogan, the left needs to address the core issues of social justice. You can form the word socialist from the letters in social justice, but it sounds better if you don't. At least 90 percent of America opposes socialism, and 90 percent of America thinks "social justice" might be a good idea. Why alienate so many people with a word? Even the true believers hawking copies of the Revolutionary Socialist Worker must realize by now that the word socialist doesn't have a lot of drawing power. In the movie Bulworth, Warren Beatty declares: "Let me hear that dirty word: socialism!" Socialism isn't really a dirty word, however; if it were, socialism might have a little underground appeal as a forbidden topic. Instead, socialism is a forgotten word, part of an archaic vocabulary and a dead language that is no longer spoken in America. Even Michael Harrington, the founder of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), didn't use the word socialism in his influential book on poverty, *The Other America*. **The best reason for the left to abandon socialism is not PR but honesty. Most of the self-described "socialists" remaining in America don't qualify as real socialists in any technical sense.** If you look at the DSA (whose prominent members include Harvard professor Cornel West and former Time columnist Barbara Ehrenreich), **most of the policies they urge—a living wage, universal health care, environmental protection, reduced spending on the Pentagon, and an end to corporate welfare—have nothing to do with socialism in the specific sense of government ownership of the means of production. Rather, the DSA program is really nothing more than what a liberal political party ought to push for, if we had one in America.** Europeans, to whom the hysteria over socialism must seem rather strange, would never consider abandoning socialism as a legitimate political ideology. **But in America, socialism simply isn't taken seriously by the mainstream. Therefore, if socialists want to be taken seriously, they need to pursue socialist goals using nonsocialist rhetoric.** Whenever someone tries to attack an idea as "socialist" (or, better yet, "communist"), there's an easy answer: Some people think everything done by a government, from Social Security to Medicare to public schools to public libraries, is socialism. The rest of us just think it's a good idea. (Whenever possible, throw public libraries into an argument, whether it's about good government programs or NEA funding. Nobody with any sense is opposed to public libraries. They are by far the most popular government institutions.) If an argument turns into a debate over socialism, simply define socialism as the total government ownership of all factories and natural resources—which, since we don't have it and no one is really arguing for this to happen, makes socialism a rather pointless debate. Of course, socialists will always argue among themselves about socialism and continue their internal debates. But when it comes to influencing public policy, **abstract discussions about socialism are worse than useless, for they alienate the progressive potential of the American people. It's only by pursuing specific progressive policies on nonsocialist terms that socialists have any hope in the long term of convincing the public that socialism isn't (or shouldn't be) a long-dead ideology.**

**Apocalyptic predictions about the ills of capitalism will not motivate activism—practical reforms are the only hope for the left.**

**Wilson, 2000** – Editor and Publisher of *Illinois Academe* – 2000 (John K. Wilson, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People” p. 14- 15)

Leftists also need to abandon their tendency to make apocalyptic predictions. It's always tempting to predict that environmental destruction is imminent or the stock market is ready to crash in the coming second Great Depression. Arguments that the U.S. economy is in terrible shape fly in the face of reality. It's hard to claim that a middle-class American family with two cars, a big-screen TV, and a computer is oppressed. While the poor in America fell behind during the Reagan/Gingrich/Clinton era and the middle class did not receive its share of the wealth produced during this time, the economy itself is in excellent shape. **Instead, the problem is the redistribution of wealth to the very rich under the resurgence of "free market" capitalism. Instead of warning that the economy will collapse without progressive policies, the left should emphasize that the progressive aspects of American capitalism have created the current success of the American economy after decades of heavy government investment in human capital. But the cutbacks in investment for education and the growing disparity between the haves and the have-nots are threatening the economy's future success.**

**AT CAPITALISM: CEDE THE POLITICAL**

**Capitalism is inevitable—reforms, not revolution, are the only option.**

**Wilson, 2000** – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People” p. 15- 16)

Capitalism is far too ingrained in American life to eliminate. If you go into the most impoverished areas of America, you will find that the people who live there are not seeking government control over factories or even more social welfare programs; they're hoping, usually in vain, for a fair chance to share in the capitalist wealth. The poor do not pray for socialism—they strive to be a part of the capitalist system. They want jobs, they want to start businesses, and they want to make money and be successful. What's wrong with America is not capitalism as a system but capitalism as a religion. We worship the accumulation of wealth and treat the horrible inequality between rich and poor as if it were an act of God. Worst of all, we allow the government to exacerbate the financial divide by favoring the wealthy: go anywhere in America, and compare a rich suburb with a poor town—the city services, schools, parks, and practically everything else will be better financed in the place populated by rich people. The aim is not to overthrow capitalism but to overhaul it. Give it a social-justice tune-up, make it more efficient, get the economic engine to hit on all cylinders for everybody, and stop putting out so many environmentally hazardous substances. To some people, this goal means selling out leftist ideals for the sake of capitalism. But the right thrives on having an ineffective opposition. The Revolutionary Communist Party helps stabilize the "free market" capitalist system by making it seem as if the only alternative to free-market capitalism is a return to Stalinism. Prospective activists for change are instead channeled into pointless discussions about the revolutionary potential of the proletariat. Instead of working to persuade people to accept progressive ideas, the far left talks to itself (which may be a blessing, given the way it communicates) and tries to sell copies of the Socialist Worker to an uninterested public.

**Overthrowing capitalism is a political non-starter—reforms are the only way that the left will be effective.**

**Wilson, 2000** Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe of many books including ‘The Myth of Political Correctness’ – 2000 (John K. Wilson, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People” p. 123)

The left often finds itself stuck in a debate between revolution and reform. To self-described revolutionaries, any attempt to reform the system is a liberal compromise that only delays the creation of a socialist utopia. The vision of workers casting off their chains and embracing the overthrow of capitalism is pure fantasy. No one actually knows what it means to overthrow capitalism, and it clearly isn't going to happen, anyway. Reforming American capitalism is not a halfhearted effort at modest change; it is a fundamental attack on the reigning ideology of "free market" capitalism. Progressive reforms, taken seriously, are revolutionary in every important sense. Reforms such as the New Deal were truly revolutionary for their time, and American capitalism has been saved from its own flaws by these progressive reforms. The problem is that these progressive reforms have not been carried far enough, in part because the revolutionary left has too often failed to support the progressives' reformist agenda. The only leftist revolution in America will come from an accumulation of progressive policies, and so the question of revolution versus reform is irrelevant.

AT CAPITALISM: CEDE THE POLITICAL, TRAINER SPECIFIC

**Trainer admits his argument would destroy mainstream environmentalism – any reason why this is good is a disad to the alternative.**

**Trainer, 07** (Ted Trainer, Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Work at the University of New South Wales. “Renewable Energy Cannot Sustain a Consumer Society” p. 7-8)

Obviously this book’s message is not a pleasant one for people in the Green Movement and I am acutely aware of the damage it would do the general environmental cause if it were taken seriously. Environmental activists have great difficulty getting the public in general to respond to environmental issues, even when they pose no significant challenges to the lifestyles and systems of consumer society. Almost all environmental activists seem to be oblivious to the contradiction built into their thinking. They are in effect saying, “Please help us save the planet by calling for a switch to the use of renewable energy sources — which can sustain consumer society and will pose no threat to our obsession with affluent lifestyles and economic growth.” Even getting people to attend to such unthreatening messages is very difficult. So how much more difficult would it be to get people to listen to the claim that to save the environment we have to cut consumption by perhaps 90%, and give up fossil fuels – and renewables cannot substitute for them? Given that I have been part of the Green Movement for decades, I realise that green goals could be significantly undermined if the theme of this book became widely discussed, let alone generally accepted. The most immediate effect would be a surge in support for nuclear energy (despite the case against it given in Chapter 9).

AT CAPITALISM: PERMUTATION

**Revolution will never happen over night—progressive policies need to be built upon over time.**

**Wilson, 2000** (John K, coordinator of the Independent Press Association's Campus Journalism Project, *How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People*, pages 121-123)

Progressives need to be pragmatic in order to be powerful. However, pragmatism shouldn't be confused with Clintonian centrism and the abandonment of all substance. Pragmatists have principles, too. The difference between a pragmatic progressive and a foolish one is the willingness to pick the right fights and fight in the right way to accomplish these same goals. The current failure of progressivism in America is due to the structure of American politics and media, not because of a wrong turn that the movement took somewhere along the way. What the left needs is not a "better" ideology but a tactical adaptation to the obstacles it faces in the contemporary political scene. A pragmatic progressivism does not sacrifice its ideals but simply communicates them better to the larger public. The words we use shape how people respond to our ideas. It's tempting to offer the standard advice that progressives should present their ideas in the most palatable form. But palatable to whom? The media managers and pedestrian pundits who are the intellectual gatekeepers won't accept these ideas. By the time progressives transform their ideas into the political baby food necessary for inclusion in current debates, it barely seems to be worth the effort. Leftists need to seize the dominant political rhetoric, even though it may be conservative in its goals, and turn it in a progressive direction. Progressives need to use the antitax ideology to demand tax cuts for the poor. Progressives need to use the antigovernment and antiwelfare ideology to demand the end of corporate welfare. Progressives need to translate every important issue into the language that is permissible in the mainstream. Something will inevitably be lost in the translation. But the political soul underlying these progressive ideas can be preserved and brought to the public's attention. The left does not need to abandon its progressive views in order to be popular. The left only needs to abandon some of its failed strategies and become as savvy as the conservatives are at manipulating the press and the politicians. The language of progressives needs to become more mainstream, but the ideas must remain radical. In an age of soulless politicians and spineless ideologies, the left has the virtue of integrity. Until progressives become less self-satisfied with the knowledge that they're right and more determined to convince everyone else of this fact, opportunities for political change will not be forthcoming. Progressives have also been hampered by a revolutionary instinct among some leftist groups. According to some left wingers, incremental progress is worthless—that is, nothing short of a radical change in government will mean anything to them. Indeed, for the most radical left wingers, liberal reforms are a threat to the movement, since they reduce the desire for more extreme changes. What the revolutionaries fail to realize is that progressive achievements can build on one another. If anything approaching a political revolution actually happens in America, it will be due to a succession of popular, effective, progressive reforms.

## AT CAPITALISM: CAP INEVITABLE

**Capitalism is inevitable – it is the only system that is capable of running the industrial world.**

**Stromberg, 04** - a Research Fellow at The Independent Institute, and previously held the JoAnn B. Rothbard chair in History at the Ludwig von Mises Institute (Joseph R. Stromberg, Ludwig von Mises Institute, "Why Capitalism is Inevitable?" 7-9-2004, <http://mises.org/article.aspx?Id=1562>)

the result is that interventions are cheered from all sides. For example, the movement for the (government-imposed) family wage spans left and right, when the state intervenes to curb mass retailing, free trade, sound money, freedom of association, private property, and all the other institutional marks of commercial society, it can count on wide intellectual agreement. Capitalism, it seems, despite its triumphs, remains an irresistible target of the opponents of liberty and property. How striking to discover, then, how few writers and thinkers are willing to spell out precisely what they mean when they refer to the economics of capitalism. For many, the term capitalism is nothing but a vessel into which they pour all the people, institutions, and ideas that they hate. And so capitalism emerges as a synonym for greed, dirty rivers and streams, pollution, corrupt businessmen, entrenched social privilege, the Republican Party, criminal syndicates, world Jewry, war for oil, or what have you. In fact, the advocates of capitalism themselves haven't always been entirely clear on the meaning and implications of capitalist theory. And this is why Murray Rothbard went to such lengths to spell out precisely what he was endorsing when he championed the economics of capitalism. This was especially necessary when he was writing in 1973, a time which was arguably the low point for capitalist theory. Mises died that year, all economists were said to be Keynesians, Nixon closed the gold window, wage and price controls were fastened on industry as an inflation fix, and the US was locked in a titanic Cold War struggle that emphasized government weaponry over private enterprise. Murray Rothbard, meanwhile, was hard at work on his book *For A New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto*, an effort to breath new life into a traditionally liberal program by infusing it with a heavy dose of political radicalism. It must have seemed like a hopeless task. The same year, he was asked to contribute an essay in a series of readings called *Modern Political Economy* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973). He was to address "The Future of Capitalism" (pp. 419-430), the conclusion of which might have seemed self-evidently bleak. But not to Rothbard. His contribution to the volume was lively, optimistic, enormously clarifying, and prescient to the extreme. Above all, he used the opportunity to explain with great clarity what precisely he means when he refers to capitalism: no more and no less than the sum of voluntary activity in society, particularly that characterized by exchange. Keep in mind that this was 1973, when hardly anyone else believed these countries capable of reform: "In Eastern Europe, then, I think that the prospects for the free market are excellent—I think we're getting free-market capitalism and that its triumph there is almost inevitable." Ten years later, it was still fashionable to speak of authoritarian regimes that could reform, as contrasted with socialist totalitarianism that could not be reform and presumably had to be obliterated. Rothbard did not believe this, based on both theory and evidence. Rothbard saw that all sectors in all countries moving either toward capitalism or toward socialism, which is to say, toward freedom or toward control. In the US, the trends looked very bleak indeed but he found trends to cheer in the antiwar movement, which he saw as a positive development against military central planning. "Both in Vietnam and in domestic government intervention, each escalating step only creates more problems which confront the public with the choice: either, press on further with more interventions, or repeal them—in Vietnam, withdraw from the coun-try." His conclusion must have sounded impossibly naïve in 1973 but today we can see that he saw further than any other "futurists" of his time: "the advent of industrialism and the Industrial Revolution has irreversibly changed the prognosis for freedom and statism. In the pre-industrial era, statism and despotism could peg along indefinitely, content to keep the peasantry at subsistence levels and to live off their surplus. But industrialism has broken the old tables; for it has become evident that socialism cannot run an industrial system, and it is gradually becoming evident that neomercantilism, interventionism, in the long run cannot run an industrial system either. Free-market capi-talism, the victory of social power and the economic means, is not only the only moral and by far the most productive system; it has become the only viable system for mankind in the industrial era. Its eventual triumph is therefore virtually inevitable."

**Capitalism is inevitable – even with financial crisis, free-market capitalism will survive.**

**The Australian, 09** (Staff Writer, "The Case for Capitalism," 6-25-2009, <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25685611-16382,00.html>)

THE way Australians are selling out of shares will delight doomsayers, giving them additional evidence for their argument that capitalism has failed and that only the state can save us from privation. The number of shareholders has slumped by 14 per cent from 2004, when more than half of us had portfolios. But the problem with the cassandras' commentary is that while they are obviously accurate in pointing to the damage down by the global financial crisis, they have misunderstood the nature of the disease and are peddling a snake oil solution to an imaginary malady. Whatever critics, including Kevin Rudd, claim, there was no crisis in capitalism last year; the laws of market economics did not suddenly stop operating - to suggest they did is the equivalent of arguing that the principles of physics are optional. The immutable rule of supply and demand did not disappear in October, the way wealth is created did not change. In the real world, entrepreneurs continued to produce products and supply services to sell for a profit, just as they have done since humanity first grasped that free exchange on open markets is the only just way to create wealth. Last year's disaster on stock exchanges and in credit markets around the world had nothing to do with capitalism. Rather, it was caused by the folly of financial alchemists, who thought they could con investors that it was possible to make money from trading what were ultimately promissory notes based on the supposed value of bundles of loans. And it was also caused by the incompetence of regulators charged with stopping such market manipulation. According to Financial Times journalist Gillian Tett, the collapse of the \$US12,000 billion market for these so-called securities precipitated the much broader slump. In the US, where regulators once required banks to hold reserves of \$US800 million to cover loans with a face value of \$US10bn, the amount required was reduced to just \$US160m. This sort of exposure meant disaster was inevitable, and beyond the global scope of the problem there was little to distinguish last year's crisis from other get-rich-quick schemes throughout history. But critics, such as the Prime Minister in his now-famous essay in which he argued that the state must regulate the economy to protect ordinary people from the ravages of capitalism, miss the point. While the world requires efficient regulation to protect the gullible from corrupt credit markets, this is very different from constraining capitalism itself.



AT CAPITALISM: CAP INEVITABLE

**Capitalism is inevitable – is just reinventing itself – it needs a few collapses to keep on the right track – it is the only way to ensure the growth of modern markets**

**The Australian, 07** (Staff Writer, “Don't worry about global panic: capitalism is just reinventing itself,” 8-25-2007, Lexis)

IN THE good old days of the Cold War, when the West had one of its periodic financial panics, we always had the Soviets on hand to remind us of the mortality of capitalism. As the Dow Jones tumbled and bankers threw themselves from window ledges, Moscow could be relied on to produce some cheerful bigwig from the politburo to explain that things like this never happened under communism. With some deft quote from Karl Marx (or, if he was subtle, John Maynard Keynes) the clever Russian would lecture us on the essential crisis of capitalism and its inevitable collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. These days, the Soviets are long gone, in hot pursuit of profits on global energy markets, and the communists in China have got the most overheated stock market in the world. But even in our post-historical age, we are not quite free from the occasional lapse of faith. Today, financial alarms still have the power to induce a sense of existential crisis, at least for our economic system if not for ourselves. The tendency is made worse, of course, by a modern media obsessed with presenting every spot of bother as the end of the world. The poor Russians. If only they'd known. Their endless prating about alienation and surplus labour was no match for a modern business reporter in search of a headline. This month's malaise in financial markets is a powerful case in point. Armed with their quiver of short, handy nouns, the scribblers besiege us daily with panics, crashes, crunches, and my personal favourite, meltdowns. But to be fair, the capacity of the current financial mess to frighten is greatly enhanced by its apparent complexity, the incomprehensibility of it all. In the past you thought you vaguely understood what drove markets down. The economy stalled unexpectedly, profits dropped and stock prices followed. But even the keen reader of the financial pages must find his eyes glazing over when the conversation turns to collateralised debt obligations and asset-backed securities, alpha-seeking hedge funds and sub-prime mortgages. I love the obscurantism of financial terminology. But when you discover that the Fed doesn't actually set the fed funds rate and that the discount rate, which it does set, is at a premium to fed funds, the temptation is to roll over and beg not to be disturbed until the commissars for financial stability are in charge. And yet we must still carefully ponder our current problems, not because they show us the essential weakness of our modern system but because they show us how strong it is, how efficient, how durable; and above all, how brilliant capitalism is at reinventing itself. First, just as Voltaire noted that the French needed to shoot the occasional admiral from time to time to encourage the others, so capitalism needs a few good collapses to keep it on the right path. The roots of the current crisis lie in an earlier period of happy excess. Although in the US the housing boom would go on for ever, people -- borrowers as well as lenders -- got lazier and lazier about inspecting the shaky foundations on which it was based. Far from representing a collapse of confidence in the system, financial crises are capitalism's way of purging itself of the excesses and Now it's true, you don't want every correction to wipe out half the wealth of the country, as used to be the case, a tendency that had the effect of encouraging capitalism's critics. But nowadays that doesn't happen -- which is the second cause for restrained optimism. The financial authorities have truly learnt the lessons of the big disasters of the past and now act quickly to stop the bleeding. There's a bit of fuss in the US this week about whether the Federal Reserve, through its injections of cheap money into the system, is bailing out institutions that have got themselves into difficulties. But this is silly. As though it would be better for everybody if they repeated the example of the 1930s and stood by while the devil took not only the hindmost, but most of the industrialised world. The third reason for cheer in the current gloom is the stabilising interconnectedness of the global economy. This may sound odd. When someone defaults on a mortgage in Ohio and it causes a crisis for a bank in Frankfurt, isn't there something wrong? On the contrary, financial innovation in the past 10 years has enabled financial markets -- and the customers they serve -- to spread risk around the world. The important lesson here, in fact, is that it is not an excess of free markets that has brought us low, but not enough. Widely available and reliable information is essential to the functioning of markets. The problems at too many banks and hedge funds this month is that they have invested in US assets, backed by dodgy mortgages that were wrongly categorised as healthy. But the biggest cause for comfort in the current crisis goes to the very heart of modern capitalism. Most of the coverage in the past few weeks has focused on the iniquity of an economic system so dependent on financial institutions. Trillions of dollars of financial assets slosh around the world every day at the flick of a switch. Doesn't that make us horribly vulnerable to sudden changes of sentiment? No. In fact it is the very growth of global financial markets that has given us so much of the prosperity we enjoy today. We no longer have boom-and-bust economics. Instead we have long cycles of growth punctuated by short downturns; and that is thanks in very large part to the efficiency of our modern financial markets.

AT CAPITALISM: CAN BE LIBERATORY

**Capitalism is inevitable and can be turned into a force for liberation as long as progressives focus on practical reforms.**

**Wilson, 2000** – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People” p. 12- 14)

Progressive capitalism is not a contradiction in terms, for progressives support capitalism in many ways. Even nonprofit organizations and cooperatives are not antithetical to capitalism and the market; these groups simply use capitalism for aims different from the single-minded pursuit of profits. But the rules of supply and demand, the expenses and revenues, the idea of entrepreneurship and innovation, and the need to adapt to the market are essential. Any progressive magazine or institution that tries to defy the rules of capitalism won't be around for very long and certainly won't have the resources to mount a serious advocacy of progressive ideas. One of the most effective tactics of the environmental movement was encouraging consumers to consider environmental values when making capitalist choices about what products to buy. Today, a manufacturer who ignores environmental issues puts its profits at risk because so many people are looking for environmentally friendly products and packaging. Crusades against Coca-Cola for its massive output of non-recycled plastic bottles in America or against companies supporting foreign dictatorships are part of the continuing battle to force companies to pay attention to consumer demands. Of course, consumer protests and boycotts are only one part of making "capitalism for everyone." Many progressive groups are now buying stock in companies precisely to raise these issues at stockholder meetings and pressure the companies to adopt environmentally and socially responsible policies. Unfortunately, the legal system is structured against progressive ideas. In 2000, Ben and Jerry's Ice Cream was forced to sell out to a big corporation that might ignore its commitment to many progressive causes. The company didn't want to sell, but the law demanded that the company's duty to stockholders was to consider only the money involved. Imagine what would happen if our capitalist laws were designed to promote progressive ideas instead of impeding them. Instead of allowing a shareholder lawsuit against any company acting in a morally, socially, and environmentally conscious way, American laws should encourage these goals. The claim by some leftists that capitalism is inherently irresponsible or evil doesn't make sense. Capitalism is simply a system of markets. What makes capitalism so destructive isn't the basic foundation but the institutions that have been created in the worship of the "free market." Unfortunately, progressives spend most of their time attacking capitalism rather than taking credit for all the reforms that led to America's economic growth. If Americans were convinced that social programs and investment in people (rather than corporate welfare and investment in weaponry) helped create the current economic growth, they would be far more willing to pursue additional progressive policies. Instead, the left allows conservatives to dismiss these social investments as “too costly” or “big government.”

AT CAPITALISM: NO SPECIFIC ALT = FAILURE

**The massive but failed WTO protests prove that protesting against capitalism without a specific alternative is doomed to failure.**

**Wilson, 2000** – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People” p. 110- 113)

Victory isn't easy for the left, even when it wins. One example in which progressives did almost everything right (but nevertheless was widely attacked) was the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) hearings in Seattle. Thanks to the hard work of leftists around the country (and the world), Seattle was overrun by more than 50,000 protesters who were determined to bring public attention to a powerful, secretive trade group. A huge rally organized by labor groups brought tens of thousands marching through Seattle, complete with union workers and environmentalists in sea turtle costumes. Thousands of protesters linked arms and prevented the opening session of the WTO from meeting. Most of the media coverage blamed the protesters for property damage that was planned and caused by anarchists and not stopped by the police. But the protesters did have a powerful effect on the scene, where the bias of the American media was less important to the delegates, many of whom sympathized with some of the protests. President Clinton, the world's leading trend detector, expressed his support for listening to the peaceful protesters, showing that he was more alert to the persuasive power of the anti-WTO forces than most of the media. Seattle and Washington left the left with many lessons. The first was never to let the media choose what the issue would be. Unfortunately, journalists (and their editors) are trained to overlook an important point for the sake of a flashy image and to portray a dramatic confrontation rather than a moral cause. This doesn't excuse the inaccurate reporting, biased attacks, and unquestioning defense of the authorities that filled most of the front pages and TV news about the WTO and IMF demonstrations. The progressives failed to spin the issue beyond their simple anti-WTO message. The reasons for opposing the WTO got some mention, but the idea of an alternative international organization built on genuine "free trade" and the protection of basic human rights never was aired. The left has become so accustomed to being ignored that progressives have wisely refined the attention-grabbing techniques of theatrical protest that can convey a simple message. Unfortunately, the left hasn't developed the difficult techniques of bringing more complex arguments into the public debate, and the result is that progressive views seem shallow and emotional compared with the more extensive coverage of the ideas of the right and the center in the mainstream media. Still, Seattle was both a success and an opportunity lost. The left brought attention to an organization without many redeeming values, but it never was able to launch a serious debate about what the alternative global values should be. Ignoring the massive evidence of police misconduct and brutality, the media served a well-defined role as gatekeepers of the truth. When the media criticized Seattle officials, it was for “permitting” the peaceful protesters to exercise their right to protest instead of shutting down the city, as happened for the rest of the WTO meetings. Still, the inability of the left to unify their ideas as easily as they unified behind the physical protest made it possible for many of the media errors to go unchallenged. Imagine if all the groups united behind the WTO protests had planned to meet after the initial melee and formulated a united response. Imagine if they had declared, “We denounce all violence, whether it is the violence of smashing windows; the violence of shooting tear gas, concussion grenades, pepper spray, and rubber bullets at peaceful protesters; or the violence of regimes anywhere in the world where political, human, or labor rights are violated and the environment is harmed. We regret that the police chose to ignore the vandalism on the streets of downtown Seattle and instead attacked nonviolent protestors with tear gas and rubber bullets. As we informed police before the protests began, a group of violent anarchists had announced their intention to try to disrupt our nonviolent protests and discredit our cause, although many peaceful demonstrators defended Seattle's stores—some of which we had previously protested in front of—against property damage and looting, we could no persuade these well-organized anarchists to stop, and we could not persuade the police shooting tear gas at us to stop the violence. We remain united in our belief that the policies of the World Trade Organization are harmful to the people of the world and are designed instead to increase the profits of corporations and the politicians who serve them. We will return to downtown Seattle to exercise our constitutional rights to assemble peacefully and express our ideas about the WTO. Saying that the WTO should be abolished is a simply and perhaps desirable goal. But failing to present a comprehensive alternative to international trade left the protesters open to accusations of being naïve or protectionist. The problem for the left was that their efforts were so disorganized that no clear alternative emerged. There was no comprehensive solution offered for the problems posed by the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF. No alternative institutions were proposed to take over the work of helping the world rather than harming it. Progressives need an international approach to free trade that doesn't seem like protectionism. “America First” is not a progressive perspective, and it fails to help the rest of the world. Without a progressive vision of globalism, the protests against free trade begin to merge with narrow-minded Buchananesque conspiracy theories about the UN or the WTO taking over the world.

## AT CAPITALISM: NO SPECIFIC ALT = FAILURE

**Don't buy their no blueprints needed argument – no revolution is possible without concrete action.**

**Kliman, 04** – PhD, Professor of Economics at Pace University (Andrew, Andrew Kliman's Writings, "Alternatives to Capitalism: What Happens After the Revolution?" <http://akliman.squarespace.com/writings/>)

Neglect is not the only reason why revolutionaries have failed to concretize the vision of the new society. Many have opposed and continue to oppose this perspective on the ground that we should not draw up "blueprints for the future." And many invoke Marx's name on behalf of this position. It is true that he rejected such blueprints, but precisely *what* was he rejecting, and *why*? Talk of "blueprints" is often careless. It is important to recall that Marx was grappling with some honest-to-goodness blueprints of a future society.

Fourier, for instance, stipulated how large each community (Phalanx) will be, how it will be laid out, how people will dine and with whom they will sit, and who will do the dirty work (a legion of "youngsters aged nine to sixteen, composed of one-third girls, two-thirds boys"). There is a great chasm between such blueprints, which Marx rejected, and what Dunayevskaya, in her final presentation on the dialectics of organization and philosophy, called "a general view of where we're headed." As Olga's report suggests, the difference is not essentially a matter of the degree of generality, but a matter of the *self-development* of the idea. Dunayevskaya wrote that once *Capital* was finished and Marx was faced with the Gotha Program in 1875, "There [was] no way now, now matter how Marx kept from trying to give any blueprints for the future, not to develop a general view of where we're headed for the day *after* the conquest of power, the day *after* we have rid ourselves of the birthmarks of capitalism" (*PON*, p. 5). Nor did Marx remain silent about this issue until that moment. For instance, in this year's classes on "Alternatives to Capitalism," we read the following statement in his 1847 *Poverty of Philosophy* (*POP*). "In a future society, in which ... there will no longer be any classes, use will no longer be determined by the minimum time of production, but the time of production devoted to different articles will be determined by the degree of their social utility." Even more important than Marx's explicit statements about the new society is the overall thrust of his critique of political economy. Although it is true that he devoted his theoretical energy to "the critical analysis of the actual facts, instead of writing recipes ... for the cook-shops of the future" (Postface to 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. of *Capital*), critique as he practiced it was not mere negative social criticism. It was a road toward the positive. He helped clarify what capital is and how it operates, and he showed that leftist alternatives will fail if they challenge only the system's outward manifestations rather than capital itself. By doing this, he helped to clarify what the new society must not and cannot be like – which is already to tell us a good deal about what it must and will be like. "All negation is determination" (Marx, draft of Vol. II of *Capital*). I believe that there are two reasons why Marx rejected blueprints for the future. As this year's classes emphasized, one reason is that he regarded the utopian socialists' schemes as not "utopian" enough. They were sanitized and idealized versions of existing capitalism: "the determination of value by labor time – the formula M. Proudhon gives us as the regenerating formula of the future – is therefore merely the scientific expression of the economic relations of present-day society" (Marx, *POP*, Ch. 1, sect. 2). But this simply means that Marx rejected a particular kind of attempt to concretize the vision of the new society, not that he rejected the task itself. The other reason was that Marx, who aligned himself with the real movement of the masses, held the utopians' schemes to be obsolete, or worse, once the working class was moving in another direction. I believe that this perspective remains valid, but that the subjective-objective situation has changed radically. Today, "what masses of people are hungering for[,] but which radical theoreticians and parties are doing little to address, is] the projection of a comprehensive alternative to existing society," as we stated in our 2003-04 Marxist-Humanist Perspectives thesis. Two months ago, Anne Jaclard spoke to a class of college youth. Many of them were eager for a concrete, well articulated vision of a liberatory alternative to capitalism, and they rejected the notion that its concretization should be put off to the future. Visitors to our classes, and participants in the "Alternatives to Capital" seminar on *Capital* in New York, have also demanded greater concreteness. How do we align with this real movement from below? Given the direction in which the masses' thinking is moving, hasn't resistance to concretizing a liberatory alternative become obsolete? I do not mean to imply that we should accommodate demands for easy answers. Like the Proudhonists and utopian socialists with whom Marx contended, many folks seem to think that concretizing an alternative to capitalism is simply a matter of articulating goals and then implementing them when the time comes. What we need to do when easy answers are demanded, I think, is convey the lessons we have learned – that the desirability of proposed alternatives means nothing if they give rise to unintended consequences that make them unsustainable, that political change flows from changes in the mode of production, and so forth – while also saying that which *can* be said about the new society, as concretely as it can be said.

Resistance to concretizing a liberatory alternative to capitalism has been and continues to be defended principally in the name of anti-vanguardism. An anarcho-syndicalist named "marko" recently put forth this argument in opposition to Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel's "parecon" (participatory economics): "Anarcho-Syndicalism demands that the detailed thinking about a future economy is to be decided by the liberated working class itself, not by a prior group of intellectuals. That is working class 'self-emancipation'."<sup>1</sup> In our own organization, a member of the clique that abandoned Marxist-Humanism put forth a very similar argument. It has sometimes been suggested that Marx rejected blueprints for the same reason, but I know of no evidence for this. The evidence sketched out above indicates that he labored to concretize a liberatory alternative to capitalism throughout his life, and did not regard this work as antithetical to working-class self-emancipation. In any case, marko confuses and conflates thinking with policy-making in a quite telling way. It is generally unfair to nitpick at unknown authors' internet posts, but marko's phraseology – "detailed thinking about the future economy is to be decided" – is too peculiar to be merely an accidental slip. All proponents of workers' self-emancipation agree that the *policies* of the future economy are to be decided upon by the working people themselves, but *thinking* simply cannot be shoehorned into the old problematic of "who decides?" Once again, a well-meaning attempt to posit spontaneity as the absolute opposite of vanguardist elitism ends up by placing the entire burden of working out a liberatory alternative to capitalism on the backs of the masses. And the newly liberated masses must somehow do this from scratch, having been deprived of the ability to learn from the theoretical achievements and mistakes of prior generations.

**AT CAPITALISM: CAP SUSTAINABLE**

**Capitalism does not need rescuing – all economies will rebound**

**The Australian, 9** (Staff Writer, "Reports of death of capitalism are greatly exaggerated," 6-25-2009, <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,25685608-20261,00.html>)

Fareed Zakaria, in Newsweek, suggests capitalism may not need rescuing:

MANY experts are convinced that the situation cannot improve yet because their own sweeping solutions to the problem have not been implemented. Most of us want to see more punishment inflicted, particularly on America's bankers ... But fundamentally, markets are not about morality. They are large, complex systems, and if things get stable enough, they move on. Consider our track record over the past 20 years, starting with the stockmarket crash of 1987, when on October 19 the Dow Jones lost 23 per cent, the largest one-day loss in its history ... John Kenneth Galbraith wrote that he just hoped that the coming recession wouldn't prove as painful as the Great Depression. It turned out to be a blip on the way to an even bigger, longer boom. Then there was the 1997 East Asian crisis, during the depths of which Paul Krugman wrote in a Fortune cover essay, "Never in the course of economic events - not even in the early years of the Depression - has so large a part of the world economy experienced so devastating a fall from grace." He went on to argue that if Asian countries did not adopt his radical strategy - currency controls - we could be looking at the kind of slump that 60 years ago devastated societies, destabilised governments and eventually led to war. Only one Asian country instituted currency controls, and partial ones at that. All rebounded within two years.

**Capitalism will inevitably transformed into something new – alternative not needed**

**Staugnews, 9** (Scott Bufis, Staff Writer, "Is Capitalism Dying or On the Cusp of Something New?" 6-22-2009, <http://staugnews.com/2009/06/22/is-capitalism-dying-or-on-the-cusp-of-something-new.html>)

With the president's new proposal, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, placing more restrictions on business as well as the continuous bailouts received by so many businesses, it's time to ask ourselves: where is capitalism going?dearly merely in a state of redesign and renewal?The idea of a free market is to allow the business and financially savvy to flourish while weeding out the lazy and half-baked. If a business goes under, that's just the natural evolutionary Darwinistic process of capitalism: survival of the fittest.So what does it mean when our government pumps money into the most dominant companies when they begin to fall as, themselves, victims of the evolutionary process of capitalism? We thought businesses like GM - the largest automotive manufacturer in the world - would never go under. I suppose we were right - the government is ensuring that they won't. Even the State of California has asked for a bailout. History tells us that communism is a fruitless venture. Our idea of a free market is changing rapidly. Capitalism, like all other economic systems, had its heyday, will fall, and be transformed into something new.

**Capitalism is sustainable and here to stay- the past proves**

**The Economist, 02-** (The Economist, "Capitalism and its troubles", 5-18-02, Lexis- Nexis Academic)

Assuming terror can be kept away from the developed world, there are two broad schools of thought about the future of capitalism. The bulls argue that the system's performance over the past year, particularly in America, bodes well for the future. Clearly, bursting stockmarket bubbles and scandal-ridden collapses of leading companies are cause for concern. But America has a long record of learning from its excesses to improve the working of its particular brand of capitalism, dating back to the imposition of antitrust controls on the robber barons in the late 1800s and the enhancement of investor protection after the 1929 crash. There is no reason why it should not turn the latest calamities to its advantage too. Senator Jon Corzine, a former boss of Goldman Sachs, puts the case for the optimists: "At the conclusion of any bull market there are always elements of excess that get washed out or cause the system to evolve. But the fact is, we are coming out of the most shallow recession in post-war history, and the outlook is good." Star performer The resilience of the financial system has surprised even the regulators responsible for its health on both sides of the Atlantic. As one of them put it, "If you had told me on September 10th that we were going to get the terrorism, Enron and Argentina, I'd have predicted at least one major international financial institution going bust, and serious consequences for the economy." As it is, the only financial firms to go under were on the fringes of the system: some banks in Argentina, and a handful of mostly long-troubled or small insurers. The bears too have been surprised by the system's resilience, but they still see a large remaining financial bubble which they fear may burst, possibly plunging America and the world into a depression similar to that of the 1930s, or at least of the past decade in Japan. The threat of further terrorism, fighting in the Middle East (with its repercussions for the oil price) and maybe a transatlantic trade war, conjuring up ghastly parallels with the 1930s, have all clouded their crystal balls further. With Argentina's default, they feel, perhaps globalisation has peaked.

**AT CAPITALISM: CAP SUSTAINABLE**

**Market innovation will outpace scarcity—their authors incorrectly that demand and supply are static.**  
**Norberg, 03** (Johan Norberg, Senior Fellow at Cato Institute, “In Defense of Global Capitalism”, p. 223)

It is a mistake, then, to believe that growth automatically ruins the environment. And claims that we would need this or that number of planets for the whole world to attain a Western standard of consumption—those “ecological footprint” calculations—are equally untruthful. Such a claim is usually made by environmentalists, and it is concerned, not so much with emissions and pollution, as with resources running out if everyone were to live as we do in the affluent world. Clearly, certain of the raw materials we use today, in present day quantities, would not suffice for the whole world if everyone consumed the same things. But that information is just about as interesting as if a prosperous Stone Age man were to say that, if everyone attained his level of consumption, there would not be enough stone, salt, and furs to go around. Raw material consumption is not static. With more and more people achieving a high level of prosperity, we start looking for ways of using other raw materials. Humanity is constantly improving technology so as to get at raw materials that were previously inaccessible, and we are attaining a level of prosperity that makes this possible. New innovations make it possible for old raw materials to be put to better use and for garbage to be turned into new raw materials. A century and a half ago, oil was just something black and sticky that people preferred not to step in and definitely did not want to find beneath their land. But our interest in finding better energy sources led to methods being devised for using oil, and today it is one of our prime resources. Sand has never been all that exciting or precious, but today it is a vital raw material in the most powerful technology of our age, the computer. In the form of silicon—which makes up a quarter of the earth’s crust—it is a key component in computer chips. There is a simple market mechanism that averts shortages. If a certain raw material comes to be in short supply, its price goes up. This makes everyone more interested in economizing on that resource, in finding more of it, in reusing it, and in trying to find substitutes for it.

**Capitalism is sustainable—consumerism may have an upper limit but efficiency gains will be critical to saving the environment.**

**Lewis 94** (Martin, lecturer in international history and interim director of the program in International Relations at Stanford University, *Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism*, Pages 10-11)

While the global economy certainly cannot grow indefinitely in volume by pouring out an ever mounting cavalcade of consumer disposables, it can continue to expand in value by producing better goods and services ever more efficiently. As I shall argue repeatedly throughout this work, economic growth of this type is absolutely essential. Only a strongly expanding economic base can generate the capital necessary to retool our economy into one that does not consume the earth in feeding itself. Ecological sanity will be expensive, and if we cannot pay the price we may well perish. This proposition is even more vital in regard to the Third World; only steady economic expansion can break the linkages so often found in poor nations between rural desperation and land degradation. Genuine development, in turn, requires both certain forms of industrialization as well as participation in the global economy.

AT CAPITALISM: TECH SAVES US

**New technologies will result in an eco-friendly food supply.**

**Lewis 94** (Martin, lecturer in international history and interim director of the program in International Relations at Stanford University, *Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism*, Page 146-147)

As advances in biotechnology make agriculture more efficient, large tracts of land can be progressively returned to nature. Similarly, intensive greenhouse cultivation, relying on high-tech glass construction, advanced atmospheric chemical control, and perhaps even the use of molecular antifungal agents, could increase food supplies while at the same time tremendously diminishing the extent of land needed for food production (Drexler and Peterson 1991:175). Yet some American politicians appear to rule out such possibilities beforehand, assuming that increasing production will only translate into larger commodity gluts (Sagoff 1991:353). Certainly the biotechnology revolution will require a difficult set of adjustments, for American farmers, but only an anti-environmentalist would automatically rule out the possibility of reducing the extent of land monopolized by agriculture. Agricultural gluts represent political, not technological, failure. Advanced techniques in food science, especially those concerned with enzyme production and protein synthesis, may also offer substantial environmental benefits. Especially desirable is the development of palatable, vegetable based meat substitutes. If soy burgers become indistinguishable from, and less expensive than, the genuine product, we could expect widespread cutbacks in meat consumption, allowing us to liberate vast tracts of land from agricultural production. Such environmental benefits would, however, be impossible to realize if consumers were to take at face value the eco-radical tenet that artificial products are to be avoided in all instances.

**Growth creates cleaner technologies that are the best hope for the environment.**

**Zey, 98** [Michael, executive director of the Expansionary Institute and professor at Montclair State University School of Business, *Seizing the Future*, p.36-37]

Third, growth itself contains the solutions to the problems it produces. Supporting this principle is the World Bank's 1992 report "Development and the Environment," which blatantly states that growth is a powerful antidote to a number of ills plaguing Third World countries, including the pollution that growth supposedly generates. The report thus contends that eliminating poverty should remain the top goal of world policymakers. Although economic growth can initially lead to such problems as pollution and waste, the resulting prosperity also facilitates the developments of technologies that lead to cleaner air and water. In fact, once a nation's per capita income rises to about \$4000 in 1993 dollars, it produces less of some pollutants per capita, mainly due to the fact that it can afford technology like catalytic converters and sewage systems that treat a variety of wastes. According to Norio Yamamoto, research director of the Mitsubishi Research Institute, "We consider any kind of environmental damage to result from mismanagement of the economy." He claims that the pollution problems of poorer regions such as Eastern Europe can be traced to their economic woes. Hence, he concludes that in order to ensure environmental safety "we need a sound economy on a global basis." So the answer to pollution, the supposed outgrowth of progress, ought to be more economic growth. The World Bank estimated that every dollar invested in developing countries will grow to \$100 in fifty years. As that happens, these countries can take all the necessary steps to invest in pollution-free cars, catalytic converters, and other pollution-free technologies, such as the cleanest of all energy sources, nuclear power.

AT CAPITALISM: CAP = PEACE

**Capitalism promotes democratic peace.**

**Fukuyama 95** – Senior Social Scientist, Rand Corporation – 1995 (Francis, TRUST, p. 360-1)

The role that a capitalist economy plays in channeling recognition struggles in a peaceful direction, and its consequent importance to democratic stability, is evident in post-communist Eastern Europe. The totalitarian project envisioned the destruction of an independent civil society and the creation of a new socialist community centered exclusively around the state. When the latter, highly artificial community, there were virtually no alternative forms of community beyond those of family and ethnic group, or else in the delinquent communities constituted by criminal gangs. In the absence of a layer of voluntary associations, individuals clung to their ascriptive identities all the more fiercely. Ethnicity provided an easy form of community by which they could avoid feeling atomized, weak, and victimized by the larger historical forces swirling around them. In developed capitalist societies with strong civil societies, by contrast, the economy itself is the locus of a substantial part of social life. When one works for Motorola, Siemens, Toyota, or even a small family dry-cleaning business, one is part of a moral network that absorbs a large part of one's energies and ambitions. The Eastern European countries that appear to have the greatest chances for success as democracies are Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, which retained nascent civil societies throughout the communist period and were able to generate capitalist private sectors in relatively short order. There is no lack of divisive ethnic conflicts in these places, whether over competing Polish and Lithuanian claims to Vilnius or Hungarian irredenta vis-à-vis neighbors. But they have not flared up into violent conflicts yet because the economy has been sufficiently vigorous to provide an alternative source of social identity and belonging. The mutual dependence of economy and polity is not limited to democratizing states in the former communist world. In a way, the loss of social capital in the United States has more immediate consequences for American democracy than for the American economy. Democratic political institutions no less than businesses depend on trust for effective operation, and the reduction of trust in a society will require a more intrusive, rule-making government to regulate social relations.



AT CAPITALISM: CAP = PEACE

**Studies prove that globalization and capitalism lessen the frequency and intensity of war.**

**Griswold, 05** (Daniel, director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at Cato, "Peace on earth? Try free trade among men", <http://www.freetrade.org/node/282>)

As one little-noticed headline on an Associated Press story recently reported, "War declining worldwide, studies say." According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has been in decline for the past half century. In just the past 15 years, ongoing conflicts have dropped from 33 to 18, with all of them now civil conflicts within countries. As 2005 draws to an end, no two nations in the world are at war with each other. The death toll from war has also been falling. According to the AP story, "The number killed in battle has fallen to its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year by one measure. Peacemaking missions, meanwhile, are growing in number." Those estimates are down sharply from annual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the 1990s, and from a peak of 700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War. Many causes lie behind the good news -- the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them -- but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author has argued, growing commercial ties between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war, for three main reasons. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high. Second, as national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war. Third, globalization allows nations to acquire wealth through production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources. Increasingly, wealth is measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital.

**Capitalism encourages international cooperation that fosters peace.**

**Bandow, 05** (Doug, Senior Fellow at Cato, "Spreading Capitalism is Good for Peace", [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=5193](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5193))

In a world that seems constantly aflame, one naturally asks: What causes peace? Many people, including U.S. President George W. Bush, hope that spreading democracy will discourage war. But new research suggests that expanding free markets is a far more important factor, leading to what Columbia University's Erik Gartzke calls a "capitalist peace." It's a reason for even the left to support free markets. The capitalist peace theory isn't new: Montesquieu and Adam Smith believed in it. Many of Britain's classical liberals, such as Richard Cobden, pushed free markets while opposing imperialism. But World War I demonstrated that increased trade was not enough. The prospect of economic ruin did not prevent rampant nationalism, ethnic hatred, and security fears from trumping the power of markets. An even greater conflict followed a generation later. Thankfully, World War II left war essentially unthinkable among leading industrialized - and democratic - states. Support grew for the argument, going back to Immanuel Kant, that republics are less warlike than other systems. Today's corollary is that creating democracies out of dictatorships will reduce conflict. This contention animated some support outside as well as inside the United States for the invasion of Iraq. But Gartzke argues that "the 'democratic peace' is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom." That is, democracies typically have freer economies than do authoritarian states. Thus, while "democracy is desirable for many reasons," he notes in a chapter in the latest volume of Economic Freedom in the World, created by the Fraser Institute, "representative governments are unlikely to contribute directly to international peace." Capitalism is by far the more important factor. The shift from statist mercantilism to high-tech capitalism has transformed the economics behind war. Markets generate economic opportunities that make war less desirable. Territorial aggrandizement no longer provides the best path to riches. Free-flowing capital markets and other aspects of globalization simultaneously draw nations together and raise the economic price of military conflict. Moreover, sanctions, which interfere with economic prosperity, provides a coercive step short of war to achieve foreign policy ends. Positive economic trends are not enough to prevent war, but then, neither is democracy. It long has been obvious that democracies are willing to fight, just usually not each other. Contends Gartzke, "liberal political systems, in and of themselves, have no impact on whether states fight." In particular, poorer democracies perform like non-democracies. He explains: "Democracy does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are 14 times more prone to conflict than those with very high levels." Gartzke considers other variables, including alliance memberships, nuclear deterrence, and regional differences. Although the causes of conflict vary, the relationship between economic liberty and peace remains.

**AT CAPITALISM: SOLVES POVERTY**

**We control the uniqueness – poverty is massively decreasing because of capitalism**

**NIC, 08** (National Intelligence Council, U.S. National Intelligence Agency Mid-Term and Long-Term Thinking, “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,” Chapter 1: A Globalizing Economy, pg. 8)

We are witnessing an unprecedented moment in human history: never before have so many been lifted out of extreme poverty as is happening today. A stunning 135 million people escaped dire poverty between 1999 and 2004 alone—more than the population of Japan and almost as many as live in Russia today. states with SWFs has grown from three to over 40, and the aggregate sum under their control from around \$700 billion to \$3 trillion. The range of functions served by SWFs also has expanded, as many of the states that created them recently have done so out of a desire to perpetuate current account surpluses, or to cultivate intergenerational savings, rather than to buffer commodity market volatility. Should current trends hold, SWFs will swell to over \$6.5 trillion within five years, and to \$12-15 trillion within a decade, exceeding total fiscal reserves and comprising some 20 percent of all global capitalization. Over the next several decades the number of people considered to be in the “global middle class” is projected to swell from 440 million to 1.2 billion or from 7.6 percent of the world’s population to 16.1 percent, according to the World Bank. Most of the new entrants will come from China and India. However, there is a dark side to the global middle class coin: continued divergence at the extremes. Many countries— especially the landlocked and resource- poor ones in Sub Saharan Africa—lack the fundamentals for entering the globalization game.

**The free market solves poverty—empirics prove**

**Wilkinson, 06-** Will Wilkinson is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. (Will Wilkinson, “Depressed markets? Happiness and free trade.(free market system's impact on quality of life” December 2006, Proquest)  
**DOES RESEARCH** on happiness prove markets are a bummer? Political scientist Benjamin Radcliff of Notre Dame University, summing up his recent studies in Social Forces and the American Political Science Review, says survey research shows that "the more we supplement the cold efficiency of the free market system with interventions that reduce poverty, insecurity and inequality, the more we improve the quality of life." But contrary to his expectations, the Dutch sociologist Ruut Veenhoven, editor of the Journal of Happiness Studies, found in a 2000 paper that a larger welfare state does not create "any well-being surplus. "A 2001 National Bureau of Economic Research paper by the economists Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella, and Robert MacCulloch indicated that inequality has no negative effect on happiness in the U.S.-- unless you're a rich leftist. More recently, a 2006 study by the University of Regina's Tomi Ovaska and the University of West Virginia's Ryo Takashima, published in the Journal of Socio-Economics, shows that the variable most strongly correlated with a nation's average self-reported happiness is "economic freedom" as measured by the Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index. To be sure, the egalitarian Swedes aren't suffering, but neither are the more market-friendly Americans. Radcliff writes that "'emancipation' from the market ... is the principal political determinant of subjective well-being." But when welfare states work relatively well, it's because they can draw on the big bucks generated by reasonably free and well-functioning markets.

**AT CAPITALISM: SOLVES POVERTY**

**Capitalism solves poverty—food prices prove**

**Bartholomew, 06-** Author of 'The Welfare State We're In' he is also a writer and columnist for the Daily Telegraph (James Bartholomew, "We need a revision course on why capitalism is a good thing" May 24th, 2006, Lexis-Nexis Academic)

I was going to say, "Let's take a revision course in why capitalism is good." But few of us had an initial lesson. I don't suggest that every school should have been teaching the virtues of capitalism, but right now they do precisely the opposite. They teach that capitalists destroy rainforests, insidiously control American foreign policy and spread the human vices of greed and selfishness. Anti-capitalism is now the subtext of history and geography lessons, as well as politics, economics and sociology. Capitalism is said to have given rise to slavery. The state is depicted as a hero that has tempered the cruelty of the beast with laws, regulations and interventions. If you have children at school - state or private - he or she will be getting another little dose of anti-capitalist propaganda today. It is absurdly lopsided, of course, and it puts our society on a self-destructive path.

What is the biggest benefit that the relatively poor have experienced over the past two centuries? It is surely the terrific reduction in the cost of food. Two centuries ago, food was the biggest part in a family's budget. It was hard for a poor family to get enough to eat. If there was a shortage, there could be a famine, resulting in thousands of deaths. Even in the 1920s, people on average spent a third of their income on food. Now they spend only a tenth. Look at any chart of the price of the basic foodstuffs, such as wheat, barley and milk, and you will see almost continuous and deep falls. What has caused this massive benefit to the poor? A series of government regulations? A good-looking politician with an easy smile and a "vision"? No. Capitalism. No single individual did it. Thousands, or millions, did it. They were not directed by any central agency. They just operated in a capitalist system. They invented farm machinery that replaced many men and therefore made food much cheaper. Farmers deployed these machines. Others created ships that could carry grain cheaply, quickly from faraway lands where food was grown more cheaply. Others still distributed the food in ever more cost-efficient ways, by rail and by road on newly created and deployed trains and lorries. They did this, each of them living his own separate life in his own undirected way. They transformed the situation. The poor were given food in abundance. They were given it at a price they could easily afford. Shortages, hunger and famine became history. That is what capitalism did. To sneer at it is to sneer at the abolition of hunger in this country. This has been, perhaps, capitalism's greatest achievement. But that is just the beginning. Capitalism achieved a similar feat in clothing. Two centuries ago, many people had clogs on their feet. Clothing was another major expense for the poor. Nye Bevan, as a child, threw an inkwell at his teacher because the man made fun of a boy whose family could afford only one pair of shoes between the boy and his brother. That is a measure of the poverty that we have come from. That is the poverty from which capitalism has elevated this country. Again, new and much cheaper methods of production have been put in place by individuals importing cotton, improving textile production techniques, deploying new kinds of transport and distributing the raw material and final products more cheaply. No longer do children share shoes.

**Capitalism is better at promoting fairness and equality to the poor rather than any alternative—History proves**

**Bartholomew, 06-** Author of 'The Welfare State We're In' he is also a writer and columnist for the Daily Telegraph (James Bartholomew, "We need a revision course on why capitalism is a good thing" May 24th, 2006, Lexis-Nexis Academic)

Capitalism has made us richer and given us the opportunity of vastly more diverse experiences. Even in my own lifetime, I have seen the normal length of holidays rise from one or two weeks to four or five weeks. Foreign travel that was unknown for most working people two centuries ago is now commonplace. Did government direction make this possible? Of course not. Most families now have cars. Read Thomas Hardy's novels and you find that people are always walking. Walking can be healthy and pleasant, but the average family of Hardy's time did not have a choice. Who invented cars? Who refined their design and manufacture to the point where they are affordable by millions of people? Not governments. The diverse, resourceful, determined power of capitalism. Why does the system work? Because it provides incentives and motivation. If you invent something, you may get fame and fortune. If you supply food or cars cheaper, you get more customers. Simple enough. Provide a good product or service at a low price and you have a business. That simple logic means capitalism tends to produce good products and services at better prices. What about the argument that capitalism promotes inequality? Let's remember, before even starting to answer, just how disastrous were the attempts in the 20th century to impose equality. Farmers in Leninist Russia were prosecuted and in many cases killed. Tens of millions died under communist rule in China. And after all the oppression and suffering, there was still no equality. There was the privileged ruling class with, in Russia's case, special dachas in the country and road lanes in town. Imposing equality is not an easy ride. It is oppressive and doomed to failure. Capitalism, meanwhile, has claims, at the least, to reducing inequality over time. The inequality was enormous when George III was sitting on his gilded throne in 1806, with thousands of servants and farm workers and other underlings at his beck and call, while elsewhere in the country were those who could barely find enough to eat and, in some cases, died of hunger. Nowadays, more than nine out of 10 young people have mobile phones, 99 per cent of households have colour televisions, most households have cars. Yes, the rich are still with us. But the contrast in financial wealth has been greatly reduced over the long term. That was not due to any government, let alone a deliberate attempt to promote equality. It was achieved by capitalism. Why is the system now taken for granted and despised? Perhaps it is because the collapse of the communist states has removed from our sight useful reminders of how vastly superior capitalism is to state control. We should be careful.

**AT CAPITALISM: SOLVES POVERTY**

**Capitalism causes structural opportunities for the poor**

**Geddes, 03-** An Auckland freelance writer (Marc Geddes, The New Zealand Herald, "Marc Geddes: Economic system still the world's best despite flaws", November 10th 2003, Lexis-Nexis Academic)

John Minto bemoaned the fact that under capitalism there was a minority of obscenely rich people and a larger number of people suffering "huge hardship". But capitalism did not cause the poverty, and the rich did not get rich at the expense of the poor. Wealth is not something that simply exists. It is created through human labour and ingenuity. That is why we speak of "making money". There is no fixed pool of resources waiting to be distributed. Resources have to be created through hard work. Capitalism is not a zero-sum game but a positive-sum game in which everyone can benefit. Economic growth creates wealth that did not exist before, and, provided the wealth is spread about a bit, everyone gets richer. Hardship exists not because there is too much capitalism but because there is too little. Capitalism is lifting humanity out of poverty, and capitalism generates the wealth that pays for the healthcare, education, and welfare that those living in advanced democracies now enjoy. If we desire a decent standard of living for all, we should encourage more entrepreneurship. The claim that the removal of tariffs and more free trade causes unemployment is false. In fact, more free trade creates more jobs. Capitalism is a dynamic system in which the nature of work continues to evolve. Some people lose their jobs but more jobs are being created elsewhere. Human ingenuity enables more of us to figure out ways to achieve more productively for less effort. So fewer people are needed to do the same amount of work. This is progress. Capitalism results in net job creation because wealth creation results in new opportunities and new kinds of work. For instance, cars resulted in drivers of the horse and buggy losing their jobs, but whole new kinds of work - mechanics, for instance - produced a net job creation. John Minto thinks that employees create wealth, and investors in sharemarkets are parasites. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is true that employees help to create wealth, for which they receive wages. But investors and business owners create wealth as well. It is not simply labour that adds value but human ingenuity and intelligence. Economists are coming to recognise that the "knowledge" component is the most important. The business owner and investors supply the knowledge component. The "profit" they make is not parasitic but a measure of "added value" to the good or service produced. Profit is not something swindled from other people. It is a reward and remuneration for the work and ingenuity that went into producing the goods and services that other people want. John Minto called for someone from the "underclass" to defend capitalism. I have responded. I defend it because as an unemployed person I know who pays my dole. It's the people who created every cent of that money. The entrepreneurs of New Zealand ... the capitalists

**AT CAPITALISM: CAP SOLVES TERRORISM**

**Capitalism doesn't fuel terrorism- bad foreign policy is the root cause.**

**Lindsey, 01-** Is the senior editor of Cato Unbound. Lindsey holds an A.B. from Princeton University and a J.D. from Harvard Law School. (Brink Lindsey, Policy Report, "Terrorism's Fellow Travelers", November/ December 2001, [http://74.125.95.132/custom?q=cache:u2CLXl5yCr4J:www.cato.org/pubs/policy\\_report/v23n6/terrorism.pdf+capitalism+and+terrorism&cd=7&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=google-coop-np](http://74.125.95.132/custom?q=cache:u2CLXl5yCr4J:www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v23n6/terrorism.pdf+capitalism+and+terrorism&cd=7&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=google-coop-np))

Al Qaeda's ideology now has a life of its own. The U.S. preoccupation with Iraq for more than two years after September 11 (beginning with President Bush naming Iraq as a member of the "axis of evil" in his January 2002 State of the Union address) has given time and space for the cancer to spread, as well as a rallying cry to recruit more Muslims to Al Qaeda's radical cause. According to Omar Bakri Mohammed, the London-based leader of the radical Islamic group al-Muhajiroun: "Al Qaeda is no longer a group. It's become a phenomenon of the Muslim world resisting the global crusade of the U.S. against Islam." We know that Al Qaeda has become a franchise of sorts, bringing other radical Islamic groups, such as Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, into its fold. But it also now appears that a "reverse franchise" effect may be taking place. That is, other groups may conduct terrorist attacks citing sympathy with Al Qaeda but without any direct connection to or contact with Al Qaeda. The November 2003 car bombings in Turkey (the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades and Great Eastern Islamic Raider's Front both claimed responsibility) and the March 2004 train bombings in Spain (the Abu Hafs al Masri Brigades claimed responsibility but the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group has been the primary target of the Spanish investigation) are signs of this phenomenon. Changing U.S. Foreign Policy

Understanding the Al Qaeda threat also means challenging the conventional wisdom articulated by President Bush in the aftermath of September 11: "Why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber—a democratically elected government. They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other." That's a misleading analysis. Throughout the world, even the Muslim world, people admire and appreciate American accomplishments, culture, and values (including democracy and capitalism). But many of those people hate U.S. policies. Polls conducted throughout the world show that anti-Americanism is fueled more by what we do than who we are. As a 1998 study for the Department of Defense reported, much of the anti-American resentment around the world, particularly the Islamic world, is the result of interventionist U.S. foreign policy. Such resentment is the first step to hatred, which can lead to violence, including terrorism. Therefore, the United States needs to stop meddling in the internal affairs of other countries and regions, except when they directly threaten U.S. national security interests, that is, when the territorial integrity, national sovereignty, or liberty of the United States is at risk.

AT CAPITALISM: CAP KEY TO SPACE

**Capitalist privatization is key to space exploration and colonization.**

**Garmong, 05** – PhD in philosophy

(Richard, Cap Mag, "Privatize Space Exploration," <http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=4327>)

As NASA scrambles to make the July 31 window for the troubled launch of space shuttle Discovery, we should recall the first privately funded manned spacecraft, SpaceShipOne, which over a year ago shattered more than the boundary of outer space: it destroyed forever the myth that space exploration can only be done by the government. Two years ago, a Bush Administration panel on space exploration recommended that NASA increase the role of private contractors in the push to permanently settle the moon and eventually explore Mars. Unfortunately, it appears unlikely that NASA will consider the true free-market solution for America's expensive space program: complete privatization. There is a contradiction at the heart of the space program: space exploration, as the grandest of man's technological advancements, requires the kind of bold innovation possible only to minds left free to pursue the best of their creative thinking and judgment. Yet, by funding the space program through taxation, we necessarily place it at the mercy of bureaucratic whim. The results are written all over the past twenty years of NASA's history: the space program is a political animal, marked by shifting, inconsistent, and ill-defined goals. The space shuttle was built and maintained to please clashing special interest groups, not to do a clearly defined job for which there was an economic and technical need. The shuttle was to launch satellites for the Department of Defense and private contractors--which could be done more cheaply by lightweight, disposable rockets. It was to carry scientific experiments--which could be done more efficiently by unmanned vehicles. But one "need" came before all technical issues: NASA's political need for showy manned vehicles. The result, as great a technical achievement as it is, was an over-sized, over-complicated, over-budget, overly dangerous vehicle that does everything poorly and nothing well. Indeed, the space shuttle program was supposed to be phased out years ago, but the search for its replacement has been halted, largely because space contractors enjoy collecting on the overpriced shuttle without the expense and bother of researching cheaper alternatives. A private industry could have fired them--but not so in a government project, with home-district congressmen to lobby on their behalf.

**Space colonization means we survive global nuclear war, bioweapon use, and environmental destruction.**

**Koschara, 01** – Major in Planetary Studies

(Fred, L5 Development Group, <http://www.l5development.com/fkespace/financial-return.html>)

Potentially one of the greatest benefits that may be achieved by the space colonies is nuclear survival, and the ability to live past any other types of mass genocide that become available. We have constructed ourselves a house of dynamite, and now live in fear that someone might light a match. If a global nuclear war were to break out, or if a deadly genetic experiment got released into the atmosphere, the entire human race could be destroyed in a very short period of time. In addition, many corporate attitudes seem concerned with only maximizing today's bottom line, with no concern for the future. This outlook leads to dumping amazingly toxic wastes into the atmosphere and oceans, a move which can only bring harm in the long run. Humanity has to diversify its hold in the universe if it is to survive. Only through space colonization is that option available, and we had all best hope we're not to late.

**It's time – environmental damage has already passed the tipping point – it will kill us all by 2050 if we don't colonize**

**Daily Record, 02** (Graham Brough, Staff Writer, "Would the Last Person to Leave Earth Please Turn Out the Lights;

Experts Warn we Need to Move Planet as Modern Life Kills Ours," 7-8-2002, Lexis)

The Earth will be so gutted, wrecked, over-exploited and the barren seas so fished out that we will have to find a new planet – or even two - by 2050. Environmentalists at the World Wildlife Fund say we have just another half century of luxury living left before the Earth becomes a spent husk. By that time, we will either have to colonise space or risk human extinction as population and consumption expand.

AT CAPITALISM: GIBSON-GRAHAM

**Once capitalism is presented as a monolith, no alternative is possible.**

**Gibson-Graham, 6** – Professor of Geosciences at University of Massachusetts, PhD; Feminist Economic Geographer and Professor at the Australian National University, PhD

(J.K. Gibson-Graham, “The End of Capitalism as We Knew It,” pg. 255-257)

Through its architectural or organismic depiction as an edifice or body, Capitalism becomes not an uncentered aggregate of practices but a structural and systemic unity, potentially co-extensive with the national or global economy as a whole. 11 As a large, durable, and self-sustaining formation, it is relatively impervious to ordinary political and cultural u, except through some herculean and coordinated struggle. Understood as a unified system or structure, Capitalism is not ultimately vulnerable to local and partial efforts at transformation. Any such efforts can always be subverted by Capitalism at another scale or in another dimension. Attempts to transform production may be seen as hopeless without control of the financial system. Socialisms in one city or in one country may be seen as undermined by Capitalism at the international scale. Capitalism cannot be chipped away at, gradually replaced or removed piecemeal. It must be transformed in its entirety or not at all. Thus one of the effects of the unity of Capitalism is to present the left with the task of systemic transformation. Singularity If the unity of Capitalism confronts us with the mammoth task of systemic transformation, it is the singularity and totality of Capitalism that make the task so hopeless. Capitalism presents itself as a singularity in the sense of having no peer or equivalent, of existing in a category by itself; and also in the sense that when it appears fully realized within a particular social formation, it tends to be dominant or alone. As a sui generis economic form, Capitalism has no true analogues. Slavery, independent commodity production, feudalism, socialism, primitive communism and other forms of economy all lack the systemic properties of Capitalism and the ability to reproduce and expand themselves according to internal laws. 12 Unlike socialism, for example, which is always struggling to be born, which needs the protection and fostering of the state, which is fragile and easily deformed, Capitalism takes on its full form as a natural outcome of an internally driven growth process. Its organic unity gives capitalism the peculiar power to regenerate itself, and even to subsume its moments of crisis as requirements of its continued growth and development. Socialism has never been endowed with that mythic capability of feeding on its own crises; its reproduction was never driven from within by a life force but always from without; it could never reproduce itself but always had to be reproduced, often an arduous if not impossible process. 13

**Capitalism has no peer so it tends to be dominant and cannot coexist with other forms of economics.**

**Gibson-Graham, 93** – Professor of Geosciences at University of Massachusetts, PhD; Feminist Economic Geographer and Professor at the Australian National University, PhD

(J.K. Gibson-Graham, “Waiting for the Revolution, or How to Smash Capitalism while Working at Home in Your Spare Time,” published in *Marxism in the Postmodern Age* by Antonio Callari et al in 1994, pg 188-197)

Capitalism presents itself as a singularity in the sense of having no peer or equivalent and also in the sense that, when it appears fully developed within a particular social formation, it tends to be dominant or alone. As a sui generis economic form, Capitalism has no true analogues. Slavery, independent commodity production, feudalism, socialism, and primitive communism all lack the systemic properties of Capitalism and the ability to reproduce and expand themselves according to internal laws. Unlike socialism, which is always struggling to be born, which needs the protection and fostering of the state, which is fragile and easily deformed, Capitalism takes on its full form as a natural outcome of an internally driven growth process. Its organic unity gives Capitalism the peculiar power to regenerate itself, and even to subsume its moments of crisis as requirements of its continued growth and development. Socialism has never been endowed with that mythic capability of feeding on its own crises; its reproduction was never driven from within by a life force, but always from without; it could never reproduce itself but always had to be reproduced, often an arduous if not impossible process. Other modes of production that lack the organic unity of Capitalism are more capable of being instituted or replaced incrementally and more likely to coexist with other economic forms. Capitalism, by contrast, tends to appear by itself. Thus, in the United States, if feudal or ancient classes exist, they exist as residual forms; if slavery exists, it exists as a marginal form; if socialism or communism exists, it exists as a prefigurative form. None of these forms truly and fully coexists with Capitalism. Where Capitalism does coexist with other forms, those places (the so-called third world, for example) are seen as not fully “developed.” Rather than signaling the real possibility of Capitalism’s coexistence with noncapitalist economic forms, the simultaneous presence of Capitalism and noncapitalism marks the third world as insufficient and incomplete.

AT CAPITALISM: GIBSON-GRAHAM

**Capitalism is a single, unified force – their attempt at personally rejecting capitalism will be massively overshadowed.**

**Gibson-Graham, 93** – Professor of Geosciences at University of Massachusetts, PhD; Feminist Economic Geographer and Professor at the Australian National University, PhD

(J.K. Gibson-Graham, “Waiting for the Revolution, or How to Smash Capitalism while Working at Home in Your Spare Time,” published in *Marxism in the Postmodern Age* by Antonio Callari et al in 1994, pg 188-197)

The birth of the concept of Capitalism as we know it coincided in time with the birth of “the economy” as an autonomous social sphere. Not surprisingly, then, Capitalism shares with its more abstract sibling the qualities of an integrated system and the capability of reproducing itself (or of being reproduced). Represented as an organism through which flows of social labor circulate in various forms, Capitalism regulates itself according to logics or laws, propelled by a life force along a preordained (though not untroubled) trajectory of growth. Often the unity of Capitalism is represented in more architectural terms. Capitalism (or capitalist society) becomes a structure in which parts are related to one another, linked to functions, and arranged “in accordance with an architecture that is. . . no less invisible than visible” (Foucault 1973, 231). The architectural/structural metaphor confers upon Capitalism qualities of durability and persistence as well as unity and coherence, giving it greater purchase on social reality than more ephemeral phenomena. While Marxist conceptions usually emphasize the contradictory and crisis-ridden nature of capitalist development, capitalist crisis may itself be seen as a unifying process. Crises are commonly presented as originating at the organic center of a capitalist society—the capital accumulation—and as radiating outward to destabilize the entire economic and social formation. What is important here is not the different metaphors and images of economy and society but the fact that they all confer integrity upon Capitalism. Through its architectural or organismic representation as an edifice or body, Capitalism becomes not an uncentered aggregate of practices but a structural and systemic unity, potentially coextensive with the (national or global) economy as a whole. Understood as a unified system or structure, Capitalism is not ultimately vulnerable to local and partial efforts at transformation. Any such efforts can always be subverted by Capitalism at another scale or in another dimension. Attempts, for example, to transform production may be seen as hopeless without control of the financial system; and socialisms in one city or in one country may be seen as undermined by Capitalism at the international scale. Capitalism cannot be gradually replaced or removed piecemeal; it must be transformed in its entirety or not at all. Thus one of the effects of the unity of Capitalism is to confront the Left with the task of systemic transformation.



AT CAPITALISM: REFORMS EFFECTIVE

**The EPA's track record proves that capitalism can be reformed.**

**Walberg and Bast, '03** (Herbert J. Walberg, distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Joseph L. Bast, president of the Heartland Institute, *Education and Capitalism: How Overcoming Our Fear of Markets and Economics Can Improve America's Schools*, "Chapter Five: Nine Myths About Capitalism,"

<http://www.hoover.org/publications/books/2995211.html>, Accessed 07-17-08)

In the United States, the environment is unequivocally becoming cleaner and safer. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), total air pollution emissions in the United States fell 34 percent between 1970 and 1990.<sup>40</sup> Particulate-matter emissions fell by 60 percent, sulfur oxides by 25 percent, carbon monoxide by 40 percent, and lead by 96 percent. Between 1987–1992 and 1994–1999, the number of bad-air days (when air quality failed to meet federal standards) fell 82 percent in Newark, 54 percent in Los Angeles, 78percent in Chicago, and 69 percent in Milwaukee.<sup>41</sup>Total emissions of air pollutants tracked by the EPA are forecast to fall by 22percent between 1997 and 2015 (assuming there are no new air-quality regulations) thanks to reductions in tailpipe emissions for most types of vehicles (already down 96 percent or more since 1978) and cleaner fuels. According to the EPA, water quality also has improved, and in some cases dramatically so.<sup>42</sup> Sports fishing has returned to all five of the Great Lakes, the number of fishing advisories has fallen, and a debate has started concerning the scientific basis of many of the remaining advisories. According to the Council on Environmental Quality, levels of PCBs, DDT, and other toxins in the Great Lakes fell dramatically during the 1970s and continued to fall (at a slower rate) during the 1980s and 1990s.<sup>43</sup> The number of wooded acres in the United States has grown by 20 percent in the past twenty years. The average annual wood growth in the United States today is three times what it was in 1920.<sup>44</sup> In Vermont, for example, the area covered by forests has increased from 35 percent a hundred years ago to about 76 percent today.<sup>45</sup> In the four states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York, there are 26 million more acres of forest today than there were at the turn of the century.<sup>46</sup> As a result of this re-greening of America, wildlife is enjoying a big comeback. According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, breeding populations of bald eagles in the lower 48 states have doubled every six or seven years since the late 1970s. In 1994, there were more than 4,000 active nests, five times the number reported in 1974.<sup>47</sup>

**AT CAPITALISM: ECON DECLINE RISKS EXTINCTION**

**Economic decline risks extinction.**

**Bearden, 2000** [Tom, Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, June 24, <http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3aaf97f22e23.htm>]

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

**Economic collapse causes extinction.**

**Zey, 98** (Michael G. Professor of management in the School of Business Administration at Montclair State University and executive director of the Expansionary Institute. Seizing the Future: The Dawn of the Macroindustrial Era. Second Edition. Page 33-34)

As we have seen, history attest to the fact that any society that maintains the belief in progress will have a better chance of achieving its goals than a society without it. As other nation's have come to understand the effect of such a concept on the West's success, they, too, have internalized the concept of progress and made it their own! The Imperative of Growth Having reached its current lofty point of development, the species will not choose to regress. The fact that the species is forging its way en masse into the Macroindustrial Era proves our need to grow is almost a genetically based predisposition. The species innately understands there can be no turning back on the road of progress. However, no outside force guarantees the continued progress of the human species, nor does anything mandate that the human species must even continue to exist. In fact, history is littered with races and civilizations that have disappeared without a trace. So, too, could the human species. There is no guarantee that the human species will survive even if we posit, as many have, a special purpose to the species' existence. Therefore, the species innately comprehends that it must engage in purposive actions in order to maintain its level of growth and progress. Humanity's future is conditioned by what I call the Imperative of Growth, a principle I will herewith describe along with its several corollaries. The Imperative of Growth states that in order to survive, any nation, indeed, the human race, must grow, both materially and intellectually. The Macroindustrial era represents growth in the areas of both technology and human development, a natural stage in the evolution of the species' continued extension of its control over itself and its environment. Although 5 billion strong, our continued existence depends on our ability to continue the progress we have been making at higher and higher levels. Systems, whether organizations, societies, or cells, have three basic directions in which to move. They can grow, decline, or temporarily reside in the state of equilibrium. These are the choices. Choosing any alternative to growth, for instance, stabilization of production/consumption through zero-growth policies, could have alarmingly pernicious side effects, including extinction.

**AT CAPITALISM: ECON DECLINE RISKS EXTINCTION**

**Continued economic growth is key to human survival.**

**Zey, 98** [Michael, executive director of the Expansionary Institute and professor at Montclair State University School of Business, *Seizing the Future*, p.34]

However, no outside force guarantees the continued progress of the human species, nor does anything mandate that the human species must even continue to exist. In fact, history is littered with races and civilizations that have disappeared without a trace. So, too, could the human species. There is no guarantee that the human species will survive even if we posit, as many have, a special purpose to the species' existence. Therefore, the species innately comprehends that it must engage in purposive actions in order to maintain its level of growth and progress. Humanity's future is conditioned by what I call the Imperative of Growth, a principle I will herewith describe along with its several corollaries. The Imperative of Growth states that in order to survive, any nation, indeed, the human race, must grow, both materially and intellectually. The Macroindustrial Era represents growth in the areas of both technology and human development, a natural stage in the evolution of the species' continued extension of its control over itself and its environment. Although 5 billion strong, our continued existence depends on our ability to continue the progress we have been making at higher and higher levels. Systems, whether organizations, societies, or cells, have three basic directions in which to move. They can grow, decline, or temporarily reside in a state of equilibrium. These are the choices. Choosing any alternative to growth, for instance, stabilization of production/consumption through zero-growth policies, could have alarmingly pernicious side effects, including extinction.

AT CAPITALISM: ALT KILLS MILLIONS

**Socialism is inherently totalitarian—transitioning now would kill millions.**

**Rockwell, 08** [Llewellyn, president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Everything You Love You Owe to Capitalism, 5/17, <http://mises.org/story/2982>]

Whatever the specifics of the case in question, socialism always means overriding the free decisions of individuals and replacing that capacity for decision making with an overarching plan by the state. Taken far enough, this mode of thought won't just spell an end to opulent lunches. It will mean the end of what we all know as civilization itself. It would plunge us back to a primitive state of existence, living off hunting and gathering in a world with little art, music, leisure, or charity. Nor is any form of socialism capable of providing for the needs of the world's six billion people, so the population would shrink dramatically and quickly and in a manner that would make every human horror ever known seem mild by comparison. Nor is it possible to divorce socialism from totalitarianism, because if you are serious about ending private ownership of the means of production, you have to be serious about ending freedom and creativity too. You will have to make the whole of society, or what is left of it, into a prison. In short, the wish for socialism is a wish for unparalleled human evil. If we really understood this, no one would express casual support for it in polite company. It would be like saying, you know, there is really something to be said for malaria and typhoid and dropping atom bombs on millions of innocents.

**De-development would require a massive human die-off.**

**Lewis 94** (Martin, lecturer in international history and interim director of the program in International Relations at Stanford University, *Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism*, Page 25-26)

No one acquainted with the rudiments of medical history could deny that health has vastly improved since the industrial revolution. Most of the credit for such amelioration belongs precisely to the medical, dietary, and sanitary advances associated with the transition to industrialism.

One has only to examine average longevity, which stood in the United States at a miserable forty-seven years as recently as 1900, to grasp the magnitude of progress over this period. If we go back to medieval Europe, socio-ecological idyll of many eco-radicals, we find that in some villages average life spans were as low as seventeen to eighteen years (Cohen 1989: 1241). By other indices as well, the health standards of most pre-industrial regimes were atrocious. Again, consider medieval and early modern Europe. As Braudel (1981:91) relates, the ancient regime was characterized by "very high infant mortality, famine, chronic under-nourishment, and formidable epidemics." Moreover, non-elite Europeans were contaminated by a wide variety of toxins on a regular basis. Few even experienced the delights of breathing clean air, for the atmospheres of their own dwellings were horribly polluted. It is difficult ... to comprehend," writes Norman Pounds (1989:1871) "how fetid and offensive must have been the air about most cottages and homes." Indeed, indoor air pollution has long been (as it perhaps still is) a greater contributor to respiratory illness than industrial airborne waste. But the most severe toxic pollution problem of the pre-modern world was associated with natural poisons produced by molds infecting the food supply. "Everyone suffered from food that was tainted," Pounds reminds us, "and the number who died of food-poisoning must have been immense (1089:213). Especially pronounced where rye was the staple food poisons produced by the ergot and Fusarium molds massively suppressed immune systems, reduced fertility levels, brought on delusions and sometimes mass insanity, and reduced blood circulation to such an extent that gangrene in the lower extremities was commonplace (Matossian 1989:1). Even where the food supply was safe, poor nutrition resulted in widespread immunological stress. Infectious diseases were rife, and periodic plagues would decimate most populations in a cruel manner. Water supplies, especially in towns, were so contaminated by human waste as to become deadly in their own right. Skin and venereal diseases were often rife and difficult, if not impossible, to cure. Other scourges abounded, including those—such as leprosy—that have been virtually eliminated by modern medicines and sanitary techniques. Individuals deformed by genetic inheritance or accident typically led short and brutal lives. And every time a woman went into labor she faced a very high risk of dying. This cursory review of the horrors of pre-industrial European life may seem a pointless exercise in overkill; all of this is, or at least used to be, common knowledge. But it is important to recall in detail the kind of social environment many eco-radicals would seek to recreate. And were we to adhere strictly to the tenets of bioregionalism, even the levels of prosperity achieved in the medieval world would be difficult if not impossible to maintain without first experiencing a truly massive human die off.

AT CAPITALISM: WORST GOVERNMENTS IN HSITORY

**Leftist revolutions have produced some of the worst human suffering in history.**

**Peretz, 03** (Martin, Former Assistant Professor at Harvard, Editor-in Chief of The New Republic, "Manque", The New Republic, February 3, lexis)

What is the grand "progressive" vision for which the French left fights, which the Zionists and Jews are insidiously holding back? In the grand conflicts of the last century, there was always a left-wing structure of Manichaeism. On the one side: imperialism and capitalism. On the other: a compelling and revolutionary dream. The dreams turned out to be nightmares. But they were dreams, nonetheless. Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Castro, Che, the Viet Cong, the Sandinistas, always a man and a movement saying they aimed to build a better world, which they actually tried to describe. In the end, of course, the better world did not arrive: In its place were death camps, mass deportations, forced famines, massacres, reeducation programs, prisons of the body, and greater prisons of the soul.

AT CAPITALISM: CAP SOLVES ENVIRONMENT

**Multiple nations prove that socialism is far worse for the environment than capitalism, especially in terms of energy consumption.**

**Lewis 94** (Martin, lecturer in international history and interim director of the program in International Relations at Stanford University, *Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism*, Page 146-147)

The easiest defense of capitalism is to simply contrast it with existing and recently existing examples of Marxian socialism. As is now abundantly clear, Marxism's record is dismal on almost every score, be it economic, social, or environmental. These failures cannot be dismissed as errant quirks; Marxian regimes have come to power in numerous countries, and everywhere the results have been disheartening. From impoverished African States like Mozambique, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, and the Congo to highly industrialized, once-prosperous European countries like the former East Germany and Czechoslovakia, all Marxist experiments have ended in disaster. Chapter six will address the failings of Marxism in the third world; the present discussion is concerned with the formerly communist industrial states of Eastern Europe. For convenience sake, the analysis focuses on the conditions that pertained before the democratic revolutions of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Radical greens admit that environmental conditions in Eastern Europe are as bad as those found in the west. But since admissions are far from adequate; by almost every measure, the communist environment is more severely degraded than the capitalist environment. Only with the recent downfall of Marxian regimes has the ecological debacle of the east come to light. As our knowledge increases, the environmental conditions of Eastern Europe are revealed as ever more horrific. And when one considers the poor performances of the economies that have wreaked such destruction the comparison between capitalism and communism becomes one-sided indeed. Although the general state of environmental devastation in Eastern Europe is now well known, a few specific examples are still in order. It is quite possible that the world's most industrially devastated landscape is that of Poland's Silesia, an area in which the soil is so lead-impregnated as to render farm products virtually poisonous. Nor are conditions much better in other Polish regions. Many Polish rivers are so filthy that their waters cannot even be used for industrial purposes. As Fischhoff 11991: 131 reports, "by U.S. and European standards, the country has virtually no potable water." In Poland's industrial belt, air pollution, especially sulfur dioxide contamination, far exceeds anything found in the West. Many buildings in Cracow are simply melting away in an acid bath. Devastation of similar magnitude may be found in many regions within the former Soviet Union. Latvia, for example, is burdened by many poorly regulated and constantly oozing toxic waste pits, and its Baltic shores are heavily contaminated with bacteria, heavy metals, and even chunks of phosphorus (in 1988 the Soviet army dropped 400 bombs containing 20 tons of phosphorus into the Baltic Sea [Burgelis n.d.:7]). The transformation of the once-rich Aral Sea into a shrunken, almost lifeless sump is now a virtual international emblem of the powers at human destructiveness (Kotlyakov 1991). Everywhere one looks the same stories recounting one ecological disaster after another. Equally telling are comparative figures on energy use. One of the principle reasons for Eastern Europe's environmental catastrophe is its appallingly inefficient use of energy. As *The Economist* (February 17, 1990) reports: "On average, the six countries of Eastern Europe...use more than twice as much energy per dollar of national income as even the more industrialized countries of western Europe." Poland, with on some counts a GDP smaller than Belgium's, uses nearly three times as much energy, Hungary, whose GDP is supposedly only a fifth of Spain's, uses more than a third as much energy." Here one can appreciate the environmental consequences of an economy that has approached the vaunted steady-state; lacking economic vitality, the East has been found to retain an antiquated, inefficient, and highly polluting set of industrial plants. Factories have remained in operation that would have been shuttered decades ago in the West. The Dismal environmental conditions of the communist world stem from the political and economic structures implicit in Marxism and not, as academic Marxist apologists would have it, from either historical contingencies or the structural power of the capitalist world system.

AT CAPITALISM: CAP SOLVES ENVIRONMENT

**Capitalism encourages conservation and efficiency that are the best way to protect the environment. The worst environmental disasters in history were in non capitalist states.**

**Norberg, 03** (Johan Norberg, Senior Fellow at Cato Institute, "In Defense of Global Capitalism", p. 235)

Very often, environmental improvements are due to the very capitalism so often blamed for the problems. The introduction of private property creates owners with long-term interests. Landowners must see to it that there is good soil or forest there tomorrow as well, because otherwise they will have no income later on, whether they continue using the land or intend to sell it. If the property is collective or government-owned, no one has any such long-term interest. On the contrary, everyone then has an interest in using up the resources quickly before someone else does. It was because they were common lands that the rain forests of the Amazon began to be rapidly exploited in the 1960s and 1970s and are still being rapidly exploited today. Only about a 10th of forests are recognized by the governments as privately owned, even though in practice Indians possess and inhabit large parts of them. It is the absence of definite fishing rights that causes (heavily subsidized) fishing fleets to try to vacuum the oceans of fish before someone else does. No wonder, then, that the most large-scale destruction of environment in history has occurred in the communist dictatorships, where all ownership was collective. A few years ago, a satellite image was taken of the borders of the Sahara, where the desert was spreading. Everywhere, the land was parched yellow, after nomads had overexploited the common lands and then moved on. But in the midst of this desert environment could be seen a small patch of green. This proved to be an area of privately owned land where the owners of the farm prevented overexploitation and engaged in cattle farming that was profitable in the long term. Trade and freight are sometimes criticized for destroying the environment, but the problem can be rectified with more efficient transport and purification techniques, as well as emissions fees to make the cost of pollution visible through pricing. The biggest environmental problems are associated with production and consumption, and there trade can make a positive contribution, even aside from the general effect it has on growth. Trade leads to a country's resources being used as efficiently as possible. Goods are produced in the places where production entails least expense and least wear and tear on the environment. That is why the amount of raw materials needed to make a given product keeps diminishing as productive efficiency improves. With modern production processes, 97 percent less metal is needed for a soft drink can than 30 years ago, partly because of the use of lighter aluminum. A car today contains only half as much metal as a car of 30 years ago.

## AT CAPITALISM: CAP SOLVES ENVIRONMENT

**Economic growth combined with environmental regulations are the only way to address environmental crises.**

**The Economist, 08** [How green is their growth, 1/24,

[http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=10566738](http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10566738)]

Some new light has been cast by a team of researchers led by Daniel Esty of Yale University, who delivered their conclusions this week to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. What they presented was the latest annual Environmental Sustainability Index, which grades the "environmental health" of 150 countries—using many indicators, from population stress and eco-system health to social and institutional capacity. This year's report focuses on the link between the state of the environment and human health. In a nutshell, what the new report (also sponsored by the European Commission and Columbia University) suggests is that poor countries have been quite right to challenge the sort of green orthodoxy which rejects the very idea of economic growth. Indeed, the single biggest variable in determining a country's ranking is income per head. But that doesn't imply that economic growth automatically leads to an improvement in the environment. The team's finding is that growth does offer solutions to the sorts of environmental woes (local air pollution, for example) that directly kill humans. This matters, because about a quarter of all deaths in the world have some link to environmental factors. Most of the victims are poor people who are already vulnerable because of bad living conditions, lack of access to medicine, and malnutrition (see article). Among the killers (especially of children) in which the environment plays a role are diarrhoea, respiratory infections and malaria. These diseases reinforce a vicious circle of poverty and hopelessness by depressing production. According to the World Bank, the economic burden on society caused by bad environmental health amounts to between 2% and 5% of GDP. Mr Esty's analysis suggests that as poor countries get richer, they usually invest heavily in environmental improvements, such as cleaning up water supplies and improving sanitation, that boost human health. (Their economies may also shift gear, from making steel or chemicals to turning out computer chips.) But the link between growth and environmentally benign outcomes is much less clear, the study suggests, when it comes to the sort of pollution that fouls up nature (such as acid rain, which poisons lakes and forests) as opposed to directly killing human beings. The key to addressing that sort of pollution, Mr Esty argues, is not just money but good governance. A closer look at the rankings makes this relationship clearer. Of course it is no surprise that Switzerland fares better than Niger. But why is the poor Dominican Republic much healthier and greener than nearby Haiti? Or Costa Rica so far ahead of Nicaragua, whose nature and resources are broadly similar? And why is wealthy Belgium the sick man of western Europe, with an environmental record worse than that of many developing countries? A mixture of factors related to good government—accurate data, transparent administration, lack of corruption, checks and balances—all show a clear statistical relationship with environmental performance. Among countries of comparable income, Mr Esty concludes, tough regulations and above all, enforcement are the key factors in keeping things green. All this may be a helpful way of looking at pollution in the classic sense, but there is another factor that may upset all previous calculations about the relationship between growth and the state of the earth: climate change. Greenhouse emissions do not poison people, or lakes or woods, in the direct or obvious way that noxious chemicals do. But at least in the medium term, they clearly alter the earth in ways that harm the welfare of the poor. Paul Epstein of the Harvard Medical School says the impact both on nature and directly on humanity of global warming will swamp all other environmental factors. As alterations in the climate lead to mass migrations, epidemics will spread; as temperate zones warm up, tropical diseases like malaria will surge; storms will overwhelm sewer systems; heat waves will push ozone levels up. He may be right, but here too economic growth, coupled with good governance, may yet prove to be a source of solutions rather than problems. At the moment, perhaps 2 billion people have no formal access to modern energy—they make do with cow dung, agricultural residue and other solid fuels which are far from healthy. Unless foresight and intelligence are applied to the satisfaction of these people's needs, they may embrace the filthiest and most carbon-emitting forms of fossil-fuel energy as soon as they get the chance. A mixture of economic growth and transparent governance may offer the only chance of avoiding that disaster.



AT CAPITALISM: CAP SOLVES ENVIRONMENT

**Capitalism protects the environment.**

**Lewis 92** – Professor, School of the Environment, Duke University – 1992 (Martin, GREEN DELSIONS, p. 10)

Only a strongly expending economic base can generate the capital necessary to retool our economy into one that does not consume the earth in feeding itself. Ecological sanity will be expensive, and if we cannot pay the price we may well perish. This proposition is even more vital in regard to the Third World; only steady economic expansion can break the linkage so often found in poor nations between rural desperation and land degradation. Genuine development, in turn, requires both certain forms of industrialization as well as participation in the global economy. The most widespread eco-radical position now is that Third World environments can only be preserved if poverty is alleviated through certain kinds of development initiatives. Third World peasants, they correctly argue, are forced to deforest and overgraze their landscapes precisely because of their poverty.

**The transition would destroy the environment—hungry people would hunt animals to extinction and older, dirtier tech would be used again.**

**Lewis 92** – Professor, School of the Environment, Duke University – 1992 (Martin, GREEN DELUSIONS, p. 117)

If the most extreme version of the radical green agenda were to be fully enacted without truly massive human die-off first, forests would be stripped clean of wood and all large animals would be hunted to extinction by hordes of neo-primitives desperate for food and warmth. If, on the other hand, eco-extremists were to succeed only in paralyzing the economy's capacity for further research, development, and expansion, our future could turn out to be reminiscent of the environmental nightmare of Poland in the 1980's, with a stagnant economy continuing to rely on outmoded, pollution-belching industries. A throttled steady-state economy would simply lack the resources necessary to create an environment benign technological base for a populace that shows every sign of continuing to demand electricity, hot water, and other connivances. Eastern Europe shows well the environmental devastation that occurs when economic growth stalls out in an already industrialized society.

**AT CAPITALISM: GLOBALIZATION GOOD**

**Economic inequalities do not prove that globalization is bad—even unequal growth is positive for all nations.**

**Bate, 04** (Roger, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, September 1<sup>st</sup>, “Who Does Globalization Hurt?”, [http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.21115,filter.all/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.21115,filter.all/pub_detail.asp))

Like many of the pressure groups that oppose corporations and economic liberalisation on apparently moral grounds (companies and markets allegedly promote greed), the ILO report wants policy changes to ensure that globalisation becomes “a positive force for all people and all countries” as it believes that at the moment it benefits the elite of the rich world. In particular, the ILO wants reform at the World Trade Organisation to protect the poor. The report draws its conclusions mainly from the alleged increase in inequality between rich and poor countries. Of course, inequality measures are largely pointless, irrelevant and also misleading. If relatively rich Britain grew 20% over five years and relatively poor Indonesia grew 12% in the same period, there would be an increase in inequality, but both countries would be better off than if they both grew 10%. Yet the ILO and all the pressure groups they support imply that the reason that countries like Indonesia grow slower than countries like Britain is because Britain is part of the elite and distorts the world trade environment in its favour (“the process of globalisation is generating unbalanced outcomes, both within and between countries”).

**Globalization is positive for poor nations—the countries that have fared poorly suffer from bad governance.**

**Bate, 04** (Roger, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, September 1<sup>st</sup>, “Who Does Globalization Hurt?”, [http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.21115,filter.all/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.21115,filter.all/pub_detail.asp))

The belief that the rich and powerful countries prevent the poor countries from performing has a long and undistinguished history but no intellectual support. Indeed, the report acknowledges that many problems have nothing to do with international trade or globalisation at all. Cuba under Fidel Castro, Venezuela under Hugo Chavez, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, North Korea under Kim Jong-il, Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe and myriad countries (adding up to the 23 imploding nations identified by the report) have all failed because they are “dysfunctional states torn apart by civil strife, authoritarian governments of various hues and states with democratic but severe inadequacies in terms of the policies and institutions required to support a well-functioning market economy”, says the report. The report fails to explain why China, in opening up to globalisation, has developed so rapidly in the past 25 years. It takes Wolf to explain that China and the other successful economies all shared “a move towards the market economy, one in which private property rights, free enterprise and competition increasingly took the place of state ownership, planning and protection. They chose, however haltingly, the path of economic liberalisation and international integration.” Perhaps even more importantly, Wolf says that “there are no examples of countries that have risen in the ranks of global living standards while being less open to trade and capital in the 1990s than in the 1960s”.

**\*CEDE THE POLITICAL\***

## CEDE THE POLITICAL

**This failure to engage the political process turns the affirmative into spectators who are powerless to produce real change.**

**Rorty 98** – professor emeritus of comparative literature and philosophy, by courtesy, at Stanford University (Richard, “ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America”, 1998, Pg. 7-9)

Such people find pride in American citizenship impossible, and vigorous participation in electoral politics pointless. They associate American patriotism with an endorsement of atrocities: the importation of African slaves, the slaughter of Native Americans, the rape of ancient forests, and the Vietnam War. Many of them think of national pride as appropriate only for chauvinists: for the sort of American who rejoices that America can still orchestrate something like the Gulf War, can still bring deadly force to bear whenever and wherever it chooses. When young intellectuals watch John Wayne war movies after reading Heidegger, Foucault, Stephenson, or Silko, they often become convinced that they live in a violent, inhuman, corrupt country. They begin to think of themselves as a saving remnant-as the happy few who have the insight to see through nationalist rhetoric to the ghastly reality of contemporary America. But this insight does not move them to formulate a legislative program, to join a political movement, or to share in a national hope. The contrast between national hope and national self-mockery and self-disgust becomes vivid when one compares novels like *Snow Crash* and *Almanac of the Dead* with socialist novels of the first half of the century—books like *The Jungle*, *An American Tragedy*, and *The Grapes of Wrath*. The latter were written in the belief that the tone of the Gettysburg Address was absolutely right, but that our country would have to transform itself in order to fulfill Lincoln's hopes. Transformation would be needed because the rise of industrial capitalism had made the individualist rhetoric of America's first century obsolete. The authors of these novels thought that this rhetoric should be replaced by one in which America is destined to become the first cooperative commonwealth, the first classless society. This America would be one in which income and wealth are equitably distributed, and in which the government ensures equality of opportunity as well as individual liberty. This new, quasi-communitarian rhetoric was at the heart of the Progressive Movement and the New Deal. It set the tone for the American Left during the first six decades of the twentieth century. Walt Whitman and John Dewey, as we shall see, did a great deal to shape this rhetoric. The difference between early twentieth-century leftist intellectuals and the majority of their contemporary counterparts is the difference between agents and spectators. In the early decades of this century, when an intellectual stepped back from his or her country's history and looked at it through skeptical eyes, the chances were that he or she was about to propose a new political initiative. Henry Adams was, of course, the great exception—the great abstainer from politics. But William James thought that Adams' diagnosis of the First Gilded Age as a symptom of irreversible moral and political decline was merely perverse. James's pragmatist theory of truth was in part a reaction against the sort of detached spectatorship which Adams affected. For James, disgust with American hypocrisy and self-deception was pointless unless accompanied by an effort to give America reason to be proud of itself in the future. The kind of proto-Heideggerian cultural pessimism which Adams cultivated seemed, to James, decadent and cowardly. "Democracy," James wrote, "is a kind of religion, and we are bound not to admit its failure. Faiths and utopias are the noblest exercise of human reason, and no one with a spark of reason in him will sit down fatalistically before the croaker's picture."<sup>2</sup>

**The affirmative's strategy is not political - it is a strategy against politics which undermines the possibility of liberation.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture”, page 278-279)

Finally, the frontier itself is transformed. It is still partly defined by an attitude in which we are all implicated. In this sense, the frontier is in everyone—and with it, the possibility of evil. But now its popular/resonance is rearticulated to “activities” that have to be affectively and morally judged and policed. The enemy is not within people but in specific activities that construct the frontier over in the image of the new conservatism. The frontier becomes a seductive machine, seducing people not only into the need to invest, but ultimately into a series of temporary and mobile investments which locate them within a popular conservatism. The frontier's articulation by the logic of scandal marks a real break with older conservatisms built on some notion of tradition. Here politics is not a solution to problems, but a machine which organizes the population and its practices. What is on the "right" (in both senses) side of the frontier, on the other side of politics, is a purely affective morality (ie., one which leaves no space within which specific actions can be judged as anything other than scandalous). The new conservatism embodies, not a political rebellion but a rebellion against politics. It makes politics into an other, located on the other side of the frontier. Anyone who actually talks about serious problems and their solutions is a dreamer; anyone who celebrates the mood in which the problem is at once terrifying and boring is a realist. It is no longer believing too strongly that is dangerous, but actually thinking that one is supposed to make one's dreams come true. The failure of Earth Day cannot be explained by merely pointing to its status as a feel-good media event, nor by pointing out the increasingly hypocritical appropriation of "green politics" by corporate polluters. It is rather that ecology, like any "politics," has become a question of attitude and investment, as if investing in the "correct" ideological beliefs, even demonstrating it, was an adequate construction of the political. Within the new conservative articulation of the frontier, political positions only exist as entirely affective investments, separated from any ability to act.

<b>CEDE THE POLITICAL—IMPACT WAR</b>
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**Failure to engage in the political process will result in the takeover by the extreme right, leading to discrimination and war worldwide**

**Rorty 98** – professor emeritus of comparative literature and philosophy, by courtesy, at Stanford University (Richard, “ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America”, 1998, pg. 89-94)

\*WE DO NOT ENDORSE GENDERED LANGUAGE\*

Many writers on socioeconomic policy have warned that the old industrialized democracies are heading into a Weimar-like period, one in which populist movements are likely to overturn constitutional governments. Edward Luttwak, for example, has suggested that fascism may be the American future. The point of his book *The Endangered American Dream* is that members of labor unions, and unorganized unskilled workers, will sooner or later realize that their government is not even trying to prevent wages from sinking or to prevent jobs from being exported. Around the same time, they will realize that suburban white-collar workers - themselves desperately afraid of being downsized - are not going to let themselves be taxed to provide social benefits for anyone else. At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for-someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis’ novel *It Can’t Happen Here* may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were wildly overoptimistic. One thing that is very likely to happen is that the gains made in the past forty years by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, will be wiped out. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words "nigger" and "kike" will once again be heard in the workplace. All the sadism which the academic Left has tried to make unacceptable to its students will come flooding back. All the resentment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness. For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make his peace with the international superrich, just as Hitler made his with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to provoke military adventures which will generate short-term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossessed? It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twentieth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The first is that the Left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Dewey’s *Reconstruction in Philosophy* in which he expresses his exasperation with the sort of sterile debate now going on under the rubric of “individualism versus communitarianism.” Dewey thought that all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situations are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the traditionally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the meaning of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a rightist maneuver, one which supplies “the apparatus for intellectual justifications of the established order.”<sup>9</sup> For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the established order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of today’s academic leftists says that some topic has been “inadequately theorized,” you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential subjectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan’s impossible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by “problematizing familiar concepts.” Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by problematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly “subversive” books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossible to clamber back down from their books to a level of abstraction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy. Even though what these authors “theorize” is often something very concrete and near at hand—a current TV show, a media celebrity, a recent scandal—they offer the most abstract and barren explanations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one’s way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations. These result in an intellectual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book *Nightmare on Main Street*, Gothic. The cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called “power.” This is the name of what Edmundson calls Foucault’s “haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook.”<sup>10</sup>

**CEDE THE POLITICAL—IMPACT KILLS ALT SOLVENCY**

**Institutional approaches are the only way to avoid the collapse of all movements and effectively challenge the flawed state policies.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture”, page 388-389)

The demand for moral and ideological purity often results in the rejection of any hierarchy or organization. The question- can the master's tools be used to tear down the master's house?-ignores both the contingency of the relation between such tools and the master's power and, even more importantly, the fact that **there may be no other tools available.** Institutionalization is seen as a repressive impurity within the body politic rather than as a strategic and tactical, even empowering, necessity. It sometimes seems as if every progressive organization is condemned to recapitulate the same arguments and crisis, often leading to their collapse. 54 For example, Minkowitz has described a crisis in Act Up over the need for efficiency and organization, professionalization and even hierarchy,55 as if these inherently contradicted its commitment to democracy. This is particularly unfortunate since Act Up, whatever its limitations, has proven itself an effective and imaginative political strategist. The problems are obviously magnified with success, as membership, finances and activities grow. This refusal of efficient operation and the moment of organization is intimately connected with the Left's appropriation and privileging of the local (as the site of democracy and resistance). This is yet another reason why structures of alliance are inadequate, since they often assume that an effective movement can be organized and sustained without such structuring. The Left needs to recognize the necessity of institutionalization and of systems of hierarchy, without falling back into its own authoritarianism. It needs to find reasonably democratic structures of institutionalization, even if they are impure and compromised.

**The desire for pure politics undermines a litany of meaningful possibilities at overcoming domination.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture”, page 396)

Above all, rethinking the possibility of a Left politics will require a new model of intellectual and political authority which does not begin by confidently judging every investment, every practice, every articulation and every individual. It will have to measure both intellectual and political progress by movement within the fragile and contradictory realities of people's lives, desires, fears and commitments, and not by some idealized utopia nor by its own theoretical criteria. It will offer a moral and progressive politics which refuses to "police" everyday life and to define a structure of "proper" and appropriate behaviors and attitudes. An impure politics—certainly, without the myth of a perfect reflexivity which can guarantee its authority (for authority is not an intellectual prize). A contaminated politics, never innocent, rooted in the organization of distance and densities through which all of us move together and apart, sometimes hesitatingly, at other times recklessly. A politics that attempts to move people, perhaps just a little at first, in a different direction. But a politics nonetheless, one which speaks with a certain authority, as limited and frail as the lives of those who speak it. It will have to be a politics articulated by and for people who are inevitably implicated in the contemporary crisis of authority and whose lives have been shaped by it. A politics for and by people who live in the contemporary world of popular tastes, and who are caught in the disciplined mobilization of everyday life. A politics for people who are never innocent and whose hopes are always partly defined by the very powers and inequalities they oppose. A modest politics that struggles to effect real change, that enters into the often boring challenges of strategy and compromise. An impure politics fighting for high stakes.

**CEDE THE POLITICAL—IMPACT KILLS ALT SOLVENCY**

**The critique divides politics from engagement in civil society—this destroys social change.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture”, page 302-304)

Civil society is that space between the domain of the state and economic apparatuses and the domain of private (which is not to say nonsocial) life and experience. It is here that public forms of interaction and cooperation are forged, that individuals and groups find forms of language and association by which they are able to evaluate and struggle to change the social order. In the 1950s, civil society did not disappear, but it was caught in a battle. When it was losing, it was pushed aside, overshadowed by the increasingly safe and seductive preoccupation with an everyday life which was not quite the same as the domain of private life. But occasionally it reappeared to offer possibilities for genuinely public forms of social action and rhetoric (e.g., the civil rights movement, however limited its successes). But in the 1980s, both civil society and private life have collapsed into the domain of everyday life and, as a result, the very possibility of lines of flight from everyday life into the public arena of state and economic apparatuses is disappearing. It is not just that capitalism or the state has come to dominate civil society or that the languages of civil society (along with those of people's private lives) have been commodified. Rather, it is becoming harder to locate the differences on people's mattering maps. It a very real sense, this exclusion of politics is itself built upon the postmodern refusal of taking things too seriously. It is precisely the sense of helplessness in the face of political and economic relations that justifies the retreat into everyday life; if you can't change the world, change the little piece of it that is within your constant reach. But that reach must be limited, not only to a specific geographic region, but to a specific plane as well. If it is too dangerous to care about the world, too difficult to change it, care about everyday life, change your life-style. Thus, for example, even the leader of IN FACT (an activist group which actually does enter into battle with economic institutions) defines the enemy in anything but structural terms: "The enemy is not capitalism but the 'abuses' of multinational corporations." She describes her own position as follows: "This isn't a job ... It's a commitment; it's a life-style ... that is based on the 'philosophy of living simply,' that makes a statement about how money gets distributed in the world." <sup>12</sup> Political activism is being replaced by "human activism. . . <sup>13</sup> The distance between life-style (as a statement) and political struggle appears to be disappearing, so that the condition of children living in poverty can be seen as the result of the "lack of responsible parenting. " It is not that politics is privatized but that it disappears from the perspective of those moving within the transits of the everyday life. The place of politics is itself transformed into a space which is inaccessible from everyday life, and hence it remains invisible to those within everyday life. Politics as the realm of governance itself the issues, interests, complexities and compromises involved in state and economic policy-cannot matter. To put it simply, there is no quicker way to end a conversation or ruin a party these days than to start "talking politics." The worst thing to be labeled is a "politico," not merely because "they" take things so seriously, but because they take seriously things outside the boundaries of everyday life. It is increasingly common to hear people say that "it takes all their time and energy to get through the day," as if that accounted for their avoidance of politics as well as of the depressing information which might lead them back into politics. It is as if, somehow, people are too involved in everyday life to notice that which shapes it. There seems to be no way out of everyday life, as if maintaining a life-style was a full-time job which absorbed all of people's energy and time. The very practices of everyday life-the speed and direction of their mobilities-seem to lock people into the disciplined mobilization's expanding exclusivities. And the only source of mobility within its circuits is capital itself. As Lefebvre correctly points out, "nowadays everyday life has taken the place of economics," <sup>15</sup> not only in the sense that it is the object which power struggles to construct and regulate, but also that it has become the field on which struggles are increasingly confined.

CEDE THE POLITICAL—IMPACT KILLS ALT SOLVENCY

**They can't solve—movements that do not engage politics are overwhelmed by larger structures.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture", pages 363-364)

Both "crises" involve a struggle to redefine cultural authority. For the former it is a struggle to reestablish the political possibility of theory. For the latter it involves the need to construct politically effective authorities, and to relocate the right of intellectuals to claim such authority without reproducing authoritarian relations. The intellectuals' crisis is a reflexive and rather self-indulgent struggle against a pessimism which they have largely created for themselves. The conflation of the two glosses over the increasing presence (even as popular figures) of new conservative intellectuals, and the threatening implications of the power of a popular new conservatism. The new conservative alliance has quite intentionally addressed the crisis of authority, often blaming it on the Left's intellectual crisis of representation (e. g., the attacks on "political correctness"), as the occasion for their own efforts to set new authorities in place: new positions, new criteria and new statements. Left intellectuals have constructed their own irrelevance, not through their "elitist" language, but through their refusal to find appropriate forms and sites of authority. Authority is not necessarily authoritarian; it need not claim the privilege of an autonomous, sovereign and unified speaking subject. In the face of real historical relations of domination and subordination, political intervention seems to demand, as part of the political responsibility of those empowered to speak, that they speak to-and sometimes for-others. And sometimes that speech must address questions about the relative importance of different struggles and the relative value, even the enabling possibilities of, different structures.



## CEDE THE POLITICAL—IMPACT KILLS ALT SOLVENCY

**Cynicism towards politics paralyzes change and destroys authentic resistance because people refuse the recognition of actual change.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture”, pages 274-277)

The popularization of the new conservatism depends on this recognition and on its ability to articulate this cynicism into a particular political relationship. Its various agencies use a variety of strategies, not to negate or challenge this cynicism, but to articulate its effects. Popular conservative intellectuals constantly remind 'people of how bad things are and blame it all on the relativism of postmodern cynicism. At the same time, they speak the language of that cynicism.<sup>21</sup> Popular media (from the spate of recent Vietnam movies to the various political exposes) reinscribe the irrationality, not only of our political system, but of the world in which it must operate. The only response to such a condition is to reduce one's claims to understand and intervene intelligently, and retreat into one's commitments. As politics becomes freed from the constraints of meaning and reconstructed within the terms of contemporary cynicism, as people increasingly accept their ignorance and the affective nature of political choices, their commitments carry little or no responsibility with them. But the cynicism never stands alone within the new conservative discourse: it is always inflected by an ironic glance: Reagan's "most effective public gesture is the humorous shrug of incomprehension, a mannerism that appears strangely genuine. To see him do it is to laugh with him, to share his amused befuddlement at the mess the world's in." This ironic cynicism not only divides the population into two groups on either side of the frontier. It also divides that population articulated to the frontier into two groups, each with a different relation to the frontier: those who actively oppose its logic even as they perhaps unknowingly live in it, and those who surrender to that logic. The first group actively participates in conservative political struggles (embodied in Operation Rescue, for example), believing not only in their own affective commitment to specific gut issues, but in the ideological correctness of their positions. Their passion is directed against their own place within the frontier as much as it is against the mythic enemies which the new conservatism has created. The second group is unable or unwilling to struggle against their place in the frontier. They may find themselves caught in the discursive trap of the new conservative articulation of the frontier. This involves a reversal by which social concern is translated into selfishness and special interests. For example, the press release for a recent ad campaign with the slogan "Do Life" describes itself as reflecting "the transformation in outlook from the 'me' generation to the 'we' generation ... 'Do Life' means don't waste your life. It's about self actualization" (emphasis added).<sup>23</sup> This reversal enables one fan of Beauty and the Beast, a theologian who defends the show as a catalyst of change, to justify her own inactivity: "I might be able to help 15 people ... But if the show survives, there will be millions who are inspired to go out and help others. ...<sup>24</sup> What is lacking here is any sense of political action aimed at changing the world. This logic of reversal foregrounds the futility of struggle as a tactic for one of the most explicit social and political struggles in recent history. The proliferation of statements suggesting, not only that the various movements of the 1960s and 1970s are dead but that their struggles were largely ineffective, is part of a larger rhetoric of helplessness which entails that control has always to be surrendered to someone else, whether corporate technology or the new conservatives. At the same time, it ignores and even hides the fact that these agents are actively struggling to gain control (e. g., the often noted irony in the active struggles of antifeminists who defend the claim that a woman's place is in the home while they are organizing and campaigning). Here activity is used in the name of passivity, and passivity is constructed as a new form of activism. Surely it is not coincidental that a powerfully visible rhetoric of the end of feminism has appeared alongside the explosion of struggles over abortion. Perhaps the most pernicious example of this ironic reversal is the rhetoric which locates people's freedom in their ability to choose to reject change. No where has this logic been more actively deployed than in various attempts to rearticulate the trajectory of the women's movements. Good Housekeeping describes "the leading edge of America's newest life-style" as belonging to the woman who "is part of the powerful social movement that researchers call 'neotraditionalism.'" <sup>25</sup> The campaign suggests that it is a woman's right to choose to ignore the arguments and gains of the feminist movement. Marketer Daniel Yankelovich says, "It's a combination of the best parts of the '40s and '50s—security, safety and family values with the '60s and '70s emphasis on personal freedom of choice. It's the first major change in the basic way we want to organize our society since the '60s. ...<sup>26</sup> Its best images are perhaps Vanna White and Tammy Faye Bakker. Leslie Savan comments: "Simply insisting that nothing has really changed—divorce, abuse, drugs, etc. notwithstanding—does two things: It makes the traditional virtuous it must deserve its longevity. And it presents a solution—eternity is the ultimate security."<sup>n</sup> Despite their real political differences, the so-called new postfeminists in rock culture (from Sinead O'Connor to Madonna) can be articulated into a similar logic of reversal. Not only do they offer a vision of authenticity as a marketable image, but their image of "becoming feminist" is often defined by images or simple reversals of a countercultural traditionalism. Ultimately, the impact of this ironic reversal is that politics becomes an act of investment in a position where one does not have to do anything, whatever one's own relation is to what is happening, however one might feel about events. This goes beyond image politics, for the logic of images is itself reversed in the new conservatism. The current power of images in politics is not an end in itself. Mood politics is not image politics, for the latter privatizes politics, while the former takes politics out of the realm of public debate. One can debate about images, but how can you debate moods? Scandal replaces debates, and emotional confessions become the dominant form of political self-definition. Why, after all, do scandals arise in certain places and not others? And why, when they have appeared, is it so unpredictable whether they will have any consequences? In the end, this is less important than the fact that public life itself is increasingly constituted as the space of scandal, and scandal is the ambiguous machinery by which stars are made, remade and only rarely undone.

## CEDE THE POLITICAL—IMAPCT DEMOCRACY

**And, Democracy****A. Uniqueness – We are on the brink of abandoning democracy**

**Stoker 06** – Professor of Politics, University of Manchester (Gerry, “WHY POLITICS MATTERS: MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK”, 2006, Pg. 45)

Some argue that formal politics is not dead, it is just sleeping. If there is something important at stake, people will return to the polls and politicians. The Bush-Kerry US presidential campaign in 2004 saw turnout rise to 60 per cent, having been around the 50 per cent mark in the three previous elections. But such a turnout took presidential election voting only to the levels achieved in the early 1960s. Upward shifts in voting are to be welcomed, but it would be wise not to conclude that all is well with the state of US politics. The disquiet about politics goes much deeper than turnout rates can reveal. Certainly people can be mobilized back into voting, and perhaps politics in general,<sup>51</sup> but in the light of the evidence presented in this chapter it appears that there is a deeper malaise about the way politics is both practised and understood in new and established democracies. There can be little doubt that a degree of scepticism about politics is healthy. When you look back to the 1950s and early 1960s in some of the established democracies, it is difficult not to think that people were too deferential or trusting. In the newer democracies, it could be argued that people just gained a healthy disrespect for politics more quickly. These discontents could be explained away by a rise in *expectations* on the part of citizens, and a greater willingness on their part to complain. Yet satisfaction with government and politics is down virtually everywhere and it is hard to give advice to policy makers about what could change this, beyond turning back the clock to a time when people were more deferential, more polite and less sophisticated about politics.<sup>52</sup> In short, there may not be a problem that can be addressed, it is just that citizens have become more critical. There is, however, a dividing between healthy scepticism and outright non-belief in the value and efficacy of politics in democratic governance.

**B. Refusal to engage in formal politics leads to the collapse of democracy**

**Stoker 06** – Professor of Politics, University of Manchester (Gerry, “WHY POLITICS MATTERS: MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK”, 2006, Pg. 45-46)

It is difficult to get away from the idea that a general and widespread disengagement from, and disenchantment with, formal politics does not sit comfortably with the long-term health of democracy. Indeed, a pessimistic reading of the degree of disenchantment from formal politics is that it will in the end undermine support for both democracy and democratic decision making. That is the explicit fear expressed in the UN report on Latin America, referred to earlier, and plainly it is a concern in some of the other newer sites for democratic governance where the concern is, as Pippa Norris puts it, that 'a disillusioned public will not function as a check on authoritarianism'.<sup>53</sup> If democracy is seen to fail, then other forms of governance may win popular endorsement. This fear is the one that stalks many of the commentaries about the state of politics in democracies in advanced industrial societies. Russell Dalton makes the point very clearly: The political culture literature argues that citizens must be supportive of the political system if it is to endure - and this seems especially relevant to democratic politics. In addition, democracy is at least partially based on public endorsement of the political decision-making process; it is not to be measured primarily by the efficiency of its outputs. Democracy is a process and a set of political expectations that elevate democracy above other political forms. In short, the universal appeal of democratic governance that was celebrated in Chapter I might prove to be short-lived if the practice of democracy fails to be seen to be making a decent go of fulfilling those ideals. What could be severely damaging to democracy as a set of procedures for making collective decisions in society is if people perceive that the formal system of politics is no longer worth engaging with. The trouble with disenchantment at the beginning of the twenty-first century is that it might be undermining the processes of formal politics that make democracy work and offering no viable alternative. The danger is that people will come to regard the formal political system as not worth bothering with and yet also find that the new politics of campaigns and protests - a minority interest, in any case - fails to satisfy because it cannot ultimately by-pass the formal political system or overthrow its power. Because of these concerns, it should be clear that we should not be sanguine about the scale of discontent with formal democratic politics, and that we need to understand in greater depth what is driving the disengagement from political activity.

CEDE THE POLITICAL—IMAPCT DEMOCRACY

**C. Democracy is essential to prevent many scenarios for war and extinction.**

**Diamond, 95** (Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, <http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm>)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. **Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.** LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. **Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another.** They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. **Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations,** and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies **do not sponsor terrorism** against one another. **They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on** or to threaten **one another.** Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. **They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.** They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

**CEDE THE POLITICAL—IMPACT ENVIRONMNET**

**The only way to address the environment is by engaging in international political reforms.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture”, page 305-306)

For example, ecology as a political struggle is increasingly displaced from questions of national and international policy and economics to the immediate micro-habits of everyday consumerism (e.g., recycling). Without denying the importance of changing individual consciousness and practices, it is still imperative to recognize that the ecological disaster cannot be averted unless individuals can be mobilized, on an international scale, to change the economic and political structures which allow and even encourage the continued pollution of the environment and the destruction of its (not our) resources. To say that ecology can be politicized only within the terms of everyday life means that it is a matter of collective life-styles and social actions, but that it cannot be treated as a question of state, corporate and economic policy. Such movements seem incapable of mounting a sustained critique of the forces which impinge upon and organize the structured ways people move through their lives. Thus, the very empowerment which struggles within everyday life make available can be articulated into larger structures of disempowerment which continue to subordinate people by erasing the possibility of political struggles in another space. It is as if the feminist insight that "the personal is political" had been magically transformed into the statement that the personal is the political, the only political realm that can matter.

**CEDE THE POLITICAL UNIQUENESS 2AC**

**The progressive movement is growing, riding on a clear mandate from voters to end backward conservative policies.**

**Podesta, 06** (John, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for American Progress, Chief of Staff to President Clinton, "The Rising Progressive Tide" Social Policy Magazine, The Center for American Progress, Winter Edition, <http://www.socialpolicy.org/index.php?id=1810>)

The 2006 elections marked the end of the grand conservative experiment and the beginnings of a resurgent progressive movement at the national and state levels. Americans unequivocally rejected the Iraq war and the failures of President Bush and his war cabinet in prosecuting this foreign policy disaster. Americans rejected the redistribution of wealth to the top and demanded a return to policies that will help the middle class and low income working people get ahead. And voters rejected years of conservative incompetence and anti-government vitriol, most acutely felt in the federal government's shameful response to Hurricane Katrina. In the end, Americans deemed the existing conservative regime to be too corrupt, too inattentive to human needs, and too removed from the practical consequences of its ideological schemes to remain in power. For the first time in recent memory, the electoral results were cast not in gray, but in black and white. According to the national House exit polls, Democrats won voters in every income category up to \$100,000 per year and won a majority of non-college educated voters. These voters constitute the core of working and middle class families that have abandoned Democrats in recent elections. Democrats essentially split married voters after losing this bloc by a large margin in 2004 and won nearly six in 10 of both moderate and independent voters. Traditional Democratic voters – including union households, African-Americans, and unmarried women – grew in strength this cycle and Democrats managed to erase all of Bush's gains among Hispanics in 2004, winning this important constituency by a 69-to-30 percent margin. 2006 marked the year wayward Reagan Democrats returned home, the progressive base grew stronger and more powerful, and Democrats successfully built a 53 percent national majority coalition. Not to be outdone by their national counterparts, progressives made tremendous gains in the states as well. Democrats picked up six governors' seats and now hold a 28-22 state advantage in gubernatorial positions. They picked up a total of 323 state legislative seats and control both legislative chambers in 23 states. Democrats also control 31 state attorneys general seats and hold a four-state advantage in secretary of state seats. In terms of progressive issues, efforts to increase economic opportunities for workers and protect the power of government to serve the public interest were extremely popular this cycle. All six ballot measures to increase the minimum wage passed and only one of 17 ballot measures to limit the power of government was enacted. The post-Goldwater/post-Reagan conservatism has been discredited as a governing philosophy, and simultaneously, a new progressive movement has seized the moment to assert itself to restore credibility to a government that serves the common good and provides practical leadership for a nation seeking a better future and a more secure world. To be clear, Democratic control across the states and in Congress does not necessarily mean that progressive reforms are on the way. Ours is not a partisan effort and we should hold the feet of all leaders to the fire – Democratic and Republican, alike – in order to move policies that can improve people's lives. There are encouraging signs, however. Although it received little attention during the last election, the new majority did put forth a specific policy agenda of a distinctly progressive tone; raising the minimum wage; allowing the government to negotiate with pharmaceutical companies for lower drug prices; raising Pell grants and lowering the cost of student loans; replacing tax breaks for polluting oil companies with clean energy technology; and implementing the 9-11 Commission recommendations for securing the homeland and protecting us abroad. Congress is acting on these progressive priorities as we write this.

CEDE THE POLITICAL UNIQUENESS

**The progressive movement is succeeding and must make big reforms now**

**Lux, 09** (Mike, Co-founder and CEO of Progressive Strategies, "Obama and the Progressive Movement," March 2<sup>nd</sup>, URL: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-lux/obama-and-the-progressive\\_b\\_171083.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-lux/obama-and-the-progressive_b_171083.html))

2009 is the year. This is the moment when progressives, and America, show whether we can live up to the heroes of our history. Progressives in the past have ended slavery and Jim Crow, given women and minorities and the poor the right to vote, created the National Parks System, made dramatic improvements in cleaning up our air and water, and launched transformational programs like Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and Head Start. Barack Obama has boldly announced his ambition to join those historic heroes and create another Big Change Moment. This year will decide whether Democrats in Congress and the progressive movement can help him deliver on that noble ambition. Seize the day.

**Obama is succeeding in being progressive – if he fails the progressive movement will be stunted for another generation.**

**Lux, 09** (Mike, Co-founder and CEO of Progressive Strategies, "Obama and the Progressive Movement," March 2<sup>nd</sup>, URL: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-lux/obama-and-the-progressive\\_b\\_171083.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-lux/obama-and-the-progressive_b_171083.html))

But we should be very clear: Obama has decided to cast his lot with those of us who have been fighting for big, transformative change. If he succeeds, we succeed, and if he fails, we fail - and we fail for at least another generation, because no Democrat will take big risks again for a very long time if Obama loses this gamble. In traveling all over the country promoting my new book, *The Progressive Revolution: How the Best in America Came to Be*, I have been saying that the lesson of history is that Obama should seize this opportunity to think very big and bold, to be transformative in pushing to fundamentally re-structure our economy, our energy system, our health system, and our very politics. And that is exactly what President Obama is doing - no credit due to me or any other advice given. He is just listening to his own remarkable political instincts. Though the recent economic recovery bill was too small and had its flaws, it was literally the biggest single investment in progressive social capital - health care, public education, green jobs, infrastructure, universal broadband - in history. His budget might well be the most audacious and sweeping in progressive history as well - certainly one that competes with LBJ's 1965 budget and FDR's 1935 budget. Obama is fulfilling his promise to the America people in the 2008 campaign: big, bold, truly transformative change.

**CEDE THE POLITICAL UNIQUENESS**

**Progressive momentum can be built upon with big tent, practical politics—operating at only the level of ideology dooms the movement.**

**Wilson, 2000** – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People” p. 5- 6)

The trend toward progressive attitudes among Americans has only accelerated. Today, Americans advocate gender equality on a level unthinkable at the time I was born, an era when airline stewardess were fired when they turned thirty, got married, or gained fifteen pounds. Today, racial equality is an ideal widely accepted, even if the reality falls short. Today, equality for gays and lesbians is a politically viable possibility, a remarkable leap for an issue that was virtually invisible at the time of the Stonewall riot. Today, environmental awareness and the enormous number of people who recycle would have been unimaginable to the small group of activists who gathered to celebrate the first Earth Day. Even though the American people have been moving to the left on a number of important issues, the two major political parties have shifted to the right. The left's revival requires both the recognition of the disadvantages it faces and a willingness to fight against those barriers while making use of the advantages that progressives have over the right. The biggest advantage that the left holds is that it doesn't have to be afraid of speaking the truth to the public. Conservatives, despite their assertions of public support, must always be wary of dealing too openly with Americans. That is, every idea on the right must be carefully vetted to ensure the proper spin control. Even "radical" ideas such as Steve Forbes's flat tax must conceal the extent of tax cuts for the rich under the disguise of a universal tax reduction. This book argues that progressives need to reshape their arguments and their policy proposals to increase their influence over American politics. It also contends that the left need not sell its soul or jettison its diverse constituents in order to succeed. Rather than moderation, I urge a new kind of tactical radicalism. Rather than a monolithic left focused on class or labor or postmodernism or whatever the pet ideological project of the day is, I advocate a big-tent left capable of mobilizing all its people. Progressives already have the hearts and minds of the American people. What the left lacks is a political movement to translate that popularity into political action. What the left needs is a rhetorical framework and political plan of action to turn the progressive potential in America into a political force.

**Progressive ideals are alive and well in the US.**

**Wilson, 2000** – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People” p. 2- 4)

The thesis of this book is that a majority of Americans now believe (or could easily be persuaded to believe) in many progressive ideas, even though the power of the progressive movement itself in mainstream politics has largely disintegrated. In reality, progressives are nearly everywhere, with the possible exception of corporate boardrooms, the White House, and Bob Jones University. Progressives look like everyone else, although they appear to be a little more forlorn than most. Unfortunately, the progressive views of the American majority do not translate into political power.

Progressives cannot sit back and await the rising masses to thrust the left into power. Rather, progressives need to give their potential supporters a reason to be politically active and intellectually interested in the ideas of the left. If you relied on just the mass media in America or on election results, you would have to conclude that this is a conservative nation. We hear about polls declaring that the American people demand lower taxes, smaller government, the elimination of welfare, the mass execution of criminals, and daily pledges of allegiance to the free market. We see Republicans in charge of Congress, successfully pursuing their goals of putting a prison on every corner and lowering taxes on the wealthy in order to allow economic prosperity to trickle down to everyone else. America must be conservative. It seems logical, doesn't it? If the Republicans hold political power and the "liberal" Democrats are following their lead, this must mean that the majority of Americans share the values of the right. If the "liberal" media agree with this assessment, then it's surely an established fact: progressivism as a mass movement is dead in America.

Progressivism as an ideology is a powerful force in the American psyche. From environmentalism to feminism to racial equality. Americans believe deeply in progressive ideas. All these ideologies were minority movements just a generation ago; now, however, open opposition to them is considered political suicide in most of the country. Why, then, does a progressive political movement seem so unthinkable? In a political system controlled by the principle of "one dollar, one vote," these progressive views lose out to the more economically powerful ideas held by the conservative status quo. These progressive ideas end up being ignored by mega-media corporations controlled by the same wealthy forces. This book is not an attempt to establish a philosophy of the left. Like any political movement, the left has many different philosophies driving its members. Leftists are concerned about civil rights, gay rights, women's rights, poverty, homelessness, education, imprisonment, empowerment, and much more. Leftists believe in liberalism, Marxism, libertarianism, Christianity, and a wide range of other ideologies. Trying to find a common intellectual ground for everything is impossible, since not every leftist can possibly share the same belief in every issue and in what the top priorities should be. Even trying to define what a leftist is seems to be a difficult task, especially since most of the people who believe in leftist ideas may be unwilling to accept the label. This book is, instead, a guide for political rhetoric and strategic action, a sometimes helpful, sometimes annoying attempt to help the left overcome its own flaws and seek out ways to reach and convince a larger audience about progressive ideas. This is a self-help book for leftists looking for ways to convince the world that what they believe is correct. This book is also a road map showing how the left can turn the public debate to issues they can win. This book originates from a puzzling paradox: over the past several decades, American political attitudes have become dramatically more progressive. Movements for civil rights, women's equality, and environmental protection, once promoted by a radical fringe, are now fully embraced by the mainstream.

**CEDE THE POLITICAL UNIQUENESS – ECONOMY**

**The block of free-market conservatives is crumbling with the economy – structuralists have rallied behind Obama and the left**

**Harris and Davidson, 2009** (*Carl Davidson and Jerry Harris* are founders of the Global Studies Association of North America. Harris is a Prof of History at DeVry University, “Obama: the New Contours of Power” Race & Class, <http://rac.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi/reprint/50/4/1>)

Since 1980, Reagan/Thatcher free-market conservatives have led the globalist bloc and, although accepting some structural and regulatory constraints, they expanded the widely speculative markets that crashed so spectacularly in 2008. Neoliberalism was aided and abetted by the Third Way politics of Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and others whose polices represented a centre/right alliance between free-market fundamentalists and structuralists. This alliance was sustained during the Bush administration, as neoliberals continued to follow the philosophy of Milton Friedman with blind faith. As Friedman succinctly wrote: ‘Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible.’<sup>3</sup> As the era’s popular saying went, ‘greed is good’. But by 2007, as the depths of the economic crisis became clearly revealed, the structuralists began to abandon their neoliberal dogma and, in 2008, split with the conservatives and rallied to Obama.

**We are entering into an economic progressive era.**

**McHugh, 09** (Michael C, PhD, Former Chair of the Political Science Department, at KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakstan. “THE SECOND GILDED AGE AND NEW PROGRESSIVE ERA,” URL: [http://www.secondprogressiveera.com/A\\_New\\_Progressive\\_Era.html](http://www.secondprogressiveera.com/A_New_Progressive_Era.html))

I think we're in a reform period that will resemble the First Progressive Era (1900-20) and the New Deal (1932-40) rather than the 1960s. This means that economic issues will be first and foremost rather than issues of race, culture, sexuality and gender, etc. For one this, the working class and middle class were hit hard during the Second Gilded Age (1970-2000), and real wealth and incomes stagnated or declined for 80% of the population. This heyday of free market capitalism is a well known story by now, with its destruction of organized labor, the welfare state, tax and trade policies that favored the wealthy and big business. It was bound to end in a crash and it did--a very big one. So did the First Gilded Age and the New Era of the 1920s. We can already see where Obama is going with his reforms, at least in outline. Aside from the emergency stimulus packages, public works and relief, we can already see that he wants to create a greener economy, and expand and improve educational opportunities, and provide health care for those who have none. This also opens up the thorny area of de facto segregation in housing and education, which has not been addressed since the 1970s, but the fact is that blacks and Hispanics still get the short end of the stick disproportionately when it comes to jobs, housing, health care and education. Obama is understandably cautious about this, recalling all too well what happened when these issues exploded in the 1960s, but he is also clever enough to realize that today, as in the 1930s, enough white voters are hurting economically so that major federal initiatives and reforms will have as much opposition as they might otherwise. Internationally, we can also expect major changes in the IMF and World Bank, with the developing countries having more of a say in how these organizations are run. I regard this as an absolutely essential reform, that the role of Wall Street and private capital be reduced in the world, and that the poorer countries are no longer subjected to free market austerity programs. I'd go so far as to say that if this system isn't changed, then there will be no recovery from this depression. I also suspect that the US is going to have a much less militaristic and interventionist foreign policy, not least because we simply can't afford it any more. We're no longer the Great Superpower of 1945, and truth be told we haven't been for a long time. We're just going to have to accept the reality of a diminished and diminishing world role, and learn how to better work and play well with others. At the very least, private capital is going to be a lot more regulated and controlled than it has been in the last 30 years, and some banks and industries may stay under de facto state control for quite some time--at least until the next conservative cycle in 10 or 12 years. We might have a more mixed economy rather than pure free market capitalism, more along the lines of social democracies like Canada or Western Europe.



**CEDE THE POLITICAL UNIQUENESS – PROGRESSIVES NOW**

**Obama has coalesced a large liberal bloc that has the momentum to pass progressive legislation**

**Harris and Davidson, 09** (*Carl Davidson and Jerry Harris* are founders of the Global Studies Association of North America. Harris is a Prof of History at DeVry University, “Obama: the New Contours of Power” Race & Class, <http://rac.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi/reprint/50/4/1>)

The hegemonic bloc in formation around Obama is broad and deep, containing the possibility of a generational shift in political orientation. Neoliberal ideology has reigned over capitalism for thirty years but the crisis has stripped bare its dominant narrative. All can now see that the emperor has no clothes, and even free-market guru Alan Greenspan admitted to ‘a state of shocked disbelief’.<sup>5</sup> The elite of the new bloc are neo-Keynesian globalists attempting to redefine liberalism for the twenty-first century in both ideology and policy. This unites broad sectors of the capitalist class. The centre has shifted left, creating new dialogue and new debates. Government job programmes, infrastructure spending, expanded federal support to states, greater environmental investments and regulation of financial markets have suddenly all become mainstream. Ideas rarely spoken of by major news outlets now appear on magazine covers and daily talk shows. A new New Deal has become the common expectation of millions. Obama made such ideas the centre of his campaign, a highroad strategy of capital investments in production, job creation, green technology, health care for all and a withdrawal from Iraq. Politically, Obama is a pragmatic centrist without the ideological sensibilities of the 1960s, yet his vision is often driven by some core progressive values. It was these values, more than his politics, which drew massive support from minorities, youth and unions.

**Obama has generated a new generation of progressives consisting of more youth and minorities**

**Harris and Davidson, 09** (*Carl Davidson and Jerry Harris* are founders of the Global Studies Association of North America. Harris is a Prof of History at DeVry University, “Obama: the New Contours of Power” Race & Class, <http://rac.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi/reprint/50/4/1>)

The most important and active sectors of the base are anti-war youth, minorities and union activists. In terms of voting results, 97 per cent of Blacks, 67 per cent of Latinos, 63 per cent of Asian Americans and 45 per cent of whites cast their ballots for Obama. Among white union members, 67 per cent voted for Obama. 18 Among youth, Obama took 65 per cent of the vote. There was also an upsurge in voting patterns, Blacks voted in greater numbers by 14 per cent, Latinos by 25 per cent and young people aged between 18 and 29 by 25 per cent. This played a key role in winning over swing states and giving Obama his victory. In New Mexico, the youth and Latino vote surged by 71 per cent; in Ohio, 27 per cent more Blacks came out; in North Carolina, the Black vote increased by 23 per cent and the youth vote by 33 per cent; and, in Florida, Blacks voted in greater numbers by 19 per cent and Latinos by 27 per cent. The large number of white voters, especially union voters, is also significant. The election in 1982 of Harold Washington, the progressive Black mayor of Chicago, is an interesting marker for comparison. Washington was a life-long Democrat but took on the Richard Daley machine in an election where race became an explosive element. Like Obama, Washington’s election was the impetus for massive new voter registration and participation. Deserted and opposed by the regular Democratic Party machine, he put a volunteer army of 10,000 on to the streets of Chicago. Washington won two elections but with never more than 18 per cent of the white vote, and Chicago was a union town. The fact that Obama could carry 45 per cent of the white vote nationally indicates a significant change in American political culture. Obama was able to awaken, organise and mobilise an incredible force of what grew into an army of more than 3 million volunteers. Obama started with his local coalition in Chicago, the Black community, ‘Lakefront liberals’ from the corporate world, and a sector of labour, mainly service workers. Obama’s initial attraction was his early opposition to the Iraq war and his participation in two mass rallies against it, one before it began and other after the war was under way. This both awakened and inspired a large layer of young anti-war activists, some active for the first time, to join his effort to win the Iowa primary. The fact that he had publicly opposed the war before it had begun distinguished him from Hillary Clinton and John Edwards, his chief opponents. These young people also contributed to the innovative nature of his organisation, combining grassroots community organising with the mass communication tools of internet-based social networking and fundraising. Many had some earlier experience organising and participating in the World Social Forum in Atlanta 2007, which energised nearly 10,000 young activists. Those who came forward put their energy to good use. Had Obama not won Iowa, it is not likely we would be talking about him today.

**CEDE THE POLITICAL UNIQUENESS – TRENDS**

**Progressivism is growing—demographic trends prove.**

**Teixeira 9** (Ruy, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he co-directed a joint Brookings-American Enterprise Institute project on political demography and geography, “New Progressive America,” March 11, URL: [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/progressive\\_america.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/progressive_america.html))

What happened? How did conservatives do so well in one election but progressives so well in the other? The answer: In those intervening 20 years, a new progressive America has emerged with a new demography, a new geography, and a new agenda. The new demography refers to the array of growing demographic groups that have aligned themselves with progressives and swelled their ranks. The new geography refers to the close relationship between pro- progressive political shifts and dynamic growth areas across the country, particularly within contested states. The new agenda is the current tilt of the public toward progressive ideas and policy priorities—a tilt that is being accentuated by the strong support for this agenda among growing demographic groups. All this adds up to big change that is reshaping our country in a fundamentally progressive direction. Consider some of the components of the new demography. Between 1988 and 2008, the minority share of voters in presidential elections has risen by 11 percentage points, while the share of increasingly progressive white college graduate voters has risen by four points. But the share of white-working class voters, who have remained conservative in their orientation, has plummeted by 15 points.

**Cultural disagreements are getting overwhelmed by a nation-wide progressive ideology.**

**Teixeira 9** (Ruy, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he co-directed a joint Brookings-American Enterprise Institute project on political demography and geography, “New Progressive America,” March 11, URL: [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/progressive\\_america.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/progressive_america.html))

As the country is growing and changing, so are the American people’s views on what government can and should do. This is shaping a new progressive agenda to go with the new demography and the new geography, starting with the likely diminution in the culture wars that have bedeviled American politics for so long. While cultural disagreements remain, their political influence is being undermined by the rise of the Millennial Generation, increasing religious and family diversity and the decline of the culturally conservative white working class. Culture wars issues, which so conspicuously failed to move many voters in the last couple of elections, will lose even more force in years to come. Instead, we will see more attention paid to issues such as health care, energy and education, where government has a positive role to play. The public holds distinctly progressive views in each of these areas, backing health care for all, a transition to clean energy and building a 21st-century education system, including a major infusion of resources to improve kindergarten-through-12th grade education and college access. In each of these areas, ongoing demographic change is likely to intensify the public’s commitment to progressive goals, since rising demographic groups tend to be especially supportive. In the pages that follow, this report will document the emergence and current state of this new progressive America through intensive analysis of election, demographic and public opinion data. As we will demonstrate, at this point in our history, progressive arguments combined with the continuing demographic and geographic changes are tilting our country in a progressive direction—trends should take America down a very different road than has been traveled in the last eight years. A new progressive America is on the rise.

CEDE THE POLITICAL UNIQUENESS – TRENDS

**Progressivism is growing in all major areas of growth in the U.S.**

**Teixeira, 09** (Ruy, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he co-directed a joint Brookings-American Enterprise Institute project on political demography and geography, “New Progressive America,” March 11, URL: [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/progressive\\_america.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/progressive_america.html))

Geographical trends are equally as stunning. Progressive gains since 1988 have been heavily concentrated in not just the urbanized cores of large metropolitan areas, but also the growing suburbs around them. Even in exurbia, progressives have made big gains. Progressive gains were only minimal in the smallest metropolitan areas and in small town rural America and only in the most isolated, least populated rural counties did progressives actually lose ground. Within states, there is a persistent pattern of strong pro-progressive shifts in fast-growing dynamic metropolitan areas. In Colorado, Obama in the 2008 presidential election improved over Sen. John Kerry’s margin in 2004 by 14 points in the fast-growing Denver metropolitan area and made his greatest gains in the super fast-growing Denver suburbs. Sen. Kerry lost Colorado to President Bush; Obama defeated Sen. John McCain. And so it went across key swing states. In Nevada, Obama carried the Las Vegas metro by 19 points, which was 14 points better than Kerry in 2004 and 35 points better than Michael Dukakis in 1988. In Florida, Obama carried the Orlando metropolitan area in the I-4 corridor by nine points, a 17-point gain over 2004 and an amazing 48 point shift since 1988. In Virginia, Obama dominated the state’s northern suburbs across the Potomac River from the District of Columbia by 19 points—15 points better than Kerry and 38 points better than Dukakis. There are many other examples, but the story is the same from state to state: where America is growing, progressives are gaining strength and gaining it fast.

**National survey proves that Americans are progressive.**

**Teixeira, 09** (Ruy, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he co-directed a joint Brookings-American Enterprise Institute project on political demography and geography, “Yes Virginia, There is a New Progressive America: A Reply to Jay Cost,” March 18, URL: [http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/03/yes\\_virginia\\_there\\_is\\_a\\_new\\_pr.html](http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/03/yes_virginia_there_is_a_new_pr.html))

But it is also true that our new survey does in fact show that the public leans progressive. The survey included a battery of 40 statements, each of which was a positive expression of either a conservative or progressive argument, with an even mix between conservative and progressive arguments. Overall, Americans expressed more agreement with the progressive than conservative arguments. Indeed, six of the top seven statements in terms of level of agreement, and eight of the top ten, were progressive statements. These statements included such items as the need for government investment in education, infrastructure and science, the need for a transition to clean energy, the need for government regulation and the need to provide financial support for the poor, the sick and the elderly, the need for a positive image around the world to promote our national security, the idea that our security is best promoted by diplomacy, alliances and international institutions and the idea that America should play a leading role in addressing climate change through reduced emissions and international agreements. This is not to say that conservative arguments do not retain considerable strength--they do, as the report clearly and, I think, very honestly documents. But the net of progressive and conservative views at this point favors progressives.

**CEDE THE POLITICAL: AT CHRISTIAN RIGHT**

**The Christian right is declining.**

**Teixeira, 09** (Ruy, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he co-directed a joint Brookings-American Enterprise Institute project on political demography and geography, “New Progressive America,” March 11, URL: [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/progressive\\_america.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/progressive_america.html))

Other demographic trends accentuate progressives’ advantage. The Millennial Generation—those born between 1978 and 2000—gave Obama stunning 66 percent-to-32 percent margin in 2008. This generation is adding 4.5 million adults to the voting pool every year. Or consider professionals, who are now the most progressive occupational group and increase that support with every election. Fast-growth segments among women like singles and the college-educated favor progressives over conservatives by large margins. And even as progressives improve their performance among the traditional faithful, the growth of religious diversity—especially rapid increases among the unaffiliated—favours progressives. By the election of 2016, it is likely that the United States will no longer be a majority white Christian nation.

**CEDE THE POLITICAL: AT PERFORMANCE**

**Faith in performance is naïve and fails to reshape politics**

**Rothberg & Valente 97** Molly Anne Rothenberg, Assoc. Prof English @ Tulane and Joseph Valente, Assis. Prof English @ U. Ill, Feb. 1997, College Literature, v. 25, Iss. 1, "Performative chic," p pq

The recent vogue for performativity, particularly in gender and postcolonial studies, suggests that the desire for political potency has displaced the demand for critical rigor. Because Judith Butler bears the primary responsibility for investing performativity with its present critical cachet, her work furnishes a convenient site for exposing the flawed theoretical formulations and the hollow political claims advanced under the banner of performativity. We have undertaken this critique not solely in the interests of clarifying performativity's theoretical stakes: in our view, the appropriation of performativity for purposes to which it is completely unsuited has misdirected crucial activist energies, not only squandering resources but even endangering those naïve enough to act on performativity's (false) political promise. It is reasonable to expect any practical political discourse to essay an analysis which links its proposed actions with their supposed effects, appraising the fruits of specific political labors before their seeds are sown. Only by means of such an assessment can any political program persuade us to undertake some tasks and forgo others. Butler proceeds accordingly: "The task is not whether to repeat, but how to repeat or, indeed to repeat, and through a radical proliferation of gender, to displace the very gender norms that enable repetition itself' (Gender Trouble 148). Here, at the conclusion to Gender Trouble, she makes good her promise that subjects can intervene meaningfully, politically, in the signification system which iteratively constitutes them. The political "task" we face requires that we choose "how to repeat" gender norms in such a way as to displace them. According to her final chapter, "The Politics of Parody," the way to displace gender norms is through the deliberate performance of drag as gender parody.

**CEDE THE POLITICAL: AT REFORMS FAIL**

**A critical mass of small reforms is the only way that a radical left agenda is possible.**

**Wilson, 2000** – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People” p. 121- 123)

Progressives need to be pragmatic in order to be powerful. However, pragmatism shouldn't be confused with Clintonian centrism and the abandonment of all substance. Pragmatists have principles, too. The difference between a pragmatic progressive and a foolish one is the willingness to pick the right fights and fight in the right way to accomplish these same goals. The current failure of progressivism in America is due to the structure of American politics and media, not because of a wrong turn that the movement took somewhere along the way. What the left needs is not a "better" ideology but a tactical adaptation to the obstacles it faces in the contemporary political scene. A pragmatic progressivism does not sacrifice its ideals but simply communicates them better to the larger public. The words we use shape how people respond to our ideas. It's tempting to offer the standard advice that progressives should present their ideas in the most palatable form. But palatable to whom? The media managers and pedestrian pundits who are the intellectual gatekeepers won't accept these ideas. By the time progressives transform their ideas into the political baby food necessary for inclusion in current debates, it barely seems to be worth the effort. Leftists need to seize the dominant political rhetoric, even though it may be conservative in its goals, and turn it in a progressive direction. Progressives need to use the antitax ideology to demand tax cuts for the poor. Progressives need to use the antigovernment and antiwelfare ideology to demand the end of corporate welfare. Progressives need to translate every important issue into the language that is permissible in the mainstream. Something will inevitably be lost in the translation. But the political soul underlying these progressive ideas can be preserved and brought to the public's attention. The left does not need to abandon its progressive views in order to be popular. The left only needs to abandon some of its failed strategies and become as savvy as the conservatives are at manipulating the press and the politicians. The language of progressive needs to become more mainstream, but the ideas must remain radical. In an age of soulless politicians and spineless ideologies, the left has the virtue of integrity. Until progressives become less self-satisfied with the knowledge that they're right and more determined to convince everyone else of this fact, opportunities for political change will not be forthcoming. Progressives have also been hampered by a revolutionary instinct among some leftist groups. According to some left wingers, incremental progress is worthless---that is, nothing short of a radical change in government will mean anything to them. Indeed, for most radical left wingers, liberal reforms are a threat to the movement, since they reduce the desire for more extreme changes. What the revolutionaries fail to realize is that progressive achievements can build on one another. If anything approaching a political revolution actually happens in America, it will be due to a succession of popular, effective, progressive reforms. A popular uprising in the ballot box is possible only if the left can change its political assumptions about smaller, specific issues.

**\*\*COERCION\*\***

**AT COERCION: FREE MARKETS = ECO-DESTRUCTION**

**Markets cannot save the environment—industry lies about global warming are a prime example of their social irresponsibility.**

**Mayer, 07** (Don, Professor of Management, Oakland University, “Corporate Citizenship and Trustworthy Capitalism: Cocreating a More Peaceful Planet”, American Business Law Journal, 44 Am. Bus. L.J. 237, lexis)

[\*252] B. Corporations Just Follow the Rules of the Game Another mental framework that does not fit with current reality is that corporations are effectively governed or restrained from antisocial actions by the public sector and are subject to rules of the game set by public authority. Consider Milton Friedman's guidance on corporate social responsibility, 43 which assumes that profit maximization takes place within a set of meaningful rules and boundaries set by public governance. Using this model, some business ethicists have suggested that manufacturers have a duty to obey whatever laws Congress or international institutions prescribe and to not resist the public control of private enterprise. 44 The idea is that, by obeying these rules, corporations fulfill their basic social responsibilities. The current reality, however, is that corporations may (singly or in concert with others): (1) work to undermine policy making by misleading the public, (2) avoid accountability under the rule of law, and (3) lobby for new or continued subsidies and anticompetitive advantages from politicians. 1. Misleading the Public The self-interest of corporations is evident by their use of media to mislead the public on one of the most critical issues of our time--global warming.

**Free markets can never solve because environmental effects do not have direct, immediate, proportionate costs.**

**Foster, 02** (John Bellamy, Professor of environmental sociology, Marxism, and political economy at the University of Oregon, *Ecology Against Capitalism*, p. 36-37)

The principal characteristic of capitalism, which this whole market-utopian notion of the capitalization of nature ignores, is that it is a system of self-expanding value in which accumulation of economic surplus – rooted in exploitation and given the force of law by competition – must occur on an ever-larger scale. At the same time, this represents a narrow form of expansion that dissolves all qualitative relations into quantitative ones, and specifically in monetary or exchange value terms. The general formula for capital (generalized commodity production), as Marx explained, is one of M-C-M, whereby money is exchanged for a commodity (or the means of producing a commodity), which is then sold again for money, but with a profit. This expresses capitalism's overriding goal: the expansion of money values (M'), not the satisfaction of human needs. The production of commodities (C) is simply the means to that end. The ceaseless expansion that characterizes such a system is obvious. As the great conservative economist Joseph Schumpeter remarked, “capitalism is a process, stationary capitalism would be a *contradictio in adjecto*.” Economists, even environmental economists, rarely deal with the question of the effect that an increasing economic scale resulting from ceaseless economic growth will have on the environment. Most economists treat the economy as if it were suspended in space, not as a subsystem within a larger biosphere. Moreover, many economists who recognize the importance of natural capital nevertheless adopt what is known as the “weak sustainability hypothesis.” According to this hypothesis, increases in the value of human capital fully compensate for any losses in natural capital, such as forests, fish stocks, and petroleum reserves. Some ecological economists, however, have countered with what is known as the “strong sustainability hypothesis,” according to which human made capital cannot always substitute for natural capital, since there is such a thing as critical natural capital, that is, natural capital necessary for the maintenance of the biosphere. Tropical forests, for example, are home to about half the world's species and are critical in regulating the planet's climate. Once this is admitted, though, the dream of reducing all of nature to natural capital to be incorporated within the market fades quite quickly. The self-regulating market system has no way of valuing nature on such a scale. Moreover, there is an inherent conflict between the maintenance of ecosystems and the biosphere and the kind of rapid, unbounded economic growth that capitalism represents. Indeed, sustainable development envisioned as the “pricing of the planet” (to refer to the title of one recent book) is little more than economic imperialism vis-à-vis nature. It tends to avoid two core issues: whether all environmental costs can actually be internalized within the context of a profit-making economy, and how the internalization of such costs can account for the effects of increasing economic scale within a limited biosphere. The difficulty of internalizing all external costs becomes obvious when one considers what it would take to internalize the costs to society and the planet of the automobile-petroleum complex alone, which is degrading our cities, the planetary atmosphere, and human life itself. Indeed, as the great ecological economist K. William Kapp once remarked, “Capitalism must be regarded as the economy of unpaid costs.” The full internalization of social and environmental costs within the structure of the private market is unthinkable.



**AT COERCION: FREE MARKETS = ECO-DESTRUCTION**

**Free markets cannot solve the environment. 1) It is a myth that corporations are more efficient than governments, and 2) accounting practices never measure the full extent of environmental damage.**

**Mayer, 07** (Don, Professor of Management, Oakland University, "Corporate Citizenship and Trustworthy Capitalism: Cocreating a More Peaceful Planet", American Business Law Journal, 44 Am. Bus. L.J. 237, lexis)

Conventional wisdom tells us that free markets and private enterprise bring about the greatest good through optimally efficient use of resources. The reality is that corporations can be as bureaucratic as any government agency with new efficiencies and innovations being strangled within the organization. Corporate initiatives to conserve energy and materials and to invest in cost-effective and eco-friendly products and efficiencies are not a given for many organizations; while there are some emerging corporate exemplars that will be discussed in Part III, they are exceptional. On a [\*266] more basic level, claims that the free market creates greater wealth and well-being globally will invariably rely on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) numbers that systematically exclude the accelerating draw-down of natural capital. What is natural capital? Natural capital is breathable air, drinkable water, fertile soil, wetlands and coastal dunes that mediate storm surges, aquifers that provide a source for irrigating otherwise unproductive land, rivers and lakes that provide recreation and fishing, and oceans that have provided sustenance and a way of life for people over the centuries. In our economic calculations of how we are doing in terms of wealth creation, the now-accelerating diminution of natural capital has been left out of the equation. Because the market paradigm recognizes only priced exchanges, it cannot compute other conditions about life, health, or happiness. Thus, while we are--by standard economic measures--getting richer, the natural environment that we bequeath to successive generations is getting poorer. 99 The well-documented evidence includes a 1,000-times-normal rate of species extinction, intensifying pollution of the air and water, collapse of fisheries and forest stocks across continents, increasing climate destabilization, and irreversible depletion of nonrenewable subsoil assets and energy sources. 100 The surge in drawing down natural capital is a looming hazard to human life and continuing commerce, but is currently not computed in market accountings or for national GDPs. 101 Economists recognize that the market allocates resources and distributes wealth among participants. While agreeing with this, Douglas Kysar also documents the recent emergence of the concept of scale from ecological economists such as Robert Costanza, Herman Daly, and Kenneth Boulding (whose classic essay on "Spaceship Earth" 102 challenged prevailing macroeconomic assumptions). According to Kysar, [\*267] Ecological economists argue that a third function served by the market has been overlooked by conventional analysis: moderation of the scale of human economic activity vis-a-vis the ecological superstructure upon which all life and activity depends (scale). While allocation determines the purposes for which resources are used, scale determines the rate and amounts of resources that are used. 103 Boulding noted that mainstream economists viewed the economy as an open system of pure exchange value with externalized environmental consequences, yet their view failed to note that the scale of externalities was becoming massive and on a public scale. He summarized the mainstream perspective as "cowboy economics," in which natural frontiers are seen as limitless, resources as inexhaustible, and wastes as innocuous. 104 Given the assumptions of an open system with infinite reservoirs of natural capital and no limits on the effluvia that can be left behind, infinite growth is an entirely rational and uncontroversial goal. Yet, in fact, the earth is a closed system, which requires that consideration be given to the stock of natural resources and the undesirable byproducts of certain kinds of production and consumption. On a spaceship, you can not ignore the byproducts of production and consumption, and you must, of necessity, pay attention to the stock of resources that you carried on board. Likewise on "Spaceship Earth," humans must be concerned with the capacity of the global vehicle to support their needs and accommodate their wastes. "The essential measure of the success of the economy is not production and consumption at all, but the nature, extent, quality, and complexity of the total capital stock, including in this the state of the human bodies and minds included in the system." 105 Should we simply let posterity worry about Spaceship Earth? Boulding seems to think we humans have enough "ethical myopia" to do just that. But doing so fails to meet the moral challenge of our time, whether as individuals, corporations, or nations. Nonetheless, mainstream economics does not (according to Kysar) pay particular attention to Boulding's ideas. Along with mainstream economics, we prefer to live for today, defining progress in standard economic terms of growing [\*268] GDP. 106 In short, we are only being efficient in narrow terms, without reference to our larger environmental context.

## AT COERCION: OIL COMPANIES EVIL

**Oil companies are the perfect example of irresponsible corporations—they sponsor global violence and are destroying the environment.**

**Mayer, 07** (Don, Professor of Management, Oakland University, “Corporate Citizenship and Trustworthy Capitalism: Cocreating a More Peaceful Planet”, American Business Law Journal, 44 Am. Bus. L.J. 237, lexis)

Much of the above is no longer true. The vision of American businesses spreading the light of peace and prosperity and free trade throughout the world is at best a partial truth. There are exceptional businesses, some of them American, whose actions abroad create respect for the rule of law; respect for the environment; and fairness for employees of differing ethnicity, race, and gender and who refuse to bribe corrupt public officials. 20 Still, more than a few corporations are engaged in the kinds of activities that contribute to global warming and lobby against regulatory solutions of any kind; 21 others are profiting handsomely in the projection [\*246] of American military power and may also do business with regimes that sponsor terrorism. 23 Further, America's addiction to oil consumption--by far the most conspicuous in the world--is supported by a foreign policy that has recently been described as “imperial.” 24 The new great game for Central Asian oil is on, 25 and military ventures to win that game are likely to cause considerable ecological damage domestically and [\*247] globally. 26 Moreover, the waste and fraud that is attendant on this use of taxpayer resources no longer seems subject to democratic controls. 27 Some observers have begun to wonder whether the United States is tending toward a kind of crony capitalism that breeds fraud, waste, secrecy, and deceit rather than the kind of open and competitive capitalism that economics texts celebrate. 28 A. Governments--Not Corporations--Make War The familiar saying that "war is good for business" certainly holds true for some businesses. P.W. Singer shows how U.S. corporations are now vital subcontractors in the outsourcing of war from the public sector. 29 The military-industrial complex 30 and the growth in exports from the arms [\*248] industry in the United States and Europe have proven quite profitable for some businesses. While some corporations may find lucrative opportunities in war and conflict, others may be tempted to encourage conflict as a normal course of business. To aid commercial interests, U.S. foreign policy has often made use of covert action and military force, becoming economized over successive administrations, whether Republican or Democrat. 31 Corporations may also actively collaborate with regimes that are oppressive, antidemocratic, and militarily aggressive. 32 Some U.S. and European multinational enterprises (MNEs) have been criticized over the past fifteen years for allying themselves with military regimes in foreign lands. In Nigeria, for example, Shell and Chevron have allegedly encouraged or allowed the local military to harass and even kill local people who protest environmental and other problems that the companies have caused. 33 Activists criticized Dow in the 1960s for providing napalm to the U.S. military, just as Halliburton is criticized today for its no-bid contracts in a war that many consider to be unjust. 34 Corporate [\*249] moral agnosticism is fairly normal in this regard. 35 When sanctions were put on so-called rogue nations (Libya and Iraq in the 1990s), U.S. and European Union (EU) sanctions were not altogether effective in preventing U.S. and EU companies from profiting by dealing with these and other nations who resisted the rule of law. Even now, Chinese and Russian commercial interests threaten to veto any harsh United Nations sanctions against Iran for developing its capacity to make nuclear bombs. 36 [\*250] The extent of the capture of public policy by private interests has apparently increased during the Bush II administration. One example is the Carlyle Group, a group of fourteen investment funds that leads all other private equity funds in annual returns. Its modus operandi is to use former government officials for their access to government bureaucracies to get government contracts, especially in defense procurement. 37 Chalmers Johnson has said, “[W]e're really talking about a systematic merging of the private and public sectors to the point where the distinctions get lost.” 38 While Carlyle's activities are legal, they raise legitimate questions about the confusion of private interests and public expenditures and policies. [\*251] The extraordinary degree to which public and private sectors are merging has been evident in no-bid contracts for Iraq, the activities of Halliburton, and -- according to Kevin Phillips in American Dynasty--in the public and private lives of the Bush family. It is tempting to dismiss Phillips' indictment of the Bush family as blatantly political, but the pattern of three generations of Bush men using political office for private gain is well documented and disturbing. 39 If both Bush I and Bush II are oil men, then it seems fair to assume that the search for oil as profit shaped their perspectives, and it should not be surprising that oil companies would use political access to help forge critical U.S. energy policies. 40 U.S. foreign policy and national security are inextricably linked to the primacy of oil supplies and oil companies. 41 Yet continuing down the fossil-fuel energy path seriously undermines the environment and the future security of global capitalism. European and U.S. dependence on oil--and the predicted rise of Chinese and Indian dependence on fossil fuels--is the macro-economic story of our time and the biggest resource struggle of all. The still-growing use of oil and fossil fuels poses dangers to a stable global environment and thus to a predictable social and natural environment for doing business. U.S. foreign policies encouraged by the business sector--oriented toward ensuring supplies of oil--provide the perfect recipe for global conflict and global ecological degradation.

**AT COERCION: LIBERTARIANISM NIHILIST**

**Frameworks that radically endorse liberty allow for nihilistic criminality because everyone has the right to define their own values.**

**Schwarz, 89** (Peter, writer, journalist, and original editor for The Intellectual Activist, The Intellectual Activist Vol. V, No.1, Ayn Rand Institute, "On Moral Sanctions",

[http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pagename=objectivism\\_sanctions](http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pagename=objectivism_sanctions))

IS LIBERTARIANISM AN EVIL DOCTRINE? Yes, if evil is the irrational and the destructive. Libertarianism belligerently rejects the very need for any justification for its belief in something called "liberty." It repudiates the need for any intellectual foundation to explain why "liberty" is desirable and what "liberty" means. Anyone from a gay-rights activist to a criminal counterfeiter to an overt anarchist can declare that he is merely asserting his "liberty"—and no Libertarian (even those who happen to disagree) can objectively refute his definition. Subjectivism, amoralism and anarchism are not merely present in certain "wings" of the Libertarian movement; they are integral to it. In the absence of any intellectual framework, the zealous advocacy of "liberty" can represent only the mindless quest to eliminate all restraints on human behavior—political, moral, metaphysical. And since reality is the fundamental "restraint" upon men's actions, it is nihilism—the desire to obliterate reality—that is the very essence of Libertarianism. If the Libertarian movement were ever to come to power, widespread death would be the consequence.

**AT COERCION: MARKET INCENTIVES SOLVE THE IMPACT**

**Market incentives are best at protecting the environment, avoiding their impact of centralized planning, and protecting liberty.**

**Scarlett, 97** (Lynn, Vice President of Research at the Reason Foundation. January. National Center for Policy Analysis, "New Environmentalism," [www.ncpa.org/studies/s201/s201.html#e](http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s201/s201.html#e))

Traditional environmentalism assumes that in important ways people do not matter - our values don't matter; our level of knowledge doesn't matter; the incentives we face don't matter. Thus it assumes environmental problems can be analyzed and solved without reference to individuals and circumstances. In contrast, the new environmentalism recognizes that in order to solve complex problems, we must have an understanding of the values, knowledge and incentives of the affected parties. Values. Traditional environmentalism assumes that environmental goals are sacrosanct, that they are more fundamental than other values. From this it follows that individuals' values are unimportant in formulating social goals. But environmental values are not sacrosanct. They are part of the many values that define the quality of human life. Time and resource constraints require that we make choices among these values. Knowledge. Traditional environmentalism assumes that planners or other experts possess the knowledge most relevant to environmental problem solving and ignores the value of location-specific knowledge and the practical experience of ordinary citizens. New environmentalism recognizes that most information relevant to understanding and solving environmental problems varies by time, place and circumstance. Because environmental problems are complex and reality is dynamic, most of the relevant information is dispersed and not readily amenable to centralized gathering or use. Incentives. Traditional environmentalism fails to appreciate the importance of incentives in guiding human action. New environmentalism focuses on decision-making processes and strives to create incentives for people to obtain the information to become good environmental stewards. Because of its respect for incentives, new environmentalism views the marketplace as an important mechanism for problem solving. It recognizes that wealth creation, appropriately harnessed, is an engine of environmental progress.

**AT COERCION: NON-UNIQUE**

**Economic statism has steadily increased—their argument is ridiculously non-unique.**

**Machan 95** (Tibor, Hoover research fellow, professor emeritus of philosophy at Auburn University, and holds the R. C. Hoiles Endowed Chair in Business Ethics and Free Enterprise at the Argyros School of Business & Economics, “Private Rights and Public Illusions”)

Throughout the last several decades economists have amassed evidence about the effects of government regulation of people's economic affairs.<sup>1</sup>

The general consensus among scholars is that, by the standard economic measure of cost and benefit, the government's regulatory policies and actions have failed. In a number of studies it has also been shown that the avowed goals of regulation have not, in fact, been achieved by regulation. Comparative analyses show, on the other hand, that in the absence of regulation those same goals are being attained.<sup>2</sup> Despite the wide acceptance of the methods employed in these studies, the results have not produced the deregulation that they would appear to warrant.<sup>3</sup> In view of the lack of significant progress in that direction, some have advanced theories aiming to explain why deregulation is not proceeding. Henry G. Manne, for example, originally pro-posed that bureaucrats were acting in pursuit of their self-interest, which resulted, in part, in their refusal to institute deregulation measures. Having revised his theory in some measure, Manne later proposed that, in addition to the bureaucrats, the managers of regulated firms were acting in pursuit of their self-interest too.<sup>4</sup> So both regulators and the regulated, acting from economic self-interest, promoted regulatory activities in the face of evidence showing the failure of these in terms of costs and benefits or of their avowed purpose. Several other economists and legal theorists have also focused on the issue of why deregulation is not proceeding.<sup>5</sup> I will not attempt here to summarize the findings or theories of these economists but merely note that the method of analysis employed by them draws heavily from the standard "economic man" model of human behavior. For example, Pro-fessor Milton Friedman uses this model in a recent nontechnical article when he claims that "every individual serves his own private interest. The great Saints of history have served their 'private interest' just as the most money-grubbing miser has served his interest. The private interest is whatever it is that drives an individual."<sup>6</sup> I want, instead of scrutinizing the economic approach to the problem of regulation and deregulation, to propose a different explanation for why, despite the economists' findings, there is no serious move toward deregulation. One of the laments expressed about the so-called Reagan Revolution by friends of the market economy is that despite its rhetoric it did not involve significant cutbacks in the state's involvement in the economy, nor in the tax and regulatory burdens shouldered by the American people. Even in the face of substantial privatization, the absolute level of economic statism has constantly increased.

AT COERCION: COERCION JUSTIFIED

**Accepting total individualism will devastate society—coercion is justified.**

**Galston,05** William, 5/23 Professor of Civic Engagement and the Director of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland. “The Case for Universal Service,”  
[http://www.pponline.org/documents/AmeriBook/AmeriBook\\_Chap6.pdf](http://www.pponline.org/documents/AmeriBook/AmeriBook_Chap6.pdf).

Classical liberals will object, of course, on the grounds that it would be an abuse of state power to move toward mandatory universal service. It is worth noting, however, that one of the high priests of classical liberalism disagrees. Consider the opening sentences of Chapter 4 of John Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty*, titled “Of the Limits to the Authority of Society Over the Individual”: “[E]veryone who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct toward the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another, or rather certain interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions society is justified in enforcing at all costs to those who endeavor to withhold fulfillment.” It is not difficult to recast Mill’s position in the vocabulary of contemporary liberal political thought. Begin with a conception of society as a system of cooperation for mutual advantage. Society is legitimate when the criterion of mutual advantage is broadly satisfied (versus, say, a situation in which the government or some group systematically coerces some for the sake of others). When society meets the standard of broad legitimacy, each citizen has a duty to do his or her fair share to sustain the social arrangements from which all benefit, and society is justified in using its coercive power when necessary to ensure that this duty is performed. That legitimate societal coercion may include mandatory military service in the nation’s defense, as well as other required activities that promote broad civic goals. Brookings scholar Robert Litan has recently suggested that citizens should be “required to give something to their country in exchange for the full range of rights to which citizenship entitles them.” Responding in a quasi-libertarian vein, Bruce Chapman, founder and president of the Seattle-based Discovery Institute, charges that this proposal has “no moral justification.” Linking rights to concrete responsibilities, he says, is “contrary to the purposes for which [the United States] was founded and has endured.” This simply isn’t true. For example, the right to receive GI Bill benefits is linked to the fulfillment of military duties. Even the right to vote (and what could be more central to citizenship than that?) rests on being law-abiding; many states disenfranchise convicted felons during their period of incarceration and probation. As Litan points out, this linkage is hardly tyrannical moralism. Rather, it reflects the bedrock reality that “the rights we enjoy are not free” and that it takes real work—contributions from citizens—to sustain constitutional institutions. If each individual’s ownership of his or her own labor is seen as absolute, then society as such becomes impossible, because no political community can operate without resources, which ultimately must come from someone. Public choice theory predicts, and all of human history proves, that no polity of any size can subsist through voluntary contributions alone; the inevitable free riders must be compelled by law, backed by force, to do their part.

AT COERCION: EXTINCTION O/W

**Communitarian ethics are the only way to ensure human survival.**

**Punzo, 76** Vincent, Professor of Ethics at St. Louis University. "The Modern State and the Search for Community," International Philosophical Quarterly, 16.3, p. 32.

Kropotkin sought to invalidate a Social Darwinist reading of human nature's penchant for narrow self-interest and violent struggle. He appealed to ethological evidence from the study of animal life, together with a reflective, historical analysis of human society. He did this to prove the naturalness of human beings establishing a decent community without needing state coercion. Sociability and mutual support, he maintained, rather than cutthroat competition, are central elements in the evolutionary struggle for human survival. Human life by its very nature is not narrowly individualistic or brutally competitive. A communitarian ethics is a natural device for insuring mankind's biological survival. His ethics of community affirm how such a system promotes justice and freedom. Sociability (as an evolutionary "instinct" developed in the lives of humans and animals) constitutes a biological root of moral behavior. Reason, subsequently, developed the "instinct" of sociability to lead to justice and maganimity as corollaries for decent survival.

**AT COERCION: AT NO VALUE TO LIFE**

**Securing life is a prerequisite to determining value.**

**Schwartz, 02** (Lisa, Medical Ethics, <http://www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf>)

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decision-making is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients' judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves. It is important to remember the subjectivity assertion in this context, so as to emphasize that the judgement made about the value of a life ought to be made only by the person concerned and not by others.



**AT COERCION: FREE MARKETS = POVERTY**

**Free markets result in devastating poverty.**

**Trainer 95** (Ted Trainer is a professor at the School of Social Work, University of Wales, “The Conserver Society; Alternatives for sustainability”, pg.4)

Only one-fifth of the world's people live affluently. Half of them average a per capita income one-sixtieth of those of the rich countries and more than 1 billion people live in desperate poverty. Deprivation takes the lives of more than 40,000 Third World children every day. There are enough resources to provide adequately for all. The appallingly unjust distributions exist because the rich countries take most of the world's resource output by bidding more for it in the global marketplace. They also take many of the things produced by Third World land, labor and capital, which should be producing things for impoverished Third World people. Many plantation and mine workers are hungry, while we enjoy the luxuries they produce. The appalling distributions and deprivation are direct consequences of the way the global market economy functions. A market system will always enable the relatively rich to take what they want and to deprive those in most need.

**\*\*CUOMO/POSITIVE PEACE\*\***

**AT CUOMO: NEGATIVE PEACE KEY TO POSITIVE PEACE**

**Preventing nuclear war is the absolute prerequisite to positive peace.**

**Folk, 78** Professor of Religious and Peace Studies at Bethany College, 78 [Jerry, "Peace Educations – Peace Studies : Towards an Integrated Approach," Peace & Change, volume V, number 1, Spring, p. 58]

Those proponents of the positive peace approach who reject out of hand the work of researchers and educators coming to the field from the perspective of negative peace too easily forget that the prevention of a nuclear confrontation of global dimensions is the prerequisite for all other peace research, education, and action. Unless such a confrontation can be avoided there will be no world left in which to build positive peace. Moreover, the blanket condemnation of all such negative peace oriented research, education or action as a reactionary attempt to support and reinforce the status quo is doctrinaire. Conflict theory and resolution, disarmament studies, studies of the international system and of international organizations, and integration studies are in themselves neutral. They do not intrinsically support either the status quo or revolutionary efforts to change or overthrow it. Rather they offer a body of knowledge which can be used for either purpose or for some purpose in between. It is much more logical for those who understand peace as positive peace to integrate this knowledge into their own framework and to utilize it in achieving their own purposes. A balanced peace studies program should therefore offer the student exposure to the questions and concerns which occupy those who view the field essentially from the point of view of negative peace.

**\*\*DERRIDA/DECONSTRUCTION\*\***

DECONSTRUCTION BAD - DEMOCRACY

**Deconstruction kills democracy and creates a civilization of madness and illusion.**

**Wolin, 04** (Richard, B.A. from Reed College--M.A. and Ph.D. from York University in Toronto--D.D. McMurtry Professor of History at Reed College and Rice University, The seduction of unreason : the intellectual romance with fascism : from Nietzsche to postmodernism, p. 21)

Over the last ten years Derrida has made a concerted effort to redress this perceived weakness, writing widely on questions of justice, ethics, and politics. But have these forays into the realm of "the political" in fact made a "difference"? When all is said and done, one suspects that discussions of "the political" are merely a metapolitical pretext for circumventing the realm of "real" politics. Endemic to Derrida's perspective is the problem that, early on, he attained renown by reiterating a "total critique" of the West that derived from Heidegger's antihumanism. According to this view, humanism culminates in the Cartesian "will to will." The twentieth century's political horrors-genocide, totalitarianism, nuclear war, and environmental devastation-are merely the logical consequences thereof. The dilemma besetting Derrida's approach to politics is that once one accepts the frameworks of "antihumanism" and "total critique," it becomes extremely difficult-if not impossible-to reconcile one's standpoint with a partisanship for reasonable democracy. In "Down By Law: Deconstruction and the Problem of Justice," I reassess Derrida's theoretical legacy, concluding that the shortcomings of "really existing democracy" cannot be remedied by recourse to the antidemocratic methods recommended by Heidegger and Nietzsche. Derrida is by no means a Counter-Enlightenment thinker. Nevertheless, in the lexicon of deconstruction, "reason" is identified as a fundamental source of tyranny and oppression. An analogous prejudice afflicts Foucault's concept of "discursive regime." Here, too, "discourse" is primarily perceived as a source of domination. Whatever deconstruction's methodological intentions may be, its pragmatic effect accords with the anti-intellectual orientation of the anti-philosophes. By the time deconstruction gets through with the history of philosophy, very little remains. One is tempted to seek refuge in myth, magic, madness, illusion, or intoxication-all seem preferable to what "civilization" has to offer. The end result is that deconstruction leaves its practitioners in a theoretical no-man's land, a forlorn and barren landscape, analogous to one described by Heidegger: an "age of affliction" characterized by the flight of the old gods and the "not yet" of the gods to come.

**DECONSTRUCTION BAD – RACISM**

**Deconstruction is racist, homophobic, and misogynist.**

**Fejfar, 07** (Anthony J, B.A. Philosophy, Magna Cum Laude, Creighton University, J.D., With Distinction, University of Nebraska College of Law, “Deconstructing Deconstruction: Deconstructing Derrida”, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/980/Deconstructing-Deconstruction-Deconstructing-Derrida>)

I have heard that Derrida has deconstructed Derrida, but I haven't found the book, so I thought I would give it a try. Derrida believes in deconstruction. His followers have tried to deconstruct “law” for example, arguing that it is simply “white male, misogynist, racist, and homophobic crap.” I would like to argue that Derrida's deconstruction itself is “white male, misogynist, racist, and homophobic.” Derrida is a white male who consistently takes a fascist pig analytic approach to reality which rejects body, spirit, relationality, freedom, autonomy, and other wonderful values. Who could possibly be bigoted enough to think that reality is simply a matter of analytic ideas. This is totally opposed to the ancient, medieval, indigenous world views. Derrida's deconstruction is also racist and misogynist. In Derrida's postmodern deconstructionist view Intuition and Compassion don't really exist. Finally, Derrida's work is anti-gay. Gay men are supposed to be artistic, intellectual, cultural, and relational- all positive attributes. But Derrida's deconstruction would tell us that there is no art, there is no intellect, only crap. Perhaps Gay men aren't even homosexual. Perhaps these are different categories. Finally, it should be pointed out that some might disagree with my interpretations of “white male, misogynist, racist and homophobic.” Perhaps one should deconstruct the categories of “white male” “misogynist” “racist” and “homophobic.” Perhaps these categories too, are culturally relative crap, or perhaps even non-existent. Deconstruction is only negative, and by it's very terms cannot support any positive statements.

**Deconstruction is elitist, racist, and fascist.**

**Ellis-Christensen, 03** (Tricia, degree in English literature, “What is deconstruction?”, <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-deconstruction.htm>)

For those practicing deconstruction, this bizarre chapter suggests that the so-called work about human rights is anything but. The underlying values in the text are not consistent with the way it is presented to students. In a sense, the deconstructionist has taken apart the novel and its critical tradition, displaying its inconsistencies. Many literary critics abhor deconstruction, stating that deconstructing a text deprives the text of meaning and ultimately dismisses the value of anything it touches. To those who use deconstruction, the answer to this criticism might be: “How does one define value? What is meaning?” Though this answer may frustrate critics of deconstruction, it points to the way in which deconstructionists see the text as a source of multiple meanings, determined very much by each reader's own subtexts and definitions. To reduce and reduce the meaning of a work may ultimately make it purposeless, say some critics. At its best, though, deconstruction can be helpful in unmasking huge contradictions present in a text. Critics of deconstruction have also accused the theory of being fascist in nature. This is largely due to one major proponent, Paul de Man, who may have written for a magazine that had some Nazi sympathies. Paul de Man has refuted these charges, yet deconstruction seems inexorably tied to fascism in the minds of many. It is true that reading a deconstruction of a text can be similar to attempting to decode a secret message. Deconstructionists like Jack Derrida deliberately choose confusing and lengthy words to derive a multiplicity of meanings from their interpretation. In some ways, this makes deconstruction elitist and inaccessible to many readers. The deconstructionist cares not, however, for those who are confused. They believe that confusion should be the result of reading a deconstruction of a text. A more accessible deconstructionist is Roland Barthes, who tragically died in his early 40s. His writing on deconstruction is somewhat more straightforward, and anyone studying literary criticism would do well to read his work before

**DECONSTRUCTION BAD – NAZISM**

**Deconstruction justifies nazism and racism.**

**Wolin, o4** (Richard, B.A. from Reed College--M.A. and Ph.D. from York University in Toronto--D.D. McMurtry Professor of History at Reed College and Rice University, The seduction of unreason : the intellectual romance with fascism : from Nietzsche to postmodernism, p. 234)

CHAPTER SIX Moreover, one can for example think of "others"-neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and other racists-who have forfeited their right to my openness. Should I remain open to *all* others-my wife, colleagues, friends, perfect strangers, enemies-in precisely the same way? Freud tried to address some of these dilemmas in *Civilization and Its Discontents* when he called into question the biblical injunction to "love thy neighbor as thyself." For him this maxim represented merely one more in a series of unattainable ideals and unrealistic demands erected by "civilization." Such commandments, which emanate from the social super ego, are a primary source of a neurotic discomfort with civilization, contended Freud. "My love is something valuable to me which I ought not to throw away without reflection," observed the founder of psychoanalysis. "On closer inspection ... not merely is [the] stranger in general unworthy of my love; I must honestly confess that he has more claim to my hostility and even my hatred."

DECONSTRUCTION BAD – CEDE THE POLITICAL

**Deconstruction's focus on semantics trades off with real world solutions.**

**Wolin, 04** (Richard, B.A. from Reed College--M.A. and Ph.D. from York University in Toronto--D.D. McMurtry Professor of History at Reed College and Rice University, The seduction of unreason : the intellectual romance with fascism : from Nietzsche to postmodernism, p. 229-230)

*Deconstruction and the "Political"* The question of deconstruction's relationship to contemporary politics has always been somewhat of a sore point. Most are by now familiar with the criticisms leveled against it for its deficiencies in this regard. These critiques have mostly centered on the issue of deconstruction's inordinate focus on questions of textuality and reading--an issue best dramatized perhaps by Derrida's oft-cited, controversial maxim, "There is nothing outside the *text*"--"il n'y a pas de hors texte."<sup>24</sup> Deconstruction's detractors have alleged that this well-nigh exclusive preoccupation with semiotic themes, with the figuration and involutions of texts, has functioned at the expense of more worldly and practical concerns. The world might be crumbling all around us, they charge, but Derrida seems more interested in the contingencies of this or that phoneme--the amusing fact that in French Hegel's name is the phonic equivalent of "eagle" (aigle). As those familiar with Derrida's work know, in *Glas* (dirge") this chance homonymic equivalence gave rise to a rumination of some three hundred pages on analogous linguistic slippages and fissures.<sup>25</sup> One of the first to raise such charges of practical-political irrelevance against Derrida's negative semiotics of reading was Michel Foucault. In his response to Derrida's unsparing critique of *Madness* 230 CHAPTER SIX *and Civilization*, Foucault pilloried deconstruction as nothing more than an idiosyncratic variant of the classical method of "explication de texte." As Foucault observes with palpable condescension, deconstruction practices an "historically determined little pedagogy" characterized by "the reduction of discursive practices [which for Foucault, of course, are sources of "power"-R.W] to textual traces: the elision of the events produced therein and the retention only of marks for a reading; the invention of voices behind texts to avoid having to analyze the modes of implication of the subject in discourses; the assigning of the originary as said and unsaid in the text to avoid replacing discursive practices in the field of transformations where they are carried out." Thus, according to Foucault, Derrida offers us little more than an interpretive practice that "teaches the pupil that there is nothing outside the text" and "which conversely gives to the master's voice the limitless sovereignty which allows it to restate the text indefinitely."<sup>26</sup> As the progenitor of deconstruction, Derrida is the master ventriloquist who in sovereign fashion determines which textual meanings become unraveled and how. Foucault's major fear is that, in the hands of deconstruction, the critique of power and domination, one of the key outcomes of May'68, would be supplanted by an exclusive orientation toward politically pointless textual analysis. Nor is Foucault the only critic to have challenged Derrida in this way. Edward Said has contended that Derrida's high formalized obsession with the abstruse terms of "archewriting"--that is, with "nonconcepts" such as the trace, grammatology, supplement, differance, dissemination, and so forth--ends up by "muddling ... thought beyond the possibility of usefulness." Said continues, The effect of [deconstructionist] logic (the *misee» abime*) is to reduce everything that we think of as having some extra textual leverage in the text to a textual function.... Derrida's key words ... are unregenerate signs: he says that they cannot be made more significant than signifiers are. In some quite urgent way, then, there is something frivolous about them, as all words that cannot be accommodated to a philosophy of serious need or utility are futile or unserious.<sup>27</sup>



DECONSTRUCTION BAD - CEDE THE POLITICAL

**Alt fails—Deconstruction leads to political apathy**

**Wolin, 04** (Richard, B.A. from Reed College--M.A. and Ph.D. from York University in Toronto--D.D. McMurry Professor of History at Reed College and Rice University, The seduction of unreason : the intellectual romance with fascism : from Nietzsche to postmodernism, p. 233)

With these remarks Derrida insinuates that existing democratic societies are incapable of self-reflection. Instead, they have an endemic tendency to fuse "empirical" and "normative" moments a debatable claim. Such an interpretive approach as deconstruction is necessary, Derrida implies, to produce a critical space at a sufficient remove from the manifold failings of existing democratic practice. Derrida's writing over the last decade has been replete with analogous reassurances concerning deconstruction's political relevance. What seems less convincing, however, given deconstruction's willful lexical abstruseness, are the practical implications of such avowals. For example, how can we be sure that Derrida's self-avowed fascination with discourses on the "double bind" and the "impossible"-the paradoxical challenge of relying on a discredited metaphysical vocabulary while at the same time fully recognizing its dysfunctionality-is not merely conducive to indecision and fence-straddling rather than to meaningful political engagement?<sup>36</sup> Moreover, in what ways might deconstruction's trademark "playfulness" be conducive to political earnestness? Lastly, since deconstruction qua political discourse seems to privilege the "negative" moments of "destabilization" and "dismantling," how might it counter the suspicion that it remains constitutionally incapable of fostering political solidarity: the democratic ideal of politics as an equitable and just framework for realizing collective goals and projects. From his very first texts, Derrida has always emphasized the positional or contextual nature of deconstruction. His recent preoccupation with politics is no exception. Since the early 1990s, Derrida has sought to reposition his thought to counter charges of apoliticism, the widespread suspicion that deconstruction is interested in little more than the "free play of signification." Nevertheless, often his efforts have failed to go beyond a few rather abstract and perfunctory invocations of "responsibility" and "openness toward the other," as in the remarks quoted above. Thus, in lieu of a more concrete specification of the meaning of openness, of the particular "others" toward whom we should open ourselves, of how we should open ourselves to the other and why, and of how we might translate the ethical maxim of "openness" into forms of practical life conduct or everyday institutional settings, we are left with a directive that, in its generality and imprecision, seems more frustrating than illuminating. As one critic has remarked, despite its apparent merits, the inordinate stress on otherness seems indicative of an endemic "other-worldliness" that suffuses deconstructionist discussions of real world politics.<sup>3</sup> In certain respects the problematic of "otherness"-a distinctly Levinasian inheritance-raises more questions than solves. This standpoint's criticism of the modern natural law tradition-the normative basis of the contemporary democratic societies-is sweeping and total to the point that democratic ideals themselves seem indefensible, and in this way undermines a politics of "reasonable democracy." Instead, we are left with a "political existentialism," in which, given the "groundless" nature of moral and political choice, one political "decision" seems almost as good as another.

DECONSTRUCTION BAD – FEMINISM

**Deconstruction destroys feminism.**

**Nilsson, 09** (Magnus, Director of Engineering for DETACH AB, Masters of Science degree in Applied Physics and Electrical Engineering from Linköping University, “Diversity and Homogeneity in a “Multicultural Society”: A Critique of the Pervasive Picture of Collective Identities”, International Migration & Ethnic Relations Research Unit at the University of Bergen, (<http://imer.uib.no/14Nordic/Papers%20fra%2014.%20Migrasjonsforskerkonferanse/Nilsson.pdf>)

Fraser doesn't view deconstruction of collective identities as unproblematic. On the contrary, she points out that deconstructive cultural politics is often “far removed from the immediate interests and identities” of the people who suffer cultural injustices, and that it becomes psychologically and politically feasible first when all people are “weaned from their attachments to current cultural constructions of their interests and identities.”<sup>21</sup> This problem becomes especially acute when there is a need for abandoning an identity-category altogether. One such situation would be when anti-racists wish to abolish the category race. This is a fairly common – and fully legitimate – position, taken by, for example, Paul Gilroy in *Against Race* (2000). Gilroy argues that “raciology” – defined as “the lore that brings the virtual realities of ‘race’ to dismal and destructive. Gilroy argues that “raciology” – defined as “the lore that brings the virtual realities of ‘race’ to dismal and destructive quandary, a more pragmatic approach to collective identities must be tried. The basic outline of such an approach can be found in Toril Moi's critique of “the pervasive picture of sex,” formulated in *What is a Woman* (1999). One of Moi's aims is to show that the idea that “any use of the word ‘woman’ (and any answer to the question ‘What is a woman?’) must entail a philosophical commitment to metaphysics and essentialism” is mistaken.<sup>26</sup> Instead she argues that “a feminist theory that starts from an ordinary understanding of what a woman is, namely a person with a female body,” will be metaphysical or essentialist, only when “sex and/or gender differences” are seen as something that “always manifest themselves in all cultural and personal activities,” or when it is assumed that they are “always the most important features of a person or a practice.”<sup>27</sup> This is what Moi calls “the pervasive picture of sex.”<sup>28</sup> Moi's reason for arguing that the concept woman should be ‘rescued’ from radical deconstruction is that is useful in certain circumstances. Her primary example is that “as long as technology has not made the usual methods of human reproduction obsolete, the biological requirements of pregnancy, childbirth and childcare will have to be accommodated within any social structure.”<sup>29</sup> Thus Moi finds it “as oppressive and theoretically unsatisfactory to reduce women to their ‘general humanity’ as it is to reduce them to their femininity.”<sup>30</sup> Moi's approach is ‘transformative enough’ to be able to deal with the problem of othering. If collective identities are not viewed as pervasive, they will not necessarily produce unwanted group distinctions. But the question is whether race and/or ethnicity are categories worth rescuing.

## DECONSTRUCTION BAD - DOGMATISM

### Deconstruction is based on dogmatic ideology and hypocrisy

**Plaut, 04** (Steven, Professor at the Graduate School of the Business Administration at the University of Haifa, "The Deconstruction of Jacques Derrida", Frontpage Magazine, 10/11, <http://www.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=11030>)

Deconstructionism is a shallow form of Non-Thinking that has gained popularity among some of the more simpleminded disciplines of the academic world. Essentially the same as post-modernism (how is that for a true nonsense word, something no woodchuck could chuck?), Deconstructionism argues that there do not exist any such things as facts, truth, logic, rationality, nor science. Nothing in the world exists beyond subjective narratives, each as legitimate as the next. Language is the ultimate form of tyranny and source of control over us oppressed folks by those evil elites. There are no false narratives, just different subjectivities. Deconstructionism was defined nicely by Robert Locke: "It is also known as poststructuralism, but don't ask what structuralism was, as it was no better. It is based on the proposition that the apparently real world is in fact a vast social construct and that the way to knowledge lies in taking apart in one's mind this thing society has built. Taken to its logical conclusion, it supposes that there is at the end of the day no actual reality, just a series of appearances stitched together by social constructs into what we all agree to call reality. But not agree voluntarily, for society has (this is the leftist bit) an oppressive structure, so we are pressured to agree to that version of reality which pleases the people in charge." Left-wing academics love substituting polysyllable-invention for thinking and analysis. Among the founders of the School of Deconstructionism was Yale professor Paul de Man, a close friend of Jacques Derrida's, who had published pro-Nazi collaborationist and anti-Semitic articles in two Belgian newspapers in the early Forties. The other Deconstructionists have always tried to deconstruct the Nazism of de Man so that it would not look too bad. Deconstructionism has long been linked with Marxism, a rather strange combination - given the insistence by deconstructionists that they should never claim to know anything. Marxists claim to know everything, based on ridiculous theories by Marx disproved 160 years ago, making the Marxist-Deconstructionist axis rather queer. It also sometimes calls itself post-colonialism, apparently because some of its Frenchie inventors came from Algeria, although I have never understood how it can be certain that anything or anyone was ever colonized or colonizer. For deconstructionists, proof and disproof are unimportant. They accept as axiomatic the claim that social power structures control everything in the world, I guess including all narratives, and that literature and art are nothing more than reflections of or protests against such power and oppression. Never mind that the Decon comen have no way of measuring nor assessing power, control, class, nor privilege; they are SURE that these things are out there and control the world, just like in the sort of giant conspiracy promoted on some of the wackier conspiracist web sites on the web. Robert Locke has said that Deconstructionism is the opiate of an obsolete intellectual class. It is little more than sophistry and absolute moral relativism. Deconstructionists insist that even words themselves have no meaning. Hence we all live in a meaningless universal in which we are all no better than noisy mutts, making silly barking sounds, which of course should already be obvious to any of you out there who have listened to comparative literature courses from lefty profs. As one critic pointed out, all of Deconstructionism is founded on the paradox of using language to claim that language cannot make unambiguous claims (John Searle, "The World Turned Upside Down," *The New York Review*, October 27, 1983). Deconstructionists oppose being judgmental about anything, except the absolute evil of capitalism and America, which is why it is popular these days mainly among American tenured leftists (the French berets have by and large moved on to other amusements). They believe in an absolute justice, although cannot tell you what and where it is, nor how to achieve it. They think it is something we all simply need to sit back and await, like a Messiah on a deconstructed donkey, although we can hurry it along by joining the Far Left. Deconstructionism attracts a certain sort of adolescent mind (regardless of the age of the accompanying body) because of its cynicism and dismissal of rational thought and science. In Locke's wonderful words, "It raises to the level of a philosophical system the intuition that everything grownups do is a fraud. It is the metaphysics of Holden Caulfield. It enables the practitioner to tell himself that he is among the privileged group of insiders who know that the Wizard of Oz is behind the curtain."

AT DERRIDA: DECONSTRUCTION FAILS

**Deconstruction is so disconnected from political reality that it fails to produce change.**

**Wolin, 04** (Richard, B.A. from Reed College--M.A. and Ph.D. from York University in Toronto--D.D. McMurtry Professor of History at Reed College and Rice University, The seduction of unreason : the intellectual romance with fascism : from Nietzsche to postmodernism, p. 225-226)

As another disillusioned contributor to the same tome laments, when all is said and done, Derrida's ethereal metapolitical musings offer us Marx 'Without Marxism-a Marxism so divested of social, economic, and historical content as to be politically valueless.<sup>9</sup> As Michele Lamont remarked in "How to Become a Dominant French Philosopher: The Case of Jacques Derrida," whereas Derrida's influence has been strong in countries lacking indigenous left-wing traditions such as the United States, conversely, in areas with a strong Marxist heritage-Germany, Italy, and Latin America-his impact has been negligible.<sup>10</sup> In the realm of political critique in particular, deconstruction's "reality-deficit" -its endemic methodological aversion to extra DOWN BY LAW 225 textual concerns-returns to haunt it. When all is said and done, one suspects that Derrida's virtuoso dismantlings of logocentric philosophical prejudices have left interpretation frozen in an originary impotence in the stead of originary "presence." In his recent essays on "hospitality," "cosmopolitanism," and "forgiveness," Derrida, sounding very much like a liberal's liberal, has spoken out forcefully against a xenophobic "Fortress Europe" mentality and in favor of immigrants' rights.<sup>11</sup> Yet such appeals, while admirable, remain couched at such a pitch of meta-theoretical abstraction that it is difficult to discern what concrete policy implications, if any, the philosopher might have in mind. Earlier in his career, Derrida suggested in a Nietzschean vein that once we have been released from the straightjacket of Western metaphysics a Dionysian "joyous wisdom" would supplant the claims of reason; in consequence, we would presumably become again, in a manner never clearly specified-citizens of a better world.<sup>12</sup> Throughout his career, Derrida has been keen on exposing the integral relationship between "metaphysics" and "violence," leading one to believe-implausibly-that all injustice and oppression can be traced back to the history of metaphysics. Yet in the eighteenth century the "rights of man and citizen" evolved from the eminently metaphysical idea of modern natural law. One might reasonably conclude that metaphysics, in the guise of the "rights of man," provided the conceptual leverage necessary to overthrow the ancien regime. Hegel arrived at this verdict in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* when, referring to modern natural law, he made the uncontroversial assertion that "the French Revolution received its first impulse from Philosophy."<sup>14</sup> Like Heidegger and Nietzsche before him, Derrida places an explanatory burden on metaphysics that the concept cannot bear. How, for example, would Derrida explain the prevalence of injustice and oppression in those parts of the world in which Western metaphysics has had a negligible impact? What role do nonmetaphysical sources of oppression those attributable, say, to indigenous cultural factors-play in the deconstructionist worldview? And what about the progressive influence of metaphysics for contemporary ideas of human rights ideas that played such a paramount role in the justly celebrated "revolutions of 1989"?

## AT DERRIDA: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Derrida is either meaningless or links to his own critique of the truth.**

**Wolin, 04** (Richard, B.A. from Reed College--M.A. and Ph.D. from York University in Toronto--D.D. McMurtry Professor of History at Reed College and Rice University, The seduction of unreason : the intellectual romance with fascism : from Nietzsche to postmodernism, p. 222-223)

Ironically, one detects a lethal self-contradiction at the heart of the deconstructionist enterprise--Derrida's attempt to out philosophize the history of philosophy. Like previous participants in the language game of Western metaphysics, he has decreed that *his* concepts (or "nonconcepts")-differance, dissemination, trace, hymen, grammatology-possess a status more primordial (and hence more "true") than those that have been proposed by his predecessors, from Plato to the historical present. A philosopher can, for any number of reasons one can imagine, cease philosophizing without the risk of falling into self-contradiction. Yet once philosophers decide to criticize the tradition by demonstrating its inherent inadequacies, they have, as it were, already taken the bait: the claims to truth or adequacy they raise can be criticized in turn. Such claims can not only be criticized, but by proposing alternative accounts concerning the origins of truth and the nature of representation, as Derrida himself does with the concept of differance, all philosophy tends towards "realism." The thinker in question is implicitly staking claims about the relationship between cognition and the external world. Derrida a realist? Paradoxical as it may sound, for the author of anti-epistemological classics such as *Writing and Difference* and *Of Grammatology*, there is no getting around this dilemma. By seeking to provide an alternative account of the relationship between representation and reality, Derrida must argue-even if only implicitly-that his account is more verisimilar vis-a-vis the way things really are than the leading competing accounts. When viewed from this perspective, Derrida, whose philosophy seeks to unmask and eliminate the last residues of Western metaphysics, may in fact be its consummate practitioner-the "last metaphysician." The question as to whether his own foundationalist claims concerning the ontological abyss separating language and reality cohere transcends the scope of the present enquiry (although the problem of deconstruction's inherent "self-contradiction" raised above would seem to speak strongly against a verdict in deconstruction's favor). If deconstruction is to succeed in convincing philosophers that its methods and insights are superior to theirs, it must rely on practices and procedures that suggest a greater standard of generality-and thus a higher standard of "truth"-than metaphysics. Must it not, then, ultimately seek to outdo metaphysics on its own terms? In a nutshell, the problem with deconstruction is that if all previous truth-claims are vitiated by considerations of differance-the twofold spatio-temporal delay that afflicts all knowledge-then deconstruction's claims are similarly vitiated. As one contemporary philosopher has observed, "It is usually a good strategy to ask whether a general claim about truth or meaning applies to itself."! When judged according to this elementary criterion, deconstruction founders under the weight of its own cleverness. Yet, assuming for the sake of argument that deconstruction's radical skepticism about meaning and morality hold water, where would this leave us? In the eyes of many readers and critics, the lack of a satisfactory response to this question constitutes one of deconstruction's major weaknesses. Under the sign of "undecidability," Derrida has repeatedly celebrated the indeterminacy of meaning. Meaning's insurmountable will-o'-the-wisp character represents an epistemic bulwark against the temptations of "logocentrism"-the tyranny of reason that has been one of the hallmarks of Western thought. As Derrida boldly declaims in *Of Grammatology*, "We want to reach the point of a certain exteriority with respect to the totality of the logocentric period."z On the same grounds, deconstruction has demonstrated an almost phobic aversion to formal logic and propositional truth, the sine qua non of discursive thought. Instead, Derridean texts revel in rhetorical tours de force, non sequiturs, puns, and abrupt linguistic jolts-techniques designed to upend the deceptive harmonies of narrative continuity. Yet this endemic mistrust of positive truth-claims seems to have undermined Derrida's own attempt to articulate a constructive critical standpoint. As Fredric Jameson has noted, deconstruction's status as a type of "negative hermeneutics"-one that privileges discontinuity and semiotic slippage rather than, like Gadamer, the "happening of tradition" in a positive sense-has not prevented it from congealing into merely another academic worldview, with acolytes and devotees, as well as the institutional trappings appropriate to a veritable postmodern scholarly cult.

AT DERRIDA: ALTERNATIVE FAILS – UTOPIAN

**Alt fails--Deconstruction is utopian and unachievable**

**Grieve-Carlson 06** (Gary, Professor of English, Director of General Education, Lebanon Valley College, "Book Review: Is the Radical Left the Child of the Radical Right?", International Journal of Baudrillard studies, January, [http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol3\\_1/grieve.htm](http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol3_1/grieve.htm))

Wolin's antipathy toward postmodernism comes across most clearly in his chapter on Jacques Derrida, titled "Deconstruction and the Problem of Justice," in which he briefly recapitulates some of the arguments that have been leveled against Derrida's philosophy of language and then takes up his more recent work on politics and law. Derrida claims that deconstruction, *pace* its critics, is not apolitical but "hyper-political" and aligned with "a certain spirit of Marxism." He has criticized the xenophobia of Europe's New Right and defended immigrants' rights in the name of "hospitality" and "openness toward the other." For Wolin, however, Derrida's thinking is "politically valueless" because of what he calls its excessive, ethereal abstraction and Derrida's refusal to get down to the level of concrete policy and to write in the idiom of normative political theory. Instead he engages in an "esoteric appeal to a messianic condition to come (*à venir*)," which exists in sublime, utopian contrast to the "perdition of the historical present." The most compelling part of Wolin's argument in this chapter is his discussion of Derrida's essay "The Force of Law," in which Derrida draws a sharp distinction between law (which is inevitably logocentric, universalist, and incapable of recognizing difference or otherness) and justice (which operates always at the level of the specific, the individual, and the exceptional). Wolin calls this distinction "a naïve binary opposition," and suggests that Derrida's dismissal of formal legal procedures and rationality, and his emphasis on "undecidability," leads him to a position almost identical with Carl Schmitt's decisionism: we must simply *decide*, outside the framework of any body of law or appeal to legal precedent. Such a model, suggests Wolin, is unlikely to advance the cause of human rights or the interests of the marginalized. Fair enough – but Derrida is correct when he argues that a real distinction between law and justice exists, and that the danger of law is precisely its blind, programmatic application to individual cases that are enormously complex. Derrida's argument is a reaction against "law" as expressed in such rigid legislation as California's "three-strikes-and-you're-out" or other kinds of mandatory sentencing.

**AT DERRIDA: ALTERANTIVE FAILS – NO SOCIAL CHANGE**

**Deconstruction too academic and narrow to spur social change.**

**Learmonth, 04** (Mark, Department of Management Studies--University of York, "Derrida Reappraised: Deconstruction, Critique and Emancipation in Management Studies", University of York, Department of Management Studies, March, [http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/2553/1/yms\\_workingpaper1.pdf](http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/2553/1/yms_workingpaper1.pdf))

Whilst the work of Jacques Derrida has a number of influential admirers amongst scholars of management and organization (Jones, forthcoming) there remains a significant degree of scepticism about the utility of his work, especially perhaps amongst those who wish to change the world in ways they consider to be emancipatory (Feldman, 1998). Indeed, for Gabriel, deconstruction is opposed to such ambitions: [o]ur theories [i.e. those of management scholars] have mostly given up on the Marxist ideal of changing the world and even on the more modest one of understanding and critiquing it. Instead they increasingly seek to 'deconstruct' it through ironic or iconic engagement, endlessly lost in narrative vortices Gabriel (2001, p.23). Even some scholars who are generally read as sympathetic to Derrida's work have suggested that emancipatory critique has to be added on to deconstruction as a supplement to Derrida's own concerns. For example, Boje feels that it is necessary "to marry deconstruction to the critical theory revival of Marxist critique of ideology ... [otherwise] deconstruction became (sic) just another formalism, anti-historical, politically conservative, and ... lacking a social change project" (2001, p.18/19). Nevertheless, Derrida himself has said he believes that there is an enormous amount to do today for emancipation, in all domains and all the areas of the world and society ... I must say that I have no tolerance for those who - deconstructionist or not - are ironical with regard to the grand discourse of emancipation Derrida (1996, p.82). The principal aim of this paper is to argue for a reappraisal of Derrida's potential to contribute to emancipatory critique in management and organization studies. A contribution that I suggest can be substantial. Indeed, it is submitted that emancipatory ambitions are not alien to deconstruction as Boje (2001) seems to claim - rather they are intrinsic to it.

AT DERRIDA: ELITISM

**Deconstruction is elitist and fails to produce real change**

**Fejfar 06** (Anthony J, B.A. Philosophy, Magna Cum Laude, Creighton University, J.D., With Distinction, University of Nebraska College of Law, “Deconstructing Derrida: Deconstructing a Cliff A Tract Book Essay A Satirical Allegory”, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/980/Deconstructing-Deconstruction-Deconstructing-Derrida>)

Let us imagine that a law professor has gone up to Harvard and has sat in on a seminar dealing with deconstruction ala Derrida. Professor Jones comes back to Widemount University School of Law and begins a faculty presentation about deconstruction. Jones begins by arguing that linguistics are the basis for reality. Put another way, linguistic deconstruction shows us what reality really is. Jones then takes the example that he learned at Harvard, that a “Cliff” could be linguistically deconstructed to show the ultimate nature of the Cliff. Jones starts out with a nice picture of a cliff face of rock at the base of the Grand Canyon. He points out that the word “Cliff” is culturally subjective and in a sense does not really exist. Undoubtedly, “Cliff” was a word which developed in a racist, patriarchal society and must be exposed by deconstruction for what it really is, that is, a 1 culturally arbitrary covention which lends a certain trajectory of meaning regarding a rock face. Unfortunately for Professor Jones, Professor Fejfar, a Critical Thomist at Widemount University School of Law raises a few awkward questions. “Professor Jones, aren’t you taking a remarkably one sided idealist approach to this question. Over 400 years ago Shakespeare asked “would a rose by any other name smell as sweet?” In this context, I would ask, “would a cliff by any other name stop being a steep rock wall?” The answer is no. Professor Fejfar argues that linguistic deconstruction does not really by itself disclose the nature of reality. It may say something useful, but not enough to persuade us that deconstructing the word “Cliff” actually deconstructs ‘Cliff’ itself. So, for example let us say that there are several different words for the word “Cliff,” such as cliff, cliffo, rocko, etc. I suggest that however much we deconstruct the words, cliff, cliffo, and rocko, that all other things being equal the real cliff itself will be there the next morning. If Professor Jones insists upon deconstructing “cliff” right in front the real cliff rock face, I think that he will find that if he walks into the cliff face he will break his nose. In fact, I would argue that to prevent this from happening over and over again, Professor Jones would have to get into a backhoe or other machinery and physically dig out the cliff face until it no longer exists. This is real physical deconstruction as opposed to linguistic deconstruction. Think about it.



## AT DERRIDA: MORAL IMPERATIVES GOOD

**Moral imperatives are essential—civil rights, women’s movement, gay liberation, and anti-war movements prove Wolin 04** (Richard, B.A. from Reed College--M.A. and Ph.D. from York University in Toronto--D.D. McMurtry Professor of History at Reed College and Rice University, The seduction of unreason : the intellectual romance with fascism : from Nietzsche to postmodernism, p. 235-236)

Yet contrary to Derrida's rash supposition that justice and law are incompatible, one might alternatively argue that the uneasy balance between these two elements, which remains the cornerstone of the modern system of right, may be adjudged a qualified success. In a number of celebrated instances, the precarious equilibrium between justice and law has prevented positive law from congealing into something positivistically rigid, impervious to reinterpretation and changing historical needs. Here I am thinking of **abe** paramount relationship between civil disobedience and political injustice in recent American history. The cases of the civil rights, women's and gay liberation, and anti-war movements were at least partly successful in provoking a sea change in political understand ing. Stressing the moral imperatives of social equality, these protest movements effectively demonstrated that, in the case of numerous social groups, claims to democratic inclusion had been dishonored. In these and other cases, the existence of moral claims deemed higher than positive law, along with superordinate constitutional norms, underwrote instances of popular protest that sought to expose individual laws or policies that fell short of justice quaethical ideal.<sup>40</sup> Such considerations form the core of the tradition of modern natural law: from the era of Locke and Rousseau, who provided the intellectual ammunition for the age of democratic revolutions, to the doctrines of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls in our own day. Yet Derrida systematically distrusts the modern natural law tradition insofar as it remains incurably logocentric. In expressing the hegemony of the logos, it fails to do justice to the claims of otherness and difference. Yet, *pace* Derrida, as the foregoing historical examples bear out, in many cases the dialectical tension between morality and law has prevented society from succumbing to the reign of an inflexible legal positivism—the tyranny of positive law. As a critic of modern law, Derrida fails to strike a proper balance between the universal and the particular. As a critic of logocentrism and a philosopher of the "undecidable" (Le., the indeterminacy of all truth claims), he glorifies the moment of particularity in a manner that is frankly *decisionistu*: that is, in a way that stresses the arbitrariness and contingency of all judgments and decisions. It is far from accidental, therefore, that Derrida cites with relish Kierkegaard's adage, "The moment of decision is madness." "This is particularly true," Derrida goes on to remark, "of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics."<sup>41</sup> From Derrida's perspective, general laws and maxims are downgraded as "logocentric": they are representative of the tyranny of the logos, which, instead of remaining open to the "otherness of the other"—Derrida's Levinasian approximation of justice—are more concerned with the imperatives of logical consistency and conceptual coherence. As Derrida avows, "There is no justice except to the degree that some event is possible which ... exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations, and so forth. Justice as the experience of absolute alterity is *unpresentable*. One suspects that given its marked aversion to "calculation, rules, and programs," Derrida's ideal of justice would be radically anti-institutional. This suspicion is borne out by his ensuing discussion of the ontological chasm separating justice and law: For Derrida positive law is intrinsically indigent insofar as it is empirical, institutional, normative, and embodied. The idea of a "just law," he claims, would be a contradiction in terms. In his view the deficiencies of positive law are counterbalanced neither by constitutional norms, nor by universalist maxims proper to modern natural right (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau), nor by contemporary conceptions of human rights. Instead, for Derrida the counterpart to law that holds out prospects of justice is the idea of the *mystical-thus* his essay's subtitle, "The Mystical Foundation of Authority," an allusion to Michel de Montaigne.

**\*\*DILLON\*\***

## AT: DILLON: CALCULATIONS GOOD

**Viewing calculative thought as equivalent to domination ensures total political paralysis.**

**Bronner, 04** Stephen Eric Bronner, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, 2004, Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, p. 3-5

“Instrumental reason” was seen as merging with what Marx termed the “commodity form” underpinning capitalist social relations. Everything thereby became subject to the calculation of costs and benefits. Even art and aesthetic tastes would become defined by a “culture industry”—intent only upon maximizing profits by seeking the lowest common denominator for its products. Instrumental rationality was thus seen as stripping the supposedly “autonomous” individual, envisioned by the philosophes, of both the means and the will to resist manipulation by totalitarian movements. Enlightenment now received two connotations: its historical epoch was grounded in an anthropological understanding of civilization that, from the first, projected the opposite of progress. This gave the book its power: Horkheimer and Adorno offered not simply the critique of some prior historical moment in time, but of all human development. This made it possible to identify enlightenment not with progress, as the philistine bourgeois might like to believe, but rather—unwittingly—with barbarism, Auschwitz, and what is still often called “the totally administered society.” Such is the picture painted by Dialectic of Enlightenment. But it should not be forgotten that its authors were concerned with criticizing enlightenment generally, and the historical epoch known as the Enlightenment in particular, from the standpoint of enlightenment itself: thus the title of the work. Their masterpiece was actually “intended to prepare the way for a positive notion of enlightenment, which will release it from entanglement in blind domination.”<sup>4</sup> Later, in fact, Horkheimer and Adorno even talked about writing a sequel that would have carried a title like “Rescuing the Enlightenment” (Rettung der Aufklärung).<sup>5</sup> This reclamation project was never completed, and much time has been spent speculating about why it wasn’t. The reason, I believe, is that the logic of their argument ultimately left them with little positive to say. Viewing instrumental rationality as equivalent with the rationality of domination, and this rationality with an increasingly seamless bureaucratic order, no room existed any longer for a concrete or effective political form of opposition: Horkheimer would thus ultimately embrace a quasi-religious “yearning for the totally other” while Adorno became interested in a form of aesthetic resistance grounded in “negative dialectics.” Their great work initiated a radical change in critical theory, but its metaphysical subjectivism surrendered any systematic concern with social movements and political institutions. Neither of them ever genuinely appreciated the democratic inheritance of the Enlightenment and thus, not only did they render critique independent of its philosophical foundations,<sup>6</sup> but also of any practical interest it might serve. Horkheimer and Adorno never really grasped that, in contrast to the system builder, the blinkered empiricist, or the fanatic, the philosophe always evidenced a “greater interest in the things of this world, a greater confidence in man and his works and his reason, the growing appetite for curiosity and the growing restlessness of the unsatisfied mind—all these things form less a doctrine than a spirit.”<sup>7</sup> Just as Montesquieu believed it was the spirit of the laws, rather than any system of laws, that manifested the commitment to justice, the spirit of Enlightenment projected the radical quality of that commitment and a critique of the historical limitations with which even its best thinkers are always tainted. Empiricists may deny the existence of a “spirit of the times.” Nevertheless, historical epochs can generate an ethos, an existential stance toward reality, or what might even be termed a “project” uniting the diverse participants in a broader intellectual trend or movement. The Enlightenment evidenced such an ethos and a peculiar stance toward reality with respect toward its transformation. Making sense of this, however, is impossible without recognizing what became a general stylistic commitment to clarity, communicability, and what rhetoricians term “plain speech.” For their parts, however, Horkheimer and Adorno believed that resistance against the incursions of the culture industry justified the extremely difficult, if not often opaque, writing style for which they would become famous—or, better, infamous. Their esoteric and academic style is a far cry from that of Enlightenment intellectuals who debated first principles in public, who introduced freelance writing, who employed satire and wit to demolish puffery and dogma, and who were preoccupied with reaching a general audience of educated readers: Lessing put the matter in the most radical form in what became a popular saying—“Write just as you speak and it will be beautiful”—while, in a letter written to D’Alembert in April of 1766, Voltaire noted that “Twenty folio volumes will never make a revolution: it’s the small, portable books at thirty sous that are dangerous. If the Gospel had cost 1,200 sesterces, the Christian religion would never have been established.”<sup>9</sup>

Appropriating the Enlightenment for modernity calls for reconnecting with the vernacular. This does not imply some endorsement of anti-intellectualism. Debates in highly specialized fields, especially those of the natural sciences, obviously demand expertise and insisting that intellectuals must “reach the masses” has always been a questionable strategy. The subject under discussion should define the language in which it is discussed and the terms employed are valid insofar as they illuminate what cannot be said in a simpler way. Horkheimer and Adorno, however, saw the matter differently. They feared being integrated by the culture industry, avoided political engagement, and turned freedom into the metaphysical-aesthetic preserve of the connoisseur. They became increasingly incapable of appreciating the egalitarian impulses generated by the Enlightenment and the ability of its advocates—Ben Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Thomas Paine, and Rousseau—to argue clearly and with a political purpose.<sup>1</sup> Thus, whether or not their “critical” enterprise was “dialectically” in keeping with the impulses of the past, its assumptions prevented them from articulating anything positive for the present or the future.

**\*\*DEEP ECOLOGY\*\***

AT DEEP ECOLOGY—POPULATION FASCISM

**The alternative embraces inhumane forms of population control—this is an endorsement of mass murder.**

Karen **Warren and** Barbara **Wells-Howe, 94**. Professor of Philosophy at Macalester College. “Ecological Feminism,” p. 93, Google Scholar.

From a Deep Ecological perspective, thinking humanely is problematic insofar as doing so is human centered. Of course, if humaneness is merely kindness and compassion, it is not anthropocentric to reflect or act humanely. Naess seems here to conflate humaneness with human-centeredness, as though application of the ethics of human interactions with each other (such as being kind) is anthropocentric. Is this merely a matter of interpretation? Is it true that the overall tone of Naess’s work evidences benevolent foundations; his reader would find that he would condone inhumane methods of population reduction. My point is to identify a vagueness, or lack of clarity in Deep Ecological thinking concerning human interactions with each other. Despite Naess’ apparent benevolent sensibilities, the writings and recommendations of a number of Deep Ecologists have sometimes verged on the inhumane, and others have put forth the view that phenomena such as the global AIDS epidemic and Third World famine are “necessary solutions” to the “population problem.”

**AT DEEP ECOLOGY—CEDE THE POLITICAL**

**Deep ecology's focus on creating a new psyche alienates the public.**

**De-Shalit, 2000.** Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. "The Environment: Between Theory and Practice," p. 49-50, Avner, Questia.

One may ask: so what? Does it matter that Deep Ecology uses the term 'environment' differently from science? My answer is: it may not matter, as long as we recognize that this is indeed the case, that Deep Ecology is a political (or psychological) theory whose goals do not always seek to reform our attitudes about the environment, but rather seek to replace politics by a non-political system. If, however, Deep Ecology claims to respect the environment and treat it 'as it is', then this claim may be deceptive because environmental attitudes become a means of changing the 'system'. Their theory, then, is not about the moral grounds for respecting the environment, but about non-environmental goals. 19 If we understand this, it is clear at least why Deep Ecology has rarely, if at all, served as a rationale for environmental policies. The general public, including activists, may have sensed that, when they want to justify recycling or the treatment of sewage, talks about the new psyche will not do. The deeper problem, I fear, is that, since Deep Ecology is rather dominant in environmental philosophy, many people in the general public conclude that 'this is environmental philosophy' and therefore that 'arguments taken from environmental philosophy in general will not suffice in real cases'.

**\*\*DELEUZE AND GUATTARI\*\***

## AT DELEUZE AND GUATTARI: AUTHORITARIANISM TURN

**Deleuze and Guattari's alternative fails and leads to authoritarian oppression.**

**Barbrook 98** (Richard, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 8/27, <http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9808/msg00091.html>)

Techno-nomad TJs are attracted by the uncompromising theoretical radicalism expressed by Deleuze and Guattari. However, far from succumbing to an outside conspiracy, Frequence Libre imploded because of the particular New Left politics which inspired A Thousand Plateaus and the other sacred texts. Unwilling to connect abstract theory with its practical application, the techno-nomads cannot see how Deleuze and Guattari's celebration of direct democracy was simultaneously a justification for intellectual elitism. This elitism was no accident. Because of their very different life experiences, many young people in the sixties experienced a pronounced 'generation gap' between themselves and their parents. Feeling so isolated, they believed that society could only be changed by a revolutionary vanguard composed of themselves and their comrades. This is why many young radicals simultaneously believed in two contradictory concepts. First, the revolution would create mass participation in running society. Second, the revolution could only be organised by a committed minority.<14> The New Left militants were reliving an old problem in a new form. Back in the 1790s, Robespierre had argued that the democratic republic could only be created by a revolutionary dictatorship. During the 1917 Russian revolution, Lenin had advocated direct democracy while simultaneously instituting the totalitarian rule of the Bolsheviks. As their 'free radio' experience showed, Deleuze and Guattari never escaped from this fundamental contradiction of revolutionary politics. The absence of the Leninist party did not prevent the continuation of vanguard politics. As in other social movements, Fr=E9quence Libre was dominated by a few charismatic individuals: the holy prophets of the anarcho-communist revolution.<15> In Deleuze and Guattari's writings, this deep authoritarianism found its theoretical expression in their methodology: semiotic structuralism. Despite rejecting its 'wooden language', the two philosophers never really abandoned Stalinism in theory. Above all, they retained its most fundamental premise: the minds of the majority of the population were controlled by bourgeois ideologies.<16> During the sixties, this elitist theory was updated through the addition of Lacanian structuralism by Louis Althusser, the chief philosopher of the French Communist party.<17> For Deleuze and Guattari, Althusser had explained why only a revolutionary minority supported the New Left. Brainwashed by the semiotic 'machinic assemblages' of the family, media, language and psychoanalysis, most people supposedly desired fascism rather than anarcho-communism. This authoritarian methodology clearly contradicted the libertarian rhetoric within Deleuze and Guattari's writings. Yet, as the rappers who wanted to make a show for Frequence Libre discovered, Deleuzoguattarian anarcho-communism even included the censorship of music. By adopting an Althusserian analysis, Deleuze and Guattari were tacitly privileging their own role as intellectuals: the producers of semiotic systems, Just like their Stalinist elders, the two philosophers believed that only the vanguard of intellectuals had the right to lead the masses - without any formal consent from them - in the fight against capitalism.

**Deleuze and Guattari's radical liberation plays out as a historical disaster—Pol Pot is an example of the alternative.**

**Barbrook 98** (Richard, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 8/27, <http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9808/msg00091.html>)

Deleuze and Guattari enthusiastically joined this attack against the concept of historical progress. For them, the 'deterritorialisation' of urban society was the solution to the contradiction between participatory democracy and revolutionary elitism haunting the New Left. If the centralised city could be broken down into 'molecular rhizomes', direct democracy and the gift economy would reappear as people formed themselves into small nomadic bands. According to Deleuze and Guattari, anarcho-communism was not the 'end of history': the material result of a long epoch of social development. On the contrary, the liberation of desire from semiotic oppression was a perpetual promise: an ethical stance which could be equally lived by nomads in ancient times or social movements in the present. With enough intensity of effort, anyone could overcome their hierarchical brainwashing to become a fully-liberated individual: the holy fool.<21> Yet, as the experience of Frequence Libre proved, this rhetoric of unlimited freedom contained a deep desire for ideological control by the New Left vanguard. While the nomadic fantasies of A Thousand Plateaus were being composed, one revolutionary movement actually did carry out Deleuze and Guattari's dream of destroying the city. Led by a vanguard of Paris-educated intellectuals, the Khmer Rouge overthrew an oppressive regime installed by the Americans. Rejecting the 'grand narrative' of economic progress, Pol Pot and his organisation instead tried to construct a rural utopia. However, when the economy subsequently imploded, the regime embarked on ever more ferocious purges until the country was rescued by an invasion by neighbouring Vietnam. Deleuze and Guattari had claimed that the destruction of the city would create direct democracy and libidinal ecstasy. Instead, the application of such anti-modernism in practice resulted in tyranny and genocide. The 'line of flight' from Stalin had led to Pol Pot.



**AT DELEUZE AND GUATTARI: AUTHORITARIANISM TURN**

**The alternativet is elitist and bound to end in a totalitarian state**

**Barbrook 98** (Richard, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 8/27, <http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9808/msg00091.html>)

This elitism is a hallowed tradition of the European avant-garde. For decades, radical intellectuals have adopted dissident politics, aesthetics and morals to separate themselves from the majority of 'herd animals' whose minds were controlled by bourgeois ideologies. Despite their revolutionary rhetoric, avant-garde intellectuals fantasised about themselves as an artistic aristocracy ruling the philistine masses. Following this elitist custom, the Deleuzoguattarians champion nomadic minorities from the 'non-guaranteed' social movements against the stupified majority from the 'guaranteed' sector. Once again, the revolution is the ethical-aesthetic illumination of a minority rather than the social liberation of all people. Earlier in this century, this dream of an artistic aristocracy sometimes evolved into fascism. More often, the avant-garde supported totalitarian tendencies within the Left. Nowadays, cultural elitism can easily turn into implicit sympathy with neo-liberalism. The European avant-garde - and its imitators - could never openly support the free market fundamentalism of the Californian ideology. Yet, as TJs cut 'n' mix, the distinctions between right and left libertarianism are blurring. On the one hand, the Californian ideologues claim that a heroic minority of cyber-entrepreneurs is emerging from the fierce competition of the electronic marketplace. On the other hand, the Deleuzoguattarians believe that this new elite consists of cool TJs and hip artists who release subversive 'assemblages of enunciation' into the Net. In both the Californian ideology and Deleuzoguattarian discourse, primitivism and futurism are combined to produce the apotheosis of individualism: the cyborg Nietzschean Superman.

**AT DELEUZE AND GUATTARI: ALT DOESN'T ASSUME TECHNOLOGY**

**Deleuze and Guattari's passion for anarcho-communism fails – the technology they celebrate will be controlled by elites.**

**Barbrook 98** (Richard, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 8/27, <http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9808/msg00091.html>)

The New Left anticipated the emergence of the hi-tech gift economy. People could collaborate with each other without needing either markets or states. However, the New Left had a purist vision of DIY culture. There could be no compromise between the authenticity of the potlatch and the alienation of the market. Fr=E9quence Libre preserved its principles to the point of bankruptcy. Bored with the emotional emptiness of post-modernism, the techno-nomads are entranced by the uncompromising fervour of Deleuze and Guattari. However, as shown by Frequence Libre, the rhetoric of mass participation often hides the rule of the enlightened few. The ethical-aesthetic commitment of anarcho-communism can only be lived by the artistic aristocracy. Yet, the antinomies of the avant-garde can no longer be avoided. The ideological passion of anarcho-communism is dulled by the banality of giving gifts within cyberspace. The theory of the artistic aristocracy cannot be based on the everyday activities of 'herd animals'. Above all, anarcho-communism exists in a compromised form on the Net. Contrary to the ethical-aesthetic vision of the New Left, the boundaries between the different methods of working are not morally precise. Within the mixed economy of the Net, the gift economy and the commercial sector can only expand through mutual collaboration within cyberspace. The free circulation of information between users relies upon the capitalist production of computers, software and telecommunications. The profits of commercial net companies depend upon increasing numbers of people participating within the hi-tech gift economy. Under threat from Microsoft, Netscape is now trying to realise the opportunities opened up by such interdependence. Lacking the resources to beat its monopolistic rival, the development of products for the shareware Linux operating system has become a top priority. Anarcho-communism is now sponsored by corporate capital. The purity of the digital DIY culture is also compromised by the political system. Because the dogmatic communism of Deleuze and Guattari has dated badly, their disciples instead emphasise their uncompromising anarchism. However, the state isn't just the potential censor and regulator of the Net. Many people use the Net for political purposes, including lobbying their political representatives. State intervention will be needed to ensure everyone can access the Net. The cult of Deleuze and Guattari is threatened by the miscegenation of the hi-tech gift economy with the private and public sectors. Anarcho-communism symbolised moral integrity: the romance of artistic 'delirium' undermining the 'machinic assemblages' of bourgeois conformity. However, as Net access grows, more and more ordinary people are circulating free information across the Net. Far from having any belief in the revolutionary ideals of May '68, the overwhelming majority of people participate within the hi-tech gift economy for entirely pragmatic reasons. In the late nineties, digital anarcho-communism is being built by hackers like Eric Raymond: "a self-described neo-pagan [right-wing] libertarian who enjoys shooting semi-automatic weapons..."

AT DELEUZE AND GUATTARI: NOMAD ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Alternative fails—treating the nomad as a complete outsider is narcissistic and impossible.**

**Mann, 95** (Professor of English at Pomona, Paul, "Stupid Undergrounds," PostModern Culture 5:3, Project MUSE)

Intellectual economics guarantees that even the most powerful and challenging work cannot protect itself from the order of fashion. Becoming-fashion, becoming-commodity, becoming-ruin. Such instant, indeed retroactive ruins, are the virtual landscape of the stupid underground. The exits and lines of flight pursued by Deleuze and Guattari are being shut down and rerouted by the very people who would take them most seriously. By now, any given work from the stupid underground's critical apparatus is liable to be tricked out with smooth spaces, war-machines, n - 1s, planes of consistency, plateaus and deterritorializations, strewn about like tattoos on the stupid body without organs. The nomad is already succumbing to the rousseauism and orientalism that were always invested in his figure; whatever Deleuze and Guattari intended for him, he is reduced to being a romantic outlaw, to a position opposite the State, in the sort of dialectical operation Deleuze most despised. And the rhizome is becoming just another stupid subterranean figure. It is perhaps true that Deleuze and Guattari did not adequately protect their thought from this dialectical reconfiguration (one is reminded of Breton's indictment against Rimbaud for not having prevented, in advance, Claudel's recuperation of him as a proper Catholic), but no vigilance would have sufficed in any case. The work of Deleuze and Guattari is evidence that, in real time, virtual models and maps close off the very exits they indicate. The problem is in part that rhizomes, lines of flight, smooth spaces, BwOs, etc., are at one and the same time theoretical-political devices of the highest critical order and merely fantasmatic, delirious, narcissistic models for writing, and thus perhaps an instance of the all-too-proper blurring of the distinction between criticism and fantasy. In Deleuze-speak, the stupid underground would be mapped not as a margin surrounding a fixed point, not as a fixed site determined strictly by its relation or opposition to some more or less hegemonic formation, but as an intensive, n-dimensional intersection of rhizomatic plateaus. Nomadology and rhizomatics conceive such a "space" (if one only had the proverbial nickel for every time that word is used as a critical metaphor, without the slightest reflection on what might be involved in rendering the conceptual in spatial terms) as a liquid, colloidal suspension, often retrievable by one or another techno-metaphorical zoning (e.g., "cyberspace"). What is at stake, however, is not only the topological verisimilitude of the model but the fantastic possibility of nonlinear passage, of multiple simultaneous accesses and exits, of infinite fractal lines occupying finite social space. In the strictest sense, stupid philosophy. Nomad thought is prosthetic, the experience of virtual exhilaration in modalities already mapped and dominated by nomad, rhizomatic capital (the political philosophy of the stupid underground: capital is more radical than any of its critiques, but one can always pretend otherwise). It is this very fantasy, this very narcissistic wish to see oneself projected past the frontier into new spaces, that abandons one to this economy, that seals these spaces within an order of critical fantasy that has long since been overdeveloped, entirely reterritorialized in advance. To pursue nomadology or rhizomatics as such is already to have lost the game. Nothing is more crucial to philosophy than escaping the dialectic and no project is more hopeless; the stupid-critical underground is the curved space in which this opposition turns back on itself.

**\*\*ECO-FEMINISM\*\***

**AT ECO-FEMINSIM: ELIMINATES CAPITALISM**

**Eco-feminism would require the elimination of capitalism.**

**Mellor 97** – Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Newcastle upon Tyne Polytechnic – 1997 (Mary, FEMINISM AND ECOLOGY, p. 162)

Eco-feminists incorporate an implicit or explicit rejection of capitalism in their critique of western society, although very few adopt a socialist analysis in the Marxian sense. Carolyn Merchant has argued the case for a socialist analysis of the ecological crisis couched in terms of socialist feminism: ‘Socialist feminism views change as dynamic, interactive and dialectical, rather than a mechanistic, linear and incremental...A socialist feminist environmental ethic involves developing sustainable, non-dominating relations with nature and supplying all peoples with a high quality of life’(1990:105). Merchant points out that ‘socialist feminism environmental theory gives both reproduction and production central places’, thus denying the centrality of the Marxian analysis of production. In a later book Merchant advocates a ‘radical ecology’ as the basis of a socialist position in which social movements such as bioregional movements, grassroots struggle and mainstream environmental campaigning have largely replaced social class as political agents.

AT ECO-FEMINISM: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Ecofeminism marginalizes women by embracing patriarchal essentialisms.**

**Biehl, 91.** Social ecology activist and the author of Rethinking Eco-feminist Politics. "Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics," p. 3-4, Janet.

Although most political movements might feel the need to sort out these differences and their theorists might argue for and against them, producing a healthy debate, ecofeminists rarely confront each other on the differences in these writings. Ecofeminists who even acknowledge the existence of serious contradictions tend, in fact, to pride themselves on the contradictions in their works as a healthy sign of "diversity"-presumably in contrast to "dogmatic," fairly consistent, and presumably "male" or "masculine" theories. But dogmatism is clearly not the same thing as coherence, clarity, and at least a minimum level of consistency. Ecofeminism, far from being healthily diverse, is so blatantly self-contradictory as to be incoherent. As one might expect, at least one ecofeminist even rejects the very notion of coherence itself, arguing that coherence is "totalizing" and by inference oppressive. Moreover, because ecofeminists rarely debate each other, it is nearly impossible to glean from their writings the extent to which they agree or disagree with each other. The reader of this book should be wary of attributing the views of anyone ecofeminist, as they are presented here, to all other ecofeminists. But ecofeminists' apparent aversion to sorting out the differences among themselves leaves the critical observer no choice but to generalize. The self-contradictory nature of ecofeminism raises further problems as well. Some ecofeminists literally celebrate the identification of women with nature as an ontological reality. They thereby speciously biologize the personality traits that patricentric society assigns to women. The implication of this position is to confine women to the same regressive social definitions from which feminists have fought long and hard to emancipate women. Other ecofeminists reject such biologizations and rightly consider what are virtually sociobiological definitions of women as regressive for women. But some of the same ecofeminists who reject these definitions nonetheless favor using them to build a movement.

**Ecofeminists association of women with nature reinforces patriarchy—this destroys the alternative's potential.**

**Biehl, 91.** Janet, Social ecology activist and the author of Rethinking Eco-feminist Politics. "Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics," p. 15-6.

Despite ecofeminism's allegedly "revolutionary" potential, some feminists (who are not ecofeminists) have criticized ecofeminism and its closely associated cultural feminism for their reactionary implications. Ecofeminist images of women, these critics correctly warn, retain the patriarchal stereotypes of what men expect women to be. These stereotypes freeze women as merely caring and nurturing beings, instead of expanding the full range of women's human potentialities and abilities. To focus overwhelmingly on women's "caring nature" as the source of ecologically necessary "values" easily leads to the notion that women are to remain intuitive and discourages them from expanding their human horizons and capacities. It is important to note that de Beauvoir flatly repudiated "the new femininity" such as ecofeminism offers, criticizing its return to an enhanced status for traditional feminine values, such as women and her rapport with nature, woman and her maternal instinct, woman and her physical being ... This renewed attempt to pin women down to their traditional role, together with a small effort to meet some of the demands made by women—that's the formula used to try and keep women quiet. Even women who call themselves feminists don't always see through it. Once again, women are being defined in terms of "the other," once again they are being made into the "second sex." ... Equating ecology with feminism is something that irritates me. They are not automatically one and the same thing at all. (emphasis added) De Beauvoir's well-placed emphasis on the "traditional role" assigned to women by male-created cultures is a conclusion that can only be highly disconcerting to ecofeminism, for it was from this pioneer in women's liberation that ecofeminists borrowed their basic concept of the "otherness" of women and nature. That it is now women-and not men-who define women as "other" with nature is a milestone in the passage in recent decades from a struggle for women's liberation to assertions of mere female chauvinism in ecofeminism. The fact is that Western associations of women with nonhuman nature—or as closer to nonhuman nature than men—were enormously debasing to women. Ancient Greek culture excluded women from political life because of their presumed intellectual inferiority; Aristotle wrote that their logos or reason "lacks authority." Plato believed that in the origin of the two sexes, women result when men who do not do well in their life on earth come back through transmigration of the soul as females." Euripides in a fragment says that "woman is a more terrible thing than the violence of the raging sea, than the force of torrents, than the sweeping breath of fire."" Semonides delivered a diatribe comparing what he saw as various types of women to various animals. Ancient Roman law regarded women as having a "levity of mind," and in Christian culture, Augustine saw women as "weaker." Eve came to be seen as a temptress for her role in the Fall—in the words of the Christian father Tertullian, "the gateway to hell." Aquinas, following Aristotle, regarded women as "misbegotten" and defective. The association of women with nonhuman nature or as beings closer to nonhuman nature has thus been immensely degrading for women, contributing to untold misery in the lives of countless women in Western culture.

**\*\*EDELMAN\*\***

AT EDELMAN: ALT DOESN'T SOLVE PATRIARCHY

**Alternative doesn't solve patriarchy – Edelman's use of queer theory can't be universalized.**

**Snediker 06** (Michael, Visiting Assistant Professor of American Literature at Mount Holyoke College, Postmodern Culture, Vol 16, "Queer Optimism", May,

[http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/postmodern\\_culture/v016/16.3snediker.html](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v016/16.3snediker.html))

Edelman's might be one way of refusing the logic of reproductive futurism, but not the only one. That there would be many possible queer courses of action might indeed seem to follow from Edelman's invoking of Lacanian truth ("Wunsch") as characterized by nothing so much as its extravagant, recalcitrant particularity. "The Wunsch," Lacan writes in a passage cited in No Future's introduction, "does not have the character of a universal law but, on the contrary, of the most particular of laws--even if it is universal that this particularity is to be found in every human being" (6). This truth, which Edelman aligns with "queerness" (and ergo with negativity, the death-drive, jouissance, etc.) "does not have the character of a universal law." Edelman, for all his attentiveness to the Lacanian "letter of the law," glosses Lacan's own argument with a symptomatic liberality. "Truth, like queerness," Edelman writes, "finds its value not in a good susceptible to generalization, but only in the stubborn particularity that voids every notion of a general good. The embrace of queer negativity, then, can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value" (6). Lacan, however, does not speak, even in Jacques-Alain Miller's translation, of a "general good." He speaks of a universal, which might be good or bad. Furthermore, if the only characteristic universally applicable to this "truth, like queerness" is its particularity, what sort of particularity voids every notion of a general good? Might so intransigent a particularity sometimes not void a universal, good or bad? My line of inquiry might seem petty, but my question, in fact, illuminates how little Edelman's argument can hold onto the particularity on which it is partly premised. "The queer," Edelman insists, "insists that politics is always a politics of the signifier" (6). Edelman likewise insists that "queer theory must always insist on its connection to the vicissitudes of the sign" (7). The ubiquity of "always" and "every" in Edelman's argument is nearly stunning, and it seems to me indicative of No Future's coerciveness, as a different passage from No Future's introduction quite handily demonstrates: Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order--such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer--but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the trump card of affirmation? Always the question: If not this, what? Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force, of negativity into some determinate stance or "position" whose determination would negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. (4)Always this, always this, always that. This absoluteness in Edelman's characterization of affirmation, meant to rally and provoke, recalls Sedgwick's incredulous reading of Fredric Jameson's ukase, "Always historicize." "What could have less to do," Sedgwick rightly asks, "with historicizing than the commanding, atemporal adverb 'always'" ("Paranoid Reading" 125)? What, for that matter, could have less to do with particularizations? The axiomatic thrust of Edelman's "always" would seem to make the world so irrevocably one thing that response to the world would amount to one thing. But still: why would rejecting a primary attachment to futurity (regardless of what this futurity always does or doesn't do) necessarily require embodying negativity? Edelman's queer pessimism positions itself as "our" only option without having exhausted what other options might glimmeringly look like. This glimmer doesn't conjure the sort of horizon Edelman would be so quick to dismantle. Rather, it suggests that not all optimisms are a priori equivalent to each other. And as importantly, that not all queer theories need look like Edelman's. "As a particular story . . . of why storytelling fails," Edelman writes, "queer theory, as I construe it, marks the 'other' side of politics . . . the 'side' outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism's unquestioned good" (7). This account of queer theory, even as construed by one theorist, hardly seems like a "particular" story, not at least particular enough. Queer theory, on this account, doesn't seem like an escape from the political's claustrophobically refracted unavailing sides, but a claustrophobia unto itself.



AT EDELMAN: ALT FAILS

**Edelman's alternative perpetuates essentialism and does not address material oppression.**

**Edwards 06** (Tim, Senior Lecturer of Sociology at the University of Leicester, Routledge, "Cultures of Masculinity" p85, [http://books.google.com/books?id=jiDisMipzEsC&source=gbs\\_navlinks\\_s](http://books.google.com/books?id=jiDisMipzEsC&source=gbs_navlinks_s))

Gay liberation is problematic not least because liberation *per se* is problematic, both theoretically and politically. In theoretical terms, the notion of liberation tends to imply essentialism and, in relation to sexuality, this is compounded by its conflation with the concept of repression and the assertion of some otherwise contained or constrained sexual desire. The difficulty here is not so much the charge of essentialism, which must remain in some senses merely a descriptive term, but rather the sense of confusion invoked concerning what exactly is being liberated: a sexual desire, a sexual identity, a sexual community, or all three? This is not to deny in the least that gay men still constitute a marginalized, stigmatized, and on occasions, even demonized group, yet such an experience is perhaps more accurately understood as a problem of subordination, emancipation or indeed oppression. The term liberation therefore remains rather inadequate in theoretical terms. This sense of ambiguity or even ambivalence concerning gay liberation was, however, also illustrated more academically. Some of the earliest works on gay politics, particularly those of Hocquenghem and Mieli, attributed a liberatory force to gay desire in celebrating promiscuity, pushing the boundaries of decency and more generally going against the mores of mainstream heterosexual society; while others, particularly those of Altman and Weeks, saw gay politics as a culturally specific phenomenon contingent on histories of movements towards reform and slowly shifting morals and values (Altman, 1971; Hocquenghem, 1972; Mieli, 1980; Weeks, 1977). It was perhaps not surprising, then, that much of this ambivalence should also be played out through a series of academic debates that followed the onset of gay liberation. These more theoretical debates were in themselves often founded on the political involvements of young writers and academics making their careers in colleges and universities. Most of these controversies centred on various, and often violently opposed, perspectives of the development of commercial gay culture and the practices and attitudes of gay men, most notoriously those of the overtly sexualised and hypermasculine clone.

**The alternative perpetuates the controversial gay clone, making unified progress impossible.**

**Edwards 06** (Tim, Senior Lecturer of Sociology at the University of Leicester, Routledge, "Cultures of Masculinity" p85-86, [http://books.google.com/books?id=jiDisMipzEsC&source=gbs\\_navlinks\\_s](http://books.google.com/books?id=jiDisMipzEsC&source=gbs_navlinks_s))

The gay clone has now become something of pariah, both within academic circles and more popular culture, pumped and inflated into near mythic status and the iconic symbol of gay liberation. With his sexuality blatantly displayed, literally bulging out of his plaid shirts, leather jackets and button-fly jeans, and publicly paraded down the streets of many of the world's major cities in celebration of his unconstrained promiscuous desire for more and more of precisely the same thing, namely those like himself, he became the emblem of the 'sex' in homosexuality, or what Michael Bronski once called 'sex incarnate' (Bronski, 1984: 191). Proclaimed by some as the epitome of the guilt-free lifestyle of sexual liberation and castigated by others as the nadir of misogynist self-loathing, the cruising gay clone came, perhaps mistakenly, to represent gay sexuality in its entirety and to divide politically motivated academia like an axe through an apple. More precisely, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, what this entire uproar often centred on was the perceived relationship of the homosexual to the masculine (Edwards, 1994, 1998).

AT EDELMAN: IGNORES CHANGES IN REPRODUCTION

**Edelman oversimplifies and ignores recent changes in reproduction and parenthood**

**Balasopoulos 06** (Antonis, Assistant Professor in English Studies at the University of Cyprus, Journal of American Studies, "Evolution and 'the Sex Problem': American Narratives during the Eclipse of Darwinism", proquest)

Edelman's book takes obvious pleasure in provocation, stylistically indulging in the ironic hermeneutics it methodologically advocates with at times infelicitous results (an excess of largely gratuitous verbal punning and a partiality for highly convoluted syntax are cases in point). More disconcertingly, No Future involves a vision of queer subjectivity that is so strongly invested in transvaluating the homophobic linkage of homosexuality with a " culture of death " that it ends up ignoring the complexity and diversity of what has historically constituted queer (lesbian and transgender as well as gay) politics. Missing, for instance, is a serious and sustained attempt to engage with the multiple transformations the concepts of reproduction and parenthood have undergone in the last two decades, partly as a result of the interventions of queer theory itself. Equally absent is any analytical concern with the cultural and representational resonances of the queer child – a figure that certainly complicates the book's one-dimensional treatment of the image of besieged childhood, while making apparent the unreflectively eclectic and historically untheorized nature of Edelman's choice of primary texts. The effect of such exclusions – a highly repetitive account of texts that are treated as virtually interchangeable – is particularly troubling from a theoretical standpoint. For though Edelman's argument largely rests on a theoretical distinction between an ideologically normative and a radically destabilizing kind of repetition compulsion, his analytical practice makes the difference between them less than obvious. Paying the reader diminishing dividends with each page, No Future bulldozes its way from Plato to the Victorians and from Hitchcock to Judith Butler by unwaveringly locating the same Manichean conflict between reproductive ideology and its queer negation, a struggle to the death between monolithic and unchanging absolutes. To declare No Future a timely work is hence not an unambiguous compliment; for its timeliness comes at the cost of intellectual surrender to the increasingly polarized and disconcertingly fundamentalist climate of American politics in the present.

**AT EDELMAN: HOMOSEXUAL NEGATIVITY BAD**

**Edelman's theory of choice regarding orientation gives moralists an opening to attack.**

**Sullivan 03** (Nikki, Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, NYU, "A critical introduction to queer theory", p30-31, [http://books.google.com/books?id=0b95f96qd8kC&source=gbs\\_navlinks\\_s](http://books.google.com/books?id=0b95f96qd8kC&source=gbs_navlinks_s))

Liberationists also attempted to replace the understanding of homosexuality as congenital with the notion of choice. The reasoning behind this shift is that the biological or 'no-choice' model of homosexuality allows gays and lesbians 'to be accepted only by representing ourselves as victims...of desires over which we have no control' (Sartelle 1994:6). Associated with this is, of course, the implication that if one could choose to be otherwise, to be straight, then one would. Such a position, argues Sartelle, constitutes both the abdication of responsibility for one's own feelings and actions, and a capitulation to hegemonic heteronormative discourses and discursive practice which ultimately function to destroy (and/or to cure) difference. Again, one can see the importance of this shift, but at the same time the claim that one's sexual orientation is freely chose has a number of drawbacks. As Harris notes, in many instances, the focus on choice fuelled anti-gay propaganda, giving homophobes and 'religious moralists the ideological loopholes they needed to attack a segment of the population once protected by the mawkish, if effective, rhetoric of powerlessness' (1997: 242-3). If sexual orientation was a choice, they argued, then it was possible for homosexuals to make the 'right' choice and to practice heterosexuality.

However, one could argue that the distinction that Harris makes here between the protection supposedly offered the 'rhetoric of powerlessness' and the inevitable backlash against the positing of homosexuality as one possible chosen sexual 'lifestyle' amongst many others, is somewhat tenuous. This is because, as Sartelle points out, the determinist argument fails to acknowledge the distinction between desire and action which is central to the claim (made by the conservative Right, and at times by more progressive groups such as feminists) that the fact that one experiences particular desires does not automatically give one the right to act on them. 14

AT EDELMAN: QUEER THEORY BAD

**Queer theory is too personal and divisive—undermines real liberation movements.**

**Kirsch 00** (Max H., Associate Professor and Director of the Ph.D. Program in Comparative Studies: The Public Intellectuals Program at the Florida Atlantic University, Routledge, “Queer theory and social change”, p114-115, [http://books.google.com/books?id=Sfd82XETptUC&source=gbs\\_navlinks\\_s](http://books.google.com/books?id=Sfd82XETptUC&source=gbs_navlinks_s))

Queer theory, as currently focused, is embedded in the context of class oppositions, and, paradoxically, the consequences of the theory are not what it appears to avow or what it contends it is. Instead of a force that opposes the dominance of power by those that control capital, it works as a part of the ideological mechanism that those in power seek to further. With the language of part radical movements, Queer theory works against the struggle it claims to engage, and as reified self-involvement it militates against the construction and building of communities. It disengages the energetic level of alliances and interpersonal relations, only to refocus efforts on the reductionistic deconstruction of texts interpreted only for personal use. The presence of conflict among peoples is tied to the struggle to maintain community and identity. What presents as senseless bigotry, sometimes resulting in genocide, is rooted in the anxious fight to maintain families, communities, and ensure survival. These are not individual functions. Their strategies, misconceived and misdirected, are a direct consequence of the loss of self-empowerment and control over everyday life. Capitalism, in this way, gives rise to psychological as well as social consequences.

**Queer theory’s focus on the individual destroys communities that could sustain liberation.**

**Kirsch 00** (Max H., Associate Professor and Director of the Ph.D. Program in Comparative Studies: The Public Intellectuals Program at the Florida Atlantic University, Routledge, “Queer theory and social change”, p121-123, [http://books.google.com/books?id=Sfd82XETptUC&source=gbs\\_navlinks\\_s](http://books.google.com/books?id=Sfd82XETptUC&source=gbs_navlinks_s))

Queer theory has developed along a path that questions the basic tenets of past resistance movements while championing the right of inclusion. But despite calls for the recognition of diversity, it has done little to further a true inclusiveness that would have the ability to form communities of resistance. Again, this is primarily due to the insistence on the uniqueness of the individual and the relativity of experience. The call made by Queer theory is familiar to those who have participated in resistance movements: the assertion of independence from oppressive authority while claiming the right to envision and create new forms of being. But instead of focusing on the creation of a society that guarantees freedom and expression for all, it has instead focused on the individual as a site of change. Indeed, this fear of connection, as argued in Chapter 5, has real possibilities for generating self-harm. The actions of those with power exert dominance in both conscious and unconscious ways, redirecting energy towards objective oppression and subjective self-hate in the process. While the belief that heterosexuality is the norm is purveyed, violence, both psychological and physical, is enacted on those outside of that projected norm, and experienced by them as being “outside” the facets of daily social life. Beyond making it more difficult to identify with others, such alienation causes a reaction to even the attempt to do so. “The right to be oneself” thus becomes a mechanism for self-protection rather than a call for equality. Current Queer theory’s engagement of this fear and concentration on the deconstruction of identity are results of such a reaction to power, a reductionistic view of the possibilities for change generated by the politics of the 1960s and 1970s. The reaction has taken place most prominently in the academy, where the purveyors of this theory are in positions that pose real danger to those opposing them. They have become the new academic elite, completely with editorships of journals, the power to hire, to decide who publishes, to deny tenure, and the ability to apply pressure with regard to which theory is well received and which disregarded. Let there be no mistake: they do act on their privileges. They are self-protective in much the same way that the managers of capitalist enterprises control the organization of work. It is not in their interest to further communities of dissidence, particularly against themselves. While Queer theory does not call for the destruction of communities, at least by name, its consequences are the same: communities must be deconstructed to free the individual for self-expression.<sup>5</sup> As the individual becomes the center of analysis in all aspects of social life, and as late capitalism emphasizes individualism on a global scale, resistance theory has closely followed the dominant streams. At best, wishful thinking and the consolidation of position underpins this direction, the hope that the *mind* can reframe the significance of harm while one’s job is not threatened. At worst, such a stance is in operative support of current structures of capitalist relations of being. Community, identity, and self-actualization are indeed complementary. Social and emotional health are promoted by active participation with others in community. The community is where “safe space” is created. Power in numbers has been the call of resistance movements world-wide, from anti-colonial struggles to fights for better working conditions. Such struggles have larger outcomes. The community is a forum for debate for the construction of strategy. Communities exist with varied needs that are part of the complexity of society. It is in communities that social change begins in embryonic form. Separatist movements have proven unproductive as the community becomes isolated and involutes with disagreement. Assimilationist movements cannot work toward sustained social change because there is no confrontation with the basis of oppression. The call for individuality is the most harmful strategy of all, for it separates every person from any concrete sense of identity and collective opposition.

**\*\*ENVIRONMENT KS/ANTHRO GOOD\*\***

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: CEDE THE POLITICAL

**Ecological utopianism prevents us from forming practical coalitions and risks dystopian extremes.**

**Lewis 92** – Professor, School of the Environment, Duke University – 1992 (Martin, GREEN DELSIONS, p. 250)

But for all of its attractions, utopia remains, and will always remain, “no place.” Although the vision is easy to conjure, the reality is elusive. In fact, those political regimes that have struggled hardest to realize utopian plans have created some of the world’s most dystopian realities. Unfortunately, American as a people seem uniquely drawn to such fantasies, and a right-wing variant of utopianism has even guided our recent national administrations; as Robert Kuttner (1991:5, 157) shows, laissez-faire itself is an ideologically driven utopian scheme that has dire consequences for the earth’s economy and ecology. As Michael Pollan (1991:188) eloquently demonstrates, eco-radicalism and right-wing economic theory are more closely allied than one might suspect: “Indeed, the wilderness ethic and laissez-faire economics, as antithetical as they might first appear, are really mirror images of one another, each proposes a quasi-divine force – Nature, the Market – that, left to its own devices, somehow knows what’s best for a place, Nature and the Market are both self-regulating, guided by an invisible hand. Worshippers of either share a deep, Puritan distrust of man, taking it on faith that human tinkering with the natural or economic order can only pervert it. So political extremists of all stripes offer utopian visions, which credulous idealists find remarkably attractive, but considering the disparity of the vision offered – the perfect market of laissez-faire, the perfect society of socialism, or the perfectly harmonious environment of eco-radicalism – it is not surprising that the utopians in the end only increases our social and intellectual rifts, steadily diminishing our chances of avoiding an ecological holocaust.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: DESTROY CPAITALISM

**Environmental radicalism is inherently anti-capitalist.**

**Lewis 92** – Professor, School of the Environment, Duke University – 1992 (Martin, GREEN DELUSIONS, p. 9-10)

Ultimately, green extremism is rooted in a single, powerful conviction: that continued economic growth is absolutely impossible, given limits of a finite planet. Only if this notion is discredited can the edifice of eco-radical philosophy be shaken. It can logically be shown that the supposed necessity of devising a steady-state economy is severely misconstrued. Economic growth, strictly speaking, is defined as an increase in the value of goods and services produced. Yet as noted almost twenty years ago by Mancur Olson (1973:4), radical greens have a significantly different conception, one that largely ignores services and that substitutes for mass value. To read some of their tracts, one could only conclude that economic growth requires producing ever larger quantities of steel, wheat, and similar material goods (for example, OrNSTEIN and Ehrlich 1989:227).

**AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM**

**Pragmatic flexibility is key to protecting the environment.**

**Farber 99** – Professor of Law, University of Minnesota – 1999 (Daniel, ECO-PRAGMATISM, p. 198)

As we have seen, one of the greatest challenges of environmental law is the pervasive uncertainty that surrounds environmental issues. Sometimes all we can do is to make the best decision we can with whatever information we have at hand. When hard numbers are unavailable, this may mean taking reasonable safe-guards against serious, but unquantifiable, risks, perhaps placing the burden of proof on the polluter. When we do have better information, we can use the environmental baseline of chapter 4, taking all feasible measures against significant risks unless the costs are clearly disproportionate to possible benefits. But in the long run, the structure of decision making may be more important than what test is applied in individual cases. We need to create structures of decision making that allow us to take advantage of increased knowledge over time. Such structures may include various forms of decentralization, administrative strategies that allow options to be kept open, and deregulatory authority to eliminate outmoded regulatory requirements. These types of flexibility should not be seen as hostile to environmentalism. Instead, they are ways of maintaining the vitality of environmental protection. Rather than being a strength, excessive rigidity could lead to collapse under pressure of constant change. A more flexible regulatory system, in the long run, may provide a higher level of environmental quality.

**Pragmatism is key to crafting laws that can genuinely protect the environment.**

**Farber 99** – Professor of Law, University of Minnesota – 1999 (Daniel, ECO-PRAGMATISM, p. 199)

The premise of this book is that environmental law is here to stay. Admittedly, prediction is a hazardous enterprise. Maybe environmental law will vanish in some political conflagration. So far, however, it has shown strong staying power, having survived the Reagan Revolution (as well as the “Gingrich Aftershock”) virtually unscathed. It would be tragic if we did lose our national commitment to the environment, but currently this outcome seems unlikely. It is now time to consider how to shape our regulatory system to implement this commitment most effectively for the indefinite future. In mapping out the future of environmental law, we need to consider not only how to make the best environmental decisions at any given time, but also how to create a sustainable environmental law that can endure over the long haul. To be sustainable, environmental law must accommodate not just environmentalism, but also other key values. Otherwise, it will slowly erode. In this book, I have advocated a pragmatic approach to environmental regulation, but one grounded in environmentalism. The key norm is that we all presumptively entitled to a safe environment and to the preservation of nature. This norm is now firmly embedded in our political culture. But the norm is tempered by an awareness of competing goals.



## AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM

**Saving the environment requires effective political engagement—environmental philosophers must abandon abstract theorizing in order to build the public.**

**De-Shalit, 2000.** Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. “The Environment: Between Theory and Practice,” Avner p. 4-6, Questia.

However, it would be wrong, if not dangerous, to blame the 'other'. From the prophets in biblical times to the French revolutionaries and the early Fabians, history is full of examples of theorists and philosophers who abandoned all hope of persuading others through deliberation, and became impatient and hence more radical in their ideas. This explains why the shift from humanistic to misanthropic attitudes has been rapid. Perhaps the 'easiest' way to solve a problem is to lose faith in a form of gradual change that can still remain respectful of humans. Such an attitude, I believe, **only brings about a new series of problems encompassing dictatorship, totalitarianism, and lack of personal freedom.** In this book I seek to maintain the philosophical impetus, not to point the finger at the politicians or the activists. Rather, I wish to examine ourselves—the philosophers who engage in discussing the environment—to discover how we might construct a theory that is much more accessible to the activists and the general public (without relinquishing any of our goals), and which can be harnessed to the aims of political philosophy. Here, the counter-argument would go something like this: 'OK, so the argumentation supplied by environmental philosophers is so removed from that used by activists and governments. So what? The only outcome of this is that more arguments, or, if you like, a pluralistic set of arguments, will emerge. Some arguments are relevant to academia alone; others can be used in politics. Thus, for example, in the university we could maintain an ecocentric environmental philosophy, 7 whereas in politics anthropocentric 8 arguments would dominate.' In response to this, it could be argued that plurality of argument is indeed welcome. Moreover, as we saw earlier, the divergence between, say, ecocentric environmental philosophy and anthropocentric environmental philosophy is not so vast in terms of the policies they recommend. In fact, as John Barry argues, 'reformed naturalistic humanism' is capable of supporting a stewardship ethics just as well (J. Barry 1999 : ch. 3). **But** my point is that **saving the environment is not just a matter of theory: it is an urgent political mission.** In a democratic system, however, one cannot expect policies to be decided without giving any thought to how these policies should be explained to the public, and thereby gain legitimacy. In other words, the rationale of a policy is an increasingly important, if not inseparable, part of the policy; in particular, the openness and transparency of the democratic regime makes the rationale a crucial aspect of the policy. A policy whose rationale is not open to the public, or one that is believed to be arrived at through a process not open to the public, is considered a-democratic (cf. Ezrahi 1990). Consequently, a policy's legitimacy is owed not only to its effectiveness, but also to the degree of moral persuasion and conviction it generates within the public arena. So, when constructing environmental policies in democratic regimes, there is a need for a theory that can be used not only by academics, but also by politicians and activists. Hence the first question in this book is, Why has the major part of environmental philosophy failed to penetrate environmental policy and serve as its rationale? The first part of this book, then, discusses this question and offers two explanations in response. These explanations are based on the premise that environmental ethics and political theory should be differentiated and well defined so that later on they may join hands, rather than that they should be united in a single theory. It is assumed that they answer two questions. Environmental ethics is about the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. Political theory with regard to the environment relates to the institutions needed to implement and support environmental policies. Thus, the failure to distinguish properly between environmental ethics and political theory underlies the failure of the major part of environmental philosophy to penetrate environmental policy and provide its rationale. In Chapter 1 it is claimed that in a way **environmental philosophers have moved too rapidly away from anthropocentrism—mainstream ethical discourses—towards biocentrism and ecocentrism.** 9 My argument is that **the public on the whole is not ready for this, and therefore many activists and potential supporters of the environmental movement become alienated from the philosophical discourse on the environment.** In addition, I suggest that the reason for the gap between on the one hand environmental philosophers and on the other activists and politicians is that environmental philosophers have applied the wrong approach to political philosophy. I claim that all moral reasoning involves a process of reflective equilibrium between intuitions and theory. I distinguish between 'private', 'contextual', and 'public' modes of reflective equilibrium, arguing that environmental philosophers use either the first or second mode of reasoning, whereas political philosophy requires the third: the public mode of reflective equilibrium. The latter differs from the other two models in that it weighs both the intuitions and the theories put forward by activists and the general public (and not just those of professional philosophers). The argument for this being so is that reasoning about the environment needs to include political and democratic philosophy. And yet, most of environmental philosophers' efforts so far have focused on such questions of meta-ethics as 'intrinsic value theories' and 'biocentrism'. Environmental philosophers have been pushed in this direction out of a genuine desire to seek out the 'good' and the truth, in an effort to ascertain the moral grounds for an environment-friendly attitude. I suggest that **environmental philosophers** should not limit themselves to discussing the moral grounds for attitudes, or to trying to reveal the good and the truth, although these are important and fascinating questions. At least some of them **should instead go beyond this and address the matter of the necessary institutions for implementing policies, and finally, and of no less importance, find a way to persuade others to act on behalf of the environment.** In other words, while there is a place for meta-ethics, it should not be the only approach to philosophizing about the environment; it should not replace political philosophy.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM

**Environmental philosophy must be oriented towards constructing policies.**

**De-Shalit, 2000.** Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. “The Environment: Between Theory and Practice,” p. 21-2, Avner Quesia.

One might still ask, What's wrong with claiming—philosophically—that animals have rights? Indeed, one can claim that animal rights arguments, perhaps philosophy in general, is first and foremost meant to have an impact on the elite—that is, other philosophers and maybe other scholars, intellectuals, and artists. Only later will the idea penetrate to the decision-makers, and later still to the general public. The public in general is important, but not that important, because it is not the public that has to be convinced, but the philosophers and decision-makers. I will therefore raise the question of how political philosophy, such as environmental philosophy, should be conducted. First, two clarifications are in order. I am not dismissing the claim that philosophy in general is an elite practice, one less about convincing people and more about finding the truth or even about constructing aesthetic theories about the world. This could be argued. Those who see philosophy in this way might regard political, or applied, philosophy as inferior branches of philosophy. Others might think that philosophy is only about changing the world, and that everything else is a waste of time, a petit bourgeois preoccupation. I cannot devote too much space to debate either of these positions. Suffice it to say that I tend to find that there is room and need—both scientific and social need—for both: there is a time for 'pure' philosophy, and there is a time for 'political' philosophy. There is a time—and a need—to search for the truth, to be engaged in debates for the sake of the debate, and there is a time to change the world. 11 However, what is important, I think, is to remember that environmental philosophy grew out of a desperate need to supply sound philosophical, normative arguments against the continuation of several policies that were causing damage to the environment, putting people's lives at serious risks, ignoring the well-being of future generations, and harming other species. In that sense, at least, the need for environmental philosophy was a need for political philosophy. Now some people distinguish between political, applied and practical philosophy. Some claim that environmental philosophy should be practical; others may call it 'pragmatism' (Light and Katz 1996). Practical philosophy is distinguished from applied philosophy with regard to the question of what comes first—the case or the theory. Political and applied philosophy usually start with the assumption that theories are there to be applied to cases; the theory is, so to speak, 'given'. The question is how to solve the case with the help of the theory. Practical philosophy begins with the case and seeks a proper theory to solve it. This distinction is sound. However, in this book I use the term 'political philosophy' to mean, in general, philosophy that is policy-oriented. I think that there is a strong need for a 'political' way of philosophizing about the environment, including humans relations with animals. Such philosophizing, while constructing the theory, will take into account two conditions: first, that the theory must relate to real life cases and, second, that the theory must relate to the existing deliberation about the case, hence to the actual arguments that have already been put forward.

**Abstract philosophy cannot save the environment—human-centered justifications can motivate people to support pragmatic protections.**

**Light, 02.** Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University. “Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy,” *Metaphilosophy* Andrew July 33.4, Ebsco.

Even with the ample development in the field of various theories designed to answer these questions, I believe that environmental ethics is, for the most part, not succeeding as an area of applied philosophy. For while the dominant goal of most work in the field, to find a philosophically sound basis for the direct moral consideration of nature, is commendable, it has tended to engender two unfortunate results: (1) debates about the value of nature as such have largely excluded discussion of the beneficial ways in which arguments for environmental protection can be based on human interests, and relatedly (2) the focus on somewhat abstract concepts of value theory has pushed environmental ethics away from discussion of which arguments morally motivate people to embrace more supportive environmental views. As a consequence, those agents of change who will effect efforts at environmental protection – namely, humans – have oddly been left out of discussions about the moral value of nature. As a result, environmental ethics has been less able to contribute to cross-disciplinary discussions with other environmental professionals (such as environmental sociologists or lawyers) on the resolution of environmental problems, especially those professionals who also have an interest in issues concerning human welfare in relation to the equal distribution of environmental goods. But can environmental philosophy afford to be quiescent about the public reception of ethical arguments over the value of nature? The original motivations for environmental philosophers to turn their philosophical insights to the environment belie such a position. Environmental philosophy evolved out of a concern about the state of the growing environmental crisis and a conviction that a philosophical contribution could be made to the resolution of this crisis. If environmental philosophers spend most of their time debating non-human-centered forms of value theory, they will arguably never be able to make such a contribution.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM

**Environmental pragmatism is the only way to prevent ecological catastrophe.**

**Light and Katz, 96.** Director of the Science, Technology and Society Program at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, teaches environmental philosophy, engineering ethics and the philosophy of technology, and a research fellow in the Environmental Health Program and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta. “Environmental Pragmatism,” p. 1-2, Andrew and Eric, Google Books.

The problematic situation of environmental ethics greatly troubles us, both as philosophers and as citizens. We are deeply concerned about the precarious state of the natural world, the environmental hazards that threaten humans, and the maintenance of long-term sustainable life on this planet. The environmental crisis that surrounds us is a fact of experience. It is thus imperative that environmental philosophy, as a discipline, address this crisis – its meaning, its causes and its possible resolution. Can philosophers contribute anything to an investigation of environmental problems? Do the traditions, history and skills of philosophical thought have any relevance to the development of environmental policy? We believe that the answer is yes. Despite the problematic (and, heretofore, ineffectual) status of environmental ethics as a practical discipline, the field has much to offer. But the fruits of this philosophical enterprise must be directed towards the practical resolution of environmental problems – environmental ethics cannot remain mired in long-running theoretical debates in an attempt to achieve philosophical certainty. As Mark Sagoff has written: [W]e have to get along with certainty; we have to solve practical, not theoretical, problems; and we must adjust the ends we pursue to the means available to accomplish them. Otherwise, method becomes an obstacle to morality, dogma the foe of deliberation, and the ideal society we aspire to in theory will become a formidable enemy of the good society we can achieve in fact. In short, environmental ethics must develop for itself a methodology of environmental pragmatism – fueled by a recognition that theoretical debates are problematic for the development of environmental policy. This collection is an attempt to bring together in one place the broad range of positions encompassed by calls for an environmental pragmatism. For us, environmental pragmatism is the open-ended inquiry into the specific real-life problems of humanity’s relationship with the environment. The new position ranges from arguments for an environmental philosophy informed by the legacy of classical American pragmatist philosophy, to the formulation of a new basis for the reassessment of our practice through a more general pragmatist methodology.

**Only a pragmatic approach can solve real world environmental problems.**

**Norton, 05.** Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Georgia Tech, Ivan Allen College School of Public Policy. “Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management,” p. 48-49, Google Books.

One of the defining features of the pragmatist outlook on things is taking a problem-oriented approach to intellectual as well as practical dilemmas. Historically, of course, philosophers have addressed questions of great abstraction and generality, believing that if one gets first principles right, solutions to particular problems will fall out as corollaries of the general principles. Many philosophers believe that they confront special problems with special tools and that philosophy occupies a special intellectual space, with a form of access to truth not associated with the empirical methods of the other sciences. Indeed, in Western philosophy there is a venerable tradition, traceable back at least as far as Plato, that philosophy has a rational method that will allow penetration beyond the veil of language and experience, apprehending reality itself. Pragmatists, by contrast, doubt that philosophy has, or needs, a method that is independent of experience. Pragmatists aspire to an ideal of a unified conception of inquiry in which philosophers are one kind of workers in a larger enterprise. Pragmatists seek a unified method of inquiry – a method that is self-correcting, based in experience, but also involving interpretation and theory-building. Philosophy, on this view, differs only in degree from other sciences, all of which have truth as their ideal; philosophy may occupy the more abstract end of the continuum of knowledge, but it is a continuum, with all knowledge and wisdom – including definitions – ultimately answering to experience. Pragmatists therefore reject “higher intuitions” and prefer to deal with specific problems whenever possible. What unifies inquiry, according to pragmatists, is a community’s shared focus on a real-world problem. Aside from creating a healthy urgency, a problem orientation can go a long way toward setting a context, clarifying what values and interests are at stake in any question, and shaping disagreements as testable hypotheses. So what exactly is the problem to which this book offers the beginnings of a solution? The central problem, as we saw in Chapter 1, is that there is a nearly complete breakdown in communication regarding environmental policy right at the crucial nexus where the particular sciences are integrated with social values and translated into public policy. This is where scientific data-gathering, model-building, and physical observations of scientists from many specialized disciplines – ecology, toxicology, economics, sociology, and so on – are brought together in the context of policy decisions. At this crucial point of unification, values are also brought into the process of policy study and formation, and this is precisely the locus – as we saw in our brief visit to the EPA building in Chapter 1 – of the deepest confusion and the most abysmal lack of adequate vocabulary for communicating about environmental problems, values, and goals.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM

**Environmental solutions must be sustainable—ignoring human needs means there will be an inevitable backlash that dismantles the alternative.**

**Farber, 99.** Daniel, Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota. Eco-Pragmatism, Pg. 12-3.

The ultimate challenge for environmental law is social sustainability. It will do little good to save the planet today, only to lose it tomorrow. Thus, we need an approach that not only embodies our firm commitment to the environment, but also recognizes competing goals and the need to keep up with changing scientific knowledge. Otherwise, we will have a regulatory structure that is too draconian for us to live with in the long run. Among the components of the global eco-system are the clever, idealistic, aggressive, acquisitive creatures known as homo sapiens. Environmental law must create a hospitable environment for them as well as for other organisms. Environmental law must be pluralistic and flexible if it is to endure. Eco-pragmatism is a rough and ready approach to environmental policy, perhaps lacking in elegance, but durable enough for hard wear. The need to make environmental law “sustainable” is a theme that runs through much of the book. It helps drive arguments on a wide range of topics. For instance, chapter 2 argues that we should reject the premise that economic interests are mere “preferences,” entitled to little or no consideration compared with environmental values. Underlying the argument, in part, is a concern about sustainability. Given the nature of human behavior in modern societies, it is unrealistic to expect environmental programs base on such an austere premise to endure long. In chapter 4, for similar reasons, I argue that we should be prepared to modify environmental regulations whenever their costs are grossly disproportionate to any possible benefits. Chapter 5 discusses the extent to which current generations can realistically be expected to make sacrifices on behalf of distant descendants, and among other topics, chapter 6 considers how we can prevent outmoded regulations from eroding the overall credibility of environmental law. In taking these positions, my goal is not to undermine environmental values, but to implement them in a way that we can expect to endure, as opposed to heroic efforts that are likely to fade after a few years. Environmental protection is a marathon, not a sprint.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM

**Radical alternatives prevent pragmatic reform and worsen environmental degradation.**

**Lewis, 94.** Martin, Lecturer in history and director of the International Relations program at Stanford. Green Delusions, p. 7, Google Books.

More frightening, and more immediate, is the specter of a few radicals actually opposing necessary environmental reforms. Such individuals conclude that “reform environmentalism” is “worse than useless because by correcting short-term symptoms it postpones the necessary reconstruction of the entire human relationship with the natural world” (Nash 1989:150). From here it is a short step to argue that reform would only forestall an ecological apocalypse – which some evidently believe is a necessary precondition for the construction of an environmentally benign social order. The insanity of pushing the planet even closer to destruction in order to save it in the future should be readily apparent. While such are the fantasies only of the most moonstruck extremists, even moderate radicals (if one may be permitted the oxymoron) espouse an ideology that would preclude the development of an ecologically sustainable economy. Most environmentalists, for instance, aver that a sustainable economy must be based on solar power. Yet the radicals’ agenda, calling for total decentralization, deurbanization, economic autarky, a ban on most forms of high technology, and the complete dismantling of capitalism, would not only prevent future improvements in solar power but would actually destroy the gains that have already been made. While most radical greens embrace “appropriate technologies” (just as anti-environmentalists denounce “pollution”), their program would, if enacted, undercut the foundations of all technological research and development. Appropriate technology, in fact, often turns out to mean little more than well-engineered medieval apparatuses: we may expect crude mechanical power from the wind, but certainly not electricity from the sun. Equally important, the systematic dismantling of large economic organizations in favor of small ones would likely result in a substantial increase in pollution, since few small-scale firms are able to devise, or afford, adequate pollution abatement equipment.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM

**National-level coordination is key to solve environmental problems.**

**Carter, 07.** Neil, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ University of York. "The Politics of the Environment," p. 59-60.

Another difficulty with decentralization is that many environmental problems are best dealt with at the national or international level. Global commons problems do not respect the political boundaries between existing nation states, let alone small bioregions. Problems such as climate change and ozone depletion require coordinated action across communities and nations, which implies international cooperation between centralized nation states (see Chapter 9). The green slogan 'Think global, act local' may therefore provide an inadequate strategy for dealing with problems of the global commons. Relying on local communities alone to protect the environment assumes that the local community has full knowledge about the causes, impact and solutions to a particular problem; even then, it makes sense only when the locals possess an appropriate social and ecological consciousness' (Eckersley 1992: 173).

**Local solutions backfire because they are too inwardly focused—only national level policies can create ecological sustainability.**

**Carter, 07.** Neil, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ University of York. "The Politics of the Environment," p. 59-60.

There are many reasons why this response is flawed. What if the communities are unwilling to act? Cooperation within a community may not result in a benevolent attitude towards the outside world. Small parochial communities often define themselves by reference to those outside, so they may be quite averse to considering wider questions, such as the possibility of environmental damage elsewhere. They may even try to free-ride on other communities by producing pollution that damages those living downstream or downwind. Hostility or indifference between communities may be accentuated by the existence of economic inequalities between them; perhaps a poor community might feel less cooperative towards a richer neighbour. It is not difficult to imagine a community being highly sensitive towards its own local environment but unconcerned by damage further afield. It may, therefore, require a central agency (the state?) to persuade localities to change their behaviour. Even if all communities were willing to act collectively to protect the environment, there would still be a role for a central agency to coordinate their actions. Yet, resolute in its rejection of such a central agency, the green anarchist model gives no adequate explanation of how the necessary coordination might take place (Goodin 1992; Martell 1994).

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: BACKLASH DA

**Radical environmental movements fuel counter-movements that destroy alternative solvency.**

**Lewis, 94.** Lecturer in history and director of the International Relations program at Stanford. Green Delusions, p. 6-7, Google Books, Martin.

The most direct way in which eco-extremists threaten the environment is simply by fueling the anti-environmental countermovement. When green radicals like Christopher Manes (1990) call for the total destruction of civilization, many begin to listen to the voices of reaction. Indeed, the mere linking of environmental initiatives to radical groups such as Earth First! often severely dampens what would otherwise be widespread public support (see Gabriel 1990:64). As radicalism depends within the environmental movement, the oppositional anti-ecological forces accordingly gain strength. The Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise, a think tank for the so-called wise use movement, has, for example, recently published a manifesto calling for such outrages as the opening of all national parks to mineral production, the logging of all old-growth forests, and the gutting of the endangered species act. This group's ideologues contend that certain environmental philosophies represent nothing less than mental illnesses, a theory anonymously propounded in the "intellectual ammunition department" of their Wise Use Memo (Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise 1990:2). Even more worrisome is the fact that a former high-ranking CIA agent is now spreading rumors that environmental scientists are presently attempting to concoct a virus that could destroy humankind (See "Tale of a Plot to Rid Earth of Humankind," San Francisco Examiner, April 14, 1991: A-2). My fear is that if green extremism captures the environmental movement's upper hand, the public would be much less likely to recognize such a claim as paranoid fantasy; while a handful of ecoradicals would be happy to destroy humanity, such individuals also reject science and thus would never be able to act on such convictions.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: PERMUTATION

**The alternative fails—idealism cannot save the environment, only specific reforms.**

**Lewis, 94.** Martin, Lecturer in history and director of the International Relations program at Stanford. Green Delusions, p. 12-3, Google Books.

It is certainly not my belief that ideas are insignificant or that attempting to change others' opinions is a futile endeavor. If that were true I would hardly feel compelled to write a polemic work of this kind. But I am also convinced that changing ideals alone is insufficient. Widespread ideological conversion, even if it were to occur, would hardly be adequate for genuine social transformation. Specific policies must still be formulated, and specific political plans must be devised if those policies are ever to be realized. Many of the more sophisticated eco-radicals would agree with this notion. But even the political moves advocated by the more savvy among them remain committed to a radicalism that the great majority of the American public finds unpalatable. Radical green strategists may call for alliances with new social movements or with radical political parties, but even a concerted coalition of the disaffected would be unable to approach the critical mass needed to gain effective power. And several radical thinkers have proposed that much narrower constituencies form potentially eco-revolutionary groups that might lead society as a whole to its necessary transformation. According to one theory, only the unemployed can seek real change, rather than just a redistribution of spoils, because only they do not participate in the wicked system (Dobson 1990:163). Although this represents a fringe view, the general process of seeking ever more radical foundations for social reinvention leads ecoextremists to reduce their own potential bases for political power to ever more minuscule, and powerless, groups. At the same time most green extremists overtly denounce more moderate environmentalists who are willing to seek compromises with individuals or groups of opposing political philosophies. Since compromise, in one form or another, is necessary for any kind of effective political action, the quest for purity will in the end only undercut the prospects for change. Even moderate environmentalists often adopt an unnecessarily exclusive political strategy. Robert Paehlke, whose Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics stands as a monument to reason within the field, insists on attaching the movement firmly to the traditional left, urging environmentalists to appeal primarily to "industrial workers, public servants, and those employed in health, education, and the arts" (1989: 276, 263). Since in the United States this traditional liberal constituency by itself has no immediate chance of gaining national power, such a tactic would again only diminish the prospects for much needed reform. At the same time, the pernicious fear of compromise seriously diminishes the possibility of creating a broader coalition for environmental action. Barry Commoner, for example, warns environmentalists that if they compromise with corporations they may become "hostages" and eventually even assume "the ideology of [their] captors" (1990: 177). The end result of this kind of thinking – to which we are painfully close in the United States – is an ideological stalemate in which opposed camps are increasingly unable even to communicate. In such a political environment, the creation of an ecologically sustainable society becomes little more than an impossible dream.

**Permutation solves best—even if our claims should be critically examined, they should still be used as the starting point for philosophy.**

**De-Shalit, 2000.** Avener, Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. "The Environment: Between Theory and Practice," p. 29-30, Questia.

A theory in political philosophy should lack 'external tensions': it should relate to real cases and should be relevant to real life. To do this, it should also arise from the cases in question. The best way to achieve this would be to start with the activists and their dilemmas. Hence an environmental philosophy theory should derive from extended sources, i.e. not only from the laid-back philosopher or anthropological explorer, but from the general public as well. It is therefore a theory that reflects the actual philosophical needs of the activist seeking to convince by appealing to practical issues, and not necessarily the philosophical needs of the philosopher, who convinces others by appealing to consistency and simplicity (despite the fact that the more coherent, consistent, etc., the environmental theory is, besides being relevant, the better it is). Naturally, the philosopher should not take the value of the activists' claims for granted; their intuitions, arguments, claims, and theories should also be scrutinized. 16 However, the fact that they need to be critically examined does not affect the main point: that the activists' intuitions, claims, and theories ought to be the starting point for a philosophy aimed at policy change.



## AT ENVIRONMENT KS: PERMUTATION

**Broad coalitions key—refusal by radicals to compromise, the alternative cannot create environmental sustainability.** Lewis, 94. Martin, Lecturer in history and director of the International Relations program at Stanford. Green Delusions, p. 22-3, Google Books.

If we are to preserve the earth, environmentalists must forge the broadest possible coalition. Major changes need to be made in public policy, changes that will require massive public support. That support can only be obtained by appealing to a centrist coalition. Yet at present, the large center ground of American voters, those who find merit in appeals both to economic efficiency and to social justice and environmental protection, is largely without an articulated platform. Party stalwarts, let alone radicals, often regard moderates with contempt, viewing them as ideological weaklings unwilling to take a stand. I would argue the opposite. If we are to take seriously the task of devising a sustainable future, it is essential to admit that worthwhile ideas may be found on both sides of this overdrawn political divide. As E. J. Dionne (1991:27) so brilliantly argues, what is necessary is the creation of a new political center that avoids “bland centrism” and instead seeks to build a genuine “coalition for social reform.” Since critical theorists rightly point out that all writing is informed by a political perspective, it is desirable to specify precisely the political stance from which this work is composed. In simplest terms, I would identify myself as a liberal moderate. The modifier “liberal” is apposite because the great majority of the positions taken here, both explicitly and implicitly, would be commonly classified as left of center. Moreover, I fully concur with David Barash (1992) that the fundamental need is to humanize capitalism, a project that defines as the core of contemporary liberalism. But the essential term remains “moderate” because of my insistence that dialogue and negotiation must be carried out across the central divide of American ideology. In order to build an adequately broad environmental consensus, we should endeavor to make that divide as permeable to ideas as we possibly can. It is especially important that environmentalists work with the leaders of the largest corporations. Without corporate consent, a far-reaching environmental reform program will prove chimerical. As will be discussed in chapter four, some companies have already made significant environmental groups, a process that has great potential if it is not undermined by eco-extremists. To be sure, contemporary American leftist radicalism, in all of its varied forms, exerts strong intellectual claims. Many of the thinkers with whom I contend have come to a profound understanding of specific problems and processes. Similarly, the visions they hold for a more just future are rich and important. These thinkers must be taken seriously, and I would not impugn the sincerity of their beliefs and actions. But one must take equal care to avoid confusing moral outrage and sophisticated dialectics with a legitimate claim to political power or with a desirable (let alone possible) vision for humanity’s future.

**Radical ecology alienates the public—only compromise allows us to prevent environmental catastrophe.** Lewis, 94. Martin, Lecturer in history and director of the International Relations program at Stanford. Green Delusions, p. 250-1, Google Books.

The best hope I see is through a new alliance of moderates from both the left and the right – a coalition in which moderate conservatives continue to insist on efficiency and prudence, and where liberals forward an agenda aimed at social progress and environmental protection, but in which both contingents are willing to compromise in the interests of a common nation and, ultimately, a common humanity. The environmental reforms necessary to ensure planetary survival will require the forging of such a broad-ranging political consensus. By thwarting its development, eco-radicalism undermines our best chance of salvaging the earth – offering instead only the peace of mind that comes from knowing that one’s own ideology is ecologically and politically pure. It is time for the environmental movement to recognize such thinking for the fantasy that it is. We must first relinquish our hopes for utopia if we really wish to save the earth. Promethean environmentalism is not simply a watered down, compromised form of the radical doctrine. Although its concrete proposals and its philosophical positions are consistently at odds with those of ecoradicalism (see the appendix), its ultimate purpose is in fact the same: to return the surface of the earth to life, to life in all its abundance, diversity, and evolutionary potential. Prometheans maintain, however, that for the foreseeable future we must actively manage the planet to ensure the survival of as much biological diversity as possible. No less is necessary if we are to begin atoning for our very real environmental sins – for our fall from grace that began at the end of the Pleistocene epoch. Eco-radicalism tells us that we must dismantle our technological and economic system, and ultimately our entire civilization. Once we do so, the rifts between humanity and nature will purportedly heal automatically. I disagree. What I believe we must do is disengage humanity from nature by cleaving to, but carefully guiding, the path of technological progress. It is for the environmental community to decide which alternative offers the best hope for ecological salvation.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: PERMUTATION

Theoretical questions can be discussed but they cannot *replace* pragmatism political theory about the environment—the combination is best.

**De-Shalit, 2000.** Avner, Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. “The Environment: Between Theory and Practice,” p. 36, Questia.

Before continuing, I would like point out a possible challenge to my argument so far. I have claimed that environmental philosophers should decide how to persuade the public of the need for environmental policies. It could, however, be argued that many of these philosophers are convinced that animals have rights, or that there is intrinsic value in nature (I discuss this idea in depth in the next chapter), and they may feel they have to discuss this, as a mission. They don't want to give up persuading people about animal rights or intrinsic value, and they don't want to 'sell out' just in order to persuade. It seems (the argument would continue) that I might expect these philosophers to suppress their ideas and feelings. However, philosophers should be loyal to their ideas and thoughts as well: they should be authentic; their role is not merely to persuade for the sake of forming a majority of well-informed citizens. I need of course to emphasize that this is not what I expect philosophers to do. Indeed, I think that a place does exist for environmental ethics and meta-ethics and that there is also a time to discuss issues bearing no relation to policies. However, environmental philosophers cannot escape the need to engage in real-life public deliberation because what they discuss is not wholly 'academic'.<sup>18</sup> The issues at stake are crucial both to human beings and their welfare, and to ecosystems and the state of the environment. The ecological crisis is not a question that can be discussed in tranquillity, and one cannot experiment with thinking about it for too long. There is a strong and urgent need for some thoughts and theories that are oriented towards institutions and policies. So, while accepting that environmental ethics and meta-ethics reflect sincere and authentic concerns, and that these concerns should be voiced, as an important part of this debate, I would stress that these cannot replace political theory concerning the environment. Such theory is vital for obvious reasons.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: PERMUTATION

**Total rejection of anthropocentrism fails—understanding humans as part of the environment allows environmental protection.**

**Grey, 93.** William, Reader in Philosophy at the University of Queensland. “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 71.4, pages 463-475, <http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html>.

There is an obvious tension which arises when attempting to rectify the first two worries at the same time. For extolling the virtues of the natural, while at the same time vilifying the man-made or artificial, depends on a distinction between the natural and the artificial which the stress on a continuity between human and nonhuman (the focus of the second worry) undermines. On the one side there is emphasis on continuity and dependency, and on the other on distinctness and separation. It seems that, while we are a part of nature, our actions are nevertheless unnatural. This is one of the points where deep ecologists often risk lapsing into an incoherence, from which they are able to save themselves (as I will illustrate) with the help of a little covert anthropocentrism. Or putting the point another way, a suitably enriched (non-atomistic) conception of humans as an integral part of larger systems—that is, correcting the misconception of humanity as distinct and separate from the natural world—means that anthropocentric concern for our own well-being naturally flows on to concern for the nonhuman world. If we value ourselves and our projects, and part of us is constituted by the natural world, then these evaluations will be transmitted to the world. That we habitually assume characteristically anthropocentric perspectives and values is claimed by deep ecologists to be a defect. And as a corrective to this parochialism, we are invited to assume an "ecocentric" (Rolston 1986, Callicott 1989) or "biocentric" (Taylor 1986) perspective. I am not persuaded, however, that it is intelligible to abandon our anthropocentric perspective in favour of one which is more inclusive or expansive. We should certainly abandon a crude conception of human needs which equates them (roughly) with the sort of needs which are satisfied by extravagant resource use. But the problem with so-called "shallow" views lies not in their anthropocentrism, but rather with the fact that they are characteristically short-term, sectional, and self-regarding. A suitably enriched and enlightened anthropocentrism provides the wherewithal for a satisfactory ethic of obligation and concern for the nonhuman world. And a genuinely non-anthropocentric view delivers only confusion.

**AT ENVIRONMENT KS: PERMUTATION**

**Permutation solves best—understanding that nature has both intrinsic and instrumental value creates pragmatic conservation.**

**Minteer, 06.** Ben A., Assistant Professor in the Human Dimensions of Biology Faculty in the School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University. “The Landscape of Reform: Civic Pragmatism and Environmental Thought in America,” p. 3, Google Books.

Although I describe it more fully in the individual chapters, one of the noteworthy features of the third way tradition in environmental thought is its embrace of a pluralistic mode of environmental value and action that accommodates both the prudent use and the preservation of nature, rather than demanding that we must always choose between these commitments. It is a way of thinking, in other words, that accepts the interpenetrating character of intrinsic and instrumental values in experience, the basic continuity of means and ends in environmental thought and practice. As such, the third way tradition is a strand within environmentalism that cannot be accurately characterized as either narrowly anthropocentric or ecocentric. Rather, it incorporates critical elements of both sensibilities in a more holistic, balanced, and practical vision of human environmental experience. Furthermore, **this pragmatic strain in environmental thought views humans as thoroughly embedded in natural systems.** Yet this recognition does not lead to the conclusion that humans have carte blanche with respect to the natural world, or that there is no moral limit to the domination of human will over the landscape. Instead, the third way view supports a wider and more integrative perspective in which human ideals and interests (including economic interests, but also other nonmaterial social, cultural, and political values) are understood to be wrapped up in the natural and built environment, and are secured and promoted through deliberate and broad-based planning and conservation efforts. While respectful of wilderness geographies and values, this tradition nevertheless represents a retreat from pure preservationist forms of environmentalism to views that accommodate ecologically benign and adaptive forms of technological enterprise and sustainable community development on the landscape.

**Permutation solves best—pure anthropocentrism or ecocentrism alienates the public—only a pragmatic middle ground can get them on board**

**Minteer, 06.** Ben A. , Assistant Professor in the Human Dimensions of Biology Faculty in the School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University. “The Landscape of Reform: Civic Pragmatism and Environmental Thought in America,” p. 6-7, Google Books.

Perhaps the most salient feature of pragmatism is its instrumentalist character and the emphasis it places on the realm of practice (As opposed to the sphere of the ideal). Pragmatism is not a mirroring philosophy that seeks to reflect ideas said to exist outside of human culture, nor does it claim to register an objective, preexperiential understanding of nature. It is rather an active constructive (or reconstructive) philosophy, one that arises from practical experience and takes shape as individuals – and communities – confront problems, learn about their (and others’) values and beliefs, and adjust and progressively improve their natural and built environments. To paraphrase Ian Hacking, pragmatism suggests less the image of the philosopher’s armchair than it does the craftsman’s workbench. Ideas, as well as values and moral principles, are not abstractions; they are tools for social experimentation with the goal of bettering the human condition and enhancing our cultural adaptation to the environment. Among other things, this emphasis on instrumental action and social practice suggests that new knowledge and novel values can emerge from reflective and well-planned human activity on the landscape. Indeed, such activities have the potential to expand human experience and generate cultural wisdom in a manner that can improve our ability to achieve valued social goals, as well as deepen our appreciation of our natural and built environments. Pragmatism is also known for its acceptance, if not hearty embrace, of the condition of pluralism; i.e., that individuals are differently situated and are shaped to a significant degree by dissimilar traditions and experiences. Any claim to a universal or singular “good” is thus illusory to most pragmatists. This commitment to pluralism (including both its metaphysical and ethical varieties) prompts in turn the acknowledgement of the fallibility of our beliefs and moral commitments. It requires an openness to revision and change as we come into contact with the views of others and accept that new evidence and further discussion may show our beliefs to be mistaken and our values to be ill-considered or to have unacceptable implications. In the environmental case, a growing body of social scientific research on public opinion has shown that citizens embrace a range of moral stances toward the environment, including both anthropocentric and ecocentric positions. In light of this evidence, the notion that we should be searching for a final and universal ethical principle (or even a small set of ultimate principles) to govern all of our problematic environmental situations seems misguided to pragmatists. Such a view not only sweeps aside real moral diversity, it also fails to acknowledge that values can and do change in the context of public debate and deliberation over environmental programs and policies.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: PERMUTATION

**Governmental action encourages private action—they aren't mutually exclusive.**

**Bowman, 92.** Margaret, Director, Environmental Program for Central and Eastern Europe. "The Role of the Citizen in Environmental Enforcement," Environmental Law Institute, <http://www.inece.org/2ndvol1/roberts.htm>.

The dynamic between citizens and the government agencies officially charged with enforcing environmental laws adds to the potential effect of citizen participation in this area. In the context of environmental enforcement, citizens and government are presumed to share a goal -- that of maximizing compliance for the good of all. This presumption of a common interest is reflected in the dual meaning of the adjective "public," when used in conjunction with the operation of a democratic system of government. In this context, "public" refers both to the citizenry at large -- which engages in "public participation" -- and to the government -- which formulates and implements "public policy." Citizens, on the other hand, often suspect government agencies of not properly fulfilling their enforcement responsibilities. Citizens may view government employees as overly susceptible to the influence of the business interests they regulate. (4) Or they may attribute government inaction to bureaucratic inertia. Either way, agency enforcers often are seen as overlooking or impeding environmental protection goals. (5) This tension between government and citizens can result in improved environmental enforcement. The government's desire to prevent citizen action it views as disruptive can encourage agencies to take their own regulatory or enforcement steps. The public's suspicion that government may not vigorously implement certain laws may prompt the legislature to grant citizens a statutory right to bring a lawsuit to require the government to perform its assigned regulatory duties. And in instances when the government insists on inaction, citizen participation can replace government enforcement. Not only may compliance be achieved, but the government can be forced to account publicly for its own inaction. (6)

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: PERMUTATION—DISCOURSE

**The permutation solves best—it creates a shared discourse that allows philosophers to influence policy.**

**Norton, 05.** Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Georgia Tech, Ivan Allen College School of Public Policy. “Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management,” p. 50, Google Books, Bryan G..

Speaking generally, the problem featured in this book is the lack of common language or shared discourse in which scientists and the public can discuss environmental problems, environmental goals, and possible environmental actions. Still speaking generally, our current language is inadequate because – as noted in the preface – it leads to the polarization over environmental values and to ideological environmentalism. Speaking generally, however, is just that; a pragmatist is committed to looking at real cases. Speaking more specifically, lack of effective communication pervades and corrupts most contexts in which human communities are struggling to live within their environmental limits. And yet **we cannot solve this problem on the most general scale until we have some idea of its manifestations at local levels and in real policy contexts.** We must survey a number of specific environmental problems, looking for general features from our survey. To get the cards on the table, however, let me state at the outset a general hypothesis: at all levels of society, and in all kinds of places across our country, there are failures of communication in discussions of environmental problems. These failures are most basically due to the lack of an adequate language for integrating environmental science and environmental values, and as a result little true communication occurs in the process of formulating and discussing environmental policies. To be more specific, I will argue that in public policy debate regarding environmental choices, we lack a crucial type of term that can (1) encapsulate a great deal of information and (2) present this information in such a way that the its importance for widely held social values is transparent.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: "BACK TO THE EARTH" BAD—ENVIRONMENT

**The world of the alternative would be comparatively worse—returning to nature would put too much pressure on the environment, hastening extinction.**

**Lewis, 94.** Martin Lecturer in history and director of the International Relations program at Stanford. *Green Delusions*, p. 8, Google Books.

Finally, the radical green movement threatens nature by advocating a return to the land, seeking to immerse the human community even more fully within the intricate webs of the natural world. Given the present human population, this is hardly possible, and even if it were to occur it would result only in accelerated destruction. Ecological philosophers may argue that we could follow the paths of the primal peoples who live in intrinsic harmony with nature, but they are mistaken. Tribal groups usually do live lightly on the earth, but often only because their population densities are low. To return to preindustrial "harmony" would necessarily entail much more than merely decimating the human population. Yet unless our numbers could be reduced to a small fraction of present levels, any return to nature would be an environmental catastrophe. The more the human presence is placed directly on the land and the more immediately it is provisioned from nature, the fewer resources will be available for non-human species. If all Americans were to flee from metropolitan areas, rural populations would soar and wildlife habitat would necessarily diminish. An instructive example of the deadly implications of returning to nature may be found when one considers the issue of fuel. Although more common in the 1970s than the 1990s, "split wood not atoms" is still one of the green radicals' favored credos. To hold such a view one must remain oblivious to the clearly devastating consequences of wood burning, including suffocating winter air pollution in the enclosed basins of the American West, widespread indoor carbon monoxide poisoning, and the ongoing destruction of the oak woodlands and savannahs of California. If we were all to split wood, the United States would be a deforested, soot-choked wasteland within a few decades. To be sure, the pollution threat of wood stoves can be mitigated by the use of catalytic converters, but note that these are technologically sophisticated devices developed by capitalist firms. If the most extreme version of the radical green agenda were to be fully enacted without a truly massive human die-off first, forests would be stripped clean of wood and all large animals would be hunted to extinction by hordes of neo-primitives desperate for food and warmth. If, on the other hand, eco-extremeists were to succeed only in paralyzing the economy's capacity for further research, development, and expansion, our future could turn out to be reminiscent of the environmental nightmare of Poland in the 1980s, with a stagnant economy continuing to rely on outmoded, pollution-belching industries. A throttled steady-state economy would simply lack the resources necessary to create an environmentally benign technological base for a populace that shows every sign of continuing to demand electricity, hot water, and other conveniences. Eastern Europe shows well the environmental devastation that occurs when economic growth stalls out in an already industrialized society.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: AT: ROLE OF BALLOT IS INTELLECTUAL

**Abstract intellectualism is useless—environmental philosophers should orient themselves towards problem solving. De-Shalit, 2000.** Professor of Political Theory at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Associate Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Environment, Ethics, and Society, Mansfield College, Oxford University. “The Environment: Between Theory and Practice,” p. 20, Avner, Questia.

So animal rights philosophers have been missing the chance to find a way to many people's hearts. But why is this so crucial? I think it is crucial because it is the wrong way of practising political philosophy. To see why, let us recall a classical book by Max Weber (1968). In Politics als Beruf, Weber presented an important distinction between two approaches to moral reasoning. One is the 'ethics of conviction', which often follows deontology, or a set of rules of conduct; the other is the ethics of responsibility, according to which it would be irresponsible to act according to one's principles alone: rather, one should also consider what others will do as a result of one's actions. It seems to me that political philosophy has this approach in mind. **Political philosophy should orient itself towards real-life problems, including the problem of public good and collective action, where people tend to react in certain undesirable ways to what others do.** In such cases there must be a way of taking into account the effect that my actions have (we include here both what I claim to be doing and the reasons I give for doing it) on others' behaviour and actions. Political reasoning would then have two stages: first, a discussion of principles, but second, a consideration of their actual application and their effect on others' behaviour. However, many environmental philosophers, while ascribing rights to animals, ignore the way others may react. I believe that many people who might have been persuaded of the importance of treating animals fairly (using the argument of what cruelty can do to the human soul) will regard the notion of animal rights as so obscure or absurd that they dismiss as mad philosophers who suggest this idea, and scorn all such claims as nonsense.



**AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ANTHROPOCENTRISM GOOD—SOLVES ENVIRONMENT**

**Rejection of anthropocentrism undermines pragmatic attempts at environmental protection.**

Andrew **Light**, July 2002. Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University. "Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy," *Metaphilosophy* 33.4, Ebsco.

With this variety of views in the field, how should environmental ethics proceed? One answer would be that it will simply proceed, whether it should or not, as a new set of debates between the more traditional non anthropocentric views and the biocentric, anthropocentric, or other alternative views briefly mentioned at the end of the previous section. Many anthropocentric environmental ethicists seem determined to do just that (see Norton 1995 and Callicott 1996). There is, however, an alternative: in addition to continuing the tradition of most environmental ethics as philosophical sparring among philosophers, we could turn our attention to the question of how the work of environmental ethicists could be made more useful in taking on the environmental problems to which environmental ethics is addressed as those problems are undertaken in policy terms. The problems with contemporary environmental ethics are arguably more practical than philosophical, or at least their resolution in more practical terms is more important than their resolution in philosophical terms at the present time. For even though there are several dissenters from the dominant traditions in environmental ethics, the more important consideration is the fact that the world of natural-resource management (in which environmental ethicists should hope to have some influence, in the same way that medical ethicists have worked for influence over the medical professions) takes a predominantly anthropocentric approach to assessing natural value, as do most other humans (more on this point in the next section). Environmental ethics appears more concerned with overcoming human interests than redirecting them toward environmental concerns. As a consequence, a nonanthropocentric form of ethics has limited appeal to such an audience, even if it were true that this literature provides the best reasons for why nature has value (de-Shalit 2000).<sup>9</sup> And **not to appeal to such an audience arguably means that we are not having an effect either on the formation of better environmental policies or on the project of engendering public support for them.** As such, I would argue, environmental ethics is not living up to its promise as a field of philosophy attempting to help resolve environmental problems. It is instead evolving mostly as a field of intramural philosophical debate. To demonstrate better how the dominant framework of environmental ethics is hindering our ability to help address environmental problems, let us examine a more specific case where the narrow rejection of anthropocentrism has hindered a more effective philosophical contribution to debates in environmental policy.

**AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ANTHROPOCENTRISM GOOD—SOLVES ENVIRONMENT**

**The environmental community functions in an anthropocentric framework—accepting this is critical for philosophers to make real contributions to environmental policy.**

**Light, 02.** Andrew, July, Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University. “Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy,” *Metaphilosophy* 33.4, Ebsco.

In addition to the reasons offered above, there are at least two practical reasons for reconsidering the rejection of anthropocentrism to consider as well. First, consider that the focus in environmental ethics on the search for a description of the nonanthropocentric value of nature also separates it from other forms of environmental inquiry. Most other environmental professionals look at environmental problems in a human context rather than try to define an abstract sense of natural value outside the human appreciation of interaction with nature. Fields like environmental sociology and environmental health, for example, are concerned not with the environment per se but with the environment as the location of human community. This is not to say that these fields reduce the value of nature to a crude resource instrumentalism. It is to say instead that they realize that a discussion of nature outside the human context impedes our ability to discuss ways in which anthropogenic impacts on nature can be understood and ameliorated. If environmental philosophers continue to pursue their work only as a contribution to value theory, they cut themselves off from the rest of the environmental community, which seeks to provide practical solutions to environmental problems, solutions that it is almost trite these days to suggest must be interdisciplinary. One may fairly wonder how environmental philosophers can make a contribution to something other than value theory. After all, what else are they trained to do as philosophers? My claim is that if philosophers could help to articulate moral reasons for environmental policies in a way that is translatable to the general anthropocentric intuitions of the public, they will have made a contribution to the resolution of environmental problems commensurate with their talents. But making such a contribution may require doing environmental philosophy in some different ways. At a minimum it requires a more public philosophy, as the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey envisioned, though one more focused on making the kind of arguments that resonate with the moral intuitions that most people carry around with them on an everyday basis.

**The public functions in anthropocentric framework—they prevent the alternative from gaining necessary public support.**

**Light, 02.** Andrew, July, Associate professor of philosophy and environmental policy, and director of the Center for Global Ethics at George Mason University. “Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy,” *Metaphilosophy* 33.4, Ebsco.

It is the empirically demonstrable prevalence of anthropocentric views on environmental issues that is the second practical reason for reconsidering the wholesale rejection of anthropocentrism. In a survey by Ben Minter and Robert Manning about the sources of positive attitudes toward environmental protection in Vermont, respondents overwhelmingly indicated that the reason they most thought the environment should be protected is that they think we have positive obligations to protect nature for future human generations (Minter and Manning 1999). More exhaustive surveys of American attitudes toward environmental protection have also found such results. In the preparatory work for their landmark study of environmental attitudes in the United States, Willett Kempton and his colleagues found that obligations to future generations was so powerfully intuitive a reason for most people to favor environmental protection that they would volunteer this view before they were asked. In a series of interviews that helped determine the focus of their questions for the survey, the authors remarked: We found that our informants’ descendants loom large in their thinking about environmental issues. Although our initial set of questions never asked about children, seventeen of the twenty lay informants themselves brought up children or future generations as a justification for environmental protection. Such a high proportion of respondents mentioning the same topic is unusual in answering an open-ended question. In fact, concern for the future of children and descendants emerged as one of the strongest values in the interviews. (Kempton et al. 1997, 95) The larger survey conducted by Kempton, which included questions about obligations to the future, confirmed these findings. Therefore, a public environmental philosophy that took as one of its tasks the translation of the converged ends of environmental ethicists to arguments that would morally motivate humans would have to take seriously the prospects of making these arguments in terms of obligations to future generations. We are empirically more likely to motivate humans to protect some part of nature if they consider it part of their generalizable obligations to the future. Other anthropocentric claims will no doubt also be warranted as targets for this translation exercise, but this one will be certain.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ANTHROPOCENTRISM GOOD—SOLVES ENVIRONMENT

**Human-centered ethics necessitate protecting the environment—change is possible without adopting a bio-centrism. Hwang, 03.** Kyung-sig, Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University. “Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism,” Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, <http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm>.

The third view, which will be defended here, is that there is no need for a specifically ecological ethic to explain our obligations toward nature, that our moral rights and duties can satisfactorily be explained in terms of traditional, human-centered ethical theory.[4] In terms of this view, ecology bears on ethics and morality in that it brings out the far-reaching, extremely important effects of man's actions, that much that seemed simply to happen—extinction of species, depletion of resources, pollution, over rapid growth of population, undesirable, harmful, dangerous, and damaging uses of technology and science - is due to human actions that are controllable, preventable, by men and hence such that men can be held accountable for what occurs. Ecology brings out that, often acting from the best motives, however, simply from short-sighted self-interest without regard for others living today and for those yet to be born, brings about very damaging and often irreversible changes in the environment, changes such as the extinction of plant and animal species, destruction of wilderness and valuable natural phenomena such as forests, lakes, rivers, seas. Many reproduce at a rate with which their environment cannot cope, so that damage is done, to and at the same time, those who are born are ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-sheltered, ill-educated. Moralists concerned with the environment have pressed the need for a basic rethinking of the nature of our moral obligations in the light of the knowledge provided by ecology on the basis of personal, social, and species prudence, as well as on general moral grounds in terms of hitherto unrecognized and neglected duties in respect of other people, people now living and persons yet to be born, those of the third world, and those of future generation, and also in respect of preservation of natural species, wilderness, and valuable natural phenomena. Hence we find ecological moralists who adopt this third approach, writing to the effect that concern for our duties entail concern for our environment and the ecosystems it contains. Environmental ethics is concerned with the moral relation that holds between humans and the natural world, the ethical principles governing those relations determine our duties, obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the earth's natural environment and all the animals and plants inhabit it. A human-centered theory of environmental ethics holds that our moral duties with respect to the natural world are all ultimately derived from the duties we owe to one another as human beings. It is because we should respect the human rights, or should protect and promote the well being of humans, that we must place certain constraints on our treatment of the earth's environment and its non-human habitants.[5]

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ANTHROPOCENTRISM GOOD—SOLVES ENVIRONMENT

**Anthropocentrism is critical to protect the environment—it gets the public on board.**

**Watson, 07.** Professor at the Department of Psychology in the University of Iowa. "Conservative anthropocentrism provides the best basis and framework for an environmental ethic," David, [http://philosophy.cnu.edu/thesis\\_papers/DavidWatsonSpring07HTML.htm](http://philosophy.cnu.edu/thesis_papers/DavidWatsonSpring07HTML.htm).

Opponents of a conservative anthropocentric environmental ethic will object to the priority of human survival in an environmental ethic. Those who oppose any anthropocentric ethic would look to the concept of value to support their argument. They would claim that other members of the biosphere possess intrinsic value and that their value cannot be considered less than that of a human. Thus, other members of the biosphere cannot be sacrificed for the betterment of humanity. According to such arguments, the intrinsic value of these other members prohibits any anthropocentric environmental ethic. Emotionally the arguments of the non-anthropocentrists have great appeal. Philosophically justified, moral and ethical theorists often gravitate to non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. However, there are several problems with the concepts they assert. Non-anthropocentrists claim that other members of the biosphere have intrinsic value, and this prohibits any anthropocentric environmental ethic. Compelling examples along these lines are often cited to justify non-anthropocentrism. The 'slaughtering' of animals such as cows, deer, or chickens for human use is wrong because the chickens and cows possess as much value as humans. However, whether or not these arguments are valid and justified is not the only consideration necessary. The discussions of philosophers and intellectuals are not the end of environmental ethics. The people of Western societies, as consumers of vast amounts of resources, must realize the importance of the other members of the biosphere if this issue is to be addressed. Humans are part of nature, or the biosphere, as are all other living and non-living entities on the earth. Though humanity often seems separate and distinct from nature, humans emerged from the already thriving biosphere. This earth has been the only home to humanity. Without the earth and its parts, the necessary conditions for the existence and survival of humanity are lacking. Environmental anthropocentrism does not necessitate an adversarial relationship between humans and the rest of nature, contrary to popular opinion. In fact, humanity has a great interest in the welfare of the biosphere: There is very good reason for thinking ecologically, and for encouraging human beings to act in such a way as to preserve a rich and balanced planetary ecology: human survival depends on it. (Massanari 45) Environmental ethics need to embrace anthropocentrism and the insights of conservation ethics. Human self-interest, regardless of its moral status, is present in human nature and culturally around the world. However, this self-interest and the direct relation it should have with the welfare of the biotic community is often overlooked. Instead of continuing the debate of whether to champion all members of the biosphere or to promote the advancement of humanity, we need to embrace all members of the biosphere in order to promote the advancement of humanity. There are many different factors that allow for life on earth, particularly human life. The 'resources,' as they are often called, necessary for the survival of humanity are limited. If the finite resources necessary for human life are gone, then the existence of humanity will no longer be viable on Earth. The recent trend of human attitude toward and interaction with the environment is frighteningly shortsighted. Only a sector of the scientific community attempts to address the potential environmental problems facing humanity in the near and distant future. Those that do, however, often express what seems like helpless concern: A great change in our stewardship of the earth and the life on it, is required, if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to be irretrievably mutilated. ("Warning to Humanity" 783) Looking only as far as twenty-five to fifty years into the future of the environment is commonly considered long-term thinking. More than likely, this will only be an intermediate point in the environmental change humans have caused. The future viability of life on the planet is necessary for human survival, and humanity can yet have a say in this future. Humans came about among a preexisting world of living and non-living agents. We are just one of many species that have inhabited, or do inhabit the earth. These various species serve different functions in the biosphere and are interdependent upon one another for the survival of themselves and the biosphere.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ANTHROPOCENTRISM GOOD—EXTINCTION

**Anthropocentrism key to survival—understanding the importance of ecosystems to future generations solves environmental destruction but radical biocentrism causes extinction.**

**Hwang, 03.** Kyung-sig, Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University. "Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism," Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, <http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm>.

While our ability to affect the future is immense, our ability to foresee the results of our environmental interventions is not. I think that our moral responsibility grows with foresight. And yet, paradoxically in some cases grave moral responsibility is entailed by the fact of one's ignorance. If the planetary life-support system appears to be complex and mysterious, humble ignorance should indicate respect and restraint. However, as many life scientists have complained, these virtues have not been apparent in these generations. Instead they point out, we have boldly marched ahead, shredding delicate ecosystems and obliterating countless species, and with them the unique genetic codes that evolved through millions of years; we have altered the climate and even the chemistry of the atmosphere, and as a result of all this-what?[18] A few results are immediately to our benefit; more energy, more mineral resources, more cropland, convenient waste disposal. Indeed, these short-term payoffs motivated us to alter our natural environment. But by far the larger and more significant results, the permanent results, are unknown and perhaps unknowable. Nature, says poet, Nancy Newhall, "holds answers to more questions than we know how to ask." And we have scarcely bothered to ask.[19] Year and year, the natural habitants diminish and the species disappear, and thus our planetary ecosystem (our household) is forever impoverished. It is awareness of ecological crisis that has led to the now common claim that we need transvaluation of value, new values, a new ethic, and an ethic that is essentially and not simply contingently new and ecological. Closer inspection usually reveals that the writer who states this does not really mean to advance such a radical thesis, that all he is arguing for is the application of old, recognized, ethical values of the kind noted under the characterization of respect for persons, justice, honesty, promotion of good, where pleasure and happiness are seen as goods. Thus, although W. T. Blackstone writes; "we do not need the kind of transvaluation that Nietzsche wanted, but we do need that for which ecologists are calling, that is, basic changes in man's attitude toward nature and man's place in nature, toward population growth, toward the use of technology, and toward the production and distribution of goods and services." We need to develop what I call the ecological attitude. The transvaluation of values, which is needed, will require fundamental changes in the social, legal, political and economic institutions that embody our values. He concludes his article by explicitly noting that he does not really demand a new ethic, or a transvaluation of values. A human being is a hierarchical system and a component of super-individual, hierarchical system of sets. What is needed is not the denial of anthropocentrism, the placing of the highest value on humans and their ends and the conceiving of the rest of the nature as an instrument for those ends. Rather what is needed is the explicit recognition of these hierarchical systems and an ecological approach to science and the accumulation of scientific knowledge in which the myriad casual relationships between different hierarchical systems are recognized and put to the use of humanity. The freedom to use the environment must be restricted to rational and human use. If there is irrational use - pollution, overpopulation, crowding, a growth in poverty, and so on - people may wipe out hierarchies of life related to their own survival and to the quality of their own lives. This sort of anthropocentrism is essential even to human survival and a radical biotic egalitarianism would undermine conditions for that survival. [20] Rational anthropocentrism, one that recognizes the value of human life "transcends our individual life" and one in which we form a collective bond of identity with the future generations is essential is the process of human evolution.

**AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ANTHROPOCENTRISM GOOD—EXTINCTION**

**Anthropocentrism is critical to human survival but still forces environmental protection in order to preserve future generations.**

**Watson, 07.** David, Professor at the Department of Psychology in the University of Iowa. "Conservative anthropocentrism provides the best basis and framework for an environmental ethic,"

[http://philosophy.cnu.edu/thesis\\_papers/DavidWatsonSpring07HTML.htm](http://philosophy.cnu.edu/thesis_papers/DavidWatsonSpring07HTML.htm).

The most important consideration in an environmental ethic should be the survival of humanity. Survival is the most important function of humans instinctively and biologically. G.G. Simpson held this view and stated it concisely: ...even if he were the lowest animal, the anthropocentric point of view would still be manifestly the only one to adopt for consideration of his place in the scheme of things and when seeking a guide on which to base his actions and evaluations of them. (Norton 144) Science considers self-interest to be a driving force in nature. Simpson explains that humans can only evaluate their actions as they relate to themselves, and that anthropocentrism is natural. G.H. Murdy simplifies the concept by saying, "it is proper for men to be anthropocentric and for spiders to be arachnocentric" (Norton 144). All living things are physiologically constructed for survival and procreation. All issues related to environmental ethics cannot be discussed without consideration of humans. There is one common trait held by all living things, and that is reproduction. All living things have the ability to procreate. Scientists believe that individual survival is not the only goal of living things, but also the reproduction of their DNA. This importance placed on the future of the DNA is analogous to the importance of the future of humanity. As much as individuals function to ensure their survival, they also function to ensure the chances of survival of their species. Likewise, an environmental ethic should function to ensure survival in the present, as well as functioning to increase the chances for future survival and humanity's longevity. The theory of natural selection revolutionized biological discussions. This theory holds that the members of each species "must and should act to increase the survival chances of their species" (Norton 145). Similar to other species included in this theory, humans should act to increase the chances of the survival of their species. According to the laws of nature we should and must act to increase the chances of present human survival as well as the future of humanity. One of the main issues of environmental treatment is that of the earth's condition when inherited by future generations. Gillespie asserts: ...there is the ethical argument that the future is barely represented in most contemporary decision making. Yet, by the time future generations are living with the environmental problems that this generation has left them, this generation will have gone, having taken the benefits of such decisions, but leaving the costs behind. (Gillespie 111-112) Making decisions that are fair to future generations of humanity may require sacrifice. Such sacrifice might be significant, but would pale in comparison to the misery future generations may face on an exhausted and devastated earth. Though acting in the interests of the present may be easier, humanity as a whole should act to increase the chances for future humans. One of the most basic needs of future generations is to have a healthy biosphere in which to live, and this must be addressed before time runs out.

AT ENVIRONMENT KS: ANIMALS DON'T DESERVE RIGHTS

**Animals can't have rights—they aren't moral agents.**

**Feinberg, 74.** Joel, American political and social philosopher who taught at institutions including Brown University, UCLA, Princeton, retired as Regents Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Arizona. "The Rights of Animals and Future Generations," *Philosophy and Environmental Crisis*, <http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/feinberg01.htm>.

Even if we allow, as I think we must, that animals are the directly intended beneficiaries of legislation forbidding cruelty to animals, it does not follow directly that animals have legal rights; and Gray himself, for one, refused to draw this further inference. Animals cannot have rights, he thought, for the same reason they cannot have duties, namely, that they are not genuine "moral agents." Now, it is relatively easy to see why animals cannot have duties, and this matter is largely beyond controversy. Animals cannot be "reasoned with" or instructed in their responsibilities; they are inflexible and unadaptable to future contingencies; they are incapable of controlling instinctive impulses. Hence, they cannot enter into contractual agreements, or make promises; they cannot be trusted; and they cannot (except within very narrow limits and for purposes of conditioning) be blamed for what would be called "moral failures" in a human being. They are therefore incapable of being moral subjects, of acting rightly or wrongly in the moral senses, of having, discharging, or breaching duties and obligations. But what is there about the intellectual incompetence of animals (which admittedly disqualifies them for duties) that makes them logically unsuitable for rights? The most common reply to this question is that animals are incapable of claiming rights on their own. They cannot make motion, on their own, to courts to have their claims recognized or enforced; they cannot initiate, on their own, any kind of legal proceedings; nor are they capable of even understanding when their rights are being violated, or distinguishing harm from wrongful injury, and responding with indignation and an outraged sense of justice instead of mere anger or fear.

**\*\*EXTERNALIZATION\*\***



**AT EXTERNALIZATION: BOBERTZ CONCLUDES AFF**

**Bobertz concludes aff – their cards are taken out of context**

**Bobertz, 96** (Brad Bobertz, University of Nebraska College of Law. Correspondence with Robert McCown, Emory debater. "Limits of the 'Scapegoating' Thesis" 9-24-96. <http://www.cs.jhu.edu/~jonathan/debate/ceda-l/archive/CEDA-L-Sep-1996/msg00382.html>)

I'm writing to clarify some of the ideas in my article, "Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory," published in vol. 73, no. 4 of the Texas Law Review (Mar. 1995). I do NOT believe that all affirmative environmental regulation is suspect either because it diverts attention from the real problems or because it alleviates personal responsibility for these problems. Certainly some environmental laws have these effects (and I discuss some specific examples as well as the general "scapegoating" phenomenon in my article). But this does not mean that ALL environmental laws exhibit these tendencies. My thoughts about the efficacy of any environmental law depends on the nature of the problem in question and on the how law responds to that problem. Let me give you an example from the article. In Part V, I discuss the saga of the "evil spray can." In essence, research indicating that CFCs could destroy stratospheric ozone evolved into a simpler story in the mid to late 1970s: spray cans that used CFCs as propellants were bad for the environment, and EPA's 1978 ban on CFCs in aerosol products "solved" the problem by banishing these environmental wrongdoers from the scene. As I noted in the article, the problem with this story was that it was incomplete. The EPA ban, while a good thing, affected only one source of CFC emissions (ignoring refrigerators and car air conditioners, for example) and, because it applied only in the U.S., did not address the international dimensions of the problem. So I used EPA's 1978 ban on CFCs in spray cans, as well as reactions to this ban by the press and public, as examples of the "scapegoating" phenomenon in action. But this wasn't the end of the story. In 1987 the United States signed (and in 1988 ratified) an extraordinary treaty called the "Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer." The Montreal Protocol froze production and consumption of CFCs and other ozone depleters at 1986 levels, followed by a 50 percent reduction in CFC use by industrialized countries over a ten-year period. As scientists began to discover that ozone depletion posed an even more serious and immediate threat, the Protocol members met in London to consider measures to strengthen the accord. Ultimately, the parties agreed on a TOTAL elimination of CFC production and use by 2000. Separate reduction and phaseout schedules were established for halons and other ozone-depleting chemicals. Five months after the London agreement, the U.S. Congress enacted a number of additional measures to accelerate the elimination of ozone-depleting substances in Title VI of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The European Community accelerated their own CFC phaseout, shortening the deadline by three years to 1997. The United States EPA then announced it would beat the EC's new timetable by a year. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations, as well as industry, joined this remarkable race to speed up the ban on ozone depleters. Last December, when the Seventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol convened in Vienna, "the developed world was within weeks of halting all production of most ozone-depleting substances that the Protocol initially had only required be cut in half by the year 2000." Robert Percival, et al., "Environmental Regulation," p. 1284 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1996). (For other sources on the Montreal Protocol, see footnotes 140 to 149 of my article.) The Montreal Protocol and the unilateral and multilateral laws that followed it strike me as an enormous success story. Obviously, it would have been better if the Protocol had been signed ten years earlier, but all the evidence wasn't in yet. As it was, the Protocol faced and overcame many obstacles (which time prevents me from recounting in detail). Although EPA's 1978 ban, in my view, illustrates the "scapegoating" thesis, the Montreal Protocol just as strongly demonstrates that affirmative environmental measures can be effective, even in the cumbersome and unpredictable arena of international affairs. To sum up, I did not write my "scapegoating" article to advance the idea that ALL environmental laws are wrongheaded, wasteful, or counterproductive because they shift "blame" from the individual consumer (or from the "real" source of a problem) to some other target of regulation. I believed and continue to believe that many laws, environmental or otherwise, exhibit aspects of the scapegoating phenomenon that I wrote about. This does not mean, however, that all laws do so. As I said before, it all depends on the problem at hand and how the law responds to the problem. I wrote the article hoping to encourage BETTER lawmaking, not to suggest that the lawmaking enterprise itself is doomed by our tendencies to oversimplify difficult problems and to transfer blame to symbolic "scapegoats." Such a nihilistic and depressing viewpoint, I sincerely hope, is not supported by a full and fair reading of my article. If I'm wrong about this, then I accomplished exactly the opposite of what I intended. I realize that quotations from the article, removed from the context of the entire piece, can be used to support a variety of positions. I hope this note helps clarify what I actually intended the article to say.

**AT EXTERNALIZATION: GUILT INEVITABLE**

Environmental guilt is inevitable

**Bobertz 95** (Bradely C. Bobertz- assistant professor of law, University of Nebraska College of Law, Texas Law Review, "Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory," Lexis Nexis)

In addition, sixty percent of Americans identify themselves as "environmentalists," and another thirty percent lean in that direction. At various times, polls indicate that people rank environmental issues at or near the top of the list of problems facing the country. Yet conforming one's personal behavior to an espoused concern for environmental quality takes the kind of energy, time, and diligence that few people can consistently muster. Alternatives to this guilt-producing predicament hold little appeal. They include: cynically denying either that environmental problems exist or that personal action matters; engaging in various forms of Ludditism; or resigning oneself to some degree of personal hypocrisy. Environmental guilt -- endemic in some people, negligible or absent in others -- seems an inevitable consequence of enjoying the benefits of life in an industrialized nation that simultaneously has an insatiable appetite for crisis-driven environmental journalism.

**AT EXTERNALIZATION: ALT DOESN'T SOLVE**

**Calls to action don't spur reform – individuals will respond with passivity**

**Ryland**

**2000** (Elisabeth Ryland, December 2000, "Gaia Rising: A Jungian Look at Environmental Consciousness and Sustainable Organizations," <http://oae.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/13/4/381>)

In spite of worldwide popularity and well-reasoned calls to action, the environmental movement has failed to stem the rising tide of environmental destruction. Research reveals a widespread lack of sustainable activity, even among professed environmentalists. The 1990 Roper Organization survey revealed a clear disconnect between environmental attitudes and behavior, as well as an overwhelming sense of individual helplessness and loss of control. This large gap between attitude and behavior exists both in the United States and abroad (De Oliver, 1999; Dunlap& Mertig, 1992; Finger, 1994; Gardner & Stern, 1996; Hallin, 1995; Scott &Willits, 1994; Uusitalo, 1990;Widegren, 1998). In the presence of growing environmental dangers, people typically respond with passivity while being prey to anxiety, fear, pessimism, and helplessness.

AT EXTERNALIZATION: ALTERNATIVE FAILS—GUILT BAD

**Personal environmental guilt fosters inaction—only state action can provide a positive outlet for solving environmental problems.**

**Currier, 92.** 4/27/, Peter, Social worker. "Stepping away from 'green guilt' THE ENVIRONMENT" We can't escape individual responsibility for pollution but it's vital that, when faced with reams of bad news about carcinogens, ozone depletion and pesticides, we don't begin to feel that things are hopeless and just give up the fight," The Globe and Mail, Lexis.

TO live life without leaving a stain is becoming a daunting task. Fear for the Earth is epidemic, and many blame themselves for their part in turning a green world grey. For me, the most everyday things have taken on an ominous cast. I pluck a Kleenex and hear the hollow "chock" of an axe biting wood. The fridge goes on, and the sluicing of freon through cold steel guts blemishes the homey burble of perking coffee. Pounds of carbon sully the air with every gallon of gas my car burns. But I think it's the sky that affects me most - the haze that lies on the sunny side of all that blueness. Is that cloud, or the ashen pallor of a world in the grip of a tropical fever? Conservation seemed so easy years ago, or perhaps the world was a simpler place back then. "Don't Litter" signs. Smokey the Bear. The 22-inch bass that my dad made me throw back because it was four days out of season. The past was so quaint and simple, and we took the Earth so much for granted. Clean air, pure water and dump sites aplenty. In those days, pollution was an icky substance without a name, not a deadly process that involves us all. From the Black Death to the threat of nuclear annihilation, history has given ample cause for fear. But those threats seemed to come from the outside, caused by forces beyond our control. But with pollution, the "them" is "us." Car drivers. Plastic baggers. Disinfectors. Indeed, all those who manufacture, package, sell, buy or use things that damage the Earth. The greening of conscience is probably not new. When the cedars of Lebanon were hewn into ships' timbers, it's hard to imagine that no one mourned the loss. The cesspool that London once made of the Thames must have repelled many. But now? Technology has truly made the times change. Never has so much innocence been lost by so many. The terms are familiar to us all: ecology, the three R's, clear-cut, carcinogenic, mutagenic, phosphates, greenhouse effect, emission standards - the list will grow endless with time. And if green guilt - that pervasive feeling that we are personally responsible for trashing the Earth - is costing us peace of mind and dashed hopes now, then what of the future? I'm familiar enough with guilt to know that no relationship can sustain boundless doses of it. That includes our relationship with the Earth. Unless we offer Mother Nature more than palliative care, her stare will grow ever sterner and we will start to feel ever more oppressed – cynical and hopeless about this Earth we live with. Eventually, we may just give up. Healthy outlets for the need to conserve must be created or we, for whom to live is to pollute, will resign ourselves to self-destruction and abandon our efforts to save the Earth. We need to feel that we can confront the complications of today's litter with something better than a stick with a spike on the end. Otherwise, as the pollution count and ultraviolet index hammer home our failures, and as acid rain dampens our spirits and corrodes our confidence, the stress of living with ecological demands that we can't meet will become unendurable. Green guilt can be directed constructively. When my family visited my sister in Sechelt, B.C., in 1990, we found that processing refuse was mealtime routine. All that washing, label-stripping, composting and paper-sorting seemed like a bag lady's sordid obsession until we saw a week's garbage hit the curb in a single, well-used paper lunch bag. Later, when I drove a trunkful of recyclables to the Sechelt depot and saw all those bins with their different labels, I knew my sister wasn't alone in her eccentricity. The glass, paper and metal there was all headed back onto the shelves. And in-home processing had cut much of the collecting and sorting costs. There, even if recycling was driving the price of raw materials down, affordability wasn't the issue. Paper recycled meant a tree saved. So much for resource gluttony. So much for landfill. So much for green guilt. The recycling issue highlights a more general need to clarify the muddy waters of current ecology: How thin is the ozone layer? Are disposable diapers that bad? Is Styrofoam really worse than paper in fast-food packaging? Is cotton production an environmental hazard? How safe is tap water? There are excellent written references for many such questions, but in a mercurial environment, answers are complex and quickly dated. A credible and visible environmental coalition that addresses ecological issues clearly, objectively and authoritatively would ground green conscience and give direction to the increasing numbers of those who are possessed of it. The state can do more as well. More and better legislation on polluting emissions, packaging, resource management and recycling is called for. If bad news triggers green guilt, then we need to make good news. More initiatives like the one in Sechelt would allow the media more heartening reportage and give us effective in-home options for survival. Changing the image of green work so that it's sexier would help, too, despite the difficulties involved. The best cures for green guilt often get your hands dirty: sorting garbage, using cloths instead of paper towels, using reusable diapers, and so on. Compulsory courses in environmental studies should start in primary school and involve more field trips for students so they know first-hand what we have already lost and what we stand to lose. These things will prevent the legacy of our ecological sins from being visited not just upon our children's world, but upon their sense of self-worth, and their sense of hope.

**\*\*FEAR KS\*\***

**AT FEAR OF DEATH: MOBILIZES PEOPLE/COMPASSION**

**Fear spurs compassion, mobilizing people to protect each other and giving meaning to life.**

**Greenspan, 03** (Miriam Greenspan – Pioneer in the Area of Women’s Psychology – 2003 (“An Excerpt from Healing through the Dark Emotions: The Wisdom of Grief, Fear, and Despair by Miriam Greenspan,”

[www.spiritualityhealth.com/newsh/excerpts/bookreview/excp\\_5513.html](http://www.spiritualityhealth.com/newsh/excerpts/bookreview/excp_5513.html))

"Fear is a very powerful emotion. When you feel fear in your body, it's helpful to relate to it as an energy that can be mobilized for life. It may feel like a constriction in your chest, throat, or abdomen. Breathe through it without judgment and allow yourself to feel it as a very strong force. If you pray for help, you can begin to expand this energy we call 'fear' and use it for healing and transformation. "In this regard, we can take our model from the heroes of Flight 93 who, realizing that they were bound for death, stormed the plane and brought it down without hitting a civilian target. One cannot even imagine being able to do this without fear. Fear for the lives of others was the energy that mobilized them to do something meaningful with their last moments of life. Some of these people said good-bye to their husbands and wives and wished them happiness before they left this earth. They had found some peace in their last moments, peace in the midst of turbulence. And they found it through their last wish, which they heroically put into action: to help others live. "Perhaps there is nothing that can redeem the dead but our own actions for the good. This is a time to find out what we want to do for the world and do it. And, as every trauma survivor knows, this is the way to make meaning out of pain, perhaps the most effective way: to draw something good out of evil. The heroes of September 11 point us to the choice we each have: to help create a state of global peace and justice that we, like they, will not see before we die. It is in giving ourselves to this vision, out of love for this world that we inhabit together, that we stand a chance of transcending the human proclivity to damage life. And that we honor those we have brought into this world and who must inherit it. . . . "Our only protection is in our interconnectedness. This has always been the message of the dark emotions when they are experienced most deeply and widely. Grief is not just "my" grief; it is the grief of every motherless child, every witness to horror in the world. Despair is not just "my" despair; it is everyone's despair about life in the twentyfirst century. Fear is not just 'my' fear; it is everyone's fear — of anthrax, of nuclear war, of truck bombs, of airplane hijackings, of things falling apart, blowing up, sickening and dying. "If fear is only telling you to save your own skin, there's not much hope for us. But the fact is that in conscious fear, there is a potentially revolutionary power of compassion and connection that can be mobilized en masse. This is the power of fear. Our collective fear, which is intelligent, is telling us now: Find new ways to keep this global village safe. Find new forms of international cooperation that will root out evil in ways that don't create more victims and more evil. Leap out of the confines of national egos. Learn the ways of peace. Find a ceremony of safety so that not just you and I but all of us can live together without fear."

**AT FEAR OF DEATH: FEAR KEY TO VALUE TO LIFE**

**Fear of death is key to value to life – recognizing death is inevitable allows us to create a world of love.**


**Kelsang 99** (Geshe, internationally renowned teacher of Buddhism (, <http://www.tharpa.com/background/fear-of-death.htm>)

A healthy fear of death would be the fear of dying unprepared, as this is a fear we can do something about, a danger we can avert. If we have this realistic fear, this sense of danger, we are encouraged to prepare for a peaceful and successful death and are also inspired to make the most of our very precious human life instead of wasting it. This "sense of danger" inspires us to make preparations so that we are no longer in the danger we are in now, for example by practicing moral discipline, purifying our negative karma, and accumulating as much merit, or good karma, as possible. We put on a seat belt out of a sense of danger of the unseen dangers of traffic on the road, and that seat belt protects us from going through the windshield. We can do nothing about other traffic, but we can do something about whether or not we go through the windscreen if someone crashes into us. Similarly, we can do nothing about the fact of death, but we can seize control over how we prepare for death and how we die. Eventually, through Tantric spiritual practice, we can even attain a deathless body. In Living Meaningfully, Dying Joyfully, Geshe Kelsang says: Dying with regrets is not at all unusual. To avoid a sad and meaningless end to our life we need to remember continually that we too must die. Contemplating our own death will inspire us to use our life wisely by developing the inner refuge of spiritual realizations; otherwise we shall have no ability to protect ourself from the sufferings of death and what lies beyond. Moreover, when someone close to us is dying, such as a parent or friend, we shall be powerless to help them because we shall not know how; and we shall experience sadness and frustration at our inability to be of genuine help. Preparing for death is one of the kindest and wisest things we can do both for ourself and others. The fact of the matter is that this world is not our home. We are travelers, passing through. We came from our previous life, and in a few years, or a few days, we shall move on to our next life. We entered this world empty-handed and alone, and we shall leave empty-handed and alone. Everything we have accumulated in this life, including our very body, will be left behind. All that we can take with us from one life to the next are the imprints of the positive and negative actions we have created. If we ignore death we shall waste our life working for things that we shall only have to leave behind, creating many negative actions in the process, and having to travel on to our next life with nothing but a heavy burden of negative karma. On the other hand, if we base our life on a realistic awareness of our mortality, we shall regard our spiritual development as far more important than the attainments of this world, and we shall view our time in this world principally as an opportunity to cultivate positive minds such as patience, love, compassion, and wisdom. Motivated by these virtuous minds we shall perform many positive actions, thereby creating the cause for future happiness.

**AT FEAR OF DEATH: KEY TO SURVIVAL**

**Fear of Death is key to human survival – confronting death is key to state and individual existence.**

**Beres 96** (Louis Rene, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Feb.,

 [http://www.freeman.org/m\\_online/feb96/beresn.htm](http://www.freeman.org/m_online/feb96/beresn.htm)).

Fear of death, the ultimate source of anxiety, is essential to human survival. This is true not only for individuals, but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance. So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel suffers acutely from insufficient existential dread. Refusing to tremble before the growing prospect of collective disintegration - a foreseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war - this state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward collective survival. What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but absolute, Israel's blithe unawareness of its national mortality deprives its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. For states, just as for individuals, confronting death can give the most positive reality to life itself. In this respect, a cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a state chooses to block off such an awareness, a choice currently made by the State of Israel, it loses, possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxiety."

**Fear is key to value to life, survival and transcending evil.**

**Greenspan 03** (Miriam, Pioneer in the Area of Women's Psychology, Healing Through the Dark Emotions: The Wisdom of Grief, Fear, and Despair, Excerpt of Chapter Three - How Dark Emotions Become Toxic,

<http://www.miriamgreenspan.com/excerpts/chapterThreeEx.html>)

Grief, fear, and despair are primary human emotions. Without them, we would be less than human, and less likely to survive. Grief arises because we are not alone, and what connects us to others and to the world also breaks our hearts. Grieving our losses allows us to heal and renew our spirits. Fear alerts us to protect our survival, extending beyond our instinct for self-preservation to our concern for others. Despair asks us to find meaning in the midst of apparent chaos or meaninglessness. Making meaning out of suffering is the basis of the human capacity to survive evil and transcend it. The purposefulness of these dark emotions is evident when we can experience them mindfully, tolerate their intense energies, and let them be.



**AT FEAR OF DEATH: DETERENCE GOOD**

**Fear of nuclear weapons has prevented their use – deterrence has checked conflict.**

**Rajaraman 02** (Professor of Theoretical Physics at JNU, 2002 [R., “Ban battlefield nuclear weapons,” 4/22/2, *The Hindu*, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/04/22/stories/2002042200431000.htm>]

There were a variety of different reasons behind each of these examples of abstinence from using nuclear weapons. But one major common factor contributing to all of them has been an ingrained terror of nuclear devastation. The well documented images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the awesome photographs of giant mushroom clouds emerging from nuclear tests in the Pacific and the numerous movies based on nuclear Armageddon scenarios have all contributed to building up a deep rooted fear of nuclear weapons. This is not limited just to the abhorrence felt by anti-nuclear activists. It permeates to one extent or another the psyche of all but the most pathological of fanatics. It colours the calculations, even if not decisively, of the most hardened of military strategists. The unacceptability of nuclear devastation is the backbone of all deterrence strategies. There is not just a fear of being attacked oneself, but also a strong mental barrier against actually initiating nuclear attacks on enemy populations, no matter how much they may be contemplated in war games and strategies. As a result a taboo has tacitly evolved over the decades preventing nations, at least so far, from actually pressing the nuclear button even in the face of serious military crises.

**AT FEAR OF NUKES: FEAR KEY TO PEACE AND SURVIVAL**

**Fear of nuclear war is key to stopping WMD use and prevents military adventurism.**

**Futterman, 91** (JAH, Livermore lab researcher, 1995, Mediation of the Bomb, online, <http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke0>)

I could say that if I didn't do it, someone else would, but that answer was rejected at Nuremberg. (It's also a better reason to leave the weapons program than to stay.) I continue to support the u business with my effort for many reasons, which I discuss throughout this piece. But mostly, I do it because the fear of nuclear holocaust is the only authority my own country or any other has respected so far when it comes to nationalistic urges to make unlimited war. As William L. Shirer states in his preface to *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (Touchstone Books, New York, 1990), "Adolf Hitler is probably the last of the great adventurer-conquerors in the tradition of Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon, and the Third Reich the last of the empires which set out on the path taken earlier by France, Rome and Macedonia. The curtain was rung down on that phase of history, at least, by the sudden invention of the hydrogen bomb, of the ballistic missile, and of rockets which can be aimed to hit the moon." Now this contrasts with the argument of those who would "reinvent government" by putting up bureaucratic roadblocks to maintaining the reliability of the US nuclear arsenal through research and testing. They reason that if the reliability of everyone's nuclear arsenals declines, everyone will be less likely to try using them. The problem is that some "adventurer-conqueror" may arise and use everyone's doubt about their arsenals to risk massive conventional war instead. An expansionist dictatorship might even risk nuclear war with weapons that are simpler, cruder, less powerful, much riskier (in terms of the possibility of accidental detonation) but much more reliable than our own may eventually become without adequate "stockpile stewardship." [14] But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.

**AT FEAR OF NUKES: PEACE AND SURVIVAL**

**Fear motivates people to pursue constructive means to sustain peace and prevent large-scale catastrophe.**

**Lifton 01** (Robert Jay, Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at John Jay College, Illusions of the second nuclear age, World Policy Journal. New York: Spring 2001. Vol. 18, Iss. 1; pg. 25, 6 pgs)

The trouble is that in other ways the dangers associated with nuclear weapons are greater than ever: the continuing weapons-- centered policies in the United States and elsewhere; the difficulties in controlling nuclear weapons that exist under unstable conditions (especially in Russia and other areas of the former Soviet Union);<sup>2</sup> and the eagerness and potential capacity of certain nations and "private" groups to acquire and possibly use the weapons. In that sense, the nuclear quietism is perilous. Or, to put the matter another way, we no longer manifest an appropriate degree of fear in relation to actual nuclear danger. While fear in itself is hardly to be recommended as a guiding human emotion, its absence in the face of danger can lead to catastrophe. We human animals have built-in fear reactions in response to threat. These reactions help us to protect ourselves--to step back from the path of a speeding automobile, or in the case of our ancestors, from the path of a wild animal. Fear can be transmuted into constructive planning and policies: whether for minimizing vulnerability to attacks by wild animals, or for more complex contemporary threats. Through fear, ordinary people can be motivated to pursue constructive means for sustaining peace, or at least for limiting the scope of violence. Similarly, in exchanges between world leaders on behalf of preventing large-scale conflict, a tinge of fear--sometimes more than a tinge-- can enable each to feel the potential bloodshed and suffering that would result from failure. But with nuclear weapons, our psychological circuits are impaired. We know that the weapons are around--and we hear talk about nuclear dangers somewhere "out there" --but our minds no longer connect with the dangers or with the weapons themselves. That blunting of feeling extends into other areas. One of the many sins for which advocates of large nuclear stockpiles must answer is the prevalence of psychic numbing to enormous potential suffering, the blunting of our ethical standards as human beings. In the absence of the sort of threatening nuclear rhetoric the United States and Russia indulged in during the 1980s, we can all too readily numb ourselves to everything nuclear, and thereby live as though the weapons pose no danger, or as though they don't exist.

**AT FEAR OF NUKES: KEY TO PREVENT EXTINCTION**

**Fearing nuclear weapons is the only way to prevent extinction.**

**Futterman, 95.** PhD and works at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. JAH, Mediation of the Bomb, <http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html>.

But the inhibitory effect of reliable nuclear weapons goes deeper than Shirer's deterrence of adventurer-conquerors. It changes the way we think individually and culturally, preparing us for a future we cannot now imagine. Jungian psychiatrist Anthony J. Stevens states, [15] "History would indicate that people cannot rise above their narrow sectarian concerns without some overwhelming paroxysm. It took the War of Independence and the Civil War to forge the United States, World War I to create the League of Nations, World War II to create the United Nations Organization and the European Economic Community. Only catastrophe, it seems, forces people to take the wider view. Or what about fear? Can the horror which we all experience when we contemplate the possibility of nuclear extinction mobilize in us sufficient libidinal energy to resist the archetypes of war? Certainly, the moment we become blasé about the possibility of holocaust we are lost. As long as horror of nuclear exchange remains uppermost we can recognize that nothing is worth it. War becomes the impossible option. Perhaps horror, the experience of horror, the consciousness of horror, is our only hope. Perhaps horror alone will enable us to overcome the otherwise invincible attraction of war." Thus I also continue engaging in nuclear weapons work to help fire that world-historical warning shot I mentioned above, namely, that as our beneficial technologies become more powerful, so will our weapons technologies, unless genuine peace precludes it. We must build a future more peaceful than our past, if we are to have a future at all, with or without nuclear weapons — a fact we had better learn before worse things than nuclear weapons are invented. If you're a philosopher, this means that I regard the nature of humankind as mutable rather than fixed, but that I think most people welcome change in their personalities and cultures with all the enthusiasm that they welcome death — thus, the fear of nuclear annihilation of ourselves and all our values may be what we require in order to become peaceful enough to survive our future technological breakthroughs.[16]

**Fearing nuclear weapons is the only way to prevent nuclear omnicide.**

**Harvard Nuclear Study Group, 83** ("Living With Nuclear Weapons," p. 47)

The question is grisly, but nonetheless it must be asked. Nuclear war [sic] cannot be avoided simply by refusing to think about it. Indeed the task of reducing the likelihood of nuclear war should begin with an effort to understand how it might start. When strategists in Washington or Moscow study the possible origins of nuclear war, they discuss "scenarios," imagined sequences of future events that could trigger the use of nuclear weaponry. Scenarios are, of course, speculative exercises. They often leave out the political developments that might lead to the use of force in order to focus on military dangers. That nuclear war scenarios are even more speculative than most is something for which we can be thankful, for it reflects humanity's fortunate lack of experience with atomic warfare since 1945. But imaginary as they are, nuclear scenarios can help identify problems not understood or dangers not yet prevented because they have not been foreseen.

**Absent fear of nuclear war, use of nuclear weapons becomes inevitable.**

**Beres, 98.** Professor of Political Science at Purdue University. Louis Rene, American University International Law Review, lexis.

Fear and reality go together naturally. Unless both Indian and Pakistani decision-makers come to acknowledge the mutually intolerable consequences of a nuclear war in South Asia, they may begin to think of nuclear weapons not as instruments of deterrence, but as "ordinary" implements of warfighting. <sup>40</sup> With such an erroneous view, reinforced by underlying commitments to Realpolitik <sup>41</sup> and nationalistic fervor, <sup>42</sup> they might even begin to take steps toward the atomic brink from which retreat would no longer be possible. "In a dark time," says the poet Theodore Roethke, "the eye begins to see." <sup>43</sup> Embedded in this ironic observation is an important mes [\*515] sage for India and Pakistan. Look closely at the expected consequences of a nuclear war. Look closely at the available "arsenal" of international legal measures, at available treaties, customs, and general principles. <sup>44</sup> Do not be lulled into complacency by anesthetized and sanitized accounts of nuclear warfighting. Acknowledge the mutually beneficial expectations of world order. <sup>45</sup>

**AT FEAR OF NUKES: REALISM INEVITABLE**

**Attempts to eliminate the security paradox fail—human nature makes realism inevitable.**

**Morgenthau, 98.** Winter, Hans, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago. *Naval War College Review* 51.1, p. 16, ebsco.

This is another example of the belief that the difficulties which confront us, the risks which threaten us, the liabilities which we must face in international affairs are the result of some kind of ephemeral, unique configuration; that if you do away with the latter you will have done away with the liabilities, the risks, and the difficulties as well. This belief is mistaken; for it is the very essence of historic experience that whenever you have disposed of one danger in foreign policy another one is going to raise its head. Once we had disposed of the Axis as a threat to American security, we were right away confronted with a new threat: the threat of the Soviet Union. I daresay if we could, by some kind of miracle, do away tomorrow with the threat which emanates from the Soviet Union, we would very soon be confronted again with a new threat--and perhaps from a very unexpected quarter. At the foundation of the realist's approach to foreign policy there is the conviction that the struggle for power on the international scene--as the struggle for power on all levels of social interaction--is not the result of some historic accident, of some passing social, constitutional, legal, or economic configuration (think, for instance, of the utopian expectations of Marxism), but that it is part and parcel of human nature itself; that the aspirations for power are innate in human nature; that it is futile to search for a mechanical device with which to eliminate those aspirations; that the wise approach to political problems lies in taking the perennial character of those aspirations for granted--in trying to live with them, to redirect them into socially valuable and beneficial channels, to transform them, to civilize them. This is as much as a man can do with this psychological and social heritage, which he cannot escape. In other words, a realistic approach to foreign policy starts with the assumption that international politics is of necessity a struggle for power; that the balance of power, for instance, is not the invention of some misguided diplomats but is the inevitable result of a multiplicity of nations living with each other, competing with each other for power, and trying to maintain their autonomy. Now let me turn to some practical problems which illustrate the characteristics of realism in foreign policy as over against the utopian or idealistic approach. Take, again, the balance of power. The balance of power, you may say, is for foreign policy what the law of gravity is for nature; that is, it is the very essence of foreign policy. I remember very well that when I used the term "balance of power" at the beginning of my academic career in the early 30's I met with an unfavorable reaction. "Balance of power" was then a kind of dirty word--something which respectable scholars would not use, at least not in an affirmative sense. It was something not to be investigated, not to be practiced; it was something to be abolished. I remember again very well a lecture I gave in Milwaukee (I think it was in 1944) in which I made the point I just made: that when the war was over there would of necessity be a new balance of power, a new set of problems which we would have to solve--and that more likely than not it would be the Soviet Union which would raise the problems. Many in the audience seemed to believe that I was a kind of Fascist agent who was trying to perpetuate an evil that they were just in the process of getting rid of.

**Turn—any move away from realism relies on a leap of faith that would lead to more violence.**

**Murray, 97.** Alastair, Professor of International Relations. *Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics.*

This highlights the central difficulty with Wendt's constructivism. It is not any form of unfounded idealism about the possibility of effective a change in international politics. Wendt accepts that the intersubjective character of international institutions such as self-help render them relatively hard social facts. Rather, what is problematic is his faith that such change, if it could be achieved, implies progress. Wendt's entire approach is governed by the belief that the problematic elements of international politics can be transcended, that the competitive identities which create these elements can be reconditioned, and that the predatory policies which underlie these identities can be eliminated. Everything, in his account, is up for grabs: there is no core of recalcitrance to human conduct which cannot be reformed, unlearned, disposed of. This generates a stance that so privileges the possibility of a systemic transformation that it simply puts aside the difficulties which it recognises to be inherent in its achievement. Thus, even though Wendt acknowledges that the intersubjective basis of the self-help system makes it reform difficult, this does not dissuade him. He simply demands that states adopt a strategy of 'altercasting', a strategy which 'tries to induce alter to take on a new identity (and thereby enlist alter in ego's effort to change itself) by treating alter as if it already had that identity'. Wendt's position effectively culminates in a demand that the state undertake nothing less than a giant leap of faith. The fact that its opponent might not take its overtures seriously, might not be interested in reformulating its own construction of the world, or might simply see such an opening as a weakness to be exploited, are completely discounted. The prospect of achieving a system transformation simply outweighs any adverse consequences which might arise from the effort to achieve it. Wendt ultimately appears, in the final analysis, to have overdosed on 'Gorbimania'.

AT FEAR OF NUKES: PLAN SOLVES IMPACT

**Advocating a plan to address harms of nuclear war overcomes impact of numbing.**

**Sandman and Valenti 86** (Peter and JoAnn, Professor of Human Ecology at Rutgers and Preeminent Risk Communications Expert published over 80 articles and books on various aspects of risk communication, Scared stiff — or scared into action, , Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1986, pp. 12–16, <http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm>)

WHEN THE MOVEMENT against nuclear weapons celebrates its heroes, a place of honor is reserved for Helen Caldicott, the Australian pediatrician who revived Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) in 1978 and made it the vehicle for her impassioned antinuclear crusade. In countless communities since then, Caldicott has briskly narrated the devastation that would result if a small nuclear warhead exploded right here and now. Thousands of activists trace their movement beginnings to a Helen Caldicott speech, wondering if it wouldn't help reverse the arms race just to make everyone sit through that speech — and each week hundreds of activists do their best to give the speech themselves. Nonetheless, PSR Executive Director Jane Wales, while acknowledging a huge debt to Caldicott, said in 1984 that the time for the “bombing runs” (as insiders call the speech) was past. “We knew it was past when someone interrupted the speech one evening, actually interrupted it, and said, ‘We know all that, but what can we do?’” In a 1985 newsletter, similarly, Sanford Gottlieb of United Campuses to Prevent Nuclear War warned that many students were “being numbed by the emphasis on nuclear blast, fire and radiation” in courses on nuclear war and were therefore “feeling more impotent and depressed than before the class began.”(1) Perhaps the first broad awareness that shock therapy may not be the best therapy came, ironically, in 1983 in the weeks preceding the broadcast of the television film *The Day After*, when Educators for Social Responsibility and others worried that the program might do children more harm than good. *The Day After* turned out to be less frightening than expected, but other films (*Threads*, *Testament*, and Caldicott's own *The Last Epidemic*) raise the same worry — and not just for children. In the following analysis of the fear of nuclear Armageddon and its implications for antinuclear advocacy, we will argue that most people are neither apathetic about nuclear war nor actively terrified of it but rather, in Robert Jay Lifton's evocative phrase, “psychically numbed”; that it is ineffective to frighten audiences who have found a refuge from their fears in numbness; and that there exist more effective keys to unlocking such paralysis. THE CENTRAL ENIGMA of antinuclear activism is why everyone is not working to prevent nuclear war. Activists who can understand those who disagree about what should be done are bewildered and frustrated by those who do nothing. Such inaction is objectively irrational; as Caldicott asked in a 1982 cover article in *Family Weekly*, “Why make sure kids clean their teeth and eat healthy food if they're not going to survive?”(2) Advocates of all causes chafe at their neighbors' lack of interest. When the issue is something like saving whales or wheelchair access to public buildings, the problem is usually diagnosed as apathy. Psychiatrist Robert Winer argues that the same is true of the nuclear threat, which most of us experience as remote, impersonal, and vague. For Winer, “one of the genuinely tragic aspects of the nuclear situation is that immediacy may be given to us only once and then it will be too late to learn.”(3) There is obviously some truth to this view. When asked to describe their images of nuclear war, people do tend to come up with abstractions — and those with more concrete, immediate images are likely to be antinuclear activists.(4)

**\*\*FOUCAULT\*\***

AT FOUCAULT: NO IMPACT

**Power is not inherently evil—it is only a problem when it turns into domination.**

**Foucault, quoted in an interview published in 97** (Michel, philosopher, professor and chairman of the History of Systems of Thought @ the College de France, Ethics Subjectivity and Truth, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Vol. 1, Ed. Paul Rabinow, 1997, p. 298-299)

Power is not evil. Power is games of strategy. We all know that power is not evil! For example, let us take sexual or amorous relationships: to wield power over the other in a sort of open-ended strategic game where the situation may be reversed is not evil; it's a part of love, of passion and sexual pleasure. And let us take, as another example, something that has often been rightly criticized—the pedagogical institution. I see nothing wrong in the practice of a person who, knowing more than others in a specific game of truth, tells those others what to do, teaches them, and transmits knowledge and techniques to them. The problem in such practices where power— which is not in itself a bad thing— must inevitably come into play in knowing how to avoid the kind of domination effects where a kid is subjected to the arbitrary and unnecessary authority of a teacher, or a student put under the thumb of a professor who abuses [their] authority. I believe that this problem must be framed in terms of rules of law, rational techniques of government and *ethos*, practices of the self and of freedom.

**All policies are not the same—biopower within a democratic context are radically different than their fascism examples.**

**Dickinson 04** - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

In the Weimar model, then, the rights of the individual, guaranteed formally by the constitution and substantively by the welfare system, were the central element of the dominant program for the management of social problems. Almost no one in this period advocated expanding social provision out of the goodness of their hearts. This was a strategy of social management, of social engineering. The mainstream of social reform in Germany believed that guaranteeing basic social rights— the substantive or positive freedom of all citizens — was the best way to turn people into power, prosperity, and profit. In that sense, the democratic welfare state was— and is — democratic not despite of its pursuit of biopower, but because of it. The contrast with the Nazi state is clear. National Socialism aimed to construct a system of social and population policy founded on the concept of individual duties, on the ubiquitous and total power of the state, and on the systematic absorption of every citizen by organizations that could implant that power at every level of their lives — in political and associational life, in the family, in the workplace, and in leisure activities. In the welfarist vision of Weimar progressives, the task of the state was to create an institutional framework that would give individuals the wherewithal to integrate themselves successfully into the national society, economy, and polity. The Nazis aimed, instead, to give the state the wherewithal to do with every citizen what it willed. And where Weimar welfare advocates understood themselves to be constructing a system of knowledge and institutions that would manage social problems, the Nazis fundamentally sought to abolish just that system by eradicating — by finding a “final solution” to — social problems. Again, as Peukert pointed out, many advocates of a rights-based welfare structure were open to the idea that “stubborn” cases might be legitimate targets for sterilization; the right to health could easily be redefined as primarily a duty to be healthy, for example. But the difference between a strategy of social management built on the rights of the citizen and a system of racial policy built on the total power of the state is not merely a semantic one; such differences had very profound political implications, and established quite different constraints. The rights-based strategy was actually not very compatible with exclusionary and coercive policies; it relied too heavily on the cooperation of its targets and of armies of volunteers, it was too embedded in a democratic institutional structure and civil society, it lacked powerful legal and institutional instruments of coercion, and its rhetorical structure was too heavily slanted toward inclusion and tolerance.



AT FOUCAULT: NO IMPACT

**Even if they are right that our policy is biopolitical, the fact that it is carried out by a democratic state makes it profoundly different.**

**Dickinson 04** - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1-48)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can—and historically does—create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.<sup>90</sup> Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of "liberty," just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.

AT FOUCAULT: NO IMPACT

**Biopower is a description of our era—it is neither inherently good, nor bad. Our specific context is more important than their sweeping generalization.**

**Dickinson 04** - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very *different* ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.<sup>91</sup>

**Biopower is not genocidal when it is deployed by a government which also respects rights.**

**Dickinson 04** - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

At its simplest, this view of the politics of expertise and professionalization is certainly plausible. Historically speaking, however, the further conjecture that this “micropolitical” dynamic creates authoritarian, totalitarian, or homicidal potentials at the level of the state does not seem very tenable. Historically, it appears that the greatest advocates of political democracy—in Germany left liberals and Social Democrats—have been also the greatest advocates of every kind of biopolitical social engineering, from public health and welfare programs through social insurance to city planning and, yes, even eugenics.<sup>102</sup> The state they built has intervened in social relations to an (until recently) ever-growing degree; professionalization has run ever more rampant in Western societies; the production of scientific and technocratic expert knowledge has proceeded at an ever more frenetic pace. And yet, from the perspective of the first years of the millennium, the second half of the twentieth century appears to be the great age of democracy in precisely those societies where these processes have been most in evidence. What is more, the interventionist state has steadily expanded both the rights and the resources of virtually every citizen— including those who were stigmatized and persecuted as biologically defective under National Socialism. Perhaps these processes have created an ever more restrictive “iron cage” of rationality in European societies. But if so, it seems clear that there is no necessary correlation between rationalization and authoritarian politics; the opposite seems in fact to be at least equally true.

## AT FOUCAULT: NO IMPACT (MASSACRES)

**Biopower does not make massacres vital—a specific form of violent sovereignty is also required.**

**Ojakangas, 05** - PhD in Social Science and Academy research fellow @ the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies @ University of Helsinki – 2005 (Mika, “The Impossible Dialogue on Biopower: Foucault and Agamben,” May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, <http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf>)

Admittedly, in the era of biopolitics, as Foucault writes, even “massacres have become vital.” This is not the case, however, because violence is hidden in the foundation of biopolitics, as Agamben believes. Although the twentieth century thanatopolitics is the “reverse of biopolitics”, it should not be understood, according to Foucault, as “the effect, the result, or the logical consequence” of biopolitical rationality. Rather, it should be understood, as he suggests, as an outcome of the “demonic combination” of the sovereign power and biopower, of “the city-citizen game and the shepherd-flock game” or as I would like to put it, of *patria potestas* (father’s unconditional power of life and death over his son) and *cura maternal* (mother’s unconditional duty to take care of her children). Although massacres can be carried out *in the name of care*, they do not follow from the logic of biopower for which death is the “object of taboo”. They follow from the logic of sovereign power, which legitimates killing by whatever arguments it chooses, be it God, Nature, or life.

**Biopower does not cause racism or massacres—it is only when it is in the context of a violent or racist government that it is dangerous.**

**Ojakangas, 05** - PhD in Social Science and Academy research fellow @ the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies @ University of Helsinki – 2005 (Mika, “The Impossible Dialogue on Biopower: Foucault and Agamben,” May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, <http://wlt-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf>)

It is the logic of racism, according to Foucault, that makes killing acceptable in modern biopolitical societies. This is not to say, however, that biopolitical societies are necessarily more racist than other societies. It is to say that in the era of biopolitics, only racism, because it is a determination immanent to life, can “justify the murderous function of the State”.<sup>89</sup> However, racism can only justify killing – killing that does not follow from the logic of biopower but from the logic of the sovereign power. Racism is, in other words, the only way the sovereign power, the right to kill, can be maintained in biopolitical societies: “Racism is bound up with workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power.”<sup>90</sup> Racism is, in other words, a discourse – “quite compatible”<sup>91</sup> with biopolitics – through which biopower can be most smoothly transformed into the form of sovereign power. Such transformation, however, changes everything. A biopolitical society that wishes to “exercise the old sovereign right to kill”, even in the name of race, ceases to be a mere biopolitical society, practicing merely biopolitics. It becomes a “demonic combination” of sovereign power and biopower, exercising sovereign means for biopolitical ends. In its most monstrous form, it becomes the Third Reich. For this reason, I cannot subscribe to Agamben’s thesis, according to which biopolitics is absolutized in the Third Reich.<sup>93</sup> To be sure, the Third Reich used biopolitical means – it was a state in which “insurance and reassurance were universal”<sup>94</sup> – and aimed for biopolitical ends in order to improve the living conditions of the German people -- but so did many other nations in the 1930s. What distinguishes the Third Reich from those other nations is the fact that, alongside its biopolitical apparatus, it erected a massive machinery of death. It became a society that “unleashed murderous power, or in other words, the old sovereign right to take life” throughout the “entire social body”, as Foucault puts it.<sup>95</sup> It is not, therefore, biopolitics that was absolutized in the Third Reich – as a matter of fact, biopolitical measures in the Nazi Germany were, although harsh, relatively modest in scale compared to some present day welfare states – but rather the sovereign power: “This power to kill, which ran through the entire social body of Nazi society, was first manifested when the power to take life, the power of life and death, was granted not only to the State but to a whole series of individuals, to a considerable number of people (such as the SA, the SS, and so on). Ultimately, everyone in the Nazi State had the power of life and death over his or her neighbours, if only because of the practice of informing, which effectively meant doing away with the people next door, or having them done away with.<sup>96</sup> The only thing that the Third Reich actually absolutizes is, in other words, the sovereignty of power and therefore, the nakedness of bare life – at least if sovereignty is defined in the Agambenian manner: “The sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.”<sup>97</sup>

AT FOUCAULT: NAZIS UNIQUE

**Nazi biopolitics were unique.**

**Dickinson 04** - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1-48)

Again, Peukert was very aware that he was writing the history of only one kind of modernity, and that the most destructive potentials of modern social engineering discourse were only to be realized in a very specific historical context. The "Final Solution" was, as he remarked, "one among other possible outcomes of the crisis of modern civilization," and one possible only in the context of the concatenation of economic, social, and political disasters through which Germany passed in the two decades before 1933. The fact that Nazism was "one of the pathological developmental forms of modernity does not imply that barbarism is the inevitable logical outcome of modernization," which also created "opportunities for human emancipation." And yet, again, the history that Peukert actually wrote was the history of disaster— a disaster that, frequently, does seem at least highly likely. The "fatal racist dynamic in the human and social sciences," which consists in their assignment of greater or lesser value to human characteristics, does "inevitably become fixated on the utopian dream of the gradual elimination of death," which is "unfailingly" frustrated by lived reality. In periods of fiscal crisis the frustration of these "fantasies of omnipotence" generates a concern with "identifying, segregating, and disposing of" those judged less valuable.<sup>68</sup> In the most detailed exposition of his analysis, *Grenzen der Sozialdisziplinierung*, Peukert argues that, given the "totalitarian claim to validity" of bourgeois norms, only the two "strategies of pedagogical normalization or eugenic exclusion" were open to middle-class social reformers; when the one failed only the other remained. Yet the failure of pedagogical normalization was preprogrammed into the collision between middle-class "utopias of order" and the "life-worlds" of the working class, which were rendered disorderly by the logic of industrial capitalism.<sup>69</sup> Again, in Peukert's model it seems to me that it is really only a matter of time and circumstance before the fundamentally and necessarily murderous potential of modernity is unleashed.

**AT FOUCAULT: BIOPOWER GOOD**

**Biopower is also positive—such as the dramatic decrease in infant mortality.**

**Dickinson 04** - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

Of course, at the most simple-minded level, it seems to me that an assessment of the potentials of modernity that ignores the ways in which biopolitics has made life tangibly better is somehow deeply flawed. To give just one example, infant mortality in Germany in 1900 was just over 20 percent; or, in other words, one in five children died before reaching the age of one year. By 1913, it was 15 percent; and by 1929 (when average real purchasing power was not significantly higher than in 1913) it was only 9.7 percent.<sup>93</sup> The expansion of infant health programs— an enormously ambitious, bureaucratic, medicalizing, and sometimes intrusive, social engineering project— had a great deal to do with that change. It would be bizarre to write a history of biopolitical modernity that ruled out an appreciation for how absolutely wonderful and astonishing this achievement— and any number of others like it — really was. There was a reason for the “Machbarkeitswahn” of the early twentieth century: many marvelous things were in fact becoming machbar. In that sense, it is not really accurate to call it a “Wahn” (delusion, craziness) at all; nor is it accurate to focus only on the “inevitable” frustration of “delusions” of power. Even in the late 1920s, many social engineers could and did look with great satisfaction on the changes they genuinely had the power to accomplish.

**AT FOUCAULT: RESISTANCE SOLVES IMPACT**

**Even if they win that our policy turns to the dark side of biopolitics, their impact will still be prevented by localized resistance.**

**Dickinson 04** - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

In the current literature, it seems that biopolitics is almost always acting on (or attempting to act on) people; it is almost never something they do. This kind of model is not very realistic. This is not how societies work. The example of the attempt to create a eugenic counseling system in Prussia should be instructive in this respect. Here public health and eugenics experts— technocrats— tried to impart their sense of eugenic crisis and their optimism about the possibility of creating a better "race" to the public; and they successfully mobilized the resources of the state in support of their vision. And yet, what emerged quite quickly from this effort was in fact a system of public contraceptive advice — or family planning. It is not so easy to impose technocratic ambitions on the public, particularly in a democratic state; and "on the ground," at the level of interactions with actual persons and social groups, public policy often takes on a life of its own, at least partially independent of the fantasies of technocrats. This is of course a point that Foucault makes with particular clarity. The power of discourse is not the power of manipulative elites, which control it and impose it from above. Manipulative elites always face resistance, often effective, resistance. More important, the power of discourse lies precisely in its ability to set the terms for such struggles, to define what they are about, as much as what their outcomes are. As Foucault put it, power— including the power to manage life —"comes from everywhere."<sup>105</sup> Biomedical knowledge was not the property only of technocrats, and it could be used to achieve ends that had little to do with their social-engineering schemes.<sup>106</sup> Modern biopolitics is a multifaceted world of discourse and practice elaborated and put into practice at multiple levels throughout modern societies.

**Power is fluid—biopower has created new freedoms as well as new oppressions—context is key.**

**Dickinson 04** - Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley - 2004 (Edward Ross, "Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About "Modernity," Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48)

Uncoupling "technocracy" from "discourse" is not yet enough, however. We should also be alive to the ways in which new social practices, institutions, and knowledge generated new choices — a limited range of them, constrained by all kinds of discursive and social frameworks, but nonetheless historically new and significant. Modern biopolitics did create, in a real sense, not only new constraints but also new degrees of freedom— new levers that increased people's power to move their own worlds, to shape their own lives. Our understanding of modern biopolitics will be more realistic and more fruitful if we reconceptualize its development as a complex process in which the implications of those new choices were negotiated out in the social and discursive context. Again, in the early twentieth century many more conservative biopolitical "experts" devoted much of their energy precisely to trying— without any discernable success— to control those new degrees of freedom. For most social liberals and Social Democrats, however, those new choices were a potential source of greater social efficiency and social dynamism. State policy reflected the constant negotiation and tension between these perspectives. Nor should we stop at a reexamination of knowledge and technology. It might make sense, too, to reexamine the process of institution-building, the elaboration of the practices and institutions of biopolitics. No doubt the creation of public and private social welfare institutions created instruments for the study, manipulation, or control of individuals and groups. But it also generated opportunities for self-organization and participation by social groups of all kinds.

AT FOUCAULT: RESISTANCE SOLVES IMPACT

**Their K oversimplifies—biopower is not a one-way street—it produces equivalent resistances that check the impact. Campbell, 98** - professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle - 1998 (David, “Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,” pg. 204-205)

The political possibilities enabled by this permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the “bio-power” discussed above. In this sense, because the governmental practices of biopolitics in Western nations have been increasingly directed toward modes of being and forms of life — such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of government— the ongoing agonism between those practices and the freedom they seek to contain means that individuals have articulated a series of counterdemands drawn from those new fields of concern. For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation, human rights activists have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight counterparts. These claims are a consequence of the permanent provocation of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the “strategic reversibility” of power relations: if the terms of governmental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the “history of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is interwoven with the history of dissenting ‘counterconducts.’”<sup>39</sup> Indeed, the emergence of the state as the major articulation of “the political” has involved an unceasing agonism between those in office and those they rule. State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular collective action, the result of which has been both resistance to the state and new claims upon the state. In particular, “the core of what we now call ‘citizenship’ consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war.” In more recent times, constituencies associated with women’s, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) have also issued claims on society. These resistances are evidence that the break with the discursive/nondiscursive dichotomy central to the logic of interpretation undergirding this analysis is (to put it in conventional terms) not only theoretically licensed; it is empirically warranted. Indeed, expanding the interpretive imagination so as to enlarge the categories through which we understand the constitution of “the political” has been a necessary precondition for making sense of Foreign Policy’s concern for the ethical borders of identity in America. Accordingly, there are manifest political implications that flow from theorizing identity. As Judith Butler concluded: “The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated.”

AT FOUCAULT: AFF PRE-REQ TO ALT

**Foucault's concept of resistance is only possible in a world without violence—the aff is a pre-requisite for the alternative.**

**Bevir, 99** – Department of Political Science @ University of Newcastle – 1999 (Mark, “Foucault and Critique: Deploying Agency against Autonomy, Political Theory, Volume 27 No. 1, Page 65 February 1999, JSTOR)

Perhaps we might say, therefore, that power or pastoral-power recognizes the value of the subject as an agent, whereas violence or discipline attempts to extinguish the capacity of the subject for agency. Although Foucault, of course, never describes things in quite these terms, he does come remarkably close to doing so. In particular, he defines violence, in contrast to power, as aiming at domination or as a physical constraint that denies the ability of the other to act: “where the determining factors saturate the whole there is no relationship of power,” rather “it is a question of a physical relationship of constraint.”<sup>27</sup> Similarly, he defines power, in contrast to violence, as able to come into play only where people have a capacity to act, perhaps even a capacity to act freely: “power is exercised over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free,” by which “we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized.”<sup>28</sup> If we thus accept that power always treats the subject as an agent, whereas violence always attempts to extinguish the capacity of the subject for agency, we can see why Foucault's later work on power emphasises that power, unlike violence, necessarily entails a capacity for resistance. To treat someone as an agent, one has to recognise that they can do other than one wishes—they can resist. Power can exist only where people have a capacity to act freely, and so only where they can resist that power. Perhaps, therefore, we should define as violent any relationship—whether overtly violent or not—in which an individual has his action determined for him. Violence manifests itself in any relationship between individuals, groups, or societies in which one denies the agency of the others by seeking to define for them actions they must perform. Power, in contrast, appears in any relationship— although no overtly violent relationship could meet the following requirement—in which an individual does not have his action determined for him. Power manifests itself whenever individuals, groups, or societies act as influences on the agency of the subject without attempting to determine the particular actions the subject performs. Here a rejection of autonomy implies that power is ineliminable, while a defence of agency implies that power need not degenerate into violence. Foucault's final work on the nature of governmentality suggests, therefore, that society need not consist solely of the forms of discipline he had analysed earlier. Society might include an arena in which free individuals attempt only to influence one another. I hope my discussion of Foucault's theory of governmentality has pointed to the way in which a distinction between violence and power might provide us with normative resources for social criticism absent from his earlier work. Provided we are willing to grant that the capacity for agency has ethical value—and this seems reasonable enough—we will denounce violent social relations and champion instead a society based on a more benign power.



**AT FOUCAULT: CEDE THE POLITICAL**

**Endless investigation of power makes real struggles against oppression impossible.**

**Hicks, 03-** Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY (Steven V., "Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond," Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109, Questia)

Hence, the only "ethico-political choice" we have, one that Foucault thinks we must make every day, is simply to determine which of the many insidious forms of power is "the main danger" and then to engage in an activity of resistance in the "nexus" of opposing forces. 72 "Unending action is required to combat ubiquitous peril." 73 But this ceaseless Foucauldian "recoil" from the ubiquitous power perils of "normalization" precludes, or so it would seem, formulating any defensible alternative position or successor ideals. And if Nietzsche is correct in claiming that the only prevailing human ideal to date has been the ascetic ideal, then even Foucauldian resistance will continue to work in service of this ideal, at least under one of its guises, viz., the nihilism of negativity. Certainly Foucault's distancing of himself from all ideological commitments, his recoiling from all traditional values by which we know and judge, his holding at bay all conventional answers that press themselves upon us, and his keeping in play the "twists" and "recoils" that question our usual concepts and habitual patterns of behavior, all seem a close approximation, in the ethicopolitical sphere, to the idealization of asceticism.

**Critiques of power are so localized that they prevent coalition from forming that could genuinely fight oppression.**

**Cook, 92-** Associate Professor at Georgetown Law School (Anthony E., "A Diversity of Influence: Reflections on Postmodernism, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751, Lexis)

Several things trouble me about Foucault's approach. First, he nurtures in many ways an unhealthy insularity that fails to connect localized struggle to other localized struggles and to modes of oppression like classism, racism, sexism, and homophobia that transcend their localized articulation within this particular law school, that particular law firm, within this particular church or that particular factory. I note among some followers of Foucault an unhealthy propensity to rely on rich, thick, ethnographic type descriptions of power relations playing themselves out in these localized laboratories of social conflict. This reliance on detailed description and its concomitant deemphasis of explanation begins, ironically, to look like a regressive positivism which purports to sever the descriptive from the normative, the is from the ought and law from morality and politics. Unless we are to be trapped in this Foucaultian moment of postmodern insularity, we must resist the temptation to sever description from explanation. Instead, our objective should be to explain what we describe in light of a vision embracing values that we make explicit in struggle. These values should act as magnets that link our particularized struggles to other struggles and more global critiques of power. In other words, we must not, as Foucault seems all too willing to do, forsake the possibility of more universal narratives that, while tempered by postmodern insights, attempt to say and do something about the oppressive world in which we live. Second, Foucault's emphasis on the techniques and discourses of knowledge that constitute the human subject often diminishes, if not abrogates, the role of human agency. Agency is of tremendous importance in any theory of oppression, because individuals are not simply constituted by systems of knowledge but also constitute hegemonic and counter-hegemonic systems of knowledge as well. Critical theory must pay attention to the ways in which oppressed people not only are victimized by ideologies of oppression but the ways they craft from these ideologies and discourses counter-hegemonic weapons of liberation.

AT FOUCAULT: GENEALOGY

**Genealogy is trapped in a double bind: its extreme relativism either undercuts its political usefulness or a new master discourse is produced.**

**Habermas, 87-** Permanent Visiting Professor at Northwestern (Jürgen, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 279)

Foucault's historiography can evade relativism as little as it can this acute presentism. His investigations are caught exactly in the self-referentiality that was supposed to be excluded by a naturalistic treatment of the problematic of validity. Genealogical historiography is supposed to make the practices of power, precisely in their discourse-constituting achievement, accessible to an empirical analysis. From this perspective, not only are truth claims confined to the discourses within which they arise; they exhaust their entire significance in the functional contribution they make to the self-maintenance of a given totality of discourse. That is to say, the meaning of validity claims consists in the power effects they have. On the other hand, this basic assumption of the theory of power is self-referential; if it is correct, it must destroy the foundations of the research inspired by it as well. But if the truth claims that Foucault himself raises for his genealogy of knowledge were in fact illusory and amounted to no more than the effects that this theory is capable of releasing within the circle of its adherents, then the entire undertaking of a critical unmasking of the human sciences would lose its point. Foucault pursues genealogical historiography with the serious intent of getting a science underway that is superior to the mismanaged human sciences. If, then, its superiority cannot be expressed in the fact that something more convincing enters in place of the convicted pseudo-sciences, if its superiority were only to be expressed in the effect of its suppressing the hitherto dominant scientific discourse *in fact*, Foucault's theory would exhaust itself in the politics of theory, and indeed in setting theoretical-political goals that would overburden the capacities of even so heroic a one-man enterprise. Foucault is aware of this. Consequently, he would like to single out his genealogy from all the rest of the human sciences in a manner that is reconcilable with the fundamental assumptions of his own theory. To this end, he turns genealogical historiography upon itself; the difference that can establish its preeminence above all the other human sciences is to be demonstrated in the history of its own emergence.

**\*\*GENDER IR\*\***

AT GENDER IR: NO ALT

**Critiques of gender relations that do not pose concrete alternatives are destined to fail.**

**Caprioli, 04** ("Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis" Mary Caprioli, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee. International Studies Review. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197, March 2004. <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076>).

If researchers cannot add gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female centered analysis seems equally biased. Such research would merely be gendercentric based on women rather than men, and it would thereby provide an equally biased account of international relations as those that are male-centric. Although one might speculate that having research done from the two opposing worldviews might more fully explain international relations, surely an integrated approach would offer a more comprehensive analysis of world affairs. Beyond a female-centric analysis, some scholars (for example, Carver 2002) argue that feminist research must offer a critique of gender as a set of power relations. Gender categories, however, do exist and have very real implications for individuals, social relations, and international affairs. Critiquing the social construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories of international relations or to address the implications of gender for what happens in the world.

AT GENDER IR: NO LINK

**IR feminists vastly over simplify the diverse field of international relations literature—they need a specific link our aff.**

**Caprioli, 04** (“Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis” Mary Caprioli, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee. *International Studies Review*. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197, March 2004. <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076>).

Conventional feminist IR scholars misrepresent the field of international relations in arguing that IR scholarship as popularly accepted excludes alternative explanations of state behavior, including feminist inquiry, that go beyond structural, state-focused models. Feminist IR theorists, among others, critique the IR field for its state-centric approach and argue that “a world of states situated in an anarchical international system leaves little room for analyses of social relations, including gender relations” (Tickner 2001:146). As a result, they appear to set up a straw man by refusing to recognize the variety within “conventional” IR research. Indeed, as Jack Levy (2000) has observed, a significant shift to societal-level variables has occurred, partly in response to the decline in the systemic imperatives of the bipolar era. Certainly the democratic peace literature, particularly its normative explanation (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), among other lines of inquiry, recognizes the role of social relations in explaining state behavior. The normative explanation for the democratic peace thesis emphasizes the societal level values of human rights, support for the rule of law, and peaceful conflict resolution in explaining the likelihood of interstate conflict. Furthermore, dyadic tests of the democratic peace thesis rely “on an emerging theoretical framework that may prove capable of incorporating the strengths of the currently predominant realist or neorealist research program, and moving beyond it” (Ray 2000:311). In addition, theorizing and research in the field of ethnonationalism has highlighted connections that domestic ethnic discrimination and violence have with state behavior at the international level (Gurr and Harff 1994; Van Evera 1997; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003a, 2003b).

**Arguing that any IR theory overwhelms the specifics of the situation is an over simplification that re-creates the hierarchies they critique.**

**Caprioli, 04** (“Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis” Mary Caprioli, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee. *International Studies Review*. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197, March 2004. <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076>).

There is little utility in constructing a divide if none exists. As Thomas Kuhn (1962) argues, common measures do exist across paradigms that provide a shared basis for theory. It seems overly pessimistic to accept Karl Popper’s “Myth of Framework,” which postulates that “we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories, our expectations, our past experiences, our language, and that as a consequence, we cannot communicate with or judge those working in terms of a different paradigm” (Neufeld 1995:44). Some feminists (for example, Tickner 1996, 2001; Peterson 2002; Steans 2003) appear to embrace this “Myth of Framework” by accentuating the differences between the perspectives of feminist and IR theorists based on their past experiences and languages and criticize IR theorists for their lack of communication with feminist IR scholars. Ironically, the “Myth of Framework” shares a number of assumptions with Hobbes’s description of the state of nature that feminists routinely reject. The “Myth of Framework” assumes no middle ground scholars are presumably entrenched in their own worldviews without hope of compromise or the ability to understand others’ worldviews. If this is the case, scholars are doomed to discussions with likeminded individuals rather than having a productive dialogue with those outside their own worldview. Scholars who accept the “Myth of Framework” have essentially created a Tower of Babel in which they choose not to understand each other’s language. The acceptance of such a myth creates conflict and establishes a hierarchy within international relations scholarship even though conventional feminists theoretically seek to identify and eradicate conflict and hierarchy within society as a whole.

AT GENDER IR: PERM

**The perm solves best: IR criticism is only effective when it is combined with practical policy making.**

**Keohane, 98** (“Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between International Relations and Feminist Theory” Robert O. Keohane, Duke University. *International Studies Quarterly* 42, 193-198. <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/action/showPdf?submitPDF=Full+Text+PDF+%2889+KB%29&doi=10.1111%2F0020-8833.00076>

The problem with Tickner’s dichotomies, however, goes much deeper. The dichotomies should be replaced by continua, with the dichotomous characterizations at the poles. Each analyst of world politics has to locate herself or himself somewhere along the dimensions between critical and problem-solving theory, nomothetic and narrative epistemology, and a social or structural conception of international relations. In my view, none of the ends of these continua are the optimal places to rest one’s perspective. Criticism of the world, by itself, becomes a jeremiad, often resting implicitly on a utopian view of human potential. Without analysis, furthermore, it constitutes merely the opinion of one or a number of people. On the other hand, implicit or complacent acceptance of the world as it is would rob the study of international relations of much of its meaning. How could one identify “problems” without criticism at some level? The issue is not problem-solving vs. critical theory- a convenient device for discarding work that one does not wish to accept- but how deeply the criticism should go. For example, most students of war study it because they hope to expose its evils or to control it in some way: few do so to glorify war as such. But the depth of their critique varies. Does the author reject certain acts of warfare, all warfare, all coercion, or the system of states itself? The deeper the criticism, the more wide-ranging the questions. Narrowly problem-solving work, as in much policy analysis, often ignores the most important causal factors in a situation because they are not manipulable in the short run. However, the more critical and wide-ranging an author’s perspective, the more difficult it is to do comparative empirical analysis. An opponent of some types of war can compare the causes of different wars, as a way to help to eliminate those that are regarded as pernicious; but the opponent of the system of states has to imagine the counterfactual situation of a system without states.

AT GENDER IR: 3RD WORLD FEMINISM

**Feminism that prioritizes theory over material experience excludes the voices of third world feminists.**

**Oloka-Onyango and Tamale, 95** "The Personal is Political" or Why Womens Rights are Indeed Human Rights. J. Oloka-Onyango and Slyvia Tamale. Human Rights Quarterly 17.4, 691-731 . Joe Oloka-Onyango is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Uganda, and spent the 1994-1995 academic year as a Visiting Professor at the University of Minnesota. Sylvia Tamale holds law degrees from Makerere University (Uganda) and Harvard Law School. She is currently a doctoral student in Sociology and Feminist Studies at the University of Minnesota, Project Muse).

In tandem with such an approach, feminists in third world contexts must be wary of cooptation and exploitation--a trait of western societies that appears to not respect boundaries of sex--particularly because the dominant mode of international feminism reflects the dominant character and color of international relations, Bourgeois/white, often predatory, and paternalistic. <sup>26</sup> As Maivân Lãm has recently pointed out in an article aptly entitled, *Feeling Foreign in Feminism*, the agenda of Western feminism appears not only to be off target, but also "filmic." <sup>27</sup> According to Lãm, Western feminism is "too cleanly and detachedly representational, with little connection to the ongoing lives of women who have experienced racial or colonial discrimination. . . ." <sup>28</sup> Vasuki Nesiiah is even more critical of the transposition of Western feminism onto the international scene because it ignores "global contradictions" 29 by emphasizing the commonality of women's experience. Instead, she urges theorists to look at gender identities as being "continually reconstituted through social processes."

**Feminists that prioritize theory over reform marginalize third world women.**

**Oloka-Onyango and Tamale, 95** "The Personal is Political" or Why Womens Rights are Indeed Human Rights. J. Oloka-Onyango and Slyvia Tamale. Human Rights Quarterly 17.4, 691-731 . Joe Oloka-Onyango is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Makerere University, Uganda, and spent the 1994-1995 academic year as a Visiting Professor at the University of Minnesota. Sylvia Tamale holds law degrees from Makerere University (Uganda) and Harvard Law School. She is currently a doctoral student in Sociology and Feminist Studies at the University of Minnesota, Project Muse).

In a succinct treatment of the issue elsewhere, Hilary Charlesworth points out that feminists "should aim not for respectability and acceptance through developing a specialized branch of women's international law because this would leave the international legal system unchanged. We must work to change *the heartland of international law and its institutions.*" <sup>51</sup> However, in her essay in *Women's Rights*, Charlesworth devotes a scant paragraph to the issue of third world feminism and even then, only in its relationship to first world feminism. <sup>52</sup> A more inclusive examination would have incorporated the views of Southern feminists on the international legal and political regime. <sup>53</sup> Third world discourse must be integrated directly into the critique of dominant structures of knowledge and power in academia, rather than "added in and stirred" as an afterthought. This is particularly necessary in light of the assault on southern institutions of advanced learning and intellectual culture by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank structural adjustment policies (SAPs). <sup>54</sup> Of course, internationalist works that include and are sensitive to the concerns of third world scholars are far better than those which presume to speak to and for them. Unfortunately, the latter are in far greater abundance. Such imbalance imports a special duty among those who experience similar conditions of exclusion in academia to allow for the expression of marginalized voices beyond the "particularities" of their geographical contexts. <sup>55</sup> In short, the "gates" must be opened even wider to ensure that international feminist theory is truly decolonized and thematically internationalized. Otherwise, we remain with the same problem as the debacle of WID--nominal participation and continuing marginalization--or just lip-service to multiculturalism and universal human rights.

**\*\*GLOBAL LOCAL\*\***



AT GLOBAL LOCAL: PERM

**Local resistance must be combined with larger struggles to be effective.**

**Gills – 02** [Barry K, Chair of the World Historical Systems theory group of the International Studies Association and a faculty affiliate of the Globalization Research Center of the University of Hawaii, “Democratizing Globalization and Globalizing Democracy, May, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May]

In this sense, we may conclude that we are living through the (gradual or sudden?) demise of the old world order and the (slow or sudden?) birth of a new one. Economically, this new order is based on an increased level of global economic integration and unison. Politically, however, it is premised on the need to translate grassroots participatory political action into increasingly popular democratic forms of governance at local, national, regional, and global levels (Gills 2000c; 2001). Moreover, it is also based on a real need to combine the peoples and social forces of North and South in new ways, bringing together new coalitions drawn from movements around the world. The governments and the corporations of the world must now listen to and accommodate the demands of the peoples of the whole world, who represent the voice of the governed. This new reality, which in my view is an objective one and not mere idealism, therefore requires a new [\*169] paradigm. This new paradigm of world order must be based profoundly on multicivilizational dialogue and universal inclusion. Rather than a political order based on one nation, we are moving toward the need for a political order based on one humanity, and only democratic norms can accommodate such a form of governance.

**Local struggles are not enough—global impacts require large-scale responses too.**

**Best and Kellner, 01** - Assoc. Prof Phil. and Human. U Texas and Phil. Of Ed. Chair – 2001 (Steven and Douglas, “Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future,” Illuminations, <http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell28.htm>)

The emphasis on local struggles and micropower, cultural politics which redefine the political, and attempts to develop political forms relevant to the problems and developments of the contemporary age is extremely valuable, but there are also certain limitations to the dominant forms of postmodern politics. While an emphasis on micropolitics and local struggles can be a healthy substitute for excessively utopian and ambitious political projects, one should not lose sight that key sources of political power and oppression are precisely the big targets aimed at by modern theory, including capital, the state, imperialism, and patriarchy. Taking on such major targets involves coalitions and multi-front struggle, often requiring a politics of alliance and solidarity that cuts across group identifications to mobilize sufficient power to struggle against, say, the evils of capitalism or the state. Thus, while today we need the expansion of localized cultural practices, they attain their real significance only within the struggle for the transformation of society as a whole. Without this systemic emphasis, cultural and identity politics remain confined to the margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism, hedonism, aestheticism, or personal therapy, where they pose no danger and are immediately coopted by the culture industries.

**Global resistance needed to create broad coalitions.**

**Gills – 02** (Barry K, Chair of the World Historical Systems theory group of the International Studies Association and a faculty affiliate of the Globalization Research Center of the University of Hawaii, “Democratizing Globalization and Globalizing Democracy, May, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May)

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AT GLOBAL LOCAL: PERM TO DELUCA

**Perm – do both – a coordination of local and global action avoids the disadvantages of solely local action**

**Retzinger, 99** – Professor at the University of California Berkley (Jean P. “Making Connections: Examining Global and Local Activism in the Scholarship of Kevin Michael DeLuca and Tarla Rai Peterson”, [http://www.esf.edu/ecn/downloads/ecd02\\_retzinger.pdf](http://www.esf.edu/ecn/downloads/ecd02_retzinger.pdf))

The second task DeLuca identifies for critical rhetoricians is to “make connections among local struggles” (153). DeLuca again is engaged here in a debate with “sympathetic critics” (81) like Harvey and Jameson who challenge the effectiveness of local activism. Harvey, for example, perceives community-based activism as vulnerable to “parochialism, myopia, and self-referentiality” and in which “respect for others gets mutilated in the fires of competition between the fragments” (Harvey 351). DeLuca cites Jameson’s claim that “the crucial issue in the politics of the postmodern’ is the inability to coordinate local and global struggles” (82). Yet rather than questioning the very concept of a “global struggle” or Jameson’s assertion that such **local and global coordination is either possible or necessary**, DeLuca edges away from celebrating place-based, local activism towards privileging “larger-than-local discourses” (82).

**The alternative fails – it leads to a denaturing of context and serves to obliterate groups**

**Retzinger, 99** – Professor at the University of California Berkley (Jean P. “Making Connections: Examining Global and Local Activism in the Scholarship of Kevin Michael DeLuca and Tarla Rai Peterson”, [http://www.esf.edu/ecn/downloads/ecd02\\_retzinger.pdf](http://www.esf.edu/ecn/downloads/ecd02_retzinger.pdf)) // MDP

DeLuca specifically challenges Harvey’s concerns about the consequences of postmodernism for politics or social movements. In contrast to Harvey’s contention that “fetishizing locality and place lead to an incoherent politics that isolates and disempowers local resistances while aiding global corporate capitalism,” DeLuca instead wonders if the condition of postmodernity could instead “offer hope for a radical democratic politics” (64). Concurring that the re-conceptualization of space and time is a defining characteristic of postmodernism, DeLuca argues that the “postmodern social field” in which radical environmental groups operate offers significant advantages, most notably a “distrust of grand narratives like progress and the valorization of the local” (152). But these advantages are jeopardized by the “denaturing of context,” or, as Katherine Hayles puts it, a state in which “contemporary Americans live ‘within the context of no context” (quoted in DeLuca 152-53). DeLuca himself points to the fact that “the postmodern compression of space . . . leads us to metaphorically conceive of our world as a ‘global village’ or ‘spaceship earth” which serves to “obliterate particular places” (152). And the rhetoric of the global, DeLuca continues, “puts radical environmental groups at a distinct disadvantage” (152-53). But to support this point, he cites Harvey’s contention that **environmental groups are “generally better at organizing in and dominating place than they are at commanding space”** (Harvey quoted in DeLuca 152-53). Somewhat surprisingly, rather than directly questioning the merit of the goal implicit in this statement--or even critiquing the “enlightenment” language Harvey employs here—DeLuca repeats this statement twice on a single page before identifying “the needs to learn from history and to make connections among local struggles” (153) as the vital tasks for critical rhetoricians.

**This recreates past failed movements**

**Esteva and Prakash, 98** – President of the 5<sup>th</sup> World Congress on Rural Sociology and Professor of Educational Theory at the University of Pennsylvania State (Gustavo and Madhu Suri, “Grassroots Post-Modernism – Remaking the Soil of Cultures”, Page 20)//MDP

Until now, however, it appears as if most of the social movements or campaigns trying to resist the new “global” phenomena have proven to be highly ineffective. Some of them are even counterproductive, getting the opposite of what they are looking for; rooting and deepening in people and society the very evils against which they are struggling. True, many workers’ strikes do succeed in protecting Jobs or pension plans. At the same time, however, they also legitimize and consolidate the policies and orientations creating unemployment or dismantling the welfare state. **Amongst the people struggling for some security in their lives, many assume that they have no more than one political option: that the best they can do is to protect their own situation; get some compensation for what they are losing; and hope that the promises offered in exchange for their sacrifices will one day be fulfilled. Such beliefs reinforce the “Global Project.”**

AT GLOBAL LOCAL: EMPIRE TURN

**The imperial machine operates because of futile local resistance**

**Hardt and Nergi, 2000** - Political Philosopher Based at Duke University and Marxist Philosopher (Antonio and Michael, "Empire", Harvard University Press) // MDP

This new framework of legitimacy includes new forms and new articulations of the exercise of legitimate force. During its formation, the new power must demonstrate the effectiveness of its force at the same time that the bases of its legitimation are being constructed. In fact, the legitimacy of the new power is in part based directly on the effectiveness of its use of force. The way the effectiveness of the new power is demonstrated has nothing to do with the old international order that is slowly dying away; nor has it much use for the instruments the old order left behind. The deployments of the imperial machine are defined by a whole series of new characteristics, such as the unbounded terrain of its activities, the singularization and symbolic localization of its actions, and the connection of repressive action to all the aspects of the biopolitical structure of society. For lack of a better term we continue to call these "interventions." This is merely a terminological and not a conceptual deficiency, for these are not really interventions into independent juridical territories but rather actions within a unified world by the ruling structure of production and communication. In effect, intervention has been internalized and universalized.

**Empire can only be confronted on a global scale – localized action inevitably fails**

**Hardt and Nergi, 2000** - Political Philosopher Based at Duke University and Marxist Philosopher (Antonio and Michael, "Empire", Harvard University Press) // MDP

Our study set out from the hypothesis that the power of Empire and the mechanisms of imperial sovereignty can be understood only when confronted on the most general scale, in their globality. We believe that toward the end of challenging and resisting Empire and its world market, it is necessary to pose any alternative at an equally global level. Any proposition of a particular community in isolation, defined in racial, religious, or regional terms, "delinked" from Empire, shielded from its powers by fixed boundaries, is destined to end up as a kind of ghetto. Empire cannot be resisted by a project aimed at a limited, local autonomy. We cannot move back to any previous social form, nor move forward in isolation. Rather, we must push through Empire to come out the other side. Deleuze and Guattari argued that rather than resist capital's globalization, we have to accelerate the process. "But which," they ask, "is the revolutionary path? Is there one? -To withdraw from the world market . . . ? Or might it be to go in the opposite direction? To go still further, that is, in the movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialization?" [1] Empire can be effectively contested only on its own level of generality and by pushing the processes that it offers past their present limitations. We have to accept that challenge and learn to think globally and act globally. Globalization must be met with a counter-globalization, Empire with a counter-Empire.

## AT GLOBAL LOCAL: CAPITALISM TURN

**Localized action props up a global capitalist hierarchy.**

**Hardt and Nergi, 2000**- Political Philosopher Based at Duke University and Marxist Philosopher (Antonio and Michael, "Empire", Harvard University Press) // MDP

Left that has followed the 1960s, a large portion of critical thought, both in the dominant countries of capitalist development and in the subordinated ones, has sought to recompose sites of resistance that are founded on the identities of social subjects or national and regional groups, often grounding political analysis on the localization of struggles. Such arguments are sometimes constructed in terms of "place-based" movements or politics, in which the boundaries of place (conceived either as identity or as territory) are posed against the undifferentiated and homogeneous space of global networks.[2] At other times such political arguments draw on the long tradition of Leftist nationalism in which (in the best cases) the nation is conceived as the primary mechanism of defense against the domination of foreign and/or global capital. [3] Today the operative syllogism at the heart of the various forms of "local" Leftist strategy seems to be entirely reactive: If capitalist domination is becoming ever more global, then our resistances to it must defend the local and construct barriers to capital's accelerating flows. From this perspective, the real globalization of capital and the constitution of Empire must be considered signs of dispossession and defeat. We maintain, however, that today this localist position, although we admire and respect the spirit of some of its proponents, is both false and damaging. It is false first of all because the problem is poorly posed. In many characterizations the problem rests on a false dichotomy between the global and the local, assuming that the global entails homogenization and undifferentiated identity whereas the local preserves heterogeneity and difference. Often implicit in such arguments is the assumption that the differences of the local are in some sense natural, or at least that their origin remains beyond question. Local differences preexist the present scene and must be defended or protected against the intrusion of globalization. It should come as no surprise, given such assumptions, that many defenses of the local adopt the terminology of traditional ecology or even identify this "local" political project with the defense of nature and biodiversity. This view can easily devolve into a kind of primordialism that fixes and romanticizes social relations and identities. What needs to be addressed, instead, is precisely the production of locality, that is, the social machines that create and recreate the identities and differences that are understood as the local.[4] The differences of locality are neither preexisting nor natural but rather effects of a regime of production. Globality similarly should not be understood in terms of cultural, political, or economic homogenization. Globalization, like localization, should be understood instead as a regime of the production of identity and difference, or really of homogenization and heterogenization. The better framework, then, to designate the distinction between the global and the local might refer to different networks of flows and obstacles in which the local moment or perspective gives priority to the reterritorializing barriers or boundaries and the global moment privileges the mobility of deterritorializing flows. It is false, in any case, to claim that we can (re)establish local identities that are in some sense outside and protected against the global flows of capital and Empire.

**Localization can become vehicle for imperial oppression—they type of policy, not the type of administration matters.**

**Hardt and Nergi, 2000** - Political Philosopher Based at Duke University and Marxist Philosopher (Antonio and Michael, "Empire", Harvard University Press) // MDP

This Leftist strategy of resistance to globalization and defense of locality is also damaging because in many cases what appear as local identities are not autonomous or self-determining but actually feed into and support the development of the capitalist imperial machine. The globalization or deterritorialization operated by the imperial machine is not in fact opposed to localization or reterritorialization, but rather sets in play mobile and modulating circuits of differentiation and identification. The strategy of local resistance misidentifies and thus masks the enemy. We are by no means opposed to the globalization of relationships as such-in fact, as we said, the strongest forces of Leftist internationalism have effectively led this process. The enemy, rather, is a specific regime of global relations that we call Empire. More important, this strategy of defending the local is damaging because it obscures and even negates the real alternatives and the potentials for liberation that exist within Empire. We should be done once and for all with the search for an outside, a standpoint that imagines a purity for our politics. It is better both theoretically and practically to enter the terrain of Empire and confront its homogenizing and heterogenizing flows in all their complexity, grounding our analysis in the power of the global multitude.

AT GLOBAL LOCAL: MORALITY TURN

**We have a moral obligation to the global community, where we were born and where we live are all just accidents.**

**Nussbaum, 94** – Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School

(Martha, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," The Boston Review, [www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan/nussbaum1.html](http://www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan/nussbaum1.html))

<Asked where he came from, the ancient Greek Cynic philosopher Diogenes replied, "I am a citizen of the world." He meant by this, it appears, that he refused to be defined by his local origins and local group memberships, so central to the self-image of a conventional Greek male; he insisted on defining himself in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns. The Stoics who followed his lead developed his image of the kosmou politês or world citizen more fully, arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities -- the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration that "is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun" (Seneca, De Otio). It is this community that is, most fundamentally, the source of our moral obligations. With respect to the most basic moral values such as justice, "we should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors" (Plutarch, On the Fortunes of Alexander). We should regard our deliberations as, first and foremost, deliberations about human problems of people in particular concrete situations, not problems growing out of a national identity that is altogether unlike that of others. Diogenes knew that the invitation to think as a world citizen was, in a sense, an invitation to be an exile from the comfort of patriotism and its easy sentiments, to see our own ways of life from the point of view of justice and the good. The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might have been born in any nation. Recognizing this, his Stoic successors held, we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings. We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect. >

**Working global allows us to have self-knowledge, solve our problems better, and allows us to recognize the value of each and every person**

**Nussbaum, 94** – Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School

(Martha, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," The Boston Review, [www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan/nussbaum1.html](http://www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan/nussbaum1.html))

<Stoics who hold that good civic education is education for world citizenship recommend this attitude on three grounds. First, they hold that the study of humanity as it is realized in the whole world is valuable for self-knowledge: we see ourselves more clearly when we see our ways in relation to those of other reasonable people. Second, they argue, as does Tagore, that we will be better able to solve our problems if we face them in this way. No theme is deeper in Stoicism than the damage done by faction and local allegiances to the political life of a group. Political deliberation, they argue, is sabotaged again and again by partisan loyalties, whether to one's team at the Circus or to one's nation. Only by making our fundamental allegiance that to the world community of justice and reason do we avoid these dangers. Finally, they insist that the stance of the kosmou politês is intrinsically valuable. For it recognizes in persons what is especially fundamental about them, most worthy of respect and acknowledgment: their aspirations to justice and goodness and their capacities for reasoning in this connection. This aspect may be less colorful than local or national traditions and identities -- and it is on this basis that the young wife in Tagore's novel spurns it in favor of qualities in the nationalist orator Sandip that she later comes to see as superficial; it is, the Stoics argue, both lasting and deep.>

AT GLOBAL LOCAL: GLOBAL GOOD

**Reform must come from within the system – the government is needed for substantive change**

**Taylor, 2K** – Oshkosh Foundation Professor of Religion and Social Ethics, and Director of Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin (Bron, Beneath the Surface, 2000, pg. 282)//NHH

Certainly the resistance of civil society to globalization and its destructive inertia is honorable and important, even a part of a wider sustainability strategy. But there will be no victories over globalization and corporate capitalism, and no significant progress toward sustainability, without new forms of international, enforceable, global environmental governance. Indeed, without new restraints on power, both within nations and internationally, the most beautiful bioregional experiments and models will be overwhelmed and futile. Even bioregional deep ecologists deeply committed to this new Green ideology sometimes realize that lasting victories must be gained through legislation or secured in the courts. The history of environmental politics ill the United States certainly demonstrates that, contrary to bioregional ideology, it is often people far away who care more for specific places than those near them. This dynamic is apparent in federal legislation and judicial rulings; they have repeatedly provided wildlands greater protection from local extractive interests than would have been the case were such places left exclusively under local jurisdiction." It is curious to me that so few bioregional deep ecologists notice the irony when their adversaries in the "wise use" movement parrot their primary *political* objective, decentralization and local control." Such realities provide ample reason for skepticism that decentralization along bioregional lines will bring the desired transformations, at least in the foreseeable future.

**Global planning and global knowledge are key to survival.**

**Nussbaum, 94** – Professor of Law and Ethics at University of Chicago Law School

(Martha, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," The Boston Review, [www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan/nussbaum1.html](http://www.soci.niu.edu/~phildept/Kapitan/nussbaum1.html))

<We make headway solving problems that require international cooperation. The air does not obey national boundaries. This simple fact can be, for children, the beginning of the recognition that, like it or not, we live in a world in which the destinies of nations are closely intertwined with respect to basic goods and survival itself. The pollution of third-world nations who are attempting to attain our high standard of living will, in some cases, end up in our air. No matter what account of these matters we will finally adopt, any intelligent deliberation about ecology -- as, also, about the food supply and population -- requires global planning, global knowledge, and the recognition of a shared future. >

AT GLOBAL LOCAL: GLOBAL GOOD

**Local action fails – business and governments will prevent successful environmental solutions**

**Held, 08** – Editor of the Environmental Activism Guide

(Tamilla Held is the editor of the Environmental Activism Guide. "Environmental Activism guide" June 15, 2008)

<http://uk.oneworld.net/guides/environmentalactivism//DMS>

Social justice issues come to the fore in local campaigning. Over recent years local communities have become increasingly active in finding their own solutions to their immediate environmental and social problems. However, typically lacking financial muscle and awareness of their rights, local activists all too often face prosecution by corrupt governments and businesses. The fight for the environment, especially at grassroots level, is inseparable from the fight for the human rights. The eco-justice movement links the goal of environmental protection to the goals of social justice, peace, and the recognition of the rights of all marginalized and underprivileged people. Environmental action has to be driven by a strong understanding of what is just and fair, and be delivered through democratic institutions, such as representative grassroots organizations which have an immediate stake in the local environment. There are too many examples of solutions which merely drive the problem away from rich to poor communities. Failures of eco-justice are also to be found at international level, in the abuse of the developing world by rich countries. From toxic waste dumped on the beaches of Somalia, a country with no government, to the attempted decommissioning of an asbestos-ridden French warship in an Indian dockyard, developing countries find themselves treated as second class environmental citizens. Climate change, the footprint of the rich on the poor, is the ultimate expression of environmental injustice.

AT GLOBAL LOCAL: CEDES THE POLITICAL

**Grassroots activism fails – it is poorly structured and cannot fully inform people, destroying movements.**  
**Stoker, 06** – Professor of Politics, University of Manchester (Gerry, “WHY POLITICS MATTERS: MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK”, 2006, Pg. 114-115)

There can be little doubt that the democratic world would be less rich and less open without the impact of this activism. However, there are a number of limitations to both its nature and scale. Although there is evidence of activists' influence and capacity to hold governments and business to account, the scale of activists' activities should not be overplayed; they are too few in number and restricted in membership to have the resources to achieve all their objectives. Two criticisms may also be made of the way they bring citizens into the political process. First, as Jan Aart Scholte argues, civil society institutions' often fall short on democratic credentials in their own behaviour' and some 'have been run with top-down managerial authoritarianism that stifles internal debate dissent' :38 Some advocates who have claimed to speak for the grass roots have actually rarely ventured into the field. On the contrary, a number of jet-setting staff have lost touch with their notional beneficiaries as they fly from one global conference to the next.<sup>39</sup> Some of the organizations involved are fronts for governments, or corporations, families, political parties and foundations. Even those which are properly autonomous are often not clear about how their leaders emerged and where their policy positions came from: the democratic credentials of these civil society organizations or networks cannot always be taken for granted. Global civil society in particular is often the preserve of professional activists. Second, these organizations rely on the mass media - TV, radio and the press - to get their message out into the wider political world, and are prone to offer a rather simplistic understanding of political issues. As protest has got more global so the media appears to play a bigger and bigger part in getting the protesters out on the street and keeping the protest going. Protest as such has become as much a part of the world of spin and media manipulation as the more traditional practices of politics. The priorities of mobilization demand simple, easy messages, not an in-depth understanding of complex issues. As Martin Shaw points out, the argument over the Iraq War in 2003 showed how millions could respond in support of the simple demand to 'Stop the War', but had little to say about what todo in the aftermath or whether leaving Saddam in power would have been better. We can draw the conclusion that [A] mass demonstration is a blunt instrument. In an intense crisis, which poses one seemingly simple question above all others, such a movement allows large numbers of people to offer an answer and influence the more conventional political process ... but when issues become more complex ... this kind of movement becomes less relevant. The mass mobilization runs out of steam, and a more specialized politics takes over once the energy and commitment of protesters can no longer be sustained. The problem with this kind of engagement is that it offers only an 'over-simplified politics':40 the engagement stops precisely at the moment that politics is designed to deal with, when conflicts are not clear cut and solutions are not obvious. Protest movement politics can degenerate into a form of identity politics. People protest as a lifestyle statement because it tells us something about them rather than making any sustained contribution to the political process. Marilyn Taylor is right to argue that 'wearing the "t" shirt and identifying with campaigning organizations can still be an important form of political 'expression and identity', but it is a limited and constrained form of engagement. Protest politics has an important place, and for a small group of activists it can provide an intense and extensive base for engagement. For most citizens, however, it provides just another opportunity to say what they care about and reinforce a sense of identity - one that they can take up or leave as they please.



**AT GLOBAL LOCAL: CEDES THE POLITICAL**

**Local movements breed inaction and corruption because of the refusal to tie themselves to a national agenda.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture", page 258)

This is precisely the paradox at the heart of contemporary U.S. politics and of the new conservatism's successes. A large proportion of the population is outraged by at least some of what is going on, yet-with the exception of those active on the Right-they remain largely inactive and uncommitted. There is a feeling of helplessness: what can anyone do? Even if you could get enough people involved, would it do any' good? And if it did, then the whole thing would no doubt be quickly corrupted by its own success. When people do protest or struggle, it is often so specific and local that it cannot be mobilized into a larger national alliance. The depoliticization of the population, its disinvestment from active political issues and struggles-its apathy, as it were-is very real and I believe that it has to be constantly produced. This is at least one crucial element within the contemporary hegemonic struggle.

**Local movements get co-opted by a conservative agenda—Earth Day proves.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture", pages 278-279)

The new conservatism embodies, not a political rebellion but a rebellion against politics. It makes politics into an other, located on the other side of the frontier. Anyone who actually talks about serious problems and their solutions is a dreamer; anyone who celebrates the mood in which the problem is at once terrifying and boring is a realist. It is no longer believing too strongly that is dangerous, but actually thinking that one is supposed to make one's dreams come true. The failure of Earth Day cannot be explained by merely pointing to its status as a feel-good media event, nor by pointing out the increasingly hypocritical appropriation of "green politics" by corporate polluters. It is rather that ecology, like any "politics," has become a question of attitude and investment, as if investing in the "correct" ideological beliefs, even demonstrating it, was an adequate construction of the political. Within the new conservative articulation of the frontier, political positions only exist as entirely affective investments, separated from any ability to act.

AT GLOBAL LOCAL: CEDES THE POLITICAL

**The refusal to engage in politics backfires—intellectuals become disempowered because they refuse to take action beyond local revolutions.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture”, pages 361-363)

It is a question of the strategic deployment of the postmodern sensibility into everyday life, of the articulation of the very structures of everyday empowerment into larger structures of political disempowerment. By erasing anything but local antagonisms, people are disempowered by their search for empowerment, demobilized by their very mobility. Intellectuals have allowed theory to direct their work even when it contradicts the real demands of historical domination and oppression, as in the following double transformation of "power": Not the overt power of armies and governments, but the more subtle powers encoded in the social order of modernism which has positioned the experiences of being female, male, black and white, an artist, reader, writer, from First or Third World, as having an immovable and constitutive character. Against these orders and powers, postmodernism has proposed a more multiplex, shifting, heterogeneous set of cultural relations that have persistently evaded stable and particular readings and meanings, have evaded the snares of grand systematic narratives, have challenged the hegemony of totalising doctrine and historically-rooted theory. In their desire to renounce vanguardism, hierarchy and authoritarianism, too many intellectuals have also renounced the value of intellectual and political authority. This renunciation of authority is predicated on a theoretical crisis of representation in which the authority of any knowledge is suspect, since all knowledge is historically determined and implicated in hierarchical relations of power. The political reflection of this suspicion is that structures and hierarchy are equated with domination. Intellectuals cannot claim to speak the "truth" of the world, and they cannot speak for or in the name of other people. There are only two strategies available to the critic. First, the ability to describe the reality of people's experience or position in the world can be given over entirely to the people who are the subjects of the analysis. They are "allowed" to speak for themselves within the intellectual's discourse. The critic merely inscribes the other's own sense of their place within and relationship to specific experiences and practices. 11 Second, the critic analyzes his or her own position self-reflexively, and its consequences for his or her study (i. e., my history and position have determined the inevitable failure of my authority) but without privileging that position. 12 In either case, there is little room for the critic's own authority. While such a moment of intellectual suspicion is necessary, it goes too far when it assumes that all knowledge claims are equally unjustified and unjustifiable, leaving the critic to celebrate difference and a radical and pluralist relativism. The fact of contextual determination does not by itself mean that all knowledge claims are false, nor does it mean that all such claims are equally invalid or useless responses to a particular context. It need not entail relativism. The fact that specific discourses are articulated into relations of power does not mean that these relations are necessary or guaranteed, nor that all knowledges are equally bad-and to be opposed-for even if they are implicated with particular structures of power, there is no reason to assume that all structures of power are equally bad. Such an assumption would entail the futility of political struggle and the end of history . This is the conundrum of the intellectual Left, for you can't have knowledge without standards and authority. Similarly, although all structures of commonality, normality and the sacred may be suspect, social existence itself is impossible without at least the imagination of such possibilities.

**\*\*HARDT AND NEGRI/EMPIRE\*\***

**AT HARDT/NEGRI: ALTERNATIVE → TERRORISM**

**Hardt and Negri's alternative is an endorsement of terrorism – the multitude's revolt against capitalism is empirically violent.**

**Balakrishnan, 2000** (Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, <http://newleftreview.org/A2275>)

In addition to having a career as an influential political philosopher, with widely-translated books on Spinoza and Marx to his credit, Negri is a convicted terrorist. In 1979, the Italian government arrested Negri, at the time a political science professor at the University of Padua, and accused him of being the secret brains behind the Red Brigades, the Italian version of the Weathermen in the U.S. or the Baader-Meinhoff Gang in West Germany—left-wing groups that during the 1970s sought to overthrow capitalism through campaigns of terrorist violence. Italian authorities believed that Negri himself planned the infamous 1979 kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, the leader of Italy's Christian Democratic Party. Just before Aldo's execution, his distraught wife got a taunting phone call, telling her that her husband was about to die. The voice was allegedly Negri's. Unable to build a strong enough case to try the philosopher for murder, Italian authorities convicted him on lesser charges of "armed insurrection against the state." Negri's theoretical work was in keeping with his terrorist activities. He had become the leading voice of Italy's ultra-Left by advancing an inventive reinterpretation of Marx's Grundrisse that located the agent of social revolution not among the industrial proletariat, largely co-opted as it was by capitalist wealth and bourgeois democratic freedoms, but among those marginalized from economic and political life: the criminal, the part-time worker, the unemployed. These dispossessed souls, Negri felt, would be far quicker to unleash the riotous confrontations with the state that he saw as necessary to destroying capitalism

**Hardt and Negri's alternative justifies terrorist attacks.**

**Wolfe, 01** (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4<sup>th</sup>, [http://www.powells.com/review/2001\\_10\\_04](http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04))

We cannot know, of course, whether Hardt and Negri, in the light of the recent atrocities at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, will want to change their minds about the progressive potential of Islamic fundamentalism. But their book gives no grounds on which such attacks can be condemned. For if being against the West is the sine qua non of good and effective protest, well, no one could accuse the murderers in New York and Washington of not being against Western hegemony. And if it is true, as Hardt and Negri blithely claim, that efforts to find legitimate reasons for intervening in world affairs are only a smokescreen for the exercise of hegemonic power, then the way is cleared for each and every illegitimate act of global intervention, since in the postmodern world of this book no justifiable distinctions between good and evil acts can ever be made.

**AT HARDT/NEGRI: ALTERNATIVE → TERRORISM**

**Hardt and Negri are so eager to oppose capitalism that their alternative embraces terrorism and misogyny**

**Wolfe, 01** (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4<sup>th</sup>, [http://www.powells.com/review/2001\\_10\\_04](http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04))

The authors of Empire see no reason to exclude explicit reactionaries, including religious fundamentalists, from the catalogue of post-Fordist movements that they admire. Fundamentalists, they write, are often portrayed as anti-modernist, but this is Western propaganda. "It is more accurate and more useful...to understand the various fundamentalism [sic] not as the re-creation of a pre-modern world, but rather as a powerful refusal of the contemporary historical passage in course." Neglecting to mention the Taliban's treatment of women, Hardt and Negri go out of their way to reassure readers of the genuinely subversive nature of the Islamic version of fundamentalism. These movements are motivated not by nostalgic attempts to reconstruct the past, but by "original thought." They are anti-Western, which means that they are anti-capitalist. Properly understood, they are postmodern rather than premodern, since they engage in a refusal of Western hegemony, with the proviso that fundamentalism speaks to the losers in the globalization project and postmodernism to the winners. Hardt and Negri even leave the impression that, if they had to choose between the postmodernists in Western universities and the fundamentalists in Iran, they would prefer the latter: "The losers in the process of globalization might indeed be the ones who give us the strongest indication of the transformation in process."

**Hardt and Negri support terrorists over democracy—it is political lunacy.**

**Balakrishnan, 2000** (Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, <http://newleftreview.org/A2275>)

Apolitical abstraction and wild-eyed utopianism, a terroristic approach to political argument, hatred for flesh and blood human beings, nihilism: Empire is a poisonous brew of bad ideas. It belongs with Mein Kampf in the library of political madness. Do Empire's many fans really believe their own praise? Does Time really think it's "smart" to call for the eradication of private property, celebrate revolutionary violence, whitewash totalitarianism, and pour contempt on the genuine achievements of liberal democracies and capitalist economics? Would Frederic Jameson like to give up his big salary at Duke? To ask such questions is to answer them. The far left's pleasure is in the adolescent thrill of perpetual rebellion. Too many who should know better refuse to grow up. The ghost of Marx haunts us still. For all its infantilism, the kind of hatred Hardt and Negri express for our flawed but decent democratic capitalist institutions—the best political and economic arrangements man has yet devised and the outcome of centuries of difficult trial and error—is dangerous, especially since it's so common in the university and media. It seems to support Islamist revolutionary hopes, the increasingly violent anti-globalization movement, and kindred political lunacies.

**Empire anarchist rhetoric which praises terrorism and totalitarianism.**

**Wolfe, 01** (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4<sup>th</sup>, [http://www.powells.com/review/2001\\_10\\_04](http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04))

The anarchist flavor of Empire is conveyed most strikingly by its romanticization of violence. Although by now everyone knows that there are terrorists in this world, there are no terrorists in Hardt and Negri's book. There are only people who are called terrorists. "a crude conception and terminological reduction that is rooted in a police mentality." Terms such as "ethnic terrorists" and "drug mafias" appear within quotation marks, as if no serious revolutionary could believe that there were such things. "Totalitarianism" is another pure construct, simply an invention of cold war ideology, that has been used to "denounce the destruction of the democratic sphere...." Certainly the term has little to do with actual life in the Soviet Union, which Hardt and Negri describe as "a society criss-crossed by extremely strong instances of creativity and freedom."

**AT HARDT/NEGRI: ALTERNATIVE JUSTIFIES HOLOCAUST**

**Hardt and Negri argue that the state as always bad and resistance movements are always good – this ignores a critical distinction between democracy and totalitarianism that downplays the Holocaust.**

**Wolfe, 01** (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, “The Snake”, The New Republic Online, October 4<sup>th</sup>, [http://www.powells.com/review/2001\\_10\\_04](http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04))

Negri, when not in prison, has been a political philosopher, and he is the author of numerous books, manifestos, and theses on subjects ranging from Spinoza's metaphysics to the nature of insurgency under contemporary capitalism. In nearly all this work, as in *Empire*, he invariably associates violence with states in the exercise of their power, never with opposition groups and their tactics. For the latter, any action, no matter how insurrectionary, is justified. For the former, any action, no matter how peaceful, is terrorism in disguise. From this warped perspective, all states are equally bad and all movements of opposition are equally good. Only the working of such a myopia can help the reader to understand why the authors of Empire are incapable of mustering any rigorous historical or moral consciousness of Nazism and its policy of Jewish extermination. In their view Nazism is capitalism, and that is the end of the story. Nazi Germany, Hardt and Negri write, far from a unique excursion into human evil, "is the ideal type of the transformation of modern sovereignty into national sovereignty and of its articulation into capitalist form...." Since Nazism is merely normal capitalism — this point of view was once associated with the Frankfurt School, and it survives almost nowhere outside the pages of this book — there is no reason to single out the Nazis or their sympathizers for crimes against humanity. Astonishingly, Hardt and Negri are worse than neutral in their discussion of the Nazi period: they actually heap praise on the ordinary Germans who supported the regime. The obedience of these citizens is called "exemplary" in this book. The authors also celebrate "their military and civil valor in the service of the nation," before moving on to identify the victims whom they valorously helped to send to Buchenwald as "communists, homosexuals, Gypsies, and others," the latter, presumably, being the Jews (whom Hardt and Negri reserve for Auschwitz). I am not making this up. Lest anyone consider these apologetics for Nazism a misreading of my own — how can good leftists, after all, engage in a downplaying of the Holocaust? — Hardt and Negri twice acknowledge that they are completely fed up with the whole question of totalitarianism.

**AT HARDT/NEGRI: GLOBALIZATION GOOD**

**Globalization increases world prosperity and freedom.**

**Balakrishnan, 2000** (Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, <http://newleftreview.org/A2275>)

Inseparable from the failure to think politically, Hardt and Negri, like the rioters endlessly disrupting World Trade Organization meetings, offer no evidence to support their basic charge that economic globalization is causing wide-scale planetary misery. Predictably, this past summer, as the G-8 meeting got underway in Genoa, Italy, the New York Times chose these two "joyful" Communists to write a lengthy op-ed extolling the virtues of anti-globalization rioters. The truth about globalization is exactly the reverse of what Hardt and Negri assert. Globalization is dramatically increasing world prosperity and freedom. As the Economist's John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge point out, in the half century since the foundation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the world economy has expanded six-fold, in part because trade has increased 1,600 percent; nations open to trade grow nearly twice as fast as those that aren't; and World Bank data show that during the past decade of accelerated economic globalization, approximately 800 million people escaped poverty.]

**Globalization allows for justice, solidarity, and democracy.**

**Gills -02** [Barry K, Chair of the World Historical Systems theory group of the International Studies Association and a faculty affiliate of the Globalization Research Center of the University of Hawaii, "Democratizing Globalization and Globalizing Democracy, May, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May]

If there is global capitalism, then the system gives rise to and in fact requires fundamental counterparts, including global justice, global solidarity, global democracy, and global citizenship, the last of these perhaps being especially significant. We need a credible political theory of global democracy based on the new concept of global citizenship rather than merely a pragmatic problem-solving approach. If democracy is a process of building countervailing powers, then the democratic theory we have at present, which is based on countries and their domestic political order, must be transposed to the global level. To do so, we must also elevate or transpose the classic enlightenment democratic ideals of equality, justice, solidarity (fraternity), and liberty to the global level.

**Globalization is inevitable and key to spreading democracy and community empowerment.**

**Gills -02** [Barry K, Chair of the World Historical Systems theory group of the International Studies Association and a faculty affiliate of the Globalization Research Center of the University of Hawaii, "Democratizing Globalization and Globalizing Democracy, May, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May]

Thus, there is likewise a historical dialectic between globalization and democratization, a process that is unavoidable. I firmly believe, on both historical and moral grounds, that this historical dialectic leads strongly, even inexorably, toward the practices and theory of global democracy, that is, to the globalization of democracy and the democratization of globalization. Insofar as neoliberal economic globalization has succeeded, it creates the conditions for further critical social responses that lead to renewed struggles for democratic freedoms and participation by the ordinary people affected by these changes. In these processes of renewed democratic struggles, we may expect to see continued efforts at self-government by many peoples and also expanded representation. Globalization allows the transcending of old established and fixed territorial units and borders of political representation, thus allowing a more territorially diffuse pattern of political community to emerge, and to do so globally. This process deepens democracy by extending it to the global arena but moreover by also devolving power to self-constituting communities seeking self-government and representation in the political order, whether this be on a local, national, regional, or global level.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: CAPITALISM GOOD

**Capitalism is not perfect but is better than Hardt and Negri's alternative—which would devolve into totalitarianism. Balakrishnan, 2000** (Political Science Professor at University of Chicago and member of the editorial board of New Left Review, Gopal, "Hardt and Negri's Empire", New Left Review, September-October, <http://newleftreview.org/A2275>)

Needless to say, economic globalization isn't without its downside. As I've argued in these pages (see "Capitalism and the Suicide of Culture," February 2000), it can—there's no necessity at work—amplify and disseminate some of the less attractive aspects of today's libertine culture. But on balance, as neoconservative sociologist Peter L. Berger has suggested, the empirical evidence proves it far preferable to any alternative economic order we know of. It has profoundly diminished human suffering. If Hardt and Negri's depiction of global capitalism is mendacious, their hazy alternative to it—absolute democracy, open borders, equal compensation—is apolitical utopian nonsense. How would such schemes actually work? Hardt and Negri never say. Do they truly think that "annulling" private property and eliminating nations, if it were somehow possible, would be liberating? Wouldn't it lead to a totalitarian increase in political power, as in the old Soviet Union? But then Hardt and Negri seem to look back fondly on Lenin and Stalin's dark regime. "Cold war ideology called that society totalitarian," they complain, "but in fact it was a society criss-crossed by extremely strong instances of creativity and freedom, just as strong as the rhythms of economic development and cultural modernization." To which one can only respond: Have they never read a page of Solzhenitsyn? Moreover, as filled with admiration as Hardt and Negri are toward the Soviet Union, they are contemptuous toward the decencies and the humbleoften not so humble—freedoms of democratic capitalist societies.



<b>AT HARDT/NEGRI: NO QUALIFIED DATA</b>
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**Hardt and Negri's have no supporting data.**

**Wolfe, 01** (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, "The Snake", The New Republic Online, October 4<sup>th</sup>, [http://www.powells.com/review/2001\\_10\\_04](http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04))

Most of Empire is an exercise in nominalism, in the attempt to name, rather than to describe, to analyze, or even to condemn, the new order that its authors see emerging. Although it is presumably devoted to outlining the contours of a new mode of production, the book contains no data, offers no effort to demonstrate who owns what or holds power over whom, and provides no indicators of any of the deplorable conditions that it discusses. As if once again to distinguish itself from Marx, Empire, like the left Hegelians whom Marx once attacked, moves entirely at the level of ideas. Unlike the left Hegelians, however, Hardt and Negri handle ideas incompetently.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: MULTITUDE FAILS

**The multitude will never be unified—“workers” stand for different objectives and never coordinate.**

**Wolfe, 01** (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, “The Snake”, The New Republic Online, October 4<sup>th</sup>, [http://www.powells.com/review/2001\\_10\\_04](http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04))

Never saying so explicitly, the authors of this book, in identifying their hopes with such disparate movements of protest whatever their targets or their political coloration, are throwing over the most central proposition of Marxism: class consciousness. Workers no longer need to be aware of themselves as workers in order to bring down capitalism. They need not develop a revolutionary strategy, for under contemporary conditions "it may no longer be useful to insist on the old distinction between strategy and tactics." They do not even need to be workers. All that is required is that they set themselves up against power, whatever and wherever power happens to be. Never mind that movements that do so can stand for wildly different objectives — an open society here, a closed society there; or that they are also, as Hardt and Negri point out, often unable or unwilling to communicate with each other. Indeed, as Hardt and Negri do not point out, they might, if they had the chance, prefer to kill one another.

**Hardt and Negri admit they have no idea how the multitude will rise up and over throw Empire.**

**Wolfe, 01** (Alan, director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College, “The Snake”, The New Republic Online, October 4<sup>th</sup>, [http://www.powells.com/review/2001\\_10\\_04](http://www.powells.com/review/2001_10_04))

And redemption will come from the multitude, who despite their oppression under empire — or Empire — remain pure in heart. In them, one can see the emergence of the new city that will put us at one with the world. Unlike Augustine's, of course, their city cannot be the divine one, since "the multitude today...resides on the imperial surfaces where there is no God the Father and no transcendence." Instead, they will create "the earthly city of the multitude," which the authors esoterically define as "the absolute constitution of labor and cooperation." About the practical question of how this can be done, Hardt and Negri have nothing significant to say. "The only response that we can give to these questions is that the action of the multitude becomes political primarily when it begins to confront directly and with an adequate consciousness the central repressive operations of Empire." This, too, is a Christian conception of revolution. We cannot know how we will be saved; we must recognize that if only we have faith, a way will be found.

**AT HARDT/NEGRI: NATION-STATE STRONG**

**The nation state is not dying away—their economic analysis is superficial.**

**Petras, 01** (James, Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University, “Empire With Imperialism”, *Rebellion: Petras Essays* in English, October 29, <http://www.rebellion.org/petras/english/negri010102.htm>)

Assumption 2: The old nation-state governments have been superseded by a new world government, made up of the heads of the IFI, the WTO, and the heads of the MNCs (p. 326). This is an argument that is based on a superficial discussion of epiphenomena, rather than a deeper analytical view of the structure of power. While it is true that the IFIs make many important decisions in a great many geographical locations affecting significant economic and social sectors, these decisions and the decision-makers are closely linked to the imperial states and the MNCs which influence them. All top IFI officials are appointed by their national/imperial governments. All their crucial policy guide lines that dictate their loans and conditions for lending are set by the finance, treasury and economy ministers of the imperial states. The vast majority of funds for the IFIs come from the imperial states. Representation on the executive board of the IFI is based on the proportion of funding by the imperial states. The IMF and the WB have always been led by individuals from the U.S. or E.U. Hardt and Negri's vision of IFI power is based on a discussion of derived power not its imperial states source. In this sense, international power is based in the imperial states not on supra-national entities. The latter concept grossly overestimates the autonomy of the IFIs and underestimates their subordination to the imperial states. The real significance of the IFIs is how they magnify, extend and deepen the power of the imperial states and how they become terrain for competition between rival imperial states. Far from superseding the old states, the IFIs have strengthened their positions.

Assumption 3: One of the common arguments of globalist theorists like Hardt and Negri is that an information revolution has taken place that has eliminated state borders, transformed capitalism and created a new epoch (p.145) by providing a new impetus to the development of the productive forces. The claims that information technologies have revolutionized economies and thus created a new global economy in which nation states and national economies have become superfluous is extremely dubious. A comparison of productivity growth in the U.S. over the past half century fails to support the globalist argument. Between 1953-72, before the so-called information revolution in the U.S. productivity grew an average 2.5%; with the introduction of computers, productivity growth between 1973-95 was less than half. Even in the so-called boom period of 1995-99, productivity growth was 2.5% about the same as the pre-computer period. Japan which makes the most extensive use of computers and robots has witnessed a decade of stagnation and crises. During the year 2000-01, the information sector went into a deep crises, tens of thousands were fired, hundreds of firms went bankrupt, stocks dropped in value some 80%. The speculative bubble, that defined the so-called information economy, burst. Moreover, the major source of growth of productivity claimed by the globalists was in the computerization of the area of computer manufacture. Studies have shown that computer use in offices is directed more toward personal use than to exchanging ideas. Estimates run up to 60% of computer time is spent in activity unrelated to the enterprise. Computer manufacturers account for 1.2% of the U.S. economy and less than 5% of capital stock. Moreover, the U.S. population census provides another explanation for the higher productivity figures - the 5 million illegal immigrants who have flooded the U.S. labor market in the 1990s. Since productivity is measured by the output per estimated worker, the 5 million uncounted workers inflate the productivity data. If the 5 million are included the productivity figures would deflate. With the decline of the information economy and its stock valuations it becomes clear that the "information revolution" is not the transcendent force defining the economies of the major imperial states, let alone defining a new world order. The fact that most people have computers and browse, that some firms have better control over their inventories does not mean that power has shifted beyond the nation-state. The publicists' claims about the "information revolution" ring hollow, as the investors in the world stock markets move funds toward the real economy and away from the high tech firms which show no profits and increasing losses.

**AT HARDT/NEGRI: NATION-STATE STRONG**

**Hardt and Negri's examples of globalization all ignore the crucial role of the nation-state in creating those trends—the nation is not dying away.**

**Post, 02** (Charlie, member of Solidarity's National Committee, "Review: Empire and Revolution", International Viewpoint Magazine, [http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/article.php?id\\_article=435](http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/article.php?id_article=435))

The result of the internationalisation of lean production over the past two decades has not been a 'smooth' or 'decentred global network' or 'empire' that Hardt and Negri claim. Quite the opposite, the centres of accumulation and social power remain in the centres of advanced capitalism in Western Europe, the US and Japan. Global uneven and combined development - the growing gap in incomes, production and the like - between this global 'north' and the global 'south' has only grown wider. Some regions of the former 'third world' have become centres of labour-intensive assembly and parts production (the 'Newly Industrialized Countries' of Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan), becoming extensions of capitalist accumulation centered in the 'north.' However, vast expanses of the globe (sub-Saharan Africa) remain at best sites of raw material extraction, or at worst huge labour reserves, marked by extreme poverty and capitalist-created famine and natural disasters. Hardt and Negri's claims that the nation-state and inter-imperialist rivalry have declined in importance with the rise of 'empire' and various institutions of 'global governance' (World Bank, IMF, WTO, G7, EU, NATO, etc) lack theoretical and even empirical plausibility. The 'declining effectiveness' of the nation-state can be traced clearly through the evolution of a whole series of global juridico-economic bodies, such as GATT, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the IMF. The globalisation of production and circulation, supported by this supranational juridical scaffolding, supersedes the effectiveness of national juridical structures (p 337). Clearly, this 'supranational juridical scaffolding' has been crucial in changing the political environment for capitalist accumulation over the past two decades. Clearly, 'neo-liberalism' - the dismantling of the rules that restrict corporations at home and abroad - would be impossible without these 'global juridico-economic bodies.' However, the growing importance of these trans-national organizations does not mean that, in the words of Hardt and Negri 'state functions and constitutional elements have effectively been displaced to other levels and domains' (p. 307). On the contrary, the ability of these global political bodies to operate effectively requires, in many ways, the strengthening of the national-capitalist state. [Kim Moody presents a compelling alternative analysis. The trans-national corporations (TNCs) have neither the desire nor ability to create a world state. They have opted instead for a system of multilateral agreements and institutions that they hope will provide coherence and order the world market. Through their 'home' governments, the TNCs have attempted to negotiate forms of regulation through the GATT, the new WTO, and the various regional and multilateral trade agreements. They have also transformed some of the old Bretton Woods institutions, notably the World Bank and IMF. [9] To ensure the unhindered operations of the trans-nationals and protect private business property, these global political institutions require national capitalist states capable of denationalising industries, abolishing social welfare programs and labour regulations, generally deregulating their capital, labour and commodities markets, and containing challenges from below. Put simply, rather than representing a simple shift of political powers 'upward' from the nation-state to the 'global juridico-economic bodies', the development of the WTO, EU, and the like actually enhance the role of the nation-state.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: AT BIOPOWER IMPACT

**Powerless people depend upon biopolitics to keep them alive—for example, those suffering from HIV/AIDS would be squeezed out of Hardt and Negri's society because they would be non-productive workers.**

**Bull, 01** (Malcolm, head of art history and theory at Oxford University, "You Can't Build a New Society with a Stanley Knife", London Review of Books, Vol. 23, No. 19, [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n19/bull01\\_.html](http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n19/bull01_.html))

It would, I think, be difficult for Hardt and Negri to turn their argument around in this way. Although they recognise the function of society in the production of individual subjectivities they barely acknowledge its role in the production of power. Using Foucault's model of biopower, they argue that power constitutes society, not the other way round: 'Power, as it produces, organises; as it organises, it speaks and expresses itself as authority.' In reply to Machiavelli's observation that the project of constructing a new society needs arms and money, they cite Spinoza and ask: 'Don't we already possess them? Don't the necessary weapons reside precisely within the creative and prophetic power of the multitude?' No one is powerless; even the old, the sick and the unemployed are engaged in the 'immaterial labour' that produces 'total social capital'. Sounding a bit like Ali G, they conclude: 'The poor itself is power. There is World Poverty, but there is above all World Possibility, and only the poor is capable of this.' It is difficult to see how this analysis comprehends the reality of powerlessness. You may be able to threaten the world with a Stanley knife, but you cannot build a new society with one. Insofar as the problems of the powerless have been addressed in recent years it is often through a dynamic that works in the opposite direction to the one Hardt and Negri suggest. Their response to globalisation is to maintain that since we have not contracted into global society, we still have all the power we need to change it. The alternative is to argue that a geographically boundless society must also be a totally inclusive society. The latter is an extension of what used to be called the politics of recognition. Globalisation may have replaced multiculturalism as the focus of contemporary political debate, but there is an underlying continuity: the concern of anti-globalisation protesters with remote regions of the world, with the lives of people unlike themselves, and with species of animals and plants that most have seen only on TV is predicated on an unparalleled imaginative identification with the Other. This totalisation of the politics of recognition from the local to the global is what has given momentum to campaigns such as the one for African Aids victims; here, it is a question of sympathy rather than sovereignty, of justice rather than power. In many cases, unless the powerful recognised some kinship with them, the powerless would just die. Capitalism has no need for the 'immaterial labour' of millions now living. For powerless human beings, as for other species, autonomy leads to extinction.

**AT HARDT/NEGRI: ALT FAILS**

**The alternative fails: there are far too many fragmented cultures to form an effective multitude and social organization is needed to combat oppression.**

**Angus, 04** (“Empire, Borders, Place: A Critique of Hardt and Negri’s Concept of Empire.” Theory & Event 7:3 Ian Angus, Project Muse, 2004)

The “aspirations” of the multitude established as the constitutive force of the future are reduced to very little: freedom, particularly to emigrate, and the right to a socially guaranteed income. In the undoubted care not to venture outside what is permitted by American liberalism, the project deliberately ignores everything that could be qualified as the heritage of the workers’ and socialist movement, in particular the equality rejected by the political culture of the United States. It is difficult to believe in the transformative power of an emerging global (and European) citizenship while the policies implemented fundamentally deprive citizenship of its effectiveness. The construction of a real alternative to the contemporary system of globalized liberal capitalism involves other requirements, in particular the recognition of the gigantic variety of needs and aspirations of the popular classes throughout the world. In fact, Hardt and Negri experience much difficulty in imagining the societies of the periphery (85 percent of the human population). The debates concerning the tactics and strategy of building a democratic and progressive alternative that would be effective in the concrete and specific conditions of the different countries and regions of the world never appear to have interested them. Would the “democracy” promoted by the intervention of the United States permit going beyond an electoral farce like the one in the Ukraine, for example? Can one reduce the rights of the “poor” who people the planet to the right to “emigrate” to the opulent West? A socially guaranteed income may be a justifiable demand. But can one have the naïveté to believe that its adoption would abolish the capitalist relation, which allows capital to employ labor (and, consequently, to exploit and oppress it), to the advantage of the worker who would from that point on be in a position to use capital freely and so be able to affirm the potential of his or her creativity? The reduction of the subject of history to the “individual” and the uniting of such individuals into a “multitude” dispose of the true questions concerning the reconstruction of subjects of history equal to the challenges of our era. One could point to many other important contributions to oppose to the silence of Hardt and Negri on this subject. Undoubtedly, historic socialisms and communisms had a tendency to reduce the major subject of modern history to the “working class.” Moreover, this is a reproach that could be leveled at the Negri of workerism. In counterpoint, I have proposed an analysis of the subject of history as formed from particular social blocs capable, in successive phases of popular struggle, of effectively transforming the social relations of force to the advantage of the dominated classes and peoples. At the present time, to take up the challenge implies that one is moving forward in the formation of democratic, popular, and national hegemonic blocs capable of overcoming the powers exercised by both the hegemonic imperialist blocs and the hegemonic comprador blocs. The formation of such blocs takes place in concrete conditions that are very different from one country to another so that no general model (whether in the style of the “multitude” or some other) makes sense. In this perspective, the combination of democratic advances and social progress will be part of the long transition to world socialism, just as the affirmation of the autonomy of peoples, nations, and states will make it possible to substitute a negotiated globalization for the unilateral globalization imposed by dominant capital (which Empire praises!) and thus gradually deconstruct the current imperialist system.

AT HARDT/NEGRI: HURTS MOVEMENTS

**Empire theory is theoretically indefensible and disabling to movements because they could misdirect their efforts. Instead of a moment of transformation, we are faced with a dramatic consolidation of state power and capitalist hegemony.**

**Steinmetz, 03** (George, *Public Culture* 15.2 (2003) 323-345, (Sociology Professor, Michigan),  
The State of Emergency and the Revival of American Imperialism: Toward an Authoritarian Post-Fordism).

Contra such theorists as Hardt and Negri, there is little support for arguments that capitalist history has entered its final phase, that with the coming of Empire the multitudes have reached a stage in which "pushing through to come out the other side" becomes a realistic possibility. These authors link the rise of Fordism to the "great economic crisis of 1929" (Hardt and Negri 2000: 241) and acknowledge the role of the economic crisis of the 1970s in creating the conditions for the transition to post-Fordism. Yet they do not entertain the possibility that Empire itself could enter into a political crisis, like the one we are currently witnessing, and give rise to a new imperialism. Nor do they consider the possibility that a more systemic economic crisis might give rise to a mode of regulation that is neither imperial nor imperialist, but protectionist and neocolonial. Each period of core hegemony has nurtured the illusion among enthusiasts of capitalism that it has reached its apotheosis and the parallel fantasy among leftists that capitalism is on its last legs. Hugo Grotius ([1625] 1901), writing during the golden age of Dutch hegemony, believed that his own world was the ultimate one. (Not surprisingly, Grotius's name is often heard in current discussions of U.S. foreign policy.) The events leading up to the 1848 revolutions in Europe, during the era of British hegemony, famously led Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto to predict "an immediately following proletarian revolution." To take a more recent example, Ernest Mandel (1975: 125) believed that *late capitalism*—the title of his book, published in 1972 at the beginning of the death throes of Fordism but written at the end of the first era of postwar American hegemony—had entered a terminal period of "overall social crisis." The final sentence of *Late Capitalism* announced that "the final abolition of capitalism. . . is now approaching." Insisting that there is something ultimate about Empire is not only theoretically indefensible but could actually be disabling for movements of resistance, for such arguments may desensitize readers to the possibility of further mutations of capitalism and modes of social regulation. Without pushing for a cyclical view of history, which Hardt and Negri rightly reject, one need not fall back on its inverse, a teleological or truncated narrative.

**\*\*HEIDEGGER\*\***



AT HEIDEGGER: NAZI

**Heidegger's philosophy is Nazism—the rejection of technology and re-connection with Being offered by National Socialism fit with his arguments.**

**Wolin, 01** – Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center – 2001 (Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children*, P. 32)

To say that Arendt's explanation was the more successful, despite its flaws, is hardly controversial. In many respects, Heidegger's own narrative was simply delusory, a retrospectively contrived psychological prophylaxis against his own enthusiastic support for the regime. In Heidegger's view, everything that came to pass—the war, the extermination camps, the German dictatorship (which he never renounced per se)—was merely a monumental instance of the "forgetting of Being," for which the Germans bore no special responsibility. After the war, he went so far as to insist that German fascism was unique among Western political movements in that, for one shining moment, it had come close to mastering the vexatious "relationship between planetary technology and modern man." In Heidegger's estimation, therein lay the "inner truth and greatness of National Socialism." But ultimately "these people [the Nazis] were far too limited in their thinking," he claimed. Pathetically, Heidegger was left to replay in his own mind the way things might have been had Hitler (instead of party hacks) heeded the call of Being as relayed by Heidegger himself. Nazism might thereby have realized its genuine historical potential. Fortunately, the world was spared the outcome of this particular thought experiment.

**Heidegger claimed that Nazism was at the heart of his philosophy and he was personally, deeply anti-Semitic.**

**Wolin, 01** – Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center – 2001 (Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children*, P. 10-11)

In May 1933, Heidegger sent a telltale telegram to Hitler expressing solidarity with recent Gleichschaltung legislation. There were instances of political denunciation and personal betrayal. Moreover, Heidegger remained a dues-paying member of the Nazi Party until the regime's bitter end. He continued to open his classes with the so-called "German greeting" of "Heil Hitler!" In 1936, he confided to Lowith that his 'partisanship for National Socialism lay in the essence of his philosophy'; it derived, he claimed, from the concept of "historicity" (which stressed the importance of authentic historical commitment) in *Being and Time*." As the rector of Freiburg University, Heidegger was charged with enforcing the anti-Semitic clauses of the so-called "Law for the Preservation of a Permanent Civil Service," which effectively banned Jews from all walks of government service, including university life. Despite his later disclaimers, in his capacity as rector Heidegger faithfully executed these laws, even though it meant banning Husserl, to whom he owed so much, from the philosophy faculty library. In the eyes of Hannah Arendt, this action, which had affected the septuagenarian phenomenologist so adversely, made Heidegger a "potential murderer." At the time, Husserl complained bitterly in a letter to a former student about Heidegger's growing anti-Semitism: "In recent years [he] has allowed his anti-Semitism to come increasingly to the fore, even in his dealings with his groups of devoted Jewish students," observes Husserl. "The events of the last few weeks," he continued (referring to Heidegger's joining the Nazi Party as well as the recent university ban on Jews), "have struck at the deepest roots of my existence." In 1929, Heidegger had already complained that Germany was faced with a stark alternative: "the choice between sustaining our German intellectual life through a renewed infusion of genuine, native teachers and educators, or abandoning it once and for all to growing Jewish influence [Verjudung]-in both the wider and narrow sense."

**AT HEIDEGGER: NAZI**

**Heidegger's Nazism is inexcusable – his own philosophy stressed that thought can't be divorced from action.**  
**Wolin, 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 33-34)

Although an understanding of Heidegger's political thought should in no way be reduced to the concrete political choices made by the philosopher in the 1930s, neither is it entirely separable therefrom. And while the strategy of his apologists has been to dissociate the philosophy from the empirical person, thereby suggesting that Heidegger's Nazism was an unessential aberration in the hope of exempting the philosophy from political taint, this strategy will not wash for several reasons. To begin with, Heidegger's philosophy itself would seem to rule out the artificial, traditional philosophical separation between thought and action. In truth, much of *Being and Time* is concerned with overcoming the conventional philosophical division between theoretical and practical reason; a fact that is evident above all in the "pragmatic" point of departure of the analytic of Dasein: "Being-in-the-world" rather than the Cartesian "thinking substance." More importantly, though, what is perhaps the central category of Heidegger's existential ontology-the category of "authenticity"- automatically precludes such a facile separation between philosophical outlook and concrete life-choices. As a work of fundamental ontology, *Being and Time* aims at delineating the essential, existential determinants of human Being-in-the-world. Heidegger refers to these structures (e.g., "care," "fallenness," "thrownness," "Being-toward-death") as Existenzialien. The category of authenticity demands that the ontological structures of Being and Time receive practical or ontic fulfillment: that is, the realization of these categorial determinations in actual, concrete life contexts is essential to the coherence of the Heideggerian project. This conclusion follows of necessity from the nature of the category of authenticity itself: it would be nonsensical to speak of an "authentic Dasein" that was unrealized, existing in a state of mere potentiality. Authenticity requires that ontic or practical choices and involvements-concrete decisions, engagements, and political commitments-become an essential feature of an authentic existence.

**Heidegger's Nazism was a logical consequence of his refusal of ethics.**

**Wolin, 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 65)

The consequences of this decisionistic "ethical vacuum," coupled with the prejudicial nature of Heidegger's conservative revolutionary degradation of the modern life-world, suggests an undeniable theoretical cogency behind Heidegger's ignominious life-choice of 1933. In its rejection of "moral convention-which qua convention, proves inimical to acts of heroic bravado-decisionism shows itself to be distinctly nihilistic vis-a-vis the totality of inherited ethical paradigms. 118F or this reason, the implicit political theory of *Being and Time*-and in this respect, it proves a classical instance of the German conservative-authoritarian mentality of the period-remains devoid of fundamental "liberal convictions" that might have served as an ethicopolitical bulwark against the enticement of fascism. Freed of such bourgeois qualms, the National Socialist movement presented itself as a plausible material "filling" for the empty vessel of authentic decision and its categorial demand for existentiell-historical content. The summons toward an "authentic historical destiny" enunciated in *Being and Time* was thus provided with an ominously appropriate response by Germany's National Revolution. The latter, in effect, was viewed by Heidegger as 'the ontic fulfillment of the categorial demands of "historicity": it was Heidegger's own choice of a "hero," a "destiny," and a "community."

**AT HEIDEGGER: NAZI**

**Heidegger's Dasein was easily translated into a German Dasein and an excuse for nationalism.**

**Wolin, 01** – Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center – 2001 (Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children*, P. 184-185)

What is troubling about Heidegger's standpoint is not that he judges but the basis on which he distinguishes. His lock-step identification with the "German ideology" risks settling in advance all questions of relative historical merit. "Capitalism," "peasant wars," "Negroes"-once the world has been neatly divided into "historical" and "unhistorical" peoples and events, history's gray zones fade from view. That the "Volk" that, in Heidegger's view, possessed "historicity" in the greatest abundance-the Germans-had as of 1934 abolished political pluralism, civil liberties, and the rule of law and was in the process of consolidating one of the most brutal dictatorships of all time, cannot help but raise additional doubts about the "existential" grounds of Heidegger's discernment. Here, one could reverse the terms and claim that Germany of the 1930s suffered from an *excess* of historicity. Conversely, the historical events and peoples that Heidegger slights could readily be incorporated into progressive historical narratives." That he fails to perceive these prospects is attributable to his renunciation of "cosmopolitan history" and his concomitant embrace of a philosophically embellished version of German particularism or so-called *Sondenveg*. From an epistemological standpoint, Heidegger's difficulties derive from his decision to base ethical and political judgments on *factual* rather than *normative* terms; that is, from the *Jemeinigkeit* or concrete particularity of German *Existenz*. The more one reconsiders Heidegger's philosophy of the 1930s, the more one sees that one of its guiding leitmotifs is a refashioning of Western metaphysics in keeping with the demands of the Germanic Dasein." He consistently rejects the "universals" that in the Western tradition occupied a position of preeminence in favor of ethnocentric notions derived from the annals of Germanic Being-in-the-world. The example of the airplane that brings the Fuhrer to Mussolini" is merely a paradigmatic instance of a more general trend.

**Heidegger thought that labor camps could be used to attack modernity.**

**Wolin, 01** – Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center – 2001 (Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children*, P. 191)

Heidegger's concern with the importance of labor in the new Reich was a matter of philosophical as well as political conviction. A longtime critic of the senescence and disorientation of German university life, he was of the opinion that the labor camps would serve to reintegrate knowledge with the life of the German Volk, whose simplicity and lack of sophistication he revered.\*6A s Lijwith remarked, Heidegger "failed to notice the destructive radicalism of the whole [Nazi] movement and the petty bourgeois character of all its 'strength-through-joy' institutions, because he was a radical petty bourgeois himself."\* Heidegger, who hailed from the provincial lower classes, and who, despite his manifest brilliance, was denied a university chair until the age of thirty-nine, found much he could agree with in Nazism's dismantling of the old estates and commitment to upward social mobility." In his view, the value of labor camps as a vehicle of ideological reeducation for politically reticent scholars could hardly be overestimated.

**AT HEIDEGGER: HUMANISM KEY TO STOP NAZISM**

**Their K has it backwards—ethical humanism is key to criticizing Nazism.**

**Ferry and Renaut, 90** – Professor of Political Science at the Sorbonne and Professor of Philosophy at Nantes – 1990 (Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, *Heidegger and Modernity*, trans. Franklin Philip, P. 107-108)

Whatever is true of this debate, which, it will be readily agreed, here remains open, one thing is still certain. Heidegger is not close to Nazism because he remained a prisoner of humanism, nor because of his deliberations about authenticity and the distinguishing property of man. For Heidegger, the distinguishing property of man is always transcendence, and on the contrary, it was in the name of this transcendence and thus because he was still a humanist that Heidegger could criticize the biologizing reifications of Nazi anti-Semitism. More generally, it is very much in the name of humanism thus understood, in the name of that strictly human capacity to wrench oneself free of natural determinations, that a criticism of the racist imaeination (in the Lacanian sense) is possible. When, however, Heidegger makes the destiny of Being the destiny of man, when he thus returns to the antihumanist idea of a traditional code (if only that of the history of Being), he founders in inauthenticity, and his fall makes possible the return of the nationalistic myth and the fanatical hatred of modernity.

AT HEIDEGGER: ETHICS TOO VAGUE

**Heidegger's "call of conscience" is hopelessly vague**

**Wolin, 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 40)

In the thought of Heidegger, it is the category of the "call of conscience" (Ruf des Gewissens) that paves the way for authentic decision or Entschlossenheit, thereby elevating Dasein above the fallenness of the They. Yet, the discussion of the "call of conscience" is disappointingly vague. When the question is posed as to whence the call emanates, the specific content of the call, or how it might be recognized, we are provided with only the most roundabout and tenuous hints. Indeed, Heidegger seems to treat the nebulousness of the call as a virtue. In part, this evasiveness is an honest reflection of the requirements of existential analysis, which should in principle bear no responsibility for supplying "existentiell" particulars. For were specific "ontic" directives provided, the whole question of the "decision" at issue-the Wozu of resolve-would become superfluous. In a very real sense, it is not up to fundamental ontology to make our choices for us. It is "we" who must decide, in accordance with what Heidegger is fond of calling our "ownmost potentiality-for- Being." Nevertheless, these caveats should by no means exonerate existential analysis from the charge of vacuity or insufficient concreteness.

AT HEIDEGGER: UNCONCEALMENT BAD

**The alternative of treating truth as unconcealment makes it impossible to judge true from false—this is the sort of error that allowed Hitler to join the Nazis.**

**Wolin, 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 121-122)

Ultimately Heidegger's theory of truth succumbs to the same problem of criterionlessness that was at issue in the decisionistic approach to human action in *Being and Time*. On the one hand, Heidegger seems at first to be claiming that unconcealment is merely an ontological *precondition* of truth—which is, as far as it goes, certainly a plausible and valuable insight. In point of fact, however, the nature of truth is conceptualized in terms of the dialectic of concealment and unconcealment that occurs within the phenomenological horizon that has been opened up by a work, a world, etc. In the end, his thoroughgoing antisubjectivism, which is radicalized in the "Turn," results in a type of ineffectual positivism: objects (beings) are no longer to be "judged" (for this would be to subject them to subjective criteria, or, worse still, to "values"), but "disclosed" or "unveiled." Yet, once the lines between truth and error become blurred, the distinction between authentic and inauthentic unveiling essentially evaporates: both are victimized by error in an unspecifiable way. Heidegger could conceivably redeem his theory of truth by an attempt, however minimal, to distinguish a true from an untrue act of unconcealment. A true unconcealment would thus unveil a being "essentially" or as it is "in itself." But no such distinction between genuine and non-genuine unveiling is forthcoming in his work. Instead, error (*Irrnis*) is paradoxically deemed a mode of unconcealment that is valid in its own right and thus "equiprimordial" with truth. Or again, Heidegger might have claimed that unconcealment presents a type of privileged or *exemplary* disclosure of beings; and judgments of truth, in turn, could have been predicated on this exemplary mode of disclosure. But no such claim is made. Instead, all we are left with is an unexalted, positivistic affirmation of "givenness," "beings in their immediacy," "disclosure as such." In this respect, Heidegger's theory of *Seinsgeschichte* regresses behind both the Husserlian and the ancient Greek conceptions of truth. For in both cases, truth resides not in the "givenness" of beings as such, but in a supramundane or *superior* mode of givenness?\*" As a result of his obsession with providing a "topography" of truth—with defining the clearing or openness as a sufficient condition for the appearance of truth as "untruth"—to the wholesale exclusion of all traditional predicative considerations, Heidegger lays himself open to extreme judgmental incapacities. And it was this philosophically induced lack of discernment that would lead to his fatal misapprehension of the intellectual as well as the political essence of National Socialism.

AT HEIDEGGER: PARALYSIS

**Heidegger's over determined Being so strongly that free will is impossible.**

**Wolin, 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 153)

Consequently, the major problem with Heidegger's later philosophy is that the doctrine of Being, in its oppressive omnipotence, causes the conceptual space in which freedom can be meaningfully thought to all but disappear. In light of this fact, Jaspers' verdict concerning Heidegger's inability to grasp the nature of human freedom-"Heidegger doesn't know what freedom is"-becomes readily intelligible. For according to the theory of the "destining of Being," all the worldly events we experience undergo a prior, other-worldly, metaontological determination. Like a deus absconditus, Being "essences" or "comes to presence" in ways that are inscrutable to the human understanding. On this point, Heidegger is emphatically clear: "The history of Being-and not the decisions of man himself-"underlies and determines every situation et condition humaine." But if this description of the human condition is correct, then human action is essentially unfree, and the notion of persons as potentially autonomous actors becomes equally incoherent. For the very possibility of a meaningful correlation between human practice and its desired ends has been disqualified in advance: it is not we who are ultimately responsible for the outcome of our actions (for "the advent of beings"); rather, it is the "destiny of Being.

**Emphasis on releasement results in paralyzing passivity.**

**Wolin, 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 147)

As we suggested earlier, the essential thinking of the later Heidegger promotes an "eclipse of practical reason." For his post-Kehre reformulation of the relation between Being and Dasein rebels so fervently against the voluntarist dimension of his own earlier thinking that the very concept of "meaningful human action" is seemingly rendered null and void. If the early Heidegger attempted to rally Dasein to "decisiveness" (Entschlossenheit), the thought of the later Heidegger appears at times to be a summary justification of human passivity and inaction (Gelassenheit)-so prejudicially is the balance between Sein and Mensch struck in favor of the former term. Thus, in the later Heidegger, the campaign against practical reason develops along a two-fold front: not only is the concept of Being grossly inflated, but the powers of human reason and will are correspondingly devalued. In the later writings, Being assumes the character of an omnipotent primal force, a "first unmoved mover," whose "presencing" proves to be the determinative, ultimate instance for events in the lowly world of human affairs. In its other-worldly supremacy, this force both withdraws from the tribunal of human reason and defies the meager capacities of human description: "A Being that not only surpasses all beings-and thus all men-but which like an unknown God rests and 'essences' in its own truth, in that it is sometimes present and sometimes absent, can never be explained like a being in existence; instead, it can only be 'evoked.'"

**AT HEIDEGGER: AUTHORITARIAN**

**Heidegger's philosophy rejects democracy and justifies domination of those deemed "inauthentic."**

**Wolin, 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 46)

The political philosophical implications of this theory are as unequivocal as they are distasteful to a democratic sensibility. On the basis of the philosophical anthropology outlined by Heidegger, the modern conception of popular sovereignty becomes a sheer non sequitur: for those who dwell in the public sphere of everydayness are viewed as essentially incapable of self-rule. Instead, the only viable political philosophy that follows from this standpoint would be brazenly elitist: since the majority of citizens remain incapable of leading meaningful lives when left to their own devices, their only hope for "redemption" lies in the imposition of a "higher spiritual mission" from above. Indeed, this was the explicit political conclusion drawn by Heidegger in 1933. In this way, Heidegger's political thought moves precariously in the direction of the "Führerprinzip" or "leadership principle." In essence, he reiterates, in keeping with a characteristic antimodern bias, a strategem drawn from Platonic political philosophy: since the majority of men and women are incapable of ruling themselves insofar as they are driven by the base part of their souls to seek after inferior satisfactions and amusements, we in effect do them a service by ruling them from above.<sup>77T</sup> o date, however, there has never been a satisfactory answer to the question Marx poses concerning such theories of educational dictatorship: "Who shall educate the educator?"

**The desire for "authentic" leaders justifies totalitarianism.**

**Wolin, 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 115-116)

There are many dangers lurking in the statist conception of politics advanced by Heidegger in the preceding citation. The specifically political danger of this theory of the polis/state is that it is latently totalitarian: when the state-and the "destiny of a historical Volk" that is its raison d'être-are accorded unchallenged ontological primacy as "the work for the works," the autonomy and integrity of the other spheres of life (social, cultural, religious) disappears: they are gleichgeschaltet or immediately subsumed within the political sphere. The Greeks could solve this potential danger via the institution of direct democracy: by virtue of this medium, political space was opened up to its maximum extent. But in Heidegger's contemporary pan-Germanic "repetition" of the ancient polis, the opposite is true: since his twentieth century polis/ state is integrally tied to the Führerprinzip, it becomes a Führerstaat, a new form of political tyranny, in which political space shrivels up into the person of the Führer and his sycophantic entourage.<sup>6</sup> As the remarks just cited suggest, for Heidegger, the concept of a Führerstaat is unproblematical provided there be "rulers alone, but then really rulers." That is, the rulers must be "authentic" and not imposters. And as we will soon see, Heidegger develops a theory of world-historical "leader-creators" in order to ground his partisanship for the Führerprinzip philosophically.



**AT HEIDEGGER: NO VALUE TO LIFE**

**Heidegger's theory reduces the value to life—he forces joyless disconnection from the real world.**

**Wolin, 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 49-50)

Heidegger's characterization of everydayness is so disproportionately negative that we are seemingly left with no immanent prospects for realizing our authentic natures in the domain of ontic life as such. For on the basis of his phenomenological descriptions, it would seem that the ontic sphere in general- "worldliness" in its entirety-has been "colonized" by the They. Here, we see that Heidegger's pessimistic philosophical anthropology and his "joyless" social ontology ultimately join forces. The result is a radical devaluation of the life-world, that delicate substratum of everyday human sociation which existential phenomenology claims to redeem. At this point, one might raise against Heidegger's social ontology the same charge he levels against Husserl's theory of the pure, transcendental ego: it suffers from an impoverishment of world-relations-a fact clearly evinced in Heidegger's self-defeating celebration of the "non-relational" character of authentic Dasein cited above. For how can the authenticity of a Dasein that is essentially "non -relational" ever attain realization in the sphere of ontic life?

**AT HEIDEGGER: NO TRUTH = NAZISM**

**Critique of the enlightenment justified Nazism.**

**Wolin, 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 152)

And thus, if upon turning to the text of a 1953 lecture we find the observation: "Thinking begins only when we have come to know that reason, glorified for centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary of thought" we cannot help but conclude that in his later work, Heidegger has only sunk more deeply into the bog of Logosvergessenheit. This verdict gives cause for dismay, for it suggests that the philosopher has drawn precisely the wrong conclusions from the political events of 1933-1945: instead of participating in the attempt to forge, out of the ravages of postwar Europe, a new conception of reason and truth, Heidegger himself has become an even greater "stiff-necked" advocate of counterenlightenment. His thought seeks refuge in the recrudescence of myth: "openness for the mystery," "the remembrance of Being," and "the mirror-play of the four-fold" (gods and mortals, heaven and earth) becomes the mystified categorial scheme around which his later thinking revolved. The notion that analogous counterenlightenment attitudes and doctrines might have played a key role in the spiritual preparation for the German catastrophe is a thought that has obviously never crossed his mind.<sup>57</sup>

AT HEIDEGGER: PARALYSIS

**Heidegger is unable to translate ontological insights into the real world.**

**Wolin, 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 164)

Heidegger's inability to conceptualize the sociohistorical determinants and character of modern technology raises the oft-discussed question of the "pseudo-concreteness of his philosophy"; that is, its apparent incapacity to fulfill its original phenomenological promise as a philosophy of "existential concretion." The problem was already evident in the tension between the ontological and ontic levels of analysis that dominated the existential analytic of Being and Time. For there the sphere of ontic life seemed degraded a priori as a result of its monopolization by the "They" and its concomitant inauthentic modalities. As a result, both the desirability and possibility of effecting the transition from the metalevel of ontology to the "factual" realm of ontic concretion seemed problematical from the outset. Nowhere was this problem better illustrated than in the case of the category of historicity. And thus despite Heidegger's real insight into limitations of Dilthey's historicism, the inflexible elevation of ontology above the ontic plane virtually closes off the conceptual space wherein real history might be thought. In truth, it can only appear as an afterthought: as the material demonstration of conclusions already reached by the categories of existential ontology. Consequently, the "ontology of Being and Time is still bound to the metaphysics that it rejects. The conventional tension between existentia and essentia stands behind the difference between everyday (factual) and 'authentic historical existence.'

AT HEIDEGGER: CALCULATIONS GOOD

**Old flaws in calculative thought require expanding the reasoning process, not rejecting it.**

**Wolin, 90** - Distinguished Professor of History at the City University of New York Graduate Center - 1990 (Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being*, P. 167)

Heidegger's theory of technology ultimately collapses under the weight of its own self-imposed conceptual limitations. And thus, the intrinsic shortcomings of his theoretical framework prevent him from entertaining the prospect that the problem of technological domination owes more to the dearth of reason in the modern world rather than an excess. For in modern life, the parameters of rationality have been prematurely restricted: formal or instrumental reason has attained de facto hegemony; practical reason-reflection on ends-has been effectively marginalized. Instead of the "overcoming" of reason recommended by Heidegger, what is needed is an expansion of reason's boundaries, such that the autonomous logic of instrumental rationality is subordinated to a rational reflection on ends. Similarly, Heidegger's incessant lamentations concerning the "will to will-the theoretical prism through which he views the modern project of human self-assertion in its entirety- only serve to confuse the problem at issue?7 That the forces of technology and industry follow an independent logic.

AT HEIDEGGER: PERMUTATION

**Action and reflection on consequences of that action are compatible.**

**Padrutt, 92** – Psychiatrist and President of the Daseinsanalyse Gesellschaft – 1992 (Hanspeter Padrutt, *Heidegger and the Earth*, “Heidegger and Ecology,” ed. LaDelle McWhorter, P.31)

Once in a while the conceptual interplay of theory and praxis is put against this attempt. From the philosophical point of view the so-called practical or political dimension of the attempt is rejected, whereas from the ecological point of view the so-called theoretical, philosophical dimension is rejected. But deeper reflection and decisive action do not need to contradict each other. Those who shield themselves from the political consequences might one day be confronted by the fact that no decision is still a decision that can have consequences. And those who believe that they need not bother about thinking fail to recognize that no philosophy is also a philosophy – e.g., a cybernetic worldview – that also has consequences.

AT HEIDEGGER: BEING MEANINGLESS

**Discourse on being is so abstract that it renders us silent—it is nihilistic paralysis.**

**Rosen, 69** - Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy at Boston University – 1969 (Stanley Rosen, *Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay*, P. 45-46)

I have been arguing that ontological speech, in the sense attributed to it by those who follow Heidegger's distinction between the ontological and ontic, is in fact silence. Ontologists of this type wish to talk about Being as distinct from beings, and speech will simply not permit this. If this is a defect of speech, and the significance of speech is in the deepest and final sense relative to silence, then there is no reason for what we say or for whether we speak at all, other than the mere fact, although there is equally no reason to keep silent. The result is absurdism or nihilism. Therefore no reason can be given which would justify our falling into such desperate straits. Every fundamental ontological speech of the type in question is not just self-refuting but self-canceling.

**\*\*IDENTITY POLITICS\*\***

**IDENTITY POLITICS CEDES THE POLITICAL**

**Identity politics replace political action with stories of personal oppression.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture", page 365-366)

Identity politics is an extension of feminists' argument that the personal (i.e., experience, determined by social difference) is political. But it ignores the fact that "the political cannot be reduced to the personal."<sup>17</sup> It assumes that politics is determined by identity and consequently, ignores the most obvious lesson of contemporary political history: the politics of any social position is not guaranteed in advance, even if it appears to be stitched tightly in place. There is no necessary reason why anyone inhabiting a particular experiential field or located in a particular social position has to adhere to particular political agendas and interests. The illusion can be maintained only by assuming that people who do not have the "right" politics must be suffering from false consciousness and they have yet to authentically experience their own lives. It is too easy to assume that abortion is "a woman's issue" and, further, that a woman who is against abortion is acting against her own experience and interests. More importantly, this often leads people to miss broader political possibilities (e.g., that *Rust v. Sullivan* limits free speech in any federally funded institution and overrides professional codes of responsibility and significantly strengthens both state courts and the Executive Branch). As June Jordan puts it, "People have to begin to understand that just because somebody is a woman or somebody is black does not mean that he or she and I should have the same politics. We should try to measure each on the basis of what we do for each other rather than on the basis of who we are."<sup>18</sup> Political struggle is too easily replaced by the ongoing analysis of one's own oppression and experience or, only slightly better, by a politics in which the only site of struggle is the local constitution of one's experience within a structure of difference. While the personal is most certainly political, it is often impossible to reach it other than through indirection, through struggles over and within the public sphere. As a political practice, identity politics has (unintentionally) played into efforts by the Right to marginalize many important struggles over both civil liberties and civil rights as "special interests."



<b>IDENTITY POLITICS CEDES THE POLITICAL</b>
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**Identity politics fail to enact greater political change.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture", page 377-380)

By focusing on the construction of social individuality, identity politics actually loses any common sense of power and oppression. It mistakes empowerment and resistance for opposition. It begins with the correct observation that people often find pleasures in unexpected places and activities, that they often use activities in unexpected ways in order to struggle to change the conditions of their everyday life. But ways of life are not inherently politicized; they do not necessarily map onto way of struggling unless they are defined by and directed against some dominant "other," which may or may not actually be the agent responsible for maintaining their subordinate position. The resistance of a politics of identity requires establishing a social conflict rather than a political antagonism, a relation between individuals or groups with specific positions in everyday life. Such a politics confuses identity for the relation between subjects and agencies. And antagonism disappears into the practice of articulation. I do not mean to deny the intellectual importance of notions of identity and difference, nor do I want to assert that they have become politically irrelevant. The question, however, is whether a politics of identity can provide a sufficient ground to organize both opposition and alternatives to the contemporary conservative hegemony. The Left cannot ignore the issues of the differential structures of power that are inscribed upon the population, but it must refuse to begin by assuming that power can always be adequately understood or contested by simply acknowledging the suffering of the subordinate. It has to address the increasing segmentation of the various subordinate groups. Groups which have been traditionally produced through and within a binary mechanism are increasingly deployed in complex and context-specific ways. The contemporary organization of power may construct and enable particular structures of binary racism in one place, while fragmenting the binarism in another. It may refuse racism at particular sites, and at others, demand it. And it may articulate specific fractions of apparently subordinated groups into real positions of power, or into positions in which their "real" interests lead them into conservative positions within which they seem to embrace their subordination. Thus, it cannot be a simple question of Blacks or women or differentially abled organizing against the new conservatism (since they are clearly not all in opposition), but rather of constructing a movement which can strategically and effectively mobilize people against it. It requires, in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, a politics of the minor. 43 Oppositional struggle depends upon an analysis and identification of the agents and agencies, the historical forces (economic, cultural and political) which construct the configuration of everyday life, specific positions within it, and the relations between these and the larger social formation. The politics of identity is always a politics of resistance, operating at the local level, within the configurations of everyday life, since it refuses to transcend the specific identities and oppressions which are being contested. It allows only the extremes of political involvement: one can only act very locally or at very great distances. The Left, because it must allow any morally correct protest (and who is to decide except the victims), cannot strategically define its priorities. Too often, it trivializes itself in public struggles which focus on the most minor signs of subordinate identities, especially given the real problems facing not only minorities but also the world. To develop a new conception of politics and alliance, we must move beyond both essentialism and the assumption that identity is the major site of political struggle. We have to define politics and the appropriate sites and forms of struggle by something other than the feelings of the oppressed. Racism, for example, whether aimed at Blacks, Latinos, Jews, Arabs, Asians, or any other group, is not merely a matter of the experience of the subordinate although that experience—the pain and anger—is very real. But it can only become a resource if it is articulated into a viable political strategy. We need to confront all forms of racism, including the racisms of subordinate groups, in our society. And we need to confront as well the ways racism is deployed in specific hegemonic struggles. This requires a politics of practice (e.g., a politics of antiracism) built on agency rather than identity. It requires a public sphere (which is not necessarily democratic) and a morality (on the basis of which we might struggle to judge and democratize it). Such a politics of practice need not necessarily involve the creation of critical communities but it does require the production of spaces of articulation and places of investment. By making social identity the cornerstone of its political analysis, identity politics has effectively erased affective subjectivity and has no theory of political commitment. In fact, the motivation to struggle can only be derived out of self-interest or charity (the latter is both patronizing and imperialistic). To the extent that such identities are mobile and fractured, the political commitment will itself be temporary and fluid: "Politics here becomes something to be plugged into and pulled out of,"<sup>45</sup> much like a stereo or a designer life-style. This is the dilemma presented by such events as BandAid and by such struggles as that over abortion rights. The very fragmentation of identity becomes a source of disempowerment as struggles multiply and proliferate. According to identity politics, only direct experience can legitimate commitment and any other involvement is suspect. Without a theory of commitment which is somewhat independent of identity, it is impossible to understand the possibilities of active political opposition which transcends any specific identity or local struggle. This suggests another way of viewing political struggle, one which locates the will to oppose the trajectories of history in the articulation of common affective structures and antagonisms. It does not involve the representation of ideological subjects but the mobilization of affective subjects. It does not have to construct a "we" which purports to represent anyone. Rather, it strategically and provisionally deploys "we" as a floating sign of a common authority and commitment to speak and to act. Authority, like representation, refers to a certain kind of proxy, but it is a proxy which empowers a position from which peoples' lives can be measured and from which the agents and agencies responsible for maintaining those lives can be challenged. Authority is the mechanism by which control over the places and spaces of everyday life is assigned. The struggle for authority is not merely the struggle to control one's own life but to structure the commitments which fashion everyday life and its relations to the social formation.

### IDENTITY POLITICS CEDES THE POLITICAL

**Identity politics fractures the left into competing factions, undermining hope of change.**

**Grossberg, 92** (Lawrence, Morris Davis Professor of Communication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture", page 367-369)

The politics of identity has had a particularly negative effect on the Left, albeit unintentionally: it has produced a "politics of guilt" or a "diagnostics of discourse" in which anyone's social position already determines their authority to address specific social problems. Disagreements can always be traced back to the social differences between the speakers (and the social "illnesses" and distortions which these differences produce) rather than projected forward into an analysis of the historical adequacy and political efficacy of the alternatives. Every individual and struggle is judged by a standard of linguistic self-righteousness and moral purity. Being morally and politically correct is defined by the constant need to demonstrate the proper deference to the subordinate terms within the systems of differences. Everyone is held accountable to an ever-expanding and unpredictable series of potential exclusions and subordinations. This demand for political purity reduces the context of struggle to the sum of particular identifications and identities. It is a strategy designed to alienate no one but, in the end, it merely constructs situations in which different fragments are constantly warring with each other. Such passionate diagnoses of other people's inevitable failure, coupled with the seemingly endless fragmentation of the Left into different subordinate identities and groups, is at least partly responsible for its current powerlessness. The old cliché that the Left constantly devours its own is no longer a joke. Donna Minkowitz's report on the 1991 National Lesbian Conference provides a sad but telling indictment of any attempt to organize a Left politics around identity (for it is only the most recent example). Despite the empowerment derived from "the profusion of lesbian personae," the conference demonstrated that the different lesbian groups "do not trust each other." The attempt to create a national organization fell by the wayside as the main business emerged: an inquisition into the political sins of conference goers.... Activism took a back seat: How could people be motivated toward political action when their value to the movement was constantly being questioned? In admittedly naive terms, a politics of guilt undermines the possibility of free and open discussion about the necessity to put aside differences in the name of common political goals, or at least common opposition to the changing balance of forces in the contemporary world. Rather than assuming a minimum of "good will," absences and disagreements become signs of inevitable moral and political failure. Supportive and even polite debate has all but disappeared and guilt and intimidation, whether intended or not, have become common experiences within the Left! This is partly the result of the fact that a politics of identity lets intellectuals too easily off the hook. It correctly rejects the old liberal model which gave select groups the unchallenged power to speak and act for others (assuming that subordinate groups are passive victims who need things done for them). But it often goes too far, undermining any recognition of the ways in which different groups of people are implicated together in relations of power and mutual responsibility. At best, such a politics seeks to identify positions from which the oppressed might be empowered to speak. However, as Spivak has argued, it is not sufficient to identify the differential access which people have to various speaking positions. It is also necessary to identify the conditions which have made it impossible for certain people to take up such positions, and to speak particular sorts of discourses. 25 Acknowledging the material reality of oppression should lead intellectuals to rethink the need for, and effectiveness of, practices of representation. Given that some groups are effectively silenced, part of the political responsibility of those empowered to speak may be that they speak for-represent-others.

**\*\*IMPERIALISM/COLONIALISM\*\***

AT IMPERIALISM: US NOT AN EMPIRE

**The U.S. mischaracterized as an empire—reciprocal economic partnerships and democratic agreements are the norm.**

**Ikenberry, 04.** Professor of Geopolitics. G. John Ikenberry. "Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order" Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004.

Is the United States an empire? If so, Ferguson's liberal empire is a more persuasive portrait than is Johnson's military empire. But ultimately, the notion of empire is misleading -- and misses the distinctive aspects of the global political order that has developed around U.S. power. The United States has pursued imperial policies, especially toward weak countries in the periphery. But U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, China, and Russia cannot be described as imperial, even when "neo" or "liberal" modifies the term. The advanced democracies operate within a "security community" in which the use or threat of force is unthinkable. Their economies are deeply interwoven. Together, they form a political order built on bargains, diffuse reciprocity, and an array of intergovernmental institutions and ad hoc working relationships. This is not empire; it is a U.S.-led democratic political order that has no name or historical antecedent. To be sure, the neoconservatives in Washington have trumpeted their own imperial vision: an era of global rule organized around the bold unilateral exercise of military power, gradual disentanglement from the constraints of multilateralism, and an aggressive effort to spread freedom and democracy. But this vision is founded on illusions of U.S. power. It fails to appreciate the role of cooperation and rules in the exercise and preservation of such power. Its pursuit would strip the United States of its legitimacy as the preeminent global power and severely compromise the authority that flows from such legitimacy. Ultimately, the neoconservatives are silent on the full range of global challenges and opportunities that face the United States. And as Ferguson notes, the American public has no desire to run colonies or manage a global empire. Thus, there are limits on American imperial pretensions even in a unipolar era. Ultimately, the empire debate misses the most important international development of recent years: the long peace among great powers, which some scholars argue marks the end of great-power war. Capitalism, democracy, and nuclear weapons all help explain this peace. But so too does the unique way in which the United States has gone about the business of building an international order. The United States' success stems from the creation and extension of international institutions that have limited and legitimated U.S. power.

**Hegemony doesn't equate to empire—other nations can choose to disengage from US security guarantees.**

**Ikenberry, 04.** Professor of Geopolitics. G. John Ikenberry. "Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order" Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004.

Johnson also offers little beyond passing mention about the societies presumed to be under Washington's thumb.

Domination and exploitation are, of course, not always self-evident. Military pacts and security partnerships are clearly part of the structure of U.S. global power, and they often reinforce fragile and corrupt governments in order to project U.S. influence. But countries can also use security ties with the United States to their own advantage. Japan may be a subordinate security partner, but the U.S.-Japan alliance also allows Tokyo to forgo a costly buildup of military capacity that would destabilize East Asia. Moreover, countries do have other options: they can, and often do, escape U.S. domination simply by asking the United States to leave. The Philippines did so, and South Korea may be next. The variety and complexity of U.S. security ties with other states makes Johnson's simplistic view of military hegemony misleading.

AT IMPERIALISM: US NOT AN EMPIRE

**Global pluralism makes empire impossible—the US has influence but not the control described by the negative.**

**Zelikow, 03** “Transformation of National Security” Philip Zelikow. Professor of History and Public Affairs, University of Virginia. National Interest, Summer 2003, pg. 18-10 Lexis).

But these imperial metaphors, of whatever provenance, do not enrich our understanding; they impoverish it. They use a metaphor of how to rule others when the problem is how to persuade and lead them. Real imperial power is sovereign power. Sovereigns rule, and a ruler is not just the most powerful among diverse interest groups. Sovereignty means a direct monopoly control over the organization and use of armed might. It means direct control over the administration of justice and the definition thereof. It means control over what is bought and sold, the terms of trade and the permission to trade, to the limit of the ruler's desires and capacities. In the modern, pluralistic world of the 21st century, the United States does not have anything like such direct authority over other countries, nor does it seek it. Even its informal influence in the political economy of neighboring Mexico, for instance, is far more modest than, say, the influence the British could exert over Argentina a hundred years ago. The purveyors of imperial metaphors suffer from a lack of imagination, and more, from a lack of appreciation for the new conditions under which we now live. It is easier in many respects to communicate images in a cybernetic world, so that a very powerful United States does exert a range of influences that is quite striking. But this does not negate the proliferating pluralism of global society, nor does it suggest a will to imperial power in Washington. The proliferation of loose empire metaphors thus distorts into banal nonsense the only precise meaning of the term imperialism that we have. The United States is central in world politics today, not omnipotent. Nor is the U.S. Federal government organized in such a fashion that would allow it to wield durable imperial power around the world—it has trouble enough fashioning coherent policies within the fifty United States. Rather than exhibiting a confident will to power, we instinctively tend, as David Brooks has put it, to “enter every conflict with the might of a muscleman and the mentality of a wimp.” We must speak of American power and of responsible ways to wield it; let us stop talking of American empire, for there is and there will be no such thing.

**The US focuses on spreading democracy- their claims of empire are outdated.**

**Boot, 03** (“Neither new nor nefarious: the liberal empire strikes back” Max Boot, fellow of the Council of foreign relations, Current History, Vol. 102, Iss. 667; pg. 361 Nov. 2003. Pro Quest)

If the Europeans, with their long tradition of colonialism, have found the price of empire too high, what chance is there that Americans, whose country was born in a revolt against empire, will replace the colonial administrators of old? Not much. The kind of imperial missions that the United States is likely to undertake today are very different. The Europeans fought to subjugate "natives"; Americans will fight to bring them democracy and the rule of law. (No one wants to put Iraq or Afghanistan permanently under the Stars and Stripes.) European rule was justified by racial prejudices; American interventions are justified by self-defense and human rights doctrines accepted (at least in principle) by all signatories to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. European expeditions were unilateral; American missions are usually blessed with international approval, whether from the United Nations, NATO, or simply an ad hoc coalition. Even the US intervention in Iraq this year, widely held to be "unilateral," enjoys far more international support (and hence legitimacy) than, say, the French role in Algeria in the 1950s.

**Multilateralism an inevitable check on the possibility of empire.**

**Zelikow, 03** “Transformation of National Security” Philip Zelikow. Professor of History and Public Affairs, University of Virginia. National Interest, Summer 2003, pg. 18-10 Lexis).

Everything that America does in the world is done multilaterally. That emphatically includes the policies the Bush Administration considers most important, and even those that are the most "military" in character. The global war against terrorism is being conducted through an elaborate, often hidden, network of multilateral cooperation among scores of governments. A large number of players are interacting on intelligence, law enforcement, military action, air transportation, shipping, financial controls and more. Ongoing military operations in Afghanistan involve several countries, and were multilateral even at the height of American military activity, as the United States relied heavily on relationships with Pakistan, Russia, three Central Asian governments and a variety of Afghan factions. The caricature of the administration's unilateralism usually rests on the recitation of a by now standard list of diplomatic actions that some other governments did not like (Kyoto, the International Criminal Court and so on). Some of these disagreements were handled in a style and manner that seemed insensitive or simply maladroit. Unfortunately, too, the caricature of the administration's unilateralism is willingly fed by some U.S. officials and unofficial advisers who relish the chance to play the role of the truth teller lancing foreign obfuscations. Sometimes they overplay the part, sensing the license they get from working for a plain-spoken president.

**AT IMPERIALISM: TERRORISM MUST BE CONFRONTED**

**Pointing out flaws with imperialism is not enough—there are real threats posed by terrorism that the alternative must be able to solve.**

**Gitlin, 06** - Professor of Journalism and Sociology at Columbia University - 2006(Todd, The Intellectuals And The Flag, p. 151)

During the Bush years intellectuals have had their work cut out for them exposing the arrogance of empire, piercing its rationalizations, identifying its betrayal of patriotic traditions. But all that said, serious questions remained about what intellectuals of the left wanted: What was to be done about fighting the jihadists and improving democracy's chances? What roles made sense for the United States, the United Nations, NATO, or anyone else? What was required of governments, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and private initiatives? Given that the Iraq War had been ill advised, what should be done next about Iraq and Iraqis? About such questions many intellectuals of the left were understandably perplexed—and sometimes evasive. Foreign policy wasn't "their problem." Their mode was critical and back-glancing, not constructive and prospective. It was useful to raise questions about the purposes of U.S. bases abroad, for example. It was satisfying, but not especially useful, to think that the questions answered themselves. So the intellectuals' evasion damaged what might have been their contribution to the larger debate that the country needed—and still needs—on its place in the world and how it protects itself. Liberal patriots would refuse to be satisfied with knee-jerk answers but would join the hard questions as members of a society do—members who criticize in behalf of a community of mutual aid, not marginal scoffers who have painted themselves into a corner. Liberal patriots would not be satisfied to reply to consensus truculence with rejectionist truculence. They would not take pride in their marginality. They would consider what they could do for our natural allies, democrats abroad. They would take it as their obligation to illuminate a transformed world in which al Qaeda and its allies are not misinterpreted as the current rein-carnations of the eternal spirit of anti-imperialism. They would retain curiosity and resist that hardening of the categories that is a form of self-protection against the unprecedented.

IMPERIALISM GOOD

**American imperialism should be embraced – it has been the greatest force for good in the world**

**Boot, 3** (Max, Olin senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, "American Imperialism? No Need to Run Away from Label," 5-18-2003, [www.attacberlin.de/fileadmin/Sommerakademie/Boot\\_Imperialim\\_fine.pdf](http://www.attacberlin.de/fileadmin/Sommerakademie/Boot_Imperialim_fine.pdf), JMP)

The greatest danger is that we won't use all of our power for fear of the "I" word -- imperialism. When asked on April 28 on al-Jazeera whether the United States was "empire building," Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reacted as if he'd been asked whether he wears women's underwear. "We don't seek empires," he replied huffily. "We're not imperialistic. We never have been." That's a fine answer for public consumption. The problem is that it isn't true. The United States has been an empire since at least 1803, when Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory. Throughout the 19th century, what Jefferson called the "empire of liberty" expanded across the continent. When U.S. power stretched from "sea to shining sea," the American empire moved abroad, acquiring colonies ranging from Puerto Rico and the Philippines to Hawaii and Alaska. While the formal empire mostly disappeared after World War II, the United States set out on another bout of imperialism in Germany and Japan. Oh, sorry -- that wasn't imperialism; it was "occupation." But when Americans are running foreign governments, it's a distinction without a difference. Likewise, recent "nation-building" experiments in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (news - web sites) are imperialism under another name. Mind you, this is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the mistreatment of the Indians. But, on the whole, U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea (news - web sites) and Panama. Yet, while generally successful as imperialists, Americans have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that "imperialism" carries, there's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice. That doesn't mean looting Iraq of its natural resources; nothing could be more destructive of our goal of building a stable government in Baghdad. It means imposing the rule of law, property rights, free speech and other guarantees, at gunpoint if need be. This will require selecting a new ruler who is committed to pluralism and then backing him or her to the hilt. Iran and other neighboring states won't hesitate to impose their despotic views on Iraq; we shouldn't hesitate to impose our democratic views. The indications are mixed as to whether the United States is prepared to embrace its imperial role unapologetically. Rumsfeld has said that an Iranian-style theocracy "isn't going to happen," and President Bush (news - web sites) has pledged to keep U.S. troops in Iraq as long as necessary to "build a peaceful and representative government." After allowing a temporary power vacuum to develop, U.S. troops now are moving aggressively to put down challenges to their authority by, for example, arresting the self-declared "mayor" of Baghdad. That's all for the good. But there are also some worrisome signs. Bush asked for only \$2.5 billion from Congress for rebuilding Iraq, even though a study from the Council on Foreign Relations and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy estimates that \$25 billion to \$100 billion will be needed. Iraq's oil revenues and contributions from allies won't cover the entire shortfall. The president should be doing more to prepare the U.S. public and Congress for a costly commitment. Otherwise, Iraqis quickly could become disillusioned about the benefits of liberation. The cost of our commitment will be measured not only in money but also in troops. While Bush and Rumsfeld have wisely eschewed any talk of an early "exit strategy," they still seem to think that U.S. forces won't need to stay more than two years. Rumsfeld even denied a report that the U.S. armed forces are planning to open permanent bases in Iraq. If they're not, they should be. That's the only way to ensure the security of a nascent democracy in such a rough neighborhood. Does the administration really imagine that Iraq will have turned into Switzerland in two years' time? Allied rule lasted four years in Germany and seven years in Japan. American troops remain stationed in both places more than 50 years later. That's why these two countries have become paragons of liberal democracy. It is crazy to think that Iraq -- which has less of a democratic tradition than either Germany or Japan had in 1945 -- could make the leap overnight. The record of nation-building during the past decade is clear: The United States failed in Somalia and Haiti, where it pulled out troops prematurely. Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan show more promise because U.S. troops remain stationed there. Afghanistan would be making even more progress if the United States and its allies had made a bigger commitment to secure the countryside, not just Kabul. If we want Iraq to avoid becoming a Somalia on steroids, we'd better get used to U.S. troops being deployed there for years, possibly decades, to come. If that raises hackles about American imperialism, so be it. We're going to be called an empire whatever we do. We might as well be a successful empire.

<b>IMPERIALISM GOOD</b>
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**Criticizing Western “imperialism” obscures more insidious practices by regional powers**

**Shaw, 2** (Martin Shaw, professor of international relations at University of Sussex, Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in the Global Era, 4-7-2002, <http://www.martinshaw.org/empire.htm> AFM)

It is fashionable in some circles, among which we must clearly include the organizers of this conference, to argue that the global era is seeing 'a new imperialism' - that can be blamed for the problem of 'failed states' (probably among many others). Different contributors to this strand of thought name this imperialism in different ways, but novelty is clearly a critical issue. The logic of using the term imperialism is actually to establish continuity between contemporary forms of Western world power and older forms first so named by Marxist and other theorists a century ago. The last thing that critics of a new imperialism wish to allow is that Western power has changed sufficiently to invalidate the very application of this critical concept. Nor have many considered the possibility that if the concept of imperialism has a relevance today, it applies to certain aggressive, authoritarian regimes of the non-Western world rather than to the contemporary West. In this paper I fully accept that there is a concentration of much world power - economic, cultural, political and military - in the hands of Western elites. In my recent book, Theory of the Global State, I discuss the development of a 'global-Western state conglomerate' (Shaw 2000). I argue that 'global' ideas and institutions, whose significance characterizes the new political era that has opened with the end of the Cold War, depend largely - but not solely - on Western power. I hold no brief and intend no apology for official Western ideas and behaviour. And yet I propose that the idea of a new imperialism is a profoundly misleading, indeed ideological concept that obscures the realities of power and especially of empire in the twenty-first century. This notion is an obstacle to understanding the significance, extent and limits of contemporary Western power. It simultaneously serves to obscure many real causes of oppression, suffering and struggle for transformation against the quasi-imperial power of many regional states. I argue that in the global era, this separation has finally become critical. This is for two related reasons. On the one hand, Western power has moved into new territory, largely uncharted -- and I argue unchartable -- with the critical tools of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, the politics of empire remain all too real, in classic forms that recall both modern imperialism and earlier empires, in many non-Western states, and they are revived in many political struggles today. Thus the concept of a 'new imperialism' fails to deal with both key post-imperial features of Western power and the quasi-imperial character of many non-Western states. The concept overstates Western power and understates the dangers posed by other, more authoritarian and imperial centres of power. Politically it identifies the West as the principal enemy of the world's people, when for many of them there are far more real and dangerous enemies closer to home. I shall return to these political issues at the end of this paper.

**Imperialism is good: the defeat of Nazism and the promotion of democracy are proof.**

**Boot, 03** “American Imperialism? No need to run away from Label” Max Boot, Senior fellow of the Council of foreign relations, USA Today, May 6, 2003.

[http://66.102.1.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:sP5soPyDtzAJ:www.attacberlin.de/fileadmin/Sommerakademie/Boot\\_Imperialim\\_fine.pdf+author:max+author:boot](http://66.102.1.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:sP5soPyDtzAJ:www.attacberlin.de/fileadmin/Sommerakademie/Boot_Imperialim_fine.pdf+author:max+author:boot)).

Mind you, this is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the mistreatment of the Indians. But, on the whole, U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea (news - web sites) and Panama. Yet, while generally successful as imperialists, Americans have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that "imperialism" carries, there's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term. But it should definitely embrace the practice. That doesn't mean looting Iraq of its natural resources; nothing could be more destructive of our goal of building a stable government in Baghdad. It means imposing the rule of law, property rights, free speech and other guarantees, at gunpoint if need be. This will require selecting a new ruler who is committed to pluralism and then backing him or her to the hilt. Iran and other neighboring states won't hesitate to impose their despotic views on Iraq; we shouldn't hesitate to impose our democratic views.



IMPERIALISM GOOD

**Criticizing benevolent action on the grounds of imperialism undermines liberation of oppressed people – imperialism is justified in some instances.**

**Shaw, 2** (Martin Shaw, professor of international relations at University of Sussex, Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in the Global Era, 4-7-2002, <http://www.martinshaw.org/empire.htm> AFM)

*Conclusion: The abuses of anti-imperialism*

It is worth asking how the politics of anti-imperialism distorts Western leftists' responses to global struggles for justice. John Pilger, for example, consistently seeks to minimise the crimes of Milosevic in Kosovo, and to deny their genocidal character - purely because these crimes formed part of the rationale for Western intervention against Serbia. He never attempted to minimise the crimes of the pro-Western Suharto regime in the same way. The crimes of quasi-imperial regimes are similar in cases like Yugoslavia and Indonesia, but the West's attitudes towards them are undeniably uneven and inconsistent. To take as the criterion of one's politics opposition to Western policy, rather than the demands for justice of the victims of oppression as such, distorts our responses to the victims and our commitment to justice. We need to support the victims regardless of whether Western governments take up their cause or not; we need to judge Western power not according to a general assumption of 'new imperialism' but according to its actual role in relation to the victims. The task for civil society in the West is not, therefore to oppose Western state policies as a matter of course, *à la* Cold War, but to mobilise solidarity with democratic oppositions and repressed peoples, against authoritarian, quasi-imperial states. It is to demand more effective global political, legal and military institutions that genuinely and consistently defend the interests of the most threatened groups. It is to grasp the contradictions among and within Western elites, conditionally allying themselves with internationalising elements in global institutions and Western governments, against nationalist and reactionary elements. The arrival in power of George Bush II makes this discrimination all the more urgent. In the long run, we need to develop a larger politics of global social democracy and an ethic of global responsibility that address the profound economic, political and cultural inequalities between Western and non-Western worlds. We will not move far in these directions, however, unless we grasp the life-and-death struggles between many oppressed peoples and the new local imperialisms, rather than subsuming all regional contradictions into the false synthesis of a new Western imperialism.

**\*\*LACAN/ZIZEK\*\***

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ZIZEK AUTHORITARIAN

**Zizek is an authoritarian bully — his arguments are non-falsifiable.**

**Kirsch, 8** – senior editor of The New Republic

(Adam, The New Republic, "The Deadly Jester," [http://www.tnr.com/story\\_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef](http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef))

When Zizek employed this phrase as the title of a short book about the September 11 attacks and their aftermath, he was not making an ironic pop reference. He was drawing an edifying parallel. Why is it, the communist revolutionary must inevitably reflect, that nobody wants a communist revolution? Why do people in the West seem so content in what Zizek calls "the Francis Fukuyama dream of the 'end of history'"? For most of us, this may not seem like a hard question to answer: one need only compare the experience of communist countries with the experience of democratic ones. But Zizek is not an empiricist, or a liberal, and he has another answer. It is that capitalism is the Matrix, the illusion in which we are trapped. This, of course, is merely a flamboyant sci-fi formulation of the old Marxist concept of false consciousness. "Our 'freedoms,'" Zizek writes in *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*, "themselves serve to mask and sustain our deeper unfreedom." This is the central instance in Zizek's work of the kind of dialectical reversal, the clever anti-liberal inversion, that is the basic movement of his mind. It could hardly be otherwise, considering that his intellectual gods are Hegel and Lacan--masters of the dialectic, for whom reality never appears except in the form of the illusion or the symptom. In both their systems, the interpreter--the philosopher for Hegel, the analyst for Lacan--is granted absolute, unchallengeable authority. Most people are necessarily in thrall to appearances, and thereby to the deceptions of power; but the interpreter is somehow immune to them, and can singlehandedly recognize and expose the hidden meanings, the true processes at work in History or in the Unconscious.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ZIZEK AUTHORITARIAN

**Their refusal to compromise with any liberal action is not noble – it's totalitarian.**

**Kirsch, 8** – senior editor of The New Republic

(Adam, The New Republic, "The Deadly Jester," [http://www.tnr.com/story\\_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef](http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef))

There is a name for the politics that glorifies risk, decision, and will; that yearns for the hero, the master, and the leader; that prefers death and the infinite to democracy and the pragmatic; that finds the only true freedom in the terror of violence. Its name is not communism. Its name is fascism, and in his most recent work Zizek has inarguably revealed himself as some sort of fascist. He admits as much in *Violence*, where he quotes the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk on the "re-emerging Left-Fascist whispering at the borders of academia"--"where, I guess, I belong." There is no need to guess.

Zizek endorses one after another of the practices and the values of fascism, but he obstinately denies the label. Is "mass choreography displaying disciplined movements of thousands of bodies," of the kind Leni Riefenstahl loved to photograph, fascist? No, Zizek insists, "it was Nazism that stole" such displays "from the workers' movement, their original creator." (He is willfully blind to the old and obvious conclusion that totalitarianism accepts content from the left and the right.) Is there something fascist about what Adorno long ago called the jargon of authenticity--"the notions of decision, repetition, assuming one's destiny ... mass discipline, sacrifice of the individual for the collective, and so forth"? No, again: "there is nothing 'inherently fascist' in all that. Is the cult of martyrdom that surrounds Che Guevara a holdover from the death worship of reactionary Latin American Catholicism, as Paul Berman has argued? Perhaps, Zizek grants, "but--so what?"

"To be clear and brutal to the end," he sums up, "there is a lesson to be learned from Hermann Goering's reply, in the early 1940s, to a fanatical Nazi who asked him why he protected a well-known Jew from deportation: 'In this city, I decide who is a Jew!'... In this city, it is we who decide what is left, so we should simply ignore liberal accusations of inconsistency." That sentence is a remarkable moment in Zizek's writing. It stands out even among the many instances in which Zizek, before delivering himself of some monstrous sentiment, warns the reader of the need to be harsh, never to flinch before liberal pieties. In order to defend himself against the charge of proto-fascism, Zizek falls back on Goering's joke about Jews! This is not just the "adrenalin-fueled" audacity of the bold writer who "dares the reader to disagree." To produce this quotation in this context is a sign, I think, of something darker. It is a dare to himself to see how far he can go in the direction of indecency, of an obsession that has nothing progressive or revolutionary about it.

**Zizek's work is a revival of totalitarianism, revolutionary terror, and anti-Semitism.**

**Kirsch, 8** – senior editor of The New Republic

(Adam, The New Republic, "The Deadly Jester," [http://www.tnr.com/story\\_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef](http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef))

And there is no doubt that this scale of killing is what Zizek looks forward to in the Revolution. "What makes Nazism repulsive," he writes, "is not the rhetoric of a final solution as such, but the concrete twist it gives to it." Perhaps there is supposed to be some reassurance for Jews in that sentence; but perhaps not. For in *In Defense of Lost Causes*, again paraphrasing Badiou, Zizek writes: "To put it succinctly, the only true solution to the 'Jewish question' is the 'final solution' (their annihilation), because Jews ... are the ultimate obstacle to the 'final solution' of History itself, to the overcoming of divisions in all-encompassing unity and flexibility." I hasten to add that Zizek dissents from Badiou's vision to this extent: he believes that Jews "resisting identification with the State of Israel," "the Jews of the Jews themselves," the "worthy successors to Spinoza," deserve to be exempted on account of their "fidelity to the Messianic impulse." In this way, Zizek's allegedly progressive thought leads directly into a pit of moral and intellectual squalor. In his New York Times piece against torture, Zizek worried that the normalization of torture as an instrument of state was the first step in "a process of moral corruption: those in power are literally trying to break a part of our ethical backbone." This is a good description of Zizek's own work. Under the cover of comedy and hyperbole, in between allusions to movies and video games, he is engaged in the rehabilitation of many of the most evil ideas of the last century. He is trying to undo the achievement of all the postwar thinkers who taught us to regard totalitarianism, revolutionary terror, utopian violence, and anti-Semitism as inadmissible in serious political discourse. Is Zizek's audience too busy laughing at him to hear him? I hope so, because the idea that they can hear him without recoiling from him is too dismal, and frightening, to contemplate.

## AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ZIZEK = VIOLENCE

**Zizek's alternative is an endorsement of authoritarian violence, like 9/11.****Kirsch, 8** – senior editor of The New Republic (Adam, The New Republic, “The Deadly Jester,”[http://www.tnr.com/story\\_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef](http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef))

This sacerdotal notion of intellectual authority makes both thinkers essentially hostile to democracy, which holds that the truth is available in principle to everyone, and that every individual must be allowed to speak for himself. Zizek, too, sees the similarity--or, as he says, "the profound solidarity"--between his favorite philosophical traditions. "Their structure," he acknowledges, "is inherently 'authoritarian': since Marx and Freud opened up a new theoretical field which sets the very criteria of veracity, their words cannot be put to the test the same way one is allowed to question the statements of their followers." Note that the term "authoritarian" is not used here pejoratively. For Zizek, it is precisely this authoritarianism that makes these perspectives appealing. Their "engaged notion of truth" makes for "struggling theories, not only theories about struggle." But to know what is worth struggling for, you need theories about struggle. Only if you have already accepted the terms of the struggle--in Zizek's case, the class struggle--can you move on to the struggling theory that teaches you how to fight. In this sense, Zizek the dialectician is at bottom entirely undialectical. That liberalism is evil and that communism is good is not his conclusion, it is his premise; and the contortions of his thought, especially in his most political books, result from the need to reconcile that premise with a reality that seems abundantly to indicate the opposite. Hence the necessity of the Matrix, or something like it, for Zizek's worldview. And hence his approval of anything that unplugs us from the Matrix and returns us to the desert of the real--for instance, the horrors of September 11. One of the ambiguities of Zizek's recent work lies in his attitude toward the kind of Islamic fundamentalists who perpetrated the attacks. On the one hand, they are clearly reactionary in their religious dogmatism; on the other hand, they have been far more effective than the Zapatistas or the Porto Alegre movement in discomfiting American capitalism. As Zizek observes, "while they pursue what appear to us to be evil goals with evil means, the very form of their activity meets the highest standard of the good." Yes, the good: Mohammed Atta and his comrades exemplified "good as the spirit of and actual readiness for sacrifice in the name of some higher cause." Zizek's dialectic allows him to have it all: the jihadis are not really motivated by religion, as they say they are; they are actually casualties of global capitalism, and thus "objectively" on the left. "The only way to conceive of what happened on September 11," he writes, "is to locate it in the context of the antagonisms of global capitalism."

**Zizek knows his revolution is doomed to fail--their utopianism arguments are excuses to ignore real suffering and create more human sacrifices to the ivory tower.****Kirsch, 8** – senior editor of The New Republic(Adam, The New Republic, “The Deadly Jester,” [http://www.tnr.com/story\\_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef](http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef))

"Will America finally risk stepping through the fantasmatic screen that separates it from the Outside World, accepting its arrival in the Real world"? Zizek asked in 2002. The answer was no. Even September 11 did not succeed in robbing the West of its liberal illusions. What remains, then, for the would-be communist? The truly dialectical answer, the kind of answer that Marx would have given, is that the adaptations of capitalism must themselves prove fatally maladaptive. This is the answer that Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt gave in their popular neo-Marxist treatises *Empire* and *Multitude*: as global capitalism evolves into a kind of disembodied, centerless, virtual reality, it makes labor autonomous and renders capital itself unnecessary. But Zizek, in *In Defense of Lost Causes*, has no use for Negri's "heroic attempt to stick to fundamental Marxist coordinates." When it comes to the heart of the matter, what Zizek wants is not dialectic, but repetition: another Robespierre, another Lenin, another Mao. His "progressivism" is not linear, it is cyclical. And if objective conditions are different from what they were in 1789 or 1917, so much the worse for objective conditions. "True ideas are eternal, they are indestructible, they always return every time they are proclaimed dead," Zizek writes in his introduction. One of the sections in the book is titled "Give the dictatorship of the proletariat a chance!" Of course, Zizek knows as well as anyone how many chances it has been given, and what the results have been. In his recent books, therefore, he has begun to articulate a new rationale for revolution, one that acknowledges its destined failure in advance. "Although, in terms of their positive content, the Communist regimes were mostly a dismal failure, generating terror and misery," he explains, "at the same time they opened up a certain space, the space of utopian expectations." He adds elsewhere: "In spite of (or, rather, *because of*) all its horrors, the Cultural Revolution undoubtedly did contain elements of an enacted utopia." The crimes denoted not the failure of the utopian experiments, but their success. This utopian dimension is so precious that it is worth any number of human lives. To the tens of millions already lost in Russia, China, Cambodia, and elsewhere, Zizek is prepared to add however many more are required. He endorses the formula of the French radical philosopher Alain Badiou: "*mieux vaut un desastre qu'un desetre*," better a disaster than a lack of being. This ontology of revolution raises some questions. On several occasions, Zizek describes the "utopian" moment of revolution as "divine." In support of this notion he adduces Walter Benjamin on "divine violence." "The most obvious candidate for 'divine violence,'" he writes in *Violence*, "is the violent explosion of resentment which finds expression in a spectrum that ranges from mob lynchings to revolutionary terror." It is true that Benjamin did, in his worst moments, endorse revolutionary violence in these terms. But for Benjamin, who had a quasi-mystical temperament, the divine was at least a real metaphysical category: when he said divine, he meant divine. For Zizek, who sometimes employs religious tropes but certainly does not believe in religion, "divine" is just an honorific--a lofty way of justifying his call for human sacrifices.

## AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ZIZEK = VIOLENCE

**The alternative relies on the imposition of a messianic leader ensuring violence**

**Tormey and Robinson, 5** – teaches in the School of Politics and Critical Theory at the University of Nottingham; doctoral student in the School of Politics at the University of Nottingham (Simon; Andrew, SAGE Publications, “A Ticklish Subject? Zizek and the Future of Left Radicalism”)

Furthermore, despite Zizek’s emphasis on politics, his discussion of the Act remains resolutely individualist – as befits its clinical origins. Zizek’s examples of Acts are nearly all isolated actions by individuals, such as Mary Kay Letourneau’s defiance of juridical pressure to end a relationship with a youth, a soldier in Full Metal Jacket killing his drill sergeant and himself, and the acts of Stalinist bureaucrats who rewrote history knowing they would later be purged (Zizek, 1997a: 21; 1999: 385–7; 2001b: 98–9). Even the Russian Revolution becomes for Zizek a set of individual choices by Lenin, Stalin and the aforementioned bureaucrats, as opposed to the culmination of mass actions involving thousands of ordinary men and women. This is problematic as a basis for understanding previous social transformations, and even more so as a recommendation for the future. The new subject Zizek envisages is an authoritarian leader, someone capable of the ‘inherently terroristic’ action of ‘redefining the rules of the game’ (Zizek, 1999: 377). We would argue that this is a conservative, if not reactionary, position. Donald Rooum’s cartoon character Wildcat surely grasps the essence of left radical ambition rather better when he states, ‘I don’t just want freedom from the capitalists. I also want freedom from people fit to take over’ (Rooum, 1991: 24). Regarding social structures, furthermore, Zizek consistently prefers overconformity to resistance. For him, disidentification with one’s ideologically-defined role is not subversive; rather, ‘an ideological edifice can be undermined by a too-literal identification’ (Zizek, 1997a: 22). Escapism and ideas of an autonomous self are identical with ideology because they make intolerable conditions ‘liveable’ (Butler et al., 2000: 104); even petty resistance is a ‘condition of possibility’ of the system (Zizek, 1997a: 20), a supplement which sustains it. To be free of the present, one should renounce ‘the transgressive fantasmic supplement that attaches us to it’, and attach oneself instead to the public discourse which power officially promotes (see, for example, Butler et al., 2000: 220; Zizek, 2000: 149). So how does Zizek distinguish his ‘leftist’ politics from ‘rightist’ alternatives which would equally meet the formal criteria of an Act? To resolve this dilemma he introduces the idea of the ‘false Act’ (or ‘rightist suspension of the ethical’) to deal with this problem. False acts, such as the Nazi seizure of power and the bombing of Afghanistan, have the formal structure of an Act, but are false because they involve impotent acting-out against a pseudoenemy, and therefore do not traverse the actual social fantasy (see, for example, Butler et al., 2000: 126–7; Zizek, 2001c: 4). Their function, rather, is to preserve the system through the acting-out. One can tell a true Act from a false Act by assessing whether an act is truly negative, i.e. negates all prior standards, and by whether it emerges from a single ‘touchy nodal point ...which decides where one truly stands’ (Butler et al., 2000: 125).<sup>19</sup> This is problematic because Zizek here introduces external criteria while elsewhere stating that the Act must negate all such criteria. Furthermore, if the authenticity of an Act is dependent on an empirical assessment of where the actual social void is, then Zizek’s account of the Act as the assertion of a Truth over and against the facts is undermined.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ZIZEK = VIOLENCE

**Zizek celebrates war and endorses terrorism.**

**Tormey and Robinson, 05** – teaches in the School of Politics and Critical Theory at the University of Nottingham; doctoral student in the School of Politics at the University of Nottingham (Simon; Andrew, SAGE Publications, “A Ticklish Subject? Zizek and the Future of Left Radicalism”)

As becomes evident, ‘class struggle’ is not for Zizek an empirical referent and even less a category of Marxian sociological analysis, but a synonym for the Lacanian Real. A progressive endorsement of ‘class struggle’ means positing the lack of a common horizon and assuming or asserting the insolubility of political conflict.<sup>8</sup> It therefore involves a glorification of conflict, antagonism, terror and a militaristic logic of carving the field into good and bad sides, as a good in itself (see, for example, the discussion in Zizek, 2000: 57, 126). Zizek celebrates war because it ‘undermines the complacency of our daily routine’ by introducing ‘meaningless sacrifice and destruction’ (Zizek, 1999: 105). He fears being trapped by a suffocating social peace or Good and so calls on people to take a ‘militant, divisive position’ of ‘assertion of the Truth that enthuses them’ (Zizek, 2001b: 237–8).<sup>9</sup> The content of this Truth is, however, a secondary issue. For Zizek, Truth has nothing to do with truth claims and the field of ‘knowledge’. Truth is an event which ‘just happens’, and in which ‘the thing itself’ is ‘disclosed to us as what it is’.<sup>10</sup> Truth is therefore the exaggeration which distorts any balanced system. A ‘truth-effect’ occurs whenever a work produces a strong emotional reaction, and it need not be identified with empirical accuracy: lies and distortions can have a ‘truth-effect’, and factual truth can cover the disavowal of desire and the Real.

**Zizek’s alternative is always ruthless, resulting in terrorism and slavery.**

**Tormey and Robinson, 5** – teaches in the School of Politics and Critical Theory at the University of Nottingham; doctoral student in the School of Politics at the University of Nottingham (Simon; Andrew, SAGE Publications, “A Ticklish Subject? Zizek and the Future of Left Radicalism”)

Zizek uses an example from the film The Usual Suspects where the hero shoots his family to give him a pretext for chasing the gang who held them hostage. This is the ‘crazy’, impossible choice of, in a way, shooting at himself, at that which is most precious to himself, through which the subject gains a ‘space of free decision’ by ‘cutting himself loose from the precious object through whose possession the enemy kept him in check’, and clears the terrain for a new beginning (Butler et al., 2000: 122–3). Through an Act, one negates one’s position in the social system and destroys the person one was before. The concept of the Act is therefore palingenetic: one destroys one’s former self to go through a moment of rebirth, but a rebirth grounded on a desire for Nothingness rather than on any particular programme of change (Zizek, 2000: 166–7). For Zizek ‘the only legitimation of revolution is negative, the will to break with the Past’, and revolutionaries should not have positive conceptions of an alternative to be realized (Butler et al., 2000: 131). Ruthlessness is characteristic of the Act: Zizek hates soft-heartedness because it ‘blurs the subject’s pure ethical stance’ and calls for an Act ‘impervious to any call of the Other’ (Zizek, 2001b: 111, 175). The Act thus reproduces in the socio-political field the Lacanian concept of traversing the fantasy. Traversing the fantasy involves ‘accepting’ that there is no way one can be satisfied, and therefore a ‘full acceptance of the pain ... as inherent to the excess of pleasure which is jouissance’, as well as a rejection of every conception of radical difference (Zizek, 1997a: 30–1). It means ‘an acceptance of the fact that there is no secret treasure in me’ (Zizek, 1997a: 10), and a transition from being the ‘nothing’ we are today to being ‘a Nothing humbly aware of itself, a Nothing paradoxically made rich through the very awareness of its lack’ (Zizek, 2000: 146–7). It involves being reduced to a zero-point or ‘ultimate level’ similar to that seen in the most broken concentration-camp inmates (Zizek, 2001b: 76–7, 86), so the role of analysis is ‘to throw out the baby’ in order to confront the patient with his ‘dirty bathwater’ (Zizek, 1997a: 62–3), inducing not an improvement but a transition ‘from Bad to Worse’, which is ‘inherently “terroristic”’ (Zizek, 1999: 377). It is also not freedom in the usual sense, but prostration before the call of the truth-event, ‘something violently imposed on me from the Outside through a traumatic encounter that shatters the very foundation of my being’ (Zizek, 1999: 377). With shades of Orwell, Zizek claims that the Act involves ‘the highest freedom and also the utmost passivity with a reduction to a lifeless automaton who blindly performs its gestures’. In other words, in the Act freedom equals slavery (Zizek, 1999: 377).

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: DOES NOT APPLY TO AFF

**No fixed understanding of the political applies to all situations. They might have persuasive descriptions of Lacan's theory but nothing that applies it to our aff.**

**Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05** (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

One of the functions of myth is to cut out what Trevor Pateman terms the "middle level" of analytical concepts, establishing a short-circuit between high-level generalizations and ultra-specific (pseudo-) concrete instances. In Barthes's classic case of an image of a black soldier saluting the French flag, this individual action is implicitly connected to highly abstract concepts such as nationalism, without the mediation of the particularities of his situation. (These particularities, if revealed, could undermine the myth. Perhaps he enlisted for financial reasons, or due to threats of violence). Thus, while myths provide an analysis of sorts, their basic operation is anti-analytical: the analytical schema is fixed in advance, and the relationship between this schema and the instances it organizes is hierarchically ordered to the exclusive advantage of the former. This is precisely what happens in Lacanian analyses of specific political and cultural phenomena. Žižek specifically advocates 'sweeping generalizations' and short-cuts between specific instances and high-level abstractions, evading the "middle level". "The correct dialectical procedure... can be best described as a direct jump from the singular to the universal, bypassing the mid-level of particularity'. He wants a 'direct jump from the singular to the universal', without reference to particular contexts.

**Prefer our specific solvency evidence over their generic theory. We will defend against any specific case turn but cannot defend against a turn that they say is rooted in the unconscious.**

**Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05** (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

The technical term operates in much the same way as in positivistic theories, where the use of a noun turns a set of observed "facts" into a "law". Lack (in the sense of the verb "to lack") is explained by means of a nominalized lack (for instance, the failure of society by the fact of antagonism), and the various versions of nominalized lack are arranged in sentences involving the verb "to be". It is not simply a relation of dislocation but a theoretical entity in its own right. For instance, "class struggle" is that on account of which every direct reference to universality... is... "biased", dislocated with regard to its literal meaning. "Class struggle" is the Marxist name for this basic "operator of dislocation"<sup>90</sup>. One might compare this formula to the statement, "I don't know what causes dislocation". Žižek also refers to history 'as a series of ultimately failed attempts to deal with the same "unhistorical", traumatic kernel'. Dallmayr similarly writes of Laclau and Mouffe's concept of antagonism that 'negativity designates not simply a lack but a "nihilating" potency', 'a nihilating ferment with real effects'<sup>92</sup>, and Newman writes of a 'creative and constitutive absence'. Butler notes that 'the "real" that is a "rock" or a "kernel" or sometimes a "substance" is also, and sometimes within the same sentence, "a loss", a "negativity"<sup>94</sup>. Constitutive lack is a positivity - an "operator of dislocation", a "nihilating" element - in the Lacanian vocabulary. It is this process of mythical construction which allows lack to be defined precisely, and which therefore meets (for instance) Newman's criterion that it be less 'radically underdefined' than Derrida's concept of lack<sup>95</sup>. One can only avoid an "I-don't-know" being underdefined if one misrepresents it mythically.



**AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ALTERNATIVE FAILS**

**Zizek's Act fails to accomplish fundamental change—it is merely therapeutic for individuals.**

**Robinson 04** (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, [http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress\\_15.html](http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html))

Why does Zizek support the Act? Although he connects the Act to 'radicalism', he does not state anywhere that the Act accomplishes any fundamental change in the deep structure of existence; at best, it can temporarily suspend (for instance) exclusion. This is not an attempt to achieve a better world (still less a perfect one!) but a purely structural attempt to restore something which Zizek thinks is missing. In this sense, even in its 'radicalism', the Act is conservative. Zizek is concerned that the matrix of sublimation - the possibility of producing 'sublime' objects which seem to encapsulate the absolute - is under threat (FA 26; elsewhere, Zizek attacks postmodernists and other 'new sophists' for this). The Act in whatever form reproduces the possibility of sublimity; in this sense, it reproduces old certainties in new forms, undermining all the gains made by theories of historicity and contingency. The purpose of the Act, which Zizek has transplanted from psychoanalytic practice (directed at individual psyches) to socio-political practice (directed at entire social systems) without considering whether this is possible or appropriate, is primarily therapeutic. The role of the Act is to solve the antinomy of the present by asserting a Real against the combined Imaginary and Real of simulacra, thereby reintroducing the impossibility that shatters the Imaginary, enabling us to traverse the fantasy (TS 374; the fantasy is the extimate kernel of libidinal investment which Zizek sees lurking almost everywhere). Zizek seems to be restoring to psychoanalysis a naive conception of psychological health: via the ex nihilo act, one can escape the logic of the symptom (DSST 178).

**Zizek's Act is radically nihilistic and accomplishes nothing political.**

**Robinson 04** (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, [http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress\\_15.html](http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html))

It is important to realise that the Act is not revolutionary in the sense of creating something new on the basis of an ideal, or an imaginary, or the restoration of an authentic pre-alienated state, or any other process which would allow one to create something on the basis of a project and praxis. The Act is radically nihilistic (see below). For Zizek, the subject can change nothing - all it can do is add itself to reality by an act of claiming responsibility for the given (SOI 221). Zizek is a little inconsistent on the relationship between the Act and the existing system, but on the whole, he seems to see Acts as occurring for the system, against imaginaries and especially the extimate kernel of fantasy. Christianity did not so much suspend the law, says Zizek, as suspend its obscene supplement (FA 130) (i.e. extimate kernel). Zizek thinks fantasy is fundamentally inconsistent, so it is an "ethical duty" to put this on display, in order to disrupt fantasy (PF 74; see CONSERVATISM on Zizek's tendency to conflate 'displaying' with 'doing', so that the boundary between being a sexist or a fascist and displaying sexism or fascism to disrupt it is unclear). Zizek is inconsistent, however, since there are also occasions when he seems to want to encourage fantasies (TS 51). Crucially, the Act is also a form of decisiveness. Zizek wants to pin down vacillating signifiers without using a Master-Signifier or quilting-point, he says on one occasion (FA 139-40). Elsewhere (eg. on Chavez and Lenin), he seems to rather like the Master or "One" whose Act 'quilts' the field. Either way, the Act seems to give a certain focus to discourse, acting as a centre. As his discussions of the vanishing mediator show, he sees the Act establishing a new set of symbolic and imaginary discourses which restore the role of the master-signifier, by directly adopting the position of the extimate kernel. Zizek also sees the Act as a resolution of a dilemma. According to Zizek, Good assumes (and therefore produces) Evil, and the Act escapes the resulting dilemma by breaking with Good (TS 382; this is also what distinguishes the Act as diabolical Evil from everyday evil - crime, the Holocaust and so on). For Zizek, denial of the possibility of the Act is the root of evil (TS 376). What seems completely missing here is any case for the Act that in any way justifies ethically the terrible nature of the Act, both for its perpetrator and for others; one can only really accept Zizek's Act if one places at the core of one's belief-system the importance of resolving dilemmas in some supposed deep structure of existence, so what matters is not human or social consequences or any specific beliefs, but merely the adoption of a structural position which solves contradictions in and thereby overcomes the problems of a structure. Despite Zizek's repeated use of the term "ethics", therefore, this is in many ways not an ethical system at all, but a kind of model of structural problem-solving - a "therapy" for society, passed off as ethics.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Zizek's alternative conceptualizes culture as having so much power over individuals that liberation is impossible.**

**Robinson 04** (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, [http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress\\_15.html](http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html))

The Act is a fundamentally negative occurrence in which one strips oneself of all human dignity and 'recognises' that one is nothing but excrement, that there is no 'little treasure' inside and that the subject is nothing but a void. (It is therefore utterly incompatible with approaches which involve action - eg. praxis - as a humanising phenomenon). "By traversing the fantasy, the subject accepts the void of his nonexistence" (TS 281). Traversing the fantasy leads to subjective destitution: abandoning the notion of something 'in me more than myself' and recognising that the big Other is nothing but a semblance. This involves a change in one's worldview: the "analyst's desire" makes possible a community minus its phantasmic support, without any need for a 'subject supposed to...' (know, enjoy or believe) (TS 296). (In this passage Zizek portrays the Act as leading to a fundamental shift in character-structure, although this is not a claim he repeats consistently). An Act is defined by the characteristic that it "surprises/transforms the agent itself" (CHU 124; a choice in the usual sense cannot therefore be an Act). It involves subjective destitution, a (supposedly) liberating moment, "the anti-ideological gesture par excellence by means of which I renounce the treasure within myself and fully admit my dependence on the externality of symbolic apparatuses - that is to say, fully assume the fact that my very self-experience of a subject who was already there prior to the external process of interpellation is a retrospective misrecognition brought about by the process of interpellation" (CHU 134; NB how this means endorsing control by the system, not opposing it; cf. MATERIALISM). The Act therefore involves an utter prostration before symbolic apparatuses: NOT the liberation of the human from the system, but the total victory of the system over humans (cf. Zizek's support for Big Brother-type surveillance; see MARX).

**Zizek's alternative is impossible to judge—it is so open ended that it denies all rational assessment.**

**Robinson, 04** (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, [http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress\\_15.html](http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html))

Not surprisingly given that he sees the Act as shattering meaning, Zizek wants a commitment which is "dogmatic", "cannot be refuted by any 'argumentation' " and "does not ask for good reasons", and which is "indifferent" to the truth-status of the Event it refers to (TS \*\*\*\*; find reference). A Decision (Act) is circular, a shibboleth, and a creative act which nevertheless reveals a constitutive void which is invisible (TS 138; NB the slippage between epistemology and ontology here: how do we know the Act is revealing rather than creating the void?). Law is legitimated by transference: it is only convincing to those who already believe (SOI 38). The Act subverts a given field as such and achieves the apparently 'impossible' by retroactively creating the conditions of its possibility by changing its conditions (CHU 121). It has its own inherent normativity, lacking any simple external standards (TS 388) As well as being problematic in itself, this kind of open advocacy of irrationalism and dogmatism would seem to rule out the possibility of empirically or rationally assessing the validity of a particular Act: by definition an Act is not open to such assessment, so one cannot judge between a false (eg. Nazi) and a true Act, since this would involve precisely such a rational and empirical process of assessment ("good reasons" and truth-status). This raises problems for Zizek's attempts to distance himself from Nazism (see below, on false acts). Also, Zizek is being inconsistent in trying to defend such an attack on communication by communicative means (can one make a rational case against rationality?).

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Zizek's alternative requires an abandonment of ethics and accepting an obliteration of the self.**

**Robinson 04** (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, [http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress\\_15.html](http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html))

Zizek's theory of the Act presupposes a belief that we are all basically worthless. "The ultimate level of the ethical experience" is found in the utterly broken victim of the Nazi or Stalinist camps (DSST 86), which means one "will be surprised to learn how even the darkest Stalinism harbours a redemptive dimension" (DSST 88). Humanity per se is reducible to the most broken concentration camp inmates (i.e. the ones who have gone beyond trying to reconstruct meaning through petty resistances; referred to in the camps as "Muslims" or "Musselmen" because of their resemblance to famine victims); these people were not dehumanised by the Nazis, but rather, express an inhuman kernel of humanity (DSST 76-7). This kind of person is the "zero-level" of humanity which makes human symbolic engagement possible by wiping the slate of animal instincts (DSST 77; NB the strong binary operative here, which is totally flawed: dogs show similar modes of action when exposed to similar situations, such as Seligman's dogs in the 'learned helplessness' experiments). Zizek thinks we all have had to go through this experience (DSST 77-8). This experience also negates the concept of authenticity (though not enough to stop Zizek using it elsewhere): one can't say such victims are involved in an authentic existential project, but it would be cynical to say they are living an inauthentic existence since it is others, not themselves, who degrade them (DSST 78-9; I don't actually see why an external basis for subordination would affect the concept of authenticity in the slightest; perhaps it would affect the strongest versions which assume pure freedom, but it would not undermine, for instance, the later Sartre, since in this case the authenticity of the project has been defeated by the practice-inert, leading to a state of existence he terms "exis": a degraded existence without project). I think a Deleuzian analysis would be more appropriate here: the dehumanisation of these victims results from the (temporary) total victory of the Oedipal/authoritarian cage: flows and breaks are cut off or utterly contained within an order of power/knowledge, with the political conclusion being that freedom exists in a struggle with domination and that the struggle for freedom is necessary to prevent us being reduced to this level. But this would be partly a causal account, whereas Zizek seems to want a pure ethics. Where Zizek's account leads politically is far more sinister; Zizek cannot in all seriousness criticise the inhumanity of the concentration camps if they simply reveal our essence, and it is hard to see how one could oppose the Nazis if they did not dehumanise their victims or treat them inhumanely. Indeed, such an excremental reduction is something Zizek elsewhere praises, and his attempts to distance himself from Nazism have nothing to do with the inhumanity of the camps; rather, they revolve around nit-picking over whether the Nazis really traversed the fantasy or stopped short at a false act (see below). The Act is a submission: revolutionaries should become "followers" of the truth-event and its call (TS 227; this reproduces with a reversed sign Vaneigem's concept of the Cause as a form of alienation. cf. Donald Roon's cartoon Wildcat: "I don't just want freedom from the capitalists, I also want freedom from people fit to take over"). Love is "nothing but" an act of self-erasure which breaks the chain of justice (DSST 49-50). Zizek demands submission to radically exterior, meaningless injunctions, "experienced as a radically traumatic intrusion", which "a renewed Left should aim at fully endorsing"; "something violently imposed on me from the Outside through a traumatic encounter that shatters the very foundations of my being" (TS 212). It also involves the negation of dignity: Zizek refers to "heroically renouncing the last vestiges of narcissistic dignity and accomplishing the act for which one is grotesquely inadequate" (TS 352). The heroism of the act is to openly endorse a transition "from Bad to Worse", and for this reason, a true act, which redefines the 'rules of the game', is "inherently 'terroristic' " (TS 377). Thus, instead of the "liberal trap" of respecting some rights and rejecting obligatory Party lines, one should seek the "good terror", i.e. choosing what one has to do (TS 378). Any qualms are dismissed by Zizek as "humanist hysterical shirking the act" (TS 380; NB this misuse of clinical categories in socio-ideological analysis quickly leads Zizek into problems: the Lacanian categories obsessional/hysterical/psychotic/perverse are strictly incompatible, whereas it is quite clear that a theorist who 'hysterically' rejects terror may easily also 'psychotically' believe in literality and 'perversely' believe in decoded flows). The Act involves accepting utter self-obliteration, and rejecting all compassion (TS 378).

**AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ALTERNATIVE FAILS**

**Zizek's "act" erases all compassion for others.**

**Robinson 04** (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, [http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress\\_15.html](http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html))

Assuming an Act means rejecting all concern for others and making oneself, to all intents and purposes, a rock. In the Act, one "assumes... the full burden of freedom impervious to any call of the Other" (DSST 175). Whereas in Derrida and other postmodernists, argues Zizek, ethics is a response to the call of the Other, either abyssal or actual, in Zizek's Lacan the ethical act proper suspends both of these along with the rest of the 'big Other' (DSST 161). Zizek loathes 'soft-heartedness' because it "blurs the subject's pure ethical stance". In this passage, he is referring to Stalinist views; but his criticism of them is not of this loathing; rather, he thinks "that they were not 'pure' enough" because they got caught in an emotional sense of duty (DSST 111). This according to Zizek is the difference between Lenin and Stalin: Zizek's Lenin did not become emotionally attached to his Act (DSST 113). Zizek's ethical anti-humanism goes so far that he advocates hating the beloved out of love (FA 126), because what one should love is not their human person. Zizek also endorses Kant's attempt to purge ethics of historical contents, including compassion and concern for others (PF 232-3).

**Zizek's alternative fails to transform the existing order—it is a shot in the dark.**

**Robinson 04** (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, [http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress\\_15.html](http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html))

How one locates the Act in relation to revolution depends just how fundamentally the change involved in a revolution is conceived. The Act according to Zizek disrupts/overthrows the existing order of Imaginary and Symbolic alignments (though this does not of course make it revolutionary in practice); however, his account seems to involve the restoration of the basic structure of the social system subsequently, so there is no possibility of meaningful change in terms of overcoming social oppression and exclusion or the irrationalities of ideology. (This also leaves the question of why an Act would lead to anything better; indeed, Zizek denies that it would. So why opt for an Act?). In a sense, the Act is conservative. Traversing the fantasy involves the act of 'accepting' there is no way one can ever be satisfied: a direct relation to the objet petit a (i.e. desired object) minus the screen of fantasy, involving "a full acceptance of the pain... as inherent to the excess of pleasure which is jouissance" (PF 30). This means accepting "radical ontological closure" - i.e. 'accepting' that there is no radical difference - and also that "we renounce every opening, every belief in the messianic Otherness", including, for instance, Derridean and Levinasian concepts of being 'out-of-joint' (PF 31), especially the idea of jouissance being amassed elsewhere. This leads one into the realm of drive; one becomes "eternal-'undead' " (PF 31). (Zizek is here replacing an irrational belief that jouissance is amassed elsewhere with an irrational belief that it isn't; the existence or non-existence of difference and Otherness is an empirical question, and Zizek's refusal to accept that radical Otherness could exist renders his theory potentially extremely normalist and ethnocentric).

Crucially, the Act does not involve overcoming Law and the system. It involves suspending them, so they can be resurrected or resuscitated on a new basis. Although the Act is a 'shot in the dark' (preventing voluntary reconstruction/transformation of society), nevertheless it always involves a necessary betrayal (see TS) which reproduces the Oedipal/authoritarian structure of the world; the vanishing mediator always vanishes so as to restore the system. It is interesting to note Zizek's insistence on using the word "suspension" (St Paul's suspension of the law, the leftist suspension of the ethics, and so on). The suspension of the Law, as shown in Zizek's quote from St Paul (TS 150-1), is clearly in fact something more: it is in a sense psychotic, breaking with both Law and desire. But it is a suspension because it resurrects Law in the more total form of the Cause. It is interesting that Zizek chooses the word "suspension". If Zizek has in mind a destruction or fundamental transformation of the Law or ethics, there are so many better terms he could have chosen: abolition, destruction, smashing, overcoming, transcending, sublating, surpassing and so on. That he (more-or-less consistently) uses the term "suspension" is therefore probably significant. This term implies a temporary absence of the phenomenon in question, as opposed to its permanent destruction, replacement, or even transformation. In other words: what is suspended (Law, ethics, etc.) nevertheless returns in the same basic form as before (which presumably means its structural nature is basically the same).

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Zizek's politics rely on extreme individualism—it results in no social change.**

**Robinson 04** (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, [http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress\\_15.html](http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html))

The category of the Act involves extreme methodological individualism. The assumption that an individual Act can alter society as a whole, whatever its earth-shattering psychological consequences for a particular individual, is deeply flawed. This problem is related to Zizek's inappropriate expansion of what are at root clinical/therapeutic concepts into socio-political analysis. Individual Acts do not have direct social effects. The Mary Kay Letourneau case, for instance, has not substantially changed popular perceptions of non-abusive relations between legal- and illegal-age people; it certainly has not shattered the social structure. Rather, Letourneau has been anathematised and victimised by the state. On a social level, the Act is impotent and politically irrelevant; it has no transformative role and makes sense only in a closed analytical system. Even when Acts of Zizek's type do have social effects, there is no reason to believe that these effects shatter or reformulate entire social structures. Zizek's account here rests on psychologising social structures, imagining that these structures rest on the same basis as a Lacanian account of the psyche. Actually, a single act on the superficial level is unlikely to alter the social structure any more than a tiny amount. For instance: suppose Letourneau's Act worked; suppose the law was changed to make love a defence for consensual sex across the age-of-consent boundary. Would this have any deep-rooted social effects? Surely not. Such changes have not, for instance, taken us very far towards gay liberation; the situation is better than it was, but the social position of gay men has not been reshaped dramatically. Acts are impotent against deep prejudices. Since Acts do not have meaningful social effects, they cannot really help the worst-off group (social symptom). If the "cathartic moment" of a break with the dominant ideology only occurs in a single individual, the social system would not be harmed. To be effective, it would have to produce a new conception of the world which is expansive and convinces wide strata of the population. Zizek is missing the significance of revolutions such as in Russia when he sees them as pure Acts by leaders; this is an intentionalist delusion. As Gramsci rightly puts it, each revolution involves an "intense critical labour" whereby a new conception of the world is formulated, spread and used to create a collective will. The collective will does not simply spring miraculously from a leader's whim.

**Zizek's alternative is so radically negative that it is unable to formulate new politics.**

**Robinson 04** (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, [http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress\\_15.html](http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html))

Because of his extreme methodological individualism, Zizek ends up with a highly intentionalist, leader-fixated model of politics which is authoritarian and also exaggerates the role of leaders both in practice and potentially. Stalinism, for instance, was not a result of an Act by Stalin and Lenin; it was a social-structural phenomenon involving the actions of many individuals, with a "history of everyday life" and structural dynamics such as intrabureaucratic competition, resulting from the mode (or modes) of thought and action it involved. The extension of clinical categories into society requires the reduction of concepts which are usually diverse to singularity: one unconscious, symptom, fundamental fantasy, etc. for entire societies or even the whole of humanity. This is in contradiction with psychoanalytic practice and also is implausible. Zizek's politics are "a prescription for political quietism and sterility" (Laclau, CHU 293). I disagree with Laclau's reasons for claiming this, but the conclusion is valid: the Act has little practical political relevance, and Zizek's sectarianism (see RESISTANCE) leaves him aloof from actual political struggles. Zizek seems to have no real sense of what is important in politics. For Zizek, the main issue is reviving the category of the Act, to fill a supposed structural void. But there are many concrete issues which are many times more important: closing down the WTO, fighting back against the wave of police repression, stopping the wholesale commodification of society, stopping environmental destruction, stopping Bush's racist war, smashing capitalism, etc. 'Restoring the properly ethical dimension of the act' only matters to someone who is so trapped in his own theory that he thinks the whole world revolves around it. (What did Wittgenstein say about philosophy and masturbation?). Zizek should let the fly out the jar! The abstract and essentialist pursuit of the "act proper" is a distraction from contingent political struggles. Zizek lacks, and is presumably unable on principle to formulate, a positive conception of what should replace the present system. His suggestions are either vague and naive (socialising cyberspace, for instance), reproduce capitalism (the necessity of betrayal), or set up something worse (terror). Zizek's endorsement of "absolute negativity" is a barrier to his developing actual alternatives.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**The alternative fails: Lacan under-develops the connection between individual psyches and universal understandings. They will not be able to explain how one person thinking will change society.**

**Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05** (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

Lacanian analysis consists mainly of an exercise in projection. As a result, Lacanian "explanations" often look more propagandistic or pedagogical than explanatory. A particular case is dealt with only in order to, and to the extent that it can, confirm the already-formulated structural theory. Judith Butler criticizes Žižek's method on the grounds that 'theory is applied to its examples', as if 'already true, prior to its exemplification'. 'The theory is articulated on its self-sufficiency, and then shifts register only for the pedagogical purpose of illustrating an already accomplished truth'. It is therefore 'a theoretical fetish that disavows the conditions of its own emergence'<sup>52</sup>. She alleges that Lacanian psychoanalysis 'becomes a theological project' and also 'a way to avoid the rather messy psychic and social entanglement' involved in studying specific cases<sup>53</sup>. Similarly, Dominick LaCapra objects to the idea of constitutive lack because specific 'losses cannot be adequately addressed when they are enveloped in an overly generalised discourse of absence... Conversely, absence at a "foundational" level cannot simply be derived from particular historical losses'<sup>54</sup>. Attacking 'the long story of conflating absence with loss that becomes constitutive instead of historical'<sup>55</sup>, he accuses several theorists of eliding the difference between absence and loss, with 'confusing and dubious results', including a 'tendency to avoid addressing historical problems, including losses, in sufficiently specific terms', and a tendency to 'enshroud, perhaps even to etherealise, them in a generalised discourse of absence'<sup>56</sup>. Daniel Bensaid draws out the political consequences of the projection of absolutes into politics. 'The fetishism of the absolute event involves... a suppression of historical intelligibility, necessary to its depoliticization'. The space from which politics is evacuated 'becomes... a suitable place for abstractions, delusions and hypostases'. Instead of actual social forces, there are 'shadows and spectres'. The operation of the logic of projection is predictable. According to Lacanians, there is a basic structure (sometimes called a 'ground' or 'matrix') from which all social phenomena arise, and this structure, which remains unchanged in all eventualities, is the reference-point from which particular cases are viewed. The "fit" between theory and evidence is constructed monologically by the reduction of the latter to the former, or by selectivity in inclusion and reading of examples. At its simplest, the Lacanian myth functions by a short-circuit between a particular instance and statements containing words such as "all", "always", "never", "necessity" and so on. A contingent example or a generic reference to "experience" is used, misleadingly, to found a claim with supposed universal validity. For instance, Stavrakakis uses the fact that existing belief-systems are based on exclusions as a basis to claim that all belief-systems are necessarily based on exclusions<sup>58</sup>, and claims that particular traumas express an 'ultimate impossibility'<sup>59</sup>. Similarly, Laclau and Mouffe use the fact that a particular antagonism can disrupt a particular fixed identity to claim that the social as such is penetrated and constituted by antagonism as such<sup>60</sup>. Phenomena are often analysed as outgrowths of something exterior to the situation in question. For instance, Žižek's concept of the "social symptom" depends on a reduction of the acts of one particular series of people (the "socially excluded", "fundamentalists", Serbian paramilitaries, etc.) to a psychological function in the psyche of a different group (westerners). The "real" is a supposedly self-identical principle which is used to reduce any and all qualitative differences between situations to a relation of formal equivalence. This shows how mythical characteristics can be projected from the outside, although it also raises different problems: the under-conceptualization of the relationship between individual psyches and collective phenomena in Lacanian theory, and a related tendency for psychological concepts to acquire an ersatz agency similar to that of a Marxian fetish. "The Real" or "antagonism" occurs in phrases which have it doing or causing something. As Barthes shows, myth offers the psychological benefits of empiricism without the epistemological costs.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Zizek's alternative is authoritarian—his concept of human nature requires political domination.**

**Robinson 04** (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, [http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress\\_15.html](http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html))

The Act also seems to be authoritarian in the sense that it involves an unfounded imposition of will which reshapes the symbolic edifice. Perhaps even worse is Zizek's conception of human nature. Zizek thinks people are basically too chaotic to live without rulers, repeating the claims of the likes of Hobbes. He sees 'unruliness' and going to the end beyond every human measure as a primordial drive and part of human nature - a drive ethics tries to contain - a drive involving "clinging to wild egotistical freedom unbound by any constraints" which "has to be broken and 'gentrified' by the pressure of education" (PF 236-7). Humanity is as such unnaturally prone to excess, and has to be gentrified through institutions (PF 135). There is a basic drive to dis-attach from the world which fantasy is a protection against (TS 289). The role of paternal Law is to expose people to the harsh demands of social reality, demands which lead to entry into desire (FA 76; Zizek is presumably some kind of expectationist). He even seems to endorse Kant's view that people need a Master and (hierarchic) discipline to tame their 'unruly' insistence on their own will and force them to submit to being placed in subjection to "the laws of mankind and brought to feel their constraint" (TS 36 - clearly a substitutionist term). So Zizek endorses Kant's work on education, where he claims the role of schools is not for children to learn but to accustom them "to sitting still and doing exactly what they are told", to "counteract man's natural unruliness" (TS 36)! (Zizek also conflates social control with the unrelated issue of "venturing wildly and rashly into danger" in this discussion of Kant). Once accustomed to freedom, one will do anything for it, so this urge must be "smoothed down" (TS 36). Zizek calls this text of Kant's a "marvellous text" (TS 36). He also makes the (apparently contradictory with all the above, but equally conservative) claim that "a human being is... in need of firm roots" and that this basic need is the root of the symbolic order (CHU 250). On the whole Zizek seems to be endorsing a conservative or even reactionary view of human nature; though this is not entirely clear.

## AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Zizek's political stance is violent and feeds into power. His alternative has so few limits that there is nothing to prevent elites from deploying it to violently maintain power.**

**Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05** (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

On a political level, this kind of stance leads to an acceptance of social exclusion which negates compassion for its victims. The resultant inhumanity finds its most extreme expression in Žižek's work, where 'today's "mad dance", the dynamic proliferation of multiple shifting identities... awaits its resolution in a new form of Terror'. It is also present, however, in the toned-down exclusionism of authors such as Mouffe. Hence, democracy depends on 'the possibility of drawing a frontier between "us" and "them"', and 'always entails relations of inclusion-exclusion'<sup>28</sup>. 'No state or political order... can exist without some form of exclusion' experienced by its victims as coercion and violence<sup>29</sup>, and, since Mouffe assumes a state to be necessary, this means that one must endorse exclusion and violence. (The supposed necessity of the state is derived from the supposed need for a master-signifier or nodal point to stabilize identity and avoid psychosis, either for individuals or for societies). What is at stake in the division between these two trends in Lacanian political theory is akin to the distinction Vaneigem draws between "active" and "passive" nihilism<sup>30</sup>. The Laclauian trend involves an implied ironic distance from any specific project, which maintains awareness of its contingency; overall, however, it reinforces conformity by insisting on an institutional mediation which overcodes all the "articulations". The Žižekian version is committed to a more violent and passionate affirmation of negativity, but one which ultimately changes very little. The function of the Žižekian "Act" is to dissolve the self, producing a historical event. "After the revolution", however, everything stays much the same. For all its radical pretensions, Žižek's politics can be summed up in his attitude to neo-liberalism: 'If it works, why not try a dose of it?'<sup>31</sup>. The phenomena which are denounced in Lacanian theory are invariably readmitted in its "small print", and this leads to a theory which renounces both effectiveness and political radicalism. It is in this pragmatism that the ambiguity of Lacanian political theory resides, for, while on a theoretical level it is based on an almost sectarian "radicalism", denouncing everything that exists for its complicity in illusions and guilt for the present, its "alternative" is little different from what it condemns (the assumption apparently being that the "symbolic" change in the psychological coordinates of attachments in reality is directly effective, a claim assumed – wrongly – to follow from the claim that social reality is constructed discursively). Just like in the process of psychoanalytic cure, nothing actually changes on the level of specific characteristics. The only change is in how one relates to the characteristics, a process Žižek terms '*dotting the 'i's*' in reality, recognizing and thereby installing necessity<sup>32</sup>. All that changes, in other words, is the interpretation: as long as they are reconceived as expressions of constitutive lack, the old politics are acceptable. Thus, Žižek claims that de Gaulle's "Act" succeeded by allowing him 'effectively to realize the necessary pragmatic measures' which others pursued unsuccessfully<sup>33</sup>. More recent examples of Žižek's pragmatism include that his alternative to the U.S. war in Afghanistan is only that 'the punishment of those responsible' should be done in a spirit of 'sad duty', not 'exhilarating retaliation'<sup>34</sup>, and his "solution" to the Palestine-Israel crisis, which is NATO control of the occupied territories<sup>35</sup>. If this is the case for Žižek, the ultra-"radical" "Marxist-Leninist" Lacanian, it is so much the more so for his more moderate adversaries. Jason Glynos, for instance, offers an uncompromizing critique of the construction of guilt and innocence in anti-"crime" rhetoric, demanding that demonization of deviants be abandoned, only to insist as an afterthought that, 'of course, this... does not mean that their offences should go unpunished'<sup>36</sup>. Lacanian theory tends, therefore, to produce an "anything goes" attitude to state action: because everything else is contingent, nothing is to limit the practical consideration of tactics by dominant elites.



AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Zizek's philosophy is contradictory and lacks a concrete alternative.**

**Tormey and Robinson, 05** – teaches in the School of Politics and Critical Theory at the University of Nottingham; doctoral student in the School of Politics at the University of Nottingham (Simon; Andrew, SAGE Publications, “A Ticklish Subject? Zizek and the Future of Left Radicalism”)

Zizek's popularity results largely from the apparent way out that he provides from the cul-de-sac in which radical theory, and in particular radical postmodern theory, has found itself. Zizek is of course not the first author to attack 'postmodernists', post-structuralists and post-Marxists on grounds of their lack of radical ambition on the terrain of politics. However, left activists interested in confronting the liberal capitalist status quo find themselves trapped between politically radical but theoretically flawed leftist orthodoxies, and theoretically innovative but politically moderate 'post'-theories. Enter Zizek. Zizek offers an alternative to traditional left radicalisms and 'postmodern' anti-essentialist approaches, especially identity politics. For Zizek, 'radical democracy' accepts the liberal-capitalist horizon, and so is never 'radical' enough. Against this alleged pseudo-radicalism, Zizek revives traditional leftist concepts such as 'class struggle'. He ignores, however, the 'orthodox' left meaning of such terms, rearticulating them in a sophisticated Hegelian and Lacanian vocabulary. Yet problems remain: Zizek's version of 'class struggle' does not map on to traditional conceptions of an empirical working class, and Zizek's 'proletariat' is avowedly 'mythical'. He also rejects newer forms of struggle such as the anti-capitalist movement and the 1968 uprisings, thereby reproducing a problem common in radical theory: **his theory has no link to radical politics in an immediate sense.**<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, he has a theory of how such a politics should look, which he uses to judge existing political radicalisms. So how does Zizek see radical politics emerging? **Zizek does not offer much by way of a positive social agenda.** He does not have anything approximating to a 'programme', nor a model of the kind of society he seeks, nor a theory of the construction of alternatives in the present. Indeed, the more one looks at the matter, the more difficult it becomes to pin Zizek down to any 'line' or 'position'. He seems at first sight to regard social transformation not as something 'possible' to be theorized and advanced, but as a fundamental 'impossibility' because the influence of the dominant symbolic system is **so great that it makes alternatives unthinkable.**<sup>7</sup> A fundamental transformation, however, is clearly the only answer to the otherwise compelling vision of contemporary crisis Zizek offers. Can he escape this contradiction? His attempt to do so revolves around a reclassification of 'impossibility' as an active element in generating action.

## AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**The Act creates no political change and results in suicide**

**Tormey and Robinson, 5** – teaches in the School of Politics and Critical Theory at the University of Nottingham; doctoral student in the School of Politics at the University of Nottingham (Simon; Andrew, SAGE Publications, “A Ticklish Subject? Zizek and the Future of Left Radicalism”)

So the Act is a rebirth – but a rebirth as what? The parallel with Lacan’s concept of ‘traversing the fantasy’ is crucial because, for Lacan, there is no escape from the symbolic order or the Law of the Master. We are trapped in the existing world, complete with its dislocation, lack, alienation antagonism, and no transcendence can overcome the deep structure of this world, which is fixed at the level of subject-formation. The most we can hope for is to go from incapable neurosis to mere alienated subjectivity. In Zizek’s politics, therefore, a fundamental social transformation is impossible. After the break initiated by an Act, a system similar to the present one is restored; the subject undergoes identification with a Cause, leading to a new ‘proper symbolic Prohibition’ revitalized by the process of rebirth pragmatic measures’ (Zizek, 1997b: 72–3), which may be the same ones astoday. It is on this ground that Zizek is relaxed about supporting measures that, far from challenging or undermining the status quo, give added support to it – as, for example, in his refusal to denounce structural adjustment policies (Zizek, 1996: 32). This is all because, in his view, it is possible to start a ‘new life’, but only by replacing one symbolic fiction with another (Zizek, 1999: 331). As a Lacanian, Zizek is opposed to any idea of realizing utopian ‘fullness’ and thus in escaping the vicissitudes of the political qua antagonism. Any change in the basic structure of existence, whereby one may overcome dislocation and disorientation, is out of the question. However, he also rejects practical solutions to problems as a mere displacement (Zizek, 1999: 383–4). So an Act neither solves concrete problems nor achieves drastic improvements; it merely removes blockages to existing modes of thought and action. It transforms the ‘constellation which generates social symptoms’ (Butler et al., 2000: 124), shifting exclusion from one group to another, but it does not achieve either drastic or moderate concrete changes. It ‘means that we accept the vicious circle of revolving around the object [the Real] and find jouissance in it, renouncing the myth that jouissance is amassed somewhere else’ (Zizek, 1988: 109–10). It also offers those who take part in it a ‘dimension of Otherness, that moment when the absolute appears in all its fragility’, a ‘brief apparition of a future utopian Otherness to which every authentic revolutionary stance should cling’ (Zizek, 2000: 159–60). This absolute, however, can only be glimpsed. The leader, Act and Cause must be betrayed so the social order can be refounded. The leader, or ‘mediator’, ‘must erase himself [sic] from the picture’ (Zizek, 2001b: 50), retreating to the horizon of the social to haunt history as spectre or phantasy (Zizek, 2000: 64). Every Great Man must be betrayed so he can assume his fame and thereby become compatible with the status quo (Zizek, 1999: 90–1, 316); once one glimpses the sublime Universal, therefore, one must commit suicide – as Zizek claims the Bolshevik Party did, via the Stalinist purges (1997c).

**The alternatives disavowal of progressive movements dooms it to failure**

**Tormey and Robinson, 5** – teaches in the School of Politics and Critical Theory at the University of Nottingham; doctoral student in the School of Politics at the University of Nottingham (Simon; Andrew, SAGE Publications, “A Ticklish Subject? Zizek and the Future of Left Radicalism”)

In our view, Zizek is justified in advocating a transformative stance given the structural causes of many of the issues he confronts, but he is wrong to posit such a stance as a radical break constituted ex nihilo. Far from being the disavowed supplement of capitalism, the space for thinking the not-real which is opened by imaginaries and ‘petty resistances’ is, we think, a prerequisite to building a more active resistance and, ultimately, any substantial social transformation. As the cultural anthropologist James Scott shows in a series of case studies, political revolutions tend to emerge through the radicalization of existing demands and resistances – not as pure Acts occurring out of nothing. Even when they are incomprehensible from the standpoint of ‘normal’, conformist bystanders, they are a product of the development of subterranean resistances and counter hegemonies among subaltern groups (see, for example, Scott, 1990: 179–82). This is to say that social change does not come from nothing, but rather requires the pre-existence of a counter-culture involving nonconformist ideas and practices. As Gramsci puts it, before coming into existence a new society must be ‘ideally active’ in the minds of those struggling for change (Gramsci, 1985: 39). The history of resistance thus gives little reason to support Zizek’s politics of the Act. The ability to Act in the manner described by Zizek is largely absent from the subaltern strata. Mary Kay Letourneau (let us recall) did not transform society; rather, her ‘Act’ was repressed and she was jailed. In another case discussed by Zizek (2001b: 74–5), a group of Siberian miners is said to accomplish an Act – by getting massacred. Since Acts are not even on Zizek’s terms socially effective, they cannot help the worst-off, let alone transform society. Zizek’s assumption of the effectiveness of Acts thus rests on a confusion between individual and social levels of analysis and between clinical therapy and political action. Vaneigem eerily foresees Zizek’s ‘Act’ when he argues against ‘active nihilism’. The transition from this ‘wasteland of the suicide and the solitary killer’ to revolutionary politics requires the repetition of negation in a different register, connected to a positive project to change the world and relying on the imaginaries Zizek denounces, the carnival spirit and the ability to dream (Vaneigem, 1967 [1994]: 111). Zizek’s politics are not merely impossible but, as we have shown, potentially despotic, and also – between support for a Master, acceptance of pain and alienation, militarism and the restoration of order – tendentially conservative. Such a politics, if adopted in practice, could only discredit progressive movements and further alienate those they seek to mobilize. We would argue that a transformative politics should be theorized instead as a process of transformation, an a-linear, rhizomatic, multiform plurality of resistances, initiatives and, indeed, acts which are sometimes spectacular and carnivalesque, sometimes prefigurative, sometimes subterranean, sometimes rooted in institutional change and reform and, under certain circumstances, directly transformative.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: REVOLUTION FAILS

**Zizek offers no clear alternative—capitalism is inevitable.**

**Robinson 04** (Andrew, PhD, political theory, University of Nottingham, "Introduction: The Basic Zizekian Model," Theory Blog, [http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress\\_15.html](http://andyrobinsontheoryblog.blogspot.com/2004/11/zizek-notes-and-work-in-progress_15.html))

It is by no means clear that Zizek thinks alternatives to capitalism are possible, or that he wants them. He seems to want to destroy capitalism, on his definition of it (see CAPITALISM, CONSERVATISM), which sets up a rather conservative target (liberalism, permissiveness, decadence, 'flabbiness', etc.). It is less clear that he wants to destroy it by any other criterion: he endorses work ethics and authoritarianism, and he has posited so much of the deep structure of society as unchangeable as to render the space for change highly limited. Laclau attacks Zizek on this subject. Despite "r-r-revolutionary zeal", Zizek is no more proposing a thoroughly different economic and political regime than Laclau. Zizek lets us know nothing about his alternative, Laclau says (actually, this is not strictly true, though he does tell us very little); he only tells us that it isn't liberal democracy or capitalism. Laclau is concerned it could mean Stalinism, despite Zizek's earlier resistance against this (NB Zizek dislikes late, post-Stalin Stalinism with a human face, but distinguishes this from the earlier Stalinism - what he resisted was the former); Laclau suspects Zizek simply doesn't know what his alternative is (CHU 289). How does Zizek respond to this? He uses it to pathologise Laclau, claiming he cannot imagine an alternative and so thinks there isn't one (which Laclau actually never states).

## AT LACAN/ZIZEK: REVOLUTION FAILS

**Zizek's alternative fails—he claims that capitalism must be over thrown but has no means of accomplishing this goal.**

**Boynnton, 98** (Director of NYU's Graduate Magazine Journalism Program, Robert, "Enjoy Your Žižek!" *Lingua Franca*, October, [http://www.robertboynnton.com/articleDisplay.php?article\\_id=43](http://www.robertboynnton.com/articleDisplay.php?article_id=43))

"Authentic politics is the art of the impossible," he writes. "It changes the very parameters of what is considered 'possible' in the existing constellation." This is a noble vision, but when Zizek turns to history, he finds only fleeting examples of genuine politics in action: in ancient Athens; in the proclamations of the Third Estate during the French Revolution; in the Polish Solidarity movement; and in the last, heady days of the East German Republic before the Wall came down and the crowds stopped chanting "Wir sind das Volk" ("We are the people!") and began chanting "Wir sind ein Volk" ("We are a/one people!"). The shift from definite to indefinite article, writes Zizek, marked "the closure of the momentary authentic political opening, the reappropriation of the democratic impetus by the thrust towards reunification of Germany, which meant rejoining Western Germany's liberal-capitalist police/political order." In articulating his political credo, Zizek attempts to synthesize three unlikely—perhaps incompatible—sources: Lacan's notion of the subject as a "pure void" that is "radically out of joint" with the world, Marx's political economy, and St. Paul's conviction that universal truth is the only force capable of recognizing the needs of the particular. Zizek is fond of calling himself a "Pauline materialist," and he admires St. Paul's muscular vision. He believes that the post-political deadlock can be broken only by a gesture that undermines "capitalist globalization from the standpoint of universal truth in the same way that Pauline Christianity did to the Roman global empire." He adds: "My dream is to combine an extremely dark, pessimistic belief that life is basically horrible and contingent, with a revolutionary social attitude. AS PHILOSOPHY, Zizek's argument is breathtaking, but as social prescription, "dream" may be an apt word. The only way to combat the dominance of global capitalism, he argues, is through a "direct socialization of the productive process"—an agenda that is unlikely to play well in Slovenia, which is now enjoying many of the fruits of Western consumer capitalism. When pressed to specify what controlling the productive process might look like, Zizek admits he doesn't know, although he feels certain that an alternative to capitalism will emerge and that the public debate must be opened up to include subjects like control over genetic engineering. Like many who call for a return to the primacy of economics, Zizek has only the most tenuous grasp of the subject.

**Zizek's alternative is political nihilism – he supplies no method for over throwing capitalism.**

**Laclau 04** Ernesto Laclau, Professor of Political Theory at the University of Essex and Visiting Professor of Comparative Literature at SUNY-Buffalo, 2004, *Umbr(a): War*, p. 33-34

Here we reach the crux of the difficulties to be found in Zizek. On the one hand, he is committed to a theory of the full revolutionary act that would operate in its own name, without being invested in any object outside itself. On the other hand, the capitalist system, as the dominating, underlying mechanism, is the reality with which the emancipatory act has to break. The conclusion from both premises is that there is no valid emancipatory struggle except one that is fully and directly anti-capitalist. In his words: "I believe in the central structuring role of the anti-capitalist struggle." The problem, however, is this: he gives no indication of what an anti-capitalist struggle might be. Zizek quickly dismisses multicultural, anti-sexist, and anti-racist struggles as not being directly anti-capitalist. Nor does he sanction the traditional aims of the Left, linked more directly to the economy: the demands for higher wages, for industrial democracy, for control of the labor process, for a progressive distribution of income, are not proposed as anti-capitalist either. Does he imagine that the Luddites' proposal to destroy all the machines would bring an end to capitalism? Not a single line in Zizek's work gives an example of what he considers an anti-capitalist struggle. One is left wondering whether he is anticipating an invasion of beings from another planet, or as he once suggested, some kind of ecological catastrophe that would not transform the world but cause it to fall apart. So where has the whole argument gone wrong? In its very premises. Since Zizek refuses to apply the hegemonic logic to strategico-political thought, he is stranded in a blind alley. He has to dismiss all "partial" struggles as internal to the "system" (whatever that means), and the "Thing" being unachievable, he is left without any concrete historical actor for his anti-capitalist struggle. Conclusion: Zizek cannot provide any theory of the emancipatory subject. At the same time, since his systemic totality, being a ground, is regulated exclusively by its own internal laws, the only option is to wait for these laws to produce the totality of its effects. Ergo: political nihilism.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: REVOLUTION FAILS

**Zizek's alternative cannot defeat capitalism – he is just joking around – the negative's argument is only strategic because it is so ridiculous**

**Kirsch, 8** – senior editor of The New Republic

(Adam, The New Republic, "The Deadly Jester," [http://www.tnr.com/story\\_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef](http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=097a31f3-c440-4b10-8894-14197d7a6eef))

**Zizek is a believer in the Revolution at a time when almost nobody, not even on the left, thinks that such a cataclysm is any longer possible or even desirable. This is his big problem, and also his big opportunity.** While "socialism" remains a favorite hate-word for the Republican right, the prospect of communism overthrowing capitalism is now so remote, so fantastic, that nobody feels strongly moved to oppose it, as conservatives and liberal anticommunists opposed it in the 1930s, the 1950s, and even the 1980s. When Zizek turns up speaking the classical language of Marxism-Leninism, he profits from the assumption that the return of ideas that were once the cause of tragedy can now occur only in the form of farce. In the visual arts, the denaturing of what were once passionate and dangerous icons has become commonplace, so that emblems of evil are transformed into perverse fun, harmless but very profitable statements of post-ideological camp; and there is a kind of intellectual equivalent of this development in Zizek's work. The cover of his book *The Parallax View* reproduces a Socialist Realist portrait of "Lenin at the Smolny Institute," in the ironically unironic fashion made familiar by the pseudo-iconoclastic work of Komar and Melamid, Cai Guo-Jiang, and other post-Soviet, post-Mao artists. He, too, expects you to be in on the joke. But there is a difference between Zizek and the other jokesters. It is that he is not really joking.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: NON-FALSIFIABLE

**Lacan's explanation of the Real requires a leap of faith similar to religion. You are asked to believe in it because it is beyond our understanding.**

**Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05** (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

This passage could almost have been written with the "Lacanian Real" in mind. The characteristic of the Real is precisely that one can invoke it without defining it (since it is "beyond symbolization"), and that the accidental failure of language, or indeed a contingent failure in social praxis, is identified with an ontological resistance to symbolization projected into Being itself. For instance, Žižek's classification of the Nation as a Thing rests on the claim that 'the only way we can determine it is by... empty tautology', and that it is a 'semantic void'<sup>63</sup>. Similarly, he claims that 'the tautological gesture of the Master-Signifier', an empty performative which retroactively turns presuppositions into conclusions, is necessary, and also that tautology is the only way historical change can occur<sup>64</sup>. He even declares constitutive lack (in this case, termed the "death drive") to be a tautology. Lacanian references to "the Real" or "antagonism" as the cause of a contingent failure are reminiscent of Robert Teflon's definition of God: 'an explanation which means "I have no explanation"'. An "ethics of the Real" is a minor ethical salvation which says very little in positive terms, but which can pose in macho terms as a "hard" acceptance of terrifying realities. It authorizes truth-claims - in Laclau's language, a 'reality' which is 'before our eyes'<sup>67</sup>, or in Newman's, a 'harsh reality' hidden beneath a protective veil<sup>68</sup> - without the attendant risks. Some Lacanian theorists also show indications of a commitment based on the particular kind of "euphoric" enjoyment Barthes associates with myths. Laclau in particular emphasizes his belief in the 'exhilarating' significance of the present<sup>69</sup>, hinting that he is committed to euphoric investments generated through the repetition of the same.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: NON-FALSIFIABLE

**Their vision of politics is a non-falsifiable myth: The root of the Lacanian subject is structured around the "lack." The problem is that there is nothing to support this idea of a missing reality.**

**Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05** (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

More precisely, I would maintain that "constitutive lack" is an instance of a Barthesian myth. It is, after all, the function of myth to do exactly what this concept does: to assert the empty facticity of a particular ideological schema while rejecting any need to argue for its assumptions. 'Myth does not deny things; on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it is a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact'. This is precisely the status of "constitutive lack": a supposed fact which is supposed to operate above and beyond explanation, on an ontological level instantly accessible to those with the courage to accept it. Myths operate to construct euphoric enjoyment for those who use them, but their operation is in conflict with the social context with which they interact. This is because their operation is connotative: they are "received" rather than "read" and open only to a "readerly" and not a "writerly" interpretation. A myth is a second-order signification attached to an already-constructed denotative sign, and the ideological message projected into this sign is constructed outside the context of the signified. A myth is therefore, in Alfred Korzybski's sense, intensional: its meaning derives from a prior linguistic schema, not from interaction with the world in its complexity. Furthermore, myths have a repressive social function, carrying in Barthes's words an 'order not to think'. They are necessarily projected onto or imposed on actual people and events, under the cover of this order. The "triumph of literature" in the Dominici trial consists precisely in this projection of an externally-constructed mythical schema as a way of avoiding engagement with something one does not understand. Lacanian theory, like Barthesian myths, involves a prior idea of a structural matrix which is not open to change in the light of the instances to which it is applied. Žižek's writes of a 'pre-ontological dimension which precedes and eludes the construction of reality'<sup>42</sup>, while Laclau suggests there is a formal structure of any chain of equivalences which necessitates the logic of hegemony<sup>43</sup>. Specific analyses are referred back to this underlying structure as its necessary expressions, without apparently being able to alter it; for instance, 'those who triggered the process of democratization in eastern Europe... are not those who today enjoy its fruits, not because of a simple usurpation... but because of a deeper structural logic'<sup>44</sup>. In most instances, the mythical operation of the idea of "constitutive lack" is implicit, revealed only by a rhetoric of denunciation. For instance, Mouffe accuses liberalism of an 'incapacity... to grasp... the irreducible character of antagonism'<sup>45</sup>, while Žižek claims that a 'dimension' is 'lost' in Butler's work because of her failure to conceive of "trouble" as constitutive of "gender"<sup>46</sup>. This language of "denial" which is invoked to silence critics is a clear example of Barthes's "order not to think": one is not to think about the idea of "constitutive lack", one is simply to "accept" it, under pain of invalidation. If someone else disagrees, s/he can simply be told that there is something crucial missing from her/his theory. Indeed, critics are as likely to be accused of being "dangerous" as to be accused of being wrong.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: CONSERVATIVE POLITICS

**Lacanian criticism is analytically radical but breaks down into very conservative politics.**

**Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05** (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

There is more than an accidental relationship between the mythical operation of the concept of "constitutive lack" and Lacanians' conservative and pragmatist politics. Myth is a way of reducing thought to the present: the isolated signs which are included in the mythical gesture are thereby attached to extra-historical abstractions. On an analytical level, Lacanian theory can be very "radical", unscrupulously exposing the underlying relations and assumptions concealed beneath officially-sanctioned discourse. This radicalism, however, never translates into political conclusions: as shown above, a radical rejection of anti-"crime" rhetoric turns into an endorsement of punishment, and a radical critique of neo-liberalism turns into a pragmatist endorsement of structural adjustment. It is as if there is a magical barrier between theory and politics which insulates the latter from the former. One should recall a remark once made by Wilhelm Reich: 'You plead for happiness in life, but security means more to you'<sup>133</sup>. Lacanians have a "radical" theory oriented towards happiness, but politically, their primary concern is security. As long as they are engaged in politically ineffectual critique, Lacanians will denounce and criticize the social system, but once it comes to practical problems, the "order not to think" becomes operative. This "magic" barrier is the alibi function of myth. The short-circuit between specific instances and high-level abstractions is politically consequential.

**The deep negativity toward politics makes Lacanian analysis collapse into reactionary politics.**

**Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05** (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

The political function of Lacanian theory is to preclude critique by encoding the present as myth. There is a danger of a stultifying conservatism arising from within Lacanian political theory, echoing the 'terrifying conservatism' Deleuze suggests is active in any reduction of history to negativity<sup>136</sup>. The addition of an "always" to contemporary evils amounts to a "pessimism of the will", or a "repressive reduction of thought to the present". Stavrakakis, for instance, claims that attempts to find causes and thereby to solve problems are always fantasmatic<sup>137</sup>, while Žižek states that an object which is perceived as blocking something does nothing but materialize the already-operative constitutive lack<sup>138</sup>. While this does not strictly entail the necessity of a conservative attitude to the possibility of any specific reform, it creates a danger of discursive slippage and hostility to "utopianism" which could have conservative consequences. Even if Lacanians believe in surplus/contingent as well as constitutive lack, there are no standards for distinguishing the two. If one cannot tell which social blockages result from constitutive lack and which are contingent, how can one know they are not all of the latter type? And even if constitutive lack exists, Lacanian theory runs a risk of "misdiagnoses" which have a neophobe or even reactionary effect. To take an imagined example, a Lacanian living in France in 1788 would probably conclude that democracy is a utopian fantasmatic ideal and would settle for a pragmatic reinterpretation of the ancien régime. Laclau and Mouffe's hostility to workers' councils and Žižek's insistence on the need for a state and a Party<sup>139</sup> exemplify this neophobe tendency. The pervasive negativity and cynicism of Lacanian theory offers little basis for constructive activity. Instead of radical transformation, one is left with a pragmatics of "containment" which involves a conservative de-problematization of the worst aspects of the status quo. The inactivity it counsels would make its claims a self-fulfilling prophecy by acting as a barrier to transformative activity.



AT LACAN/ZIZEK: CONSERVATIVE POLITICS

**The alternative encourages oppressive social relations—the idea we are driven by *jouissance* is essentially a justification for sadomasochism—including accepting totalitarianism.**

**Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05** (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

The "death instinct" is connected to an idea of primordial masochism which, in the form of "aphanisis" or "subjective destitution", recurs throughout Lacanian political theory. Žižek in particular advocates masochism, in the guise of "shooting at" or "beating" oneself, as a radical gesture which reveals the essence of the self and breaks the constraints of an oppressive reality, although the masochistic gesture is present in all Lacanian theorists. The death instinct is typified by Žižek as a pathological (in the Kantian sense), contingent attitude which finds satisfaction in the process of self-blockage<sup>109</sup>. It is identical with the Lacanian concept of jouissance or enjoyment. For him, 'enjoyment (*jouissance*) is not to be equated with pleasure: enjoyment is precisely "pleasure in unpleasure"; it designates the paradoxical satisfaction procured by a painful encounter with a Thing that perturbs the equilibrium of the pleasure principle. In other words, enjoyment is located "beyond the pleasure principle"<sup>110</sup>. It is also the core of the self, since enjoyment is 'the only "substance" acknowledged by psychoanalysis', and 'the subject fully "exists" only through enjoyment'<sup>111</sup>. Primordial masochism is therefore central to the Lacanian concept of the Real, which depends on there being a universal moment at which active desire - sometimes given the slightly misleading name of the "pleasure principle" - is suspended, not for a greater or delayed pleasure, but out of a direct desire for unpleasure (i.e. a primary reactive desire). Furthermore, this reactive desire is supposed to be ontologically prior to active desire. Dominick LaCapra offers a similar but distinct critique to my own, claiming that Lacanian and similar theories induce a post-traumatic compulsion repetition or an 'endless, quasi-transcendental grieving that may be indistinguishable from interminable melancholy'. Reich has already provided a rebuttal of "primordial masochism", which, paradoxically given Žižek's claims to radicalism, was denounced by orthodox Freudians as communist propaganda. In Reich's view, masochism operates as a relief at a lesser pain which operates as armouring against anxiety about an underlying trauma<sup>113</sup>. Regardless of what one thinks of Reich's specific account of the origins of masochism, what is crucial is his critique of the idea of a death drive. 'Such hypotheses as are criticised here are often only a sign of therapeutic failure. For if one explains masochism by a death instinct, one confirms to the patient his [sic] alleged will to suffer'. Thus, Lacanian metaphysics conceal Lacanians' encouragement of a variety of neurosis complicit with oppressive social realities. Politically, the thesis of primordial masochism provides a mystifying cover for the social forces which cause and benefit from the contingent emergence of masochistic attachments (i.e. sadistic power apparatuses). One could compare this remark to Butler's claim that Žižek 'defends the trauma of the real... over and against a different kind of threat'<sup>115</sup>

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: CONSERVATIVE POLITICS

**Zizek's alternative is pessimistic and authoritarian – his theory precludes democratic politics.**

**Breger, 01** Assistant Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana, 2001 (Claudia, Diacritics 31.1 (2001) 73-90, "The Leader's Two Bodies: Slavoj Zizek's Postmodern Political Theology," project muse)

More than ten years later—after a decade of authoritarian rule, war, and genocide in former Yugoslavia—recent revolutionary events in Serbia once more allow one to hope for a thorough democratization of the region. In a newspaper article evaluating the uprising, however, Zizek warned that these hopes might be premature: while Milosevic could find his new role as "a Serbian Jesus Christ," taking upon him all the "sins" committed by his people, Kostunica and his "democratic" nationalism might represent "nothing but Milosevic in the 'normal' version, without the excess" [Zizek, "Gewalt"]. Zizek was not alone in warning that the new government in Yugoslavia might not bring an end to Serbian nationalist politics. The pessimistic scenario Zizek evoked on this occasion, however, was not simply the result of his evaluation of the current political constellation in Serbia. Rather, the fantasy of the necessary return of the leader is connected to his political theory—a theory that does not allow for more optimistic scenarios of democratization and the diminution of nationalism in society. My reading of Zizek's work thus argues for a reevaluation of his theory in terms of its implicit authoritarian politics. The need for such a reevaluation is also suggested by Laclau toward the end of his recent exchange with Judith Butler and Zizek when he admits that "the more our discussions progressed, the more I realized that my sympathy for Zizek's politics was largely the result of a mirage" [Laclau, "Constructing Universality" 292]. Laclau now criticizes Zizek's radical Marxist rhetoric by suggesting that he "wants to do away with liberal democratic regimes" without specifying a political alternative [289], and describes Zizek's discourse as "schizophrenically split between a highly sophisticated Lacanian analysis and an insufficiently deconstructed traditional Marxism" [205]. On [End Page 73] the other hand, he also problematizes Zizek's "psychoanalytic discourse" as "not truly political" [289]. My argument primarily starts from this latter point: the antidemocratic—and, as I will argue, both antifeminist and anti-Semitic—moment of Zizek's theory is to be located not only in the way he performs Marxism, but also in the way he performs Lacanian psychoanalysis. While, in other words, Zizek's skepticism vis-à-vis democracy is obviously informed by, and inseparable from, Marxist critiques of "liberal," "representative" democracy, his failure to elaborate alternative visions of political change towards egalitarian and/or plural scenarios of society cannot be explained solely by his Marxist perspective.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ESSENTIALISM TURN

**The alternative links to the critique: the Lacanian notion of a “constitutive element” that is at the root of all political fantasy is just as essentialist as they claim the affirmative to be.**

**Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05** (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

Lacanianians assume that the idea of a founding negativity is not essentialist, whereas any idea of an autonomous positive or affirmative force, even if constructed as active, undefinable, changing and/or incomplete, is essentialist. The reason Lacanianians can claim to be "anti-essentialist" is that there is a radical rupture between the form and content of Lacanian theory. The "acceptance of contingency" constructed around the idea of "constitutive lack" is a closing, not an opening, gesture, and is itself "essentialist" and non-contingent. Many Lacanian claims are not at all contingent, but are posited as ahistorical absolutes. To take an instance from Mouffe's work, 'power and antagonism' are supposed to have an 'ineradicable character' so that 'any social objectivity is constituted through acts of power' and will show traces of exclusions. One could hardly find a clearer example anywhere of a claim about a fixed basic structure of Being. One could also note again the frequency of words such as "all" and "always" in the Lacanian vocabulary. Ludwig Wittgenstein argues that 'if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions - namely the disjunction of all their common properties" - I should reply: Now you are only playing with words'<sup>77</sup>. Lacanian theory seems, indeed, to be treating disjunction as a basis for similarity, thus simply "playing with words". "contingency" embraced in Lacanian theory is not an openness which exceeds specifiable positivities, but a positivity posing as negativity. The relationship between contingency and "constitutive lack" is like the relationship between Germans and "Germanness", or tables and "tableness", in the work of Barthes. One could speak, therefore, of a "lack-ness" or a "contingency-ness" or an "antagonism-ness" in Lacanian political theory, and of this theory as a claim to fullness with this reified "lack-ness" as one of the positive elements within the fullness. One sometimes finds direct instances of such mythical vocabulary, as for instance when Stavrakakis demands acknowledgement of 'event-ness and negativity'<sup>78</sup>. Indeed, it is an especially closed variety of fullness, with core ideas posited as unquestionable dogmas and the entire structure virtually immune to falsification.

## AT LACAN/ZIZEK: ESSENTIALISM TURN

**Their alternative links to the critique. Their claim is that the aff is a quest for a new-master signifier that will fail because of the inevitable re-emergence of the Real. However, that statement is itself, a new master-signifier. Robinson (PhD Political Theory, University of Nottingham) 05** (Theory and Event, Andrew, 8:1, The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique).

The gap between the two kinds of contingency is also suggested by the Lacanian insistence on the "need" for a master-signifier (or "nodal point"), i.e. a particular signifier which fills the position of universality, a 'symbolic injunction which relies only on its own act of enunciation'<sup>116</sup>. It is through such a gesture that one establishes a logic of sameness, and such a logic seems to be desired by Lacanians. Butler remarks that Žižek's text is a 'project of mastery' and a discourse of the law in which 'the "contingency" of language is mastered in and by a textual practice which speaks as the law'. He demands a "New Harmony", sustained by a newly emerged Master-Signifier'. This insistence on a master-signifier is an anti-contingent gesture, especially in its rejection of the multiordinality of language. It is, after all, this multiordinality (the possibility of making a statement about any other statement) which renders language an open rather than a closed system. The "need" for a master-signifier seems to be a "need" to restore an illusion of closure, the "need" for metacommunication to operate in a repressive rather than an open way. This "need" arises because the mythical concept of "constitutive lack" is located in an entire mythical narrative in which it relates to other abstractions. In the work of Laclau and Mouffe, this expresses itself in the demand for a "hegemonic" agent who contingently expresses the idea of social order "as such". One should recall that such an order is impossible, since antagonism is constitutive of social relations, and that the hegemonic gesture therefore requires an exclusion. Thus, the establishment of a hegemonic master-signifier is merely a useful illusion. The alternative to demanding a master-signifier - an illusion of order where there is none - would be to reject the pursuit of the ordering function itself, and to embrace a "rhizomatic" politics which goes beyond this pursuit. In Laclau and Mouffe's work, however, the "need" for a social order, and a state to embody it, is never questioned, and, even in Žižek's texts, the "Act" which smashes the social order is to be followed by a necessary restoration of order<sup>118</sup>. This necessity is derived ontologically: people are, says Žižek, 'in need of firm roots'<sup>119</sup>. The tautological gesture of establishing a master-signifier by retrospectively positing conditions of an object as its components, thereby 'blocking any further inquiry into the social meaning' of what it quilts (i.e. repressive metacommunication), is a structural necessity<sup>120</sup>. This is because 'discourse itself is in its fundamental structure "authoritarian"'. The role of the analyst is not to challenge the place of the master, but to occupy it in such a way as to expose its underlying contingency<sup>121</sup>. The master-signifier, also termed the One, demonstrates the centrality of a logic of place in Lacanian theory. Lacanians assume that constitutive lack necessitates the construction of a positive space which a particular agent can fill (albeit contingently), which embodies the emptiness/negativity as such. Therefore, the commitment to master-signifiers and the state involves a continuation of an essentialist image of positivity, with "lack" operating structurally as the master-signifier of Lacanian theory itself (not as a subversion of positivity, but as a particular positive element). The idea of "constitutive lack" is supposed to entail a rejection of neutral and universal standpoints, and it is this rejection which constructs it as an "anti-essentialist" position. In practice, however, Lacanians restore the idea of a universal framework through the backdoor. Beneath the idea that "there is no neutral universality" lurks a claim to know precisely such a "neutral universality" and to claim a privileged position on this basis. A consistent belief in contingency and "anti-essentialism" entails scepticism about the idea of constitutive lack. After all, how does one know that the appearance that 'experience' shows lack to be constitutive reflects an underlying universality, as opposed to the contingent or even simulated effects of a particular discourse or episteme? Alongside its opponents, shouldn't Lacanian theory also be haunted by its own fallibility and incompleteness? There is a paradox in the idea of radical choice, for it is unclear whether Lacanians believe this should be applied reflexively. Is the choice of Lacanian theory itself an ungrounded Decision? If so, the theory loses the universalist status it implicitly claims. If not, it would seem to be the kind of structural theory it attacks. A complete structural theory would seem to assume an extra-contingent standpoint, even if the structure includes a reference to constitutive lack. Such a theory would seem to be a radical negation of the incompleteness of "I don't know".

## AT LACAN/ZIZEK: 9/11 ARGUMENTS BAD

**Zizek's arguments about 9/11 fail to recognize that the shock of the attack was not in its simulated nature but in its impact on real people. We need to focus on the actual effects of violence.**

**Crosswhite, 01** (Associate Professor of English at University of Oregon, 2001 Jim, "A Response to Slavoj Zizek's "Welcome to the Desert of the Real!," September 25, [http://www.uoregon.edu/~jcross/response\\_to\\_zizek.htm](http://www.uoregon.edu/~jcross/response_to_zizek.htm))

But to say that what happened on September 11 is like the scene in the *Matrix* where Morpheus introduces the Keanu Reeves character to the "desert of the real" is to say something that belongs on a Fox Network talk show. For what Americans is it true that the events of September 11 broke into an "insulated artificial universe" that generated an image of a diabolical outsider? Let's not consider the 5,000 incinerated and dismembered men and women and children who suffered from disease and injury like all people, who cleaned toilets and coughed up phlegm and changed diapers and actually occupied with what was once their real bodies those towers which, for Zizek, stand for virtual capitalism. They can't be the ones whose delusions generated the fantasy of a diabolical outsider. None of them, none of their surviving children, none of their fellow citizens fantasized Bin Laden's ruling that it is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, to kill the Americans, military and civilians. So for whom has the fantastic "outside" broken in and smashed, with "shattering impact," an immaterial world of delusion? For whom does Osama Bin Laden appear as a character from a James Bond film? For whom did the events of September 11 arrive with the painful awareness that we were living in an artificial insulated reality? For whom do the people and events in this massacre of innocents appear solely in the shapes of film and television? Perhaps, perhaps the Americans living in an insulated, artificial reality are the characters in American television shows and in increasingly intertextual American films. Perhaps these are the Americans Zizek is listening to, watching, imagining. But here is the true "shattering impact:" that 5,000 innocent people who lived real lives in real, vulnerable human bodies, who bore real children, suffered real disease and injury and pain, bled real blood; 5,000 real people who helped to sustain a cosmopolitan city of millions and millions of other real people of different ethnic groups and religions and languages, real citizens who had achieved a great measure of peace and hope, who had been slowly and successfully bringing down the New York City crime rate; that 5,000 of these people would have their real bodies and lives erased in a matter of minutes, and that only body parts, the vapors of the incinerated, and the grieving and the sorrowful and the orphans would remain. This is the shock. This is the disbelief. Not the shattering of an illusion but the shattering of those real people and their real bodies. Not the shattering of a virtual reality, but the erasing of what was real. This is why the people of New York wept in the streets, why the tears and grief will continue. And this is why, in their grief, the survivors will struggle to preserve a memory of what was real, and to keep this memory of what was real from evanescing into someone else's symbol, or fantasy, or tool. Were the real lives they led less real for any happiness or peace they achieved? Are the unfathomable sufferings of Rwanda and what happened in Sarajevo to be the measure of what is most real? And yet in Zizek's writing, what happened on September 11 is not real but symbolic, as it seems to have been for the murderers, too: "the actual effect of these bombings is much more symbolic than real." We are just "getting a taste of" what goes on around the world "on a daily basis." OK, perhaps we are insulated and ignorant. But where are 5,000 innocents being incinerated by murderers on a daily basis? If Zizek is saying that Americans should be more knowledgeable about the lives and sufferings of other peoples whose lives and sufferings are entangled with America's own history, then who would disagree? If Zizek is saying that American power and its direct involvement in international affairs create a special responsibility for our educational systems and our media to provide us with a knowledge of global matters that we have not yet achieved, then who would disagree? If he is saying that Americans should comprehend more deeply how people in other parts of the world comprehend us, once more, who would disagree? If he is saying that real understanding of geographically distant others is endangered and distorted by the fantasies of film and television, are there educated Americans who have not heard this? Is the struggle to educate a democratic citizenship adequate to our time and the realities of globalization unique to the United States? That would be hard to believe. However, it must be conceded by all that the U.S. faces one special difficulty and so a special but obligatory struggle here. Many of its citizens will never have a first hand experience of Europe or the Middle East or Africa or Asia or even South America. I can drive or fly 3,000 miles and never leave my country. At best, I can get to Mexico or Canada. This would take someone living in France through all of Europe and into central Asia, or into the center of Africa. The problems of truly comprehending these others whose languages are rarely spoken anywhere near you and into whose actual presence you will never come are not trivial. But Zizek seems to be saying something more than all of this. He seems to know more than most of us know. He knows that "the ultimate truth of the capitalist utilitarian de-spiritualized universe is the dematerialization of the 'real life' itself, its reversal into a spectral show." This is difficult to comprehend. Is this the "ultimate truth" about a real nation, about real people, about a real, existing economic system, about an ethical theory, about a fantasy of real people, or about movies or television or what? The problem may be that many of us cannot imagine that "capitalism" (is it one thing?), which is after all something historical, has an "ultimate truth." And it is difficult to understand what he is asking at the end: "Or will America finally risk stepping through the fantasmatic screen separating it from the Outside World, accepting its arrival into the Real world, making the long-overdue move from 'A thing like this should not happen HERE!' to 'A thing like this should not happen ANYWHERE!'" Of course, to abandon the "here" for the "anywhere" would be foolish. We are in real bodies in real places with real limitations and with real work to do. It is not simply a "fantasmatic screen" that deeply attaches people in a unique way to the sufferings of their neighbors and their fellow citizens. But the demand that Zizek makes is neither unfamiliar nor inappropriate. It is more than worth pursuing. What can we do to work to see that what the people of New York City suffered on September 11 does not happen anywhere, neither in the U.S. nor anywhere else? The reactions of the American government now threaten regions all over the world and seriously threaten liberty and privacy and tolerance in the United States. The American past carries humanitarian successes and catastrophic failures and genocide. Perhaps fantastic critique has a role to play. Certainly we must struggle to sustain serious social criticism through threatening times, but unless we are simply displaying critical virtuosity, we must achieve a kind of criticism that is reasonably concrete, less pretending to ultimate truths of history, more capable of acknowledging the real suffering of real people, criticism that is not too proud to descend to the practicable. What do we seek now? First, to avert a catastrophe. We must undo the terrorist networks and prevent American anger and power from leading us into the catastrophic roles that seem to have been scripted for us. Five thousand innocents are murdered in New York City. That is more than enough. Every dead innocent fuels more anger, either from the powerless or from the powerful. Averting an escalation of global violence is the immediate and pressing task. Undoing and weakening the terrorist networks, withdrawing support from them, arresting the guilty—everyone who is not already a monster must be persuaded to join in this.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: NO CONNECTION ALT AND BALLOT

**There is no connection between the ballot and the alterative—Zizek argues that the alternative cannot be consciously brought about—it can only be recognized in hindsight.**

**Tell, 04** Communication Arts and Sciences at The Pennsylvania State University, 2004

(David, "On Belief (Review)," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 37.1 (2004) 96-99, Project MUSE)

Most scholars of rhetoric, however, will not be satisfied with Zizek's belief. For although this belief provides the necessary subjective conditions for public intervention, it is difficult to imagine it being publicly deployed. This belief is, after all, radically privatized; it is the internal repetition of a "primordial decision," or an "unconscious atemporal deed" (147). One must wonder about the public possibilities of such a private (and subconscious) experience. Moreover, most rhetoricians may well be troubled by Zizek's claim that all "acts proper"—acts of actual freedom—occur outside the symbolic order. Insofar as rhetoric can be considered symbolic action, then, its action can never provide for innovative intervention into the public sphere. Zizek admits as much in an endnote: "true acts of freedom are choices/decisions which we make while unaware of it—we never decide (in the present tense); all of a sudden, we just take note of how we have already decided " (156n46). It is precisely here that the rhetorician will not be satisfied: if Rorty marginalized the rhetorical purchase of [End Page 98] belief by banishing it to the private sphere, Zizek does so by marginalizing rhetoric itself.

AT LACAN/ZIZEK: METAPHORIC CONDENSATION PERM

**Perm – The plan can be deployed as part of a universal strategy to restructure social space – this isn't intrinsic because it is our particular demand that gives way to a universal politics.**

**Zizek, 98** – PhD, Professor of Philosophy at The European Graduate School (Slavoj, Journal of Political Ideologies, "For a Leftist Appropriation of the European Legacy," <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-leftist.htm>)

Are we then condemned to the debilitating alternative of choosing between a knave or a fool, or is there a tertium datur? Perhaps the contours of this tertium datur can be discerned via the reference to the fundamental European legacy. When one says 'European legacy', every self-respectful Leftist intellectual has the same reaction as Joseph Goebbels had to culture as such-he reaches for his gun and starts to shoot out accusations of proto-Fascist Eurocentrist cultural imperialism. However, is it possible to imagine a Leftist appropriation of the European political tradition? Was it not politicization in a specific Greek sense which re-emerged violently in the disintegration of Eastern European Socialism? From my own political past, I remember how, after four journalists were arrested and brought to trial by the Yugoslav Army in Slovenia in 1988, I participated in the 'Committee for the protection of the human rights of the four accused'. Officially, the goal of the Committee was just to guarantee fair treatment for the four accused; however, the Committee turned into the major oppositional political force, practically the Slovene version of the Czech Civic Forum or East German Neues Forum, the body which coordinated democratic opposition, a de facto representative of civil society. The program of the Committee was set up in four items; the first three directly concerned the accused, while the devil which resides in the detail, of course, was the fourth item, which said that the Committee wanted to clarify the entire background of the arrest of the four accused and thus contribute to creating the circumstances in which such arrests would no longer be possible-a coded way to say that we wanted the abolishment of the existing Socialist regime. Our demand 'Justice for the accused four!' started to function as the metaphoric condensation of the demand for the global overthrow of the Socialist regime. For that reason, in almost daily negotiations with the Committee, the Communist Party officials were always accusing us of a 'hidden agenda', claiming that the liberation of the accused four was not our true goal, i.e. that we were 'exploiting and manipulating the arrest and trial for other, darker political goals'. In short, the Communists wanted to play the 'rational' depoliticized game: they wanted to deprive the slogan 'Justice for the accused four!' of its explosive general connotation, and to reduce it to its literal meaning which concerned just a minor legal matter; they cynically claimed that it was us, the Committee, who were behaving 'non-democratically' and manipulating the fate of the accused, coming up with global pressure and blackmailing strategies instead of focusing on the particular problem of the plight of the accused. This is politics proper: this moment in which a particular demand is not simply part of the negotiation of interests, but aims at something more, i.e. starts to function as the metaphoric condensation of the global restructuring of the entire social space. The contrast is clear between this subjectivization of a part of the social body which rejects its subordinated place in the social police edifice and demands to be heard at the level of egaliberte, and today's proliferation of postmodern 'identity-politics' whose goal is the exact opposite, i.e. precisely the assertion of one's particular identity, of one's proper place within the social structure. The postmodern identity-politics of particular (ethnic, sexual, etc.) life-styles fits perfectly the depoliticized notion of society in which every particular group is 'accounted for', has its specific status (of a victim) acknowledged through affirmative action or other measures destined to guarantee social justice. The fact that this kind of justice rendered to victimized minorities requires an intricate police apparatus (for identifying the group in question, for punishing the offenders against its rights-how legally to define sexual harassment or racial injury, etc.-for providing the preferential treatment which should outweigh the wrong this group suffered) is deeply significant. The postmodern 'identity politics' involves the logic of resentment, of proclaiming oneself a victim and expecting the social big Other to 'pay for the damage', while egaliberte breaks out of the vicious cycle of resentment. What is usually praised as 'postmodern politics' (the pursuit of particular issues whose resolution is to be negotiated within the 'rational' global order allocating to its particular component its proper place) is thus effectively the end of politics proper.

## AT LACAN/ZIZEK: LETTER OF THE LAW PERM

**Turn – The permutation is more subversive because it makes demands on the system that the system expects will never be made. The alternative's radical attempt to impose something completely different is more easily defeated.**

**Zizek, 98** – Professor of Philosophy at Institute of Social Sciences at University of Ljubljana  
(Slavoj, Law and the Postmodern Mind, "Why Does the Law need an Obscene Supplement?" Pg 91-94)

Finally, the point about inherent transgression is not that every opposition, every attempt at subversion, is automatically "coopted." On the contrary, the very fear of being coopted that makes us search for more and more "radical," "pure" attitudes, is the supreme strategy of suspension or marginalization. The point is rather that true subversion is not always where it seems to be. Sometimes, a small distance is much more explosive for the system than an ineffective radical rejection. In religion, a small heresy can be more threatening than an outright atheism or passage to another religion; for a hard-line Stalinist, a Trotskyite is infinitely more threatening than a bourgeois liberal or social democrat. As le Carre put it, one true revisionist in the Central Committee is worth more than thousand dissidents outside it. It was easy to dismiss Gorbachev for aiming only at improving the system, making it more efficient-he nonetheless set in motion its disintegration. So one should also bear in mind the obverse of the inherent transgression: one is tempted to paraphrase Freud's claim from The Ego and the Id that man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but also much more moral than he knows-the System is not only infinitely more resistant and invulnerable than it may appear (it can coopt apparently subversive strategies, they can serve as its support), it is also infinitely more vulnerable (a small revision etc. can have large unforeseen catastrophic consequences). Or, to put it in another way: the paradoxical role of the unwritten superego injunction is that, with regard to the explicit, public Law, it is simultaneously transgressive (superego suspends, violates, the explicit social rules) and more coercive (superego consists of additional rules that restrain the field of choice by way of prohibiting the possibilities allowed for, guaranteed even, by the public Law). From my personal history, I recall the moment of the referendum for the independence of Slovenia as the exemplary case of such a forced choice: the whole point, of course, was to have a truly free choice-but nonetheless, in the pro-independence euphoria, every argumentation for remaining within Yugoslavia was immediately denounced as treacherous and disloyal. This example is especially suitable since Slovenes were deciding about a matter that was literally "transgressive" (to break from Yugoslavia with its constitutional order), which is why the Belgrade authorities denounced Slovene referendum as unconstitutional-one was thus ordered to transgress the Law ... The obverse of the omnipotence of the unwritten is thus that, if one ignores them, they simply cease to exist, in contrast to the written law that exists (functions) whether one is aware of it or not-or, as the priest in Kafka's The Trial put it, law does not want anything from you, it only bothers you if you yourself acknowledge it and address yourself to it with a demand ... When, in the late eighteenth century, universal human rights were proclaimed, this universality, of course, concealed the fact that they privilege white, men of property; however, this limitation was not openly admitted, it was coded in apparently tautological supplementary qualifications like "all humans have rights, insofar as they truly are, rational and free," "which then implicitly excludes the mentally ill, "savages," criminals, children, women." . So, if, in this situation, a poor black woman disregards this unwritten, implicit, qualification and demands human rights, also for herself, she just takes the letter of the discourse of rights "more literally than it was meant" (and thereby redefines its universality, inscribing it into a different hegemonic chain). "Fantasy" designates precisely this unwritten framework that tells us how are we to understand the letter of Law. The lesson of this is that-sometimes, at least-the truly subversive thing is not to disregard the explicit letter of Law on behalf of the underlying fantasies, but to stick to this letter against the fantasy that sustains it. Is-at a certain level, at least-this not the outcome of the long conversation between Joseph K. and the priest that follows the priest's narrative on the Door of the Law in The Trial?-the uncanny effect of this conversation does not reside in the fact that the reader is at a loss insofar as he lacks the unwritten interpretive code or frame of reference that would enable him to discern the hidden Meaning, but, on the contrary, in that the priest's interpretation of the parable on the Door of the Law disregards all standard frames of unwritten rules and reads the text in an "absolutely literal" way. One could also approach this deadlock via Lacan's notion of the specifically symbolic mode of deception: ideology "cheats precisely by letting us know that its propositions (say, on universal human rights) are not to be read a la lettre, but against the background of a set of unwritten rules. Sometimes, at least, the most effective anti-ideological subversion of the official discourse of human rights consists in reading it in an excessively "literal" way, disregarding the set of underlying unwritten rules. The need for unwritten rules thus bears witness to, confirms, this vulnerability: the system is compelled to allow for possibilities of choices that must never actually take place since they would disintegrate the system, and the function of the unwritten rules is precisely to prevent the actualization of these choices formally allowed by the system. One can see how unwritten rules are correlative to, the obverse of, the empty symbolic gesture and/or the forced choice: unwritten rules prevent the subject from effectively accepting what is offered in the empty gesture, from taking the choice literally and choosing the impossible, that the choice of which destroys the system. In the Soviet Union of the 1930s and 1940s, to take the most extreme example, it was not only prohibited to criticize Stalin, it was perhaps even more prohibited to enounce publicly this prohibition, i.e., too state that one is prohibited to criticize Stalin-the system needed to maintain the appearance that one is allowed to criticize Stalin, i.e., that the absence of this criticism (and the fact that there is no opposition party or movement, that the Party got 99.99% of the votes at elections) simply demonstrates that Stalin is effectively the best and (almost) always right. In Hegelese, this appearance qua appearance was essential. This dialectical tension between the vulnerability and invulnerability of the System also enables us to denounce the ultimate racist and/or sexist trick, that of "two birds in the bush instead of a bird in hand": when women demand 'simple equality, quasi-"feminists" often pretend to offer them "much more" (the role of the warm and wise "conscience of society," elevated above the vulgar everyday competition and struggle for domination ...)-the only proper answer to this offer, of course, is "No, thanks! Better is the enemy of the Good! We do not want more, just equality!" Here, at least, the last lines in Now Voyager ("Why reach for the moon, when we can have the stars?") are wrong. It is homologous with the native American who wants to become integrated into the predominant "white" society, and a politically correct progressive liberal endeavors to convince him that, he is thereby renouncing his very unique prerogative, the authentic native culture and tradition-no thanks, simple equality is enough, I also wouldn't mind my part of consumerist alienation! ... A modest demand of the excluded group for the full participation at the society's universal rights is much more threatening for the system than the apparently much more "radical" rejection of the predominant "social values" and the assertion of the superiority of one's own culture. For a true feminist, Otto Weininger's assertion that, although women are "ontologically false," lacking the proper ethical stature, they should be acknowledged the same rights as men in public life, is infinitely more acceptable than the false elevation of women that makes them "too good" for the banality of men's rights.



**\*\*LANGUAGE/REPRESENTATIONS K\*\***

AT LANGAUGE K: CEDE THE POLITICAL

**A focus on discourse substitutes philosophical musing for material politics.**

**Taft-Kaufman, 95** - Professor, Department of Speech Communication And Dramatic Arts, Central Michigan University – 1995 (Jill, “Other ways: Postmodernism and performance praxis,” The Southern Communication Journal, Vol.60, Iss. 3; pg. 222)

In its elevation of language to the primary analysis of social life and its relegation of the de-centered subject to a set of language positions, postmodernism ignores the way real people make their way in the world. While the notion of decentering does much to remedy the idea of an essential, unchanging self, it also presents problems. According to Clarke (1991): Having established the material quality of ideology, everything else we had hitherto thought of as material has disappeared. There is nothing outside of ideology (or discourse). Where Althusser was concerned with ideology as the imaginary relations of subjects to the real relations of their existence, the connective quality of this view of ideology has been dissolved because it lays claim to an outside, a real, an extra-discursive for which there exists no epistemological warrant without lapsing back into the bad old ways of empiricism or metaphysics. (pp. 25-26) Clarke explains how the same disconnection between the discursive and the extra-discursive has been performed in semiological analysis: Where it used to contain a relation between the signifier (the representation) and the signified (the referent), antiempiricism has taken the formal arbitrariness of the connection between the signifier and signified and replaced it with the abolition of the signified (there can be no real objects out there, because there is no out there for real objects to be). (p. 26) To the postmodernist, then, real objects have vanished. So, too, have real people. Smith (1988) suggests that postmodernism has canonized doubt about the availability of the referent to the point that "the real often disappears from consideration" (p. 159). Real individuals become abstractions. Subject positions rather than subjects are the focus. The emphasis on subject positions or construction of the discursive self engenders an accompanying critical sense of irony which recognizes that "all conceptualizations are limited" (Fischer, 1986, p. 224). This postmodern position evokes what Connor (1989) calls "an absolute weightlessness in which anything is imaginatively possible because nothing really matters" (p. 227). Clarke (1991) dubs it a "playfulness that produces emotional and/or political disinvestment: a refusal to be engaged" (p. 103). The luxury of being able to muse about what constitutes the self is a posture in keeping with a critical venue that divorces language from material objects and bodily subjects.

AT LANGUAGE K: GENERIC

**Suppressing language because it is offensive preserves its injurious meaning – using the words in new ways makes them more humane.**

**Kurtz and Oscarson 03** (Anna and Christopher, Members of National Council of Teachers of English Conference on College Composition and Communication, “BookTalk: Revising the Discourse of Hate,” ProQuest)

However, Butler also argues that the daily, repeated use of words opens a space for another, more empowering kind of performance. This alternative performance, Butler insists, can be "the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an original subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open" (p. 38). To think of words as having an "open" future is to recognize that their authority lies less in their historical than in their present uses; it is to acknowledge that people can revise the meaning of words even as we repeat them; it is to embrace the notion that the instability of words opens the possibility that we can use them to (re)construct a more humane future for ourselves and others. Because words can be revised, Butler contends that it would be counterproductive simply to stop using terms that we would deem injurious or oppressive. For when we choose not to use offensive words under any circumstance, we preserve their existing meanings as well as their power to injure. If as teachers, for instance, we were simply to forbid the use of speech that is hurtful to LGBT students we would be effectively denying the fact that such language still exists. To ignore words in this way, Butler insists, won't make them go away. Butler thus suggests that we actually use these words in thoughtful conversation in which we work through the injuries they cause (p. 1.02). Indeed, Butler insists that if we are to reclaim the power that oppressive speech robs from us, we must use, confront, and interrogate terms like "queer."

**Censorship will be co-opted by conservative elements to destroy minority rights – instead language should be used to subvert the conventional meanings of the words.**

**Nye 99** (Andrea, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin Whitewater, “Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative; In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology,” Jstor)

Once the state has the power to legislate what can be said and not said, she argues, that power will be coopted by conservative elements to defeat liberal causes and minority rights. State power will also curtail the freedom of speech of private individuals that is the very basis for effective antidotes to derogatory name calling. DeCew, however, painstakingly reviews the legal and philosophical history of privacy rights as well as current debates about its scope and status before she takes on the question of whether feminists have any interest in preserving a private sphere. For DeCew, too, a major target is MacKinnon, specifically her argument that leaving alone the privacy of home and family means leaving men alone to abuse and dominate women. DeCew argues that decisions that protect the use of sexually explicit materials in the home, consensual sex practices in private, and personal decisions about abortion are in the interest of women as well as men, even though in some cases, such as wife beating, there may be overriding considerations that justify state intervention. Both authors argue persuasively for a more careful look at the dangers lurking behind calls for state action. For Butler, the danger is that the state becomes arbiter of what is and is not permissible speech, allowing rulings that the erection of burning crosses by the Ku Klux Klan is protected speech but that artistic expressions of gay sexuality or statements of gay identity are actions rather than speech and so are not protected. The danger DeCew sees is that once the right to privacy is denied or narrowly defined, the state can, on the grounds of immorality, move into women's personal lives to interfere with sexual expression, whether homosexual or heterosexual, or with the right to choose an abortion established in Roe v. Wade. Both DeCew and Butler, however, provide alternative remedies for the admitted harm that state action is intended to redress. For DeCew, the right to privacy is not absolute; like freedom, it can be overridden by other rights —thus the state can intervene in domestic abuse cases because of the physical harm being done. Butler's remedy for harmful hate language is more deeply rooted in postmodern theories of the speaking subject. Given the postmodern view that the subject can never magisterially use a language with fixed meanings according to clear intentions, it is always possible to subvert the conventional meanings of words. What is said as a derogatory slur—"nigger," "chick," "spic," or "gay," for example —can be "resignified," that is, returned in such a manner that its conventional meaning in practices of discrimination and abuse is subverted. Butler gives as examples the revalorization of terms like "black" or "gay," the satirical citation of racial or sexual slurs, reappropriation in street language or rap music, and expressions of homosexual identity in art depicting graphic sex. These are expressions that any erosion in First Amendment rights might endanger.

AT LANGUAGE K: GENERIC

**Placing representations and discourse first trades off with concrete political change and makes no difference to those engaged in political struggles.**

**Taft-Kaufman, 95** Jill Speech prof @ CMU, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, "Other Ways", p pq

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maandering on about Otherness: phallogocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) *The Postmodern Condition* in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure.

AT LANGUAGE K: GENERIC—PERM

**Perm – combining discursive change with action is key to accurate representation and successfully addressing material inequalities.**

**Swartz, 06** Ph.D. in Communication from Purdue University in 1995, 2006, (Omar, “Social justice and communication scholarship,” pg. 43-44)

The reason such rhetorical criticism does not necessarily produce social change is because of the great divide between the symbolic and material worlds. As Cloud (1994) persuasively argued, although the study of rhetoric is “vital to the projects of critique and social change ... discourse is not the only thing that ‘matters’ in these projects” (p. 141). She cautioned against falling victim to the “materiality of discourse hypothesis”: the belief that “discourse itself is influential or even constitutive of social and material reality” (p. 141). The materiality of discourse hypothesis draws no distinction between symbolic and material acts, because reality is viewed as being a discursive formation. However, as McGee (1986) pointed out: Action is doing to the world, the chopping of trees. ... There is a tremendous gulf between action and discourse, the distance between murder, for example, and the “symbolic killing” of name-calling. In truth, the only actions that consist in discourse are performed on discourse itself. Speech will not fell a tree, and one cannot write a house to dwell in. One can act through discourse on discourse to guide or control the meaning people see in selected representations of the world. Discursive action, however, always stands in anticipation of its consequences, an act that requires additional acts before one is clear that it was ever more than “mere talk.” (p. 122) Hence, as Cloud (1994) maintained, When discourse counts as material, emancipation is seemingly possible in “mere talk” (p. 154), but it is not only discourses and codes from which many people need liberation. A politics of discourse ... assumes that those who are oppressed or exploited need discursive redefinition of their identities, rather than transformation of their material conditions as a primary task (p. 157). Cloud pointed out that “to say that hunger and war are rhetorical is to state the obvious; to suggest that rhetoric is all they are is to leave critique behind” (p. 159). Thus, criticism alone, the textualizing of politics, as Farrell (1993) called it, does not produce social change unless it leads “to some kind of concrete oppositional action – a successful strike, a demonstration that builds a mass movement, or other collective and effective refusal of the prevailing social order” (Cloud, 1994, p. 151); that is, action that results in changes in the material world. As Wander (1984) exclaimed, “Cries of help call for much more than appreciation” (p. 199)

**Opposing discursive interpretations result in a deadlock – only reaching a consensus through the perm allows for successful solutions and effective critical analysis.**

**Carr, 89** Prof of Philosophy of Edu @ U. of Sheffield UK, 89 (Wilfred, “The Idea of an Educational Science,” Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vd. 23, No. 1, p 34 1989 <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119440829/abstract>)

But such discourse, Habermas notes, can only proceed if participants are satisfied that certain claims about the validity of what is being said are being met. These “validity claims”-that what is being said is comprehensible, that any factual assertions being made are true, that what is being said is in the context appropriate and justified, and that a speaker is being sincere and not trying to deceive the listener-are thus built into the very structure of discursive language. Hence, the very act of engaging in discourse presupposes a “communicative rationality” such that any agreement reached through a discussion in which these four validity claims are met constitutes what Habermas calls a “rational consensus”-an agreement arising precisely because “the force of the better argument” has been allowed to prevail. Habermas recognises, of course, that this kind of purely rational discourse does not describe the way in which disagreements are actually resolved. It nevertheless, creates the image of what Habermas calls an “ideal speech situation”-a social context in which constraints on free and open dialogue have been excluded and in which impediments to rational argumentation and deliberation have been removed. Thus, by their very use of language, individuals reveal an unavoidable allegiance to those forms of social life in which human reason has been “emancipated” from the corrupting influence of tradition and ideology-precisely the form of social life which a critical social science seeks to create.

AT LANGUAGE K: ALT VIOLENT

**Their efforts to represent those harmed by our language is EQUALLY violent as our use of certain words. The alt cannot solve.**

**Shapiro, 98**, Professor of Political Science – University of Hawaii, “Representational Violence,” Peace Review v. 10 i. 4, Michael J.

Of late, critical and polemical commentaries aimed at politicizing language have been focused on the damaging effects of what Judith Butler has called "excitable speech," utterances intended to incite violence toward persons with recognizable social identities: religious groups, ethnic groups, and gays and lesbians, among others. Apart from the problem of neglecting the meaning slippage involved in assigning an unmediated causal effect to speech acts, the position of those who are arguing, for example, in favor of juridical responses to censor hate speech confronts a paradox. In order to militate against one kind of linguistic violence--the damaging effects of utterances on persons--they have to commit another kind of violence. By assigning a unitary identity to the targets of hate speech, the protectors of vulnerable bodies engage in a violence of representation. They must attribute to speech-act victims a unitary and unambiguously coherent identity; they must dissolve hybridities, turning pluralistic and contingent historical affiliations into essential characteristics. As a result, their arguments in favor of protecting the vulnerable reinforce the identity perspectives presupposed in the discourses they oppose. The paradox evident in juridically oriented attempts to sanction hate speech is part of a more pervasive historical phenomenon toward which Jacques Derrida has pointed in his warning about attempts at definitively expunging violence. As he has famously put it, a commitment to total non-violence risks the "worst violence;" it perpetuates the illusion that an absolute peace is possible. Strategies for attaining such a peace have varied from the structural approach, e.g. the Hobbesian idea of concentrating violence at one point above the social formation, to the conceptual approach, e.g. the Kantian commitment to a universalizing cognitive enlargement at the levels of both the individual and global society.

**Discussions of linguistic violence have the potential to insight violence.**

**Apressyan, 98**, Ruben G., Chair – Department of Ethics – Institute of Philosophy in Moscow, Director – Research and Education Center for the Ethics of Nonviolence, and Professor of Moral Philosophy – Moscow Lomonosov State University, Peace Review, v. 10 i. 4, December, CLASSIC MW/KL

The issue of linguistic violence is an issue of linguistic culture. Hence, any discussion of linguistic violence may be the cause for violence itself. This is the case because the language of violence can also be constructed, cultivated and exercised culturally. Finally, the issue of linguistic violence in the political sphere is ultimately an issue of openness and democracy in political discourse, in which various voices must be incorporated and where any political group and every citizen have an equal right to speak. But for such purposes, political discourse should be organized as a colloquium in the original sense of the word "colloquy."

AT LANGUAGE K: LANGUAGE NOT VIOLENT

**Language isn't inherently violent – violence exists independent of it**

**Apressyan, 98**, Ruben G. Chair – Department of Ethics – Institute of Philosophy in Moscow, Director – Research and Education Center for the Ethics of Nonviolence, and Professor of Moral Philosophy – Moscow Lomonosov State University, Peace Review, v. 10 i. 4, December,

There is another aspect, however. Language per se is not violent; although, it easily may become an object of violence. This defenselessness against violence, means that violence exists beyond language. Speech is a prerogative of reason: violence is speechless. This means that violence has no need of language. With the help of language, violence may mark itself, give itself a kind of justification, allude to itself, or hide itself in various forms of reserve and awesomeness. Potential violence may resolve into speech or disembodied words. But in turn, words themselves, or words inserted into certain contexts or articulated with a certain intonation may appear as potentially violent. Thus language becomes a means of violence which "keeps silence."

AT LANGUAGE K: CENSORSHIP BAD

**Free speech is critical—censorship will backfire on the left.**

**Wilson, 2000** – Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe – 2000 (John K. Wilson, “How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People” p. 163)

The left must stand strongly on the side of free speech. Because there is so much censorship of progressive ideas, it can be tempting for the left to turn the tables and to try to silence far right advocates. But repression is unnecessary: progressive ideas are more popular than conservative ones, and all the left needs to do is get a fair and open hearing. Censorship is not only wrong, it’s also a losing strategy for the left. Progressive attract more attention if they’re the censors. Because conservative censorship is largely taken for granted, news about intolerance on the right isn’t usually publicized. But when someone on the left seems guilty of censorship, the rights publicity machine quickly starts up. That’s why the right was able to push the myth of political correctness in the 1990s and invent the idea of a wave of left-wing oppression sweeping college at a time when there was more freedom of thought than ever before, and infringement of free speech on campuses by conservative forces was more prevalent than anything committed by the left. Progressives certainly need to better publicize incidents of censorship, but the left must also realize that the right will always win the suppression battles. It has all the resources and the media on its side. When some leftists are willing to make exceptions to the First Amendment to silence conservative hate mongers, it becomes even more difficult for progressive to draw attention to the censorship of left-wing ideas. The only winning strategy is to maintain a consistent commitment to freedom of speech.

**Preventing the use of representations precludes the possibility of giving them new meaning.**

**Butler, 97**, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature – University of California-Berkeley, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative p. 38 Judith

This story underscores the limits and risks of resignification as a strategy of opposition. I will not propose that the pedagogical recirculation of examples of hate speech always defeats the project of opposing and defusing such speech, but I want to underscore the fact that such terms carry connotations that exceed the purposes for which they may be intended and can thus work to afflict and defeat discursive efforts to oppose such speech. Keeping such terms unsaid and unsayable can also work to lock them in place, preserving their power to injure, and arresting the possibility of a reworking that might shift their context and purpose. That such language carries trauma is not a reason to forbid its use. There is no purifying language of its traumatic residue, and no way to work through trauma except through the arduous effort it takes to direct the course of its repetition. It may be that trauma constitutes a strange kind of resource, and repetition, its vexed but promising instrument. After all, to be rained by another is traumatic: it is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might then begin to exercise agency at all. A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life. This is what I have been called. Because I have been called something, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. The terms by which we are hailed are rarely the ones we choose (and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); but these terms we never really choose are the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open.



AT LANGUAGE K: CENSORSHIP BAD

**Censorship is deconstructive and regressive and turns the criticism – blocking the freedom of speech will only guarantee the domination of current prevailing discursive practices.**

**Ward, 90** ( David V. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Widener University in Pennsylvania. “Library Trends” Philosophical Issues in Censorship and Intellectual Freedom, Volume 39, Nos 1 & 2. Summer/Fall 1990. Pages 86-87)

Second, even if the opinion some wish to censor is largely false, it may contain some portion of truth, a portion denied us if we suppress the speech which contains it. The third reason for allowing free expression is that any opinion “however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” (Mill, 1951, p. 126). Merely believing the truth is not enough, Mill points out, for even a true opinion held without full and rich understanding of its justification is “a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument-this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth” (p. 127). Fourth, the meaning of a doctrine held without the understanding which arises in the vigorous debate of its truth, “will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience” (p. 149). Censorship, then, is undesirable according to Mill because, whether the ideas censored are true or not, the consequences of suppression are bad. Censorship is wrong because it makes it less likely that truth will be discovered or preserved, and it is wrong because it has destructive consequences for the intellectual character of those who live under it. Deontological arguments in favor of freedom of expression, and of intellectual freedom in general, are based on claims that people are entitled to freely express their thoughts, and to receive the expressions made by others, quite independently of whether the effects of that speech are desirable or not. These entitlements take the form of rights, rights to both free expression and access to the expressions of others.

**Every invasion of freedom must be rejected**

**Petro, 74** Sylvester Petro, professor of law, Wake Forest University, Spring 1974, TOLEDO LAW REVIEW, p. 480.

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway – “I believe in only one thing: liberty.” And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value, and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

AT LANGUAGE K: CENSORSHIP BAD

**Censorship destroys rights – this should take precedence over discursive consequences**

**Ward, 90** ( David V. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Widener University in Pennsylvania. “Library Trends” Philosophical Issues in Censorship and Intellectual Freedom, Volume 39, Nos 1 & 2. Summer/Fall 1990. Pages 90-91)

This line of reasoning has consequences for what I take to be a more important issue than the subsidy of controversial works of art. That is the issue of removal or banning of books from publicly supported libraries (including public school libraries) because of their political, sexual, racial, or ethnic content. What is the ethical position for the librarian in such cases? The libraries in question are publicly supported. Doesn't this give the public the right to determine which books will and will not be included in the collection? Isn't the librarian a public employee, obligated to carry out the public's will, as expressed through the appropriate elected officials? The answer to these questions is “yes,” but an importantly qualified “yes.” It is true that no one's rights are violated if the taxpayers remove Huckleberry Finn or Soul on Ice from a tax-supported library. The taxpayers are exercising their acknowledged right to decide what they will and will not support, just as in the Mapplethorpe/Serrano case. And the librarian, if he or she is to remain in that position, must acknowledge the public's rights to be selective about what it wants in libraries it pays for. This does not mean that we, or the librarian, must agree with the public's position. What librarians can do in such cases is to articulate the important consequentialist reasons for not removing books. In the passion of the moment, the public might rashly choose to ban what it regards as a particularly outrageous book from the public library with no thought to the difficult to discern and serious long-term costs imposed by a policy which allowed such removals. The librarian is in a special position to aid the public in understanding that, while it has the right to remove or ban books from publicly supported institutions, doing so is unwise. Such removals are wrong and constitute bad public policy just because the long-term consequences may be disastrous. The points of this article can be summarized in a few succinct ideas. Deontological rights-based arguments for intellectual freedom and against censorship are stronger than, and take precedence over, consequentialist considerations. Utilitarian counter arguments fail against arguments based on justice or rights. This precedence however must not serve as a motive for attempting to turn all that is desirable into a right. The inflation of rights, by conflating the merely desirable with the obligatory, dilutes the rights which protect us all. But when rights issues are not at stake, or when conflicting plausible rights claims produce a “deontological stand-off,” consequentialist arguments, especially those of Mill, are authoritative. To say that such arguments are secondary to deontological considerations in no way diminishes their validity in those situations where they correctly apply.

AT LANGUAGE K: CENSORSHIP BAD

**Lack of freedom of speech enables genocide and the death of democracy**

**D'Souza, 96** Executive Director of Article 19, the International Centre Against Censorship. Public Hearing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy Subcommittee on Human Rights Brussels, 25 April 1996. "Freedom of Expression: The First Freedom?" Article 19, International Centre Against Censorship.  
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/19960425/droi/freedom\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/19960425/droi/freedom_en.htm), Frances

There are undoubted connections between access to information, or rather the lack of it, and war, as indeed there are between poverty, the right to freedom of expression and development. One can argue that democracy aims to increase participation in political and other decision-making at all levels. In this sense democracy empowers people. The poor are denied access to information on decisions which deeply affect their lives, are thus powerless and have no voice; the poor are not able to have influence over their own lives, let alone other aspect of society. Because of this essential powerlessness, the poor are unable to influence the ruling elite in whose interests it may be to initiate conflict and wars in order to consolidate their own power and position. Of the 126 developing countries listed in the 1993 Human Development Report, war was ongoing in 30 countries and severe civil conflict in a further 33 countries. Of the total 63 countries in conflict, 55 are towards the bottom scale of the human development index which is an indicator of poverty. There seems to be no doubt that there is a clear association between poverty and war. It is reasonably safe to assume that the vast majority of people do not ever welcome war. They are normally coerced, more often than not by propaganda, into fear, extreme nationalist sentiments and war by their governments. If the majority of people had a democratic voice they would undoubtedly object to war. But voices are silenced. Thus, the freedom to express one's views and to challenge government decisions and to insist upon political rather than violent solutions, are necessary aspects of democracy which can, and do, avert war. Government sponsored propaganda in Rwanda, as in former Yugoslavia, succeeded because there weren't the means to challenge it. One has therefore to conclude that it is impossible for a particular government to wage war in the absence of a compliant media willing to indulge in government propaganda. This is because the government needs civilians to fight wars for them and also because the media is needed to re-inforce government policies and intentions at every turn. In a totalitarian state where the expression of political views, let alone the possibility of political organisation, is strenuously suppressed, one has to ask what other options are open to a genuine political movement intent on introducing justice. All too often the only perceived option is terrorist attack and violence because it is, quite literally, the only method available to communicate the need for change.

**Democracy prevents extinction**

**Diamond, 95** Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1995, p. [http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam\\_rpt.html](http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html) //

Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

AT LANGUAGE K: CENSORSHIP BAD

**Any risk that the aff turns are right makes censorship a violation of rights – rights are a prior question to whether language is intrinsically wrong.**

**Ward, 90** ( David V. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Widener University in Pennsylvania. “Library Trends” Philosophical Issues in Censorship and Intellectual Freedom, Volume 39, Nos 1 & 2. Summer/Fall 1990. Pages 85-86)

The first task is to lay out the ethical theories under which issues of censorship and free expression can be evaluated. There are two basic types of moral theories: consequentialist theories and deontological theories. This discussion will regard utilitarianism, the pre-eminent consequentialist theory, and a variety of deontological concerns. Consequentialist moral theories are those which hold that the rightness of an action is determined solely by the degree to which it produces good consequences. Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory which holds that the best actions are those which produce the greatest amount of good (understood as pleasure or happiness) for the greatest number of people. It is the moral theory underlying modern cost-benefit and risk-benefit analysis, according to which we are directed to choose the action with the most favorable ratio of cost or risks to benefits. Deontological theories, the most important alternative to consequentialism, hold that the rightness of an action depends upon factors other than the consequences of the action. These include such things as whether the intentions with which the act is done were good, whether the action is just, whether it respects the rights of those affected by it, whether the action is consistent with the demands of duty, and whether, whatever its consequences, something in the nature of the action makes it intrinsically wrong. There are a variety of deontological theorists, from the first deontologist, Immanuel Kant, to W. D. Ross in the twentieth century. This discussion is neutral among them for our interest is in the deontological form of argument rather than in the specifics of any particular deontological theory. Our first major problem is whether issues of intellectual freedom are to be decided primarily by appeal to utilitarianism or to deontological considerations. That is, we must determine which of the two ethical theories expresses the more fundamental and overriding moral concerns. The classical objection to utilitarianism is that it makes insufficient provision for considerations of rights and justice. Utilitarianism, it is argued, would countenance, even mandate, actions which violated individuals’ rights or which were unjust in other ways, so long as those actions maximized utility. This objection is a sound one. Rights take precedence over utility; thus, deontological theories take precedence over consequentialist theories. This is not to say that utilitarian arguments are wrong or worthless, only that they do not express the most fundamental truths about ethical issues. In disputes in which injustice or violation of rights is not at issue, or in which equally balanced rights claims offset each other, it is often the case that utilitarian arguments determine the issue. Additionally, utilitarian arguments can be used in support of deontological arguments. The claim that deontological concerns take precedence over considerations of utility means only that in cases of conflict, rights and justice are more important than is maximization of utility. Deontological arguments cannot be answered by utilitarian counter-arguments, but need to be dealt with directly in deontological terms. This will prove of great practical significance when we begin to apply these ethical theories to a number of recent controversies involving freedom of expression. First, however, we must lay out the arguments concerning freedom of expression from both ethical perspectives. In *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government*, J. S. Mill (1950), the leading proponent of utilitarianism, gives an elegant and detailed defense of freedom of expression. He offers four arguments against censorship. The first is that: the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. (pp. 104-05)

**\*\*NIETZSCHE\*\***

AT NIETZSCHE: AT: NO VALUE TO LIFE

**Securing life is a prerequisite to determining value.**

**Schwartz, 02** (Lisa, Medical Ethics, <http://www.fleshandbones.com/readingroom/pdf/399.pdf>)

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decision-making is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients' judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.

**Turn--elevating other values over extinction destroys the value to life and makes extinction certain—their representation that they know the absolute truth of the value to life makes it easier to end it**

**Schell, 82** (Jonathan, writer for the New Yorker and nuclear weapons expert, [The Fate of the Earth](#))

For the generations that now have to decide whether or not to risk the future of the species, the implication of our species' unique place in the order of things is that while things in the life of mankind have worth, we must never raise that worth above the life of mankind and above our respect for that life's existence. To do this would be to make of our highest ideals so many swords with which to destroy ourselves. To sum up the worth of our species by reference to some particular standard, goal, or ideology, no matter how elevated or noble it might be, would be to prepare the way for extinction by closing down in thought and feeling the open-ended possibilities for human development which extinction would close down in fact. There is only one circumstance in which it might be possible to sum up the life and achievement of the species, and that circumstance would be that it had already died, but then, of course, there would be no one left to do the summing up. Only a generation that believed itself to be in possession of final, absolute truth could ever conclude that it had reason to put an end to human life, and only generations that recognized the limits to their own wisdom and virtue would be likely to subordinate their interests and dreams to the as yet unformed interests and undreamed dreams of the future generations, and let human life go on.

**AT NIETZSCHE: CEDE THE POLITICAL LINKS**

**Nietzsche's affirmation of chaos is willful abandonment of all reason—we become mere pawns of fate, reduced to silence.**

**Wolin, 06** (The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, Richard Wolin, Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center, City University).

Once Nietzsche realized the illusory character of all language and human ends, silence became the only viable and honest response. Recourse to "consciousness" and "reason" would only falsify this profound realization. The "vicious circle" Klossowski alludes to in his title expresses this dilemma. The act of turning the eternal return into a "doctrine" risks falsifying it, risks translating an unfathomable insight into the hackneyed terms of linguistic convention or "culture." The theory of eternal recurrence embodies a new "lucidity"; yet, paradoxically, this lucidity must remain inexpressible. For if such a lucidity is impossible, what the doctrine of the vicious Circle tends to demonstrate is that "belief" in the Return, adherence to the non-sense of life, in itself implies an otherwise impracticable lucidity. We cannot renounce language, nor our intentions, nor our willing; but we could evaluate this willing and these intentions in a different manner than we have hitherto evaluated them—namely, as subject to the "law" of the vicious Circle. The vicious circle expresses the fundamental paradox of the human condition: "the only way we can overcome our servitude is by knowing we are not free." We cannot escape the essential determinism of all being. Nevertheless, insight into this condition permits a measure of tragic superiority for a spiritual elite, the "lucid few." The anti-intellectual implications of Klossowski's "parody" of Nietzsche are stunning. They are tantamount to a willful abandonment of reason, history, and freedom.

**Nietzsche's radical skepticism is nihilistic because to give up on the rules of logic is to abandon critical thinking.**

**Comte- Sponville 91** (Andre, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne. "The Brute, the Sophist, and the Aesthete "Art in the Service of Illusion", *Why We are Not Nietzscheans*).

But Nietzsche cannot then escape from the aporia of logical nihilism: if there is no truth, the proposition that states that there is no truth is not true. We must therefore conclude either that there is a truth (in which case the proposition "there is no truth" is false, and Nietzsche is mistaken), or that we cannot think at all any more (since the proposition "there is no truth" is simultaneously true and false, which violates the principle of noncontradiction, or neither true nor false, which transgresses the principle of the excluded third). In a word: we have either to save logic and give up Nietzsche or to save Nietzsche and give up on logic. The genealogists may ask us: "Why are you so attached to logic?" We have our reasons, to which I will come back. But we also have to return the question to them: and you, why are you so little attached to it? Nietzsche claims that attachment to logic is a sign of weakness, that it betrays a plebeian or Jewish origin (WP, 431 ff.; GS, 348, 370). Should we then conclude that every illogicality is a sign of aristocratic or Aryan force? Or would this conclusion be itself too logical? Too plebeian? Too Jewish? Or are logic and genealogy legitimate only when coming from Nietzschean pens? But let's leave that aside. Another, more solid objection that could be made against me is that the aporia I have just evoked (the self contradiction of logical nihilism) is that of any radical skepticism, and that I can't take Nietzsche to task for it more than I would Pyrrhon, Montaigne, or Hume, whom I nevertheless profess to admire.

**AT NIETZSCHE: GENOCIDE DISAD**

**The trans-valuation of values will result in one of two things: a moral philosophy similar to the aff or an immoral alternative that would allow for rape, racism, cruelty etc.**

**Comte- Sponville 91** (Andre, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne. "The Brute, the Sophist, and the Aesthete "Art in the Service of Illusion", *Why We are Not Nietzscheans*).

If I had no morality, as I so haughtily claimed, then in the name of what did I condemn rape or forbid it to myself? In the name of what could I decide what was wrong or not? In the name of what, for instance, fight against racism, injustice, or barbarity? In the name of what should I even prefer sincerity to mendacity or sweetness to cruelty? For a time I tried to answer: "In the name of an ethic." But this kind of purely verbal solution is satisfactory only for a while. This ethic still had to be thought out, and the strange fact accounted for that a supposedly amoral ethic most often corresponds quite well, and this on all the serious problems, to what any honest man would call morality. So I took up my Spinoza again, and what I saw there is that there is no Spinozist immoralism, or rather only a theoretical immoralism, and that . . . but let's get back to Nietzsche. There is a Nietzschean immoralism, not only theoretical but practical, and the more I got to know it, the more I found it-I barely dare to write the word, so much does it go without saying, and so much will it make our great wits smile. The more I got to know this immoralism, the more I found it immoral. Simply, stupidly, inadmissibly immoral.

**Modern technologies, such as WMDs, means that we can no longer afford to live beyond good and evil, ethical norms are a necessary check on apocalypse.**

**Fasching, 93** - professor in USF's religious studies department – 1993 (Darrell, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima : Apocalypse or Utopia?, Pg. 28)

Our modern technological civilization offers us seemingly infinite utopian opportunities to recreate ourselves (e.g., genetic engineering, behavioral engineering) and our societies (social engineering) and our world (chemical engineering, atomic engineering). But having transcended all limits and all norms, we seem bereft of a normative vision to govern the use of our utopian techniques. This normlessness threatens us with demonic self-destruction. It is this dark side of technical civilization that was revealed to us not only at Auschwitz and but also at Hiroshima. Auschwitz represents a severe challenge to the religious traditions of the West: to Christians, because of the complicity of Christianity in the anti-Judaic path that led to Auschwitz renders its theological categories ethically suspect; to Jews, because their victim status presses faith in the God of history and in humanity to the breaking point. But the path to Auschwitz, and from Auschwitz to Hiroshima, represents a challenge, equally severe, for the scientific and technical, secular culture of the Enlightenment. We do not seem to have fared any better under a secular ethic than we did under a religious one. Indeed we have fared worse. Genocide it seems is a unique product of the modern secular world and its technically competent barbarians. Auschwitz stands for a demonic period in modern Western civilization in which the religious, political and technological developments converged to create a society whose primary purpose was the most efficient organization of that entire society for the purpose of exterminating all persons who were regarded as aliens and strangers—especially the Jews. The Nazi vision of the pure Aryan society represents a utopian vision of demonic proportions—a vision that inspired an apocalyptic revolutionary program of genocide. It reveals at once both a time of "The Death of God" in the Nietzschean sense and yet the resurgence of religion, that is, a demonic religiosity that creates a new public order in which all pluralism is eliminated from the public square and in which virtually nothing is sacred—not even human life. The period of the Holocaust stands as prophetic warning to a technological civilization that has no other norm than the will to power. If Auschwitz embodies the demonic use of technology against targeted populations to commit genocide, Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent the last such use of technology. For with the coming of Nuclear warfare, technology has outstripped human intentionality so that if the bomb is ever used again, genocide will be transformed into collective suicide or *omnicide*—the destruction of all life. Having enemies is a luxury no community on the face of the earth can any longer afford



**AT NIETZSCHE: GENOCIDE DISAD**

**Nietzsche advocated exterminating those who he thought of as weak and establishing a master race**

**Wolin, 06** (The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, Richard Wolin, Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center, City University).

How might one translate the conviction that hierarchy is beneficial and equality symptomatic of weakness-beliefs Nietzsche held-into the terms of a consistent political ethos? This was the dilemma confronting Nietzsche as a political philosopher, and the solution he found was an endorsement of

"great politics." His belief in the necessity of hierarchy had profound political implications, which found expression in his conviction that the "well-being of the majority and the well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value." If one were passionately committed to greatness, as was Nietzsche, one couldn't shy away from drawing the necessary conclusions, harsh as they might seem from a humanitarian point of view. Nietzsche, of course, was anything but timorous in this regard. As he observes in Schopenhauer as Educator, "A People

is a detour of nature to get six or seven great men." And in the notes for The Will to Power, he flirts seriously with the idea of a "master race": From now on there will be more favorable preconditions for more comprehensive forms of dominion, whose like has never yet existed. ...

The possibility has been established for the production of international racial unions whose task wd be to rear a master race, the future "masters of the earth-a new, tremendous aristocracy, based on the severest self-legislation, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist tyrants will be made to endure for millennia . In Ecce Homo Nietzsche openly speculates on what a "successful" realization of his doctrines ("my attempt to assassinate two

millennia of antinature and human disfiguration") might mean. The scenario he envisions cannot but make one shudder: "That higher Party of Life which would take the greatest of all tasks into its hands, the higher breeding of humanity, including the merciless extermination [Vernichtung] of everything degenerate and parasitical, would make possible again that excess of life on earth from which the Dionysian state will grow again."

**AT NIETZSCHE: GENOCIDE DISAD**

**Nietzsche's celebration of cruelty, violence, and authoritarianism are cornerstones of his philosophy.**

**Wolin, 06** - Professor of History and Comparative Literature at City University (Richard, *The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism*).

Ironically, whereas an earlier generation of critics took Nietzsche's philosophy to task for its repugnant political message, the postmodern approach is fond of celebrating his apoliticism. But no special interpretive talent is needed to see that the remarks just quoted, far from being "apolitical," are fraught with political directives and implications. The postmodernists exaggerate Nietzsche's status as an aesthete and systematically downplay the components of his work that are politically consequential. Nietzsche was, admittedly, an unrelenting critic of contemporary European politics, which in his estimation wreaked of mediocrity and conformity. But that hardly makes him an apolitical thinker. Instead, Nietzsche's unabashed embrace of hierarchy, violence, and the virility of the "warrior type," combined with his visceral distaste for the values of altruism and political egalitarianism, suggests that his doctrines foreshadowed not only some of the more unsavory dimensions of twentieth-century Machtpolitik cum total war. Any serious attempt to reassess Nietzsche's philosophical legacy must ultimately confront the distasteful character of his moral and political views. Conversely, any discussion of Nietzsche that focused exclusively on this aspect of his thought would be extremely limited. Nietzsche's influence on modern thought and literature has been incalculable. Writers as diverse as Rilke, Yeats, Valéry, D. H. Lawrence, and George Bernard Shaw embraced his teachings. In *Doctor Faustus* Thomas Mann used Nietzsche as the model for the composer Adrian Leverkühn. For a period of five years during the late 1930s Martin Heidegger lectured exclusively on Nietzsche. Perhaps the writer Gottfried Benn said it best when in the late 1940s he observed to a friend, "Really, you know, [Nietzsche] has anticipated and formulated everything, absolutely everything we poke around in—what else have we done these last fifty years but trot out and vulgarize his gigantic thoughts and suffering." His stylistic brilliance aside, no other writer articulated the spiritual disorientation of fin-de-siècle Europe as consummately as Nietzsche. As a cultural analyst, a diagnostician of European moral collapse, his acumen was unparalleled. A self-described "good European," he sensed, in a manner that was almost uncanny, the abyss toward which Europe was uncontrollably heading. Who could deny the preternatural clairvoyance of the following prophetic claim from *Ecce Homo*: When the truth enters into a fight with the lies of millennia, we shall have upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, the like of which has never been dreamed of. . . . The concept of politics will have merged entirely with a war of spirits; all power structures of the old society will have been exploded. . . . There will be wars the like of which have never yet been on earth. It is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics. No one gave voice to the dilemmas of European nihilism with as much force and clarity as Nietzsche. He realized that the religious, moral, and political values that had been the mainstay of the old Europe were moribund and that the new values destined to supplant them had not yet arisen. Nietzsche viewed himself as the midwife of these new values. But he was also aware that he was a man ahead of his time. As a prophet of nihilism, Nietzsche recognized that Europe had lost its moral compass, that it was ethically adrift. In the opening sections of *The Will to Power*, he offered a succinct definition of nihilism, "The highest values devalue themselves. The aim is lacking; 'why?' finds no answer." With the advent of the modern age, condemned to labor in the shadow of Zarathustra's chilling proclamation concerning the death of God, Europe had seemingly begun an irreversible course of existential meaninglessness. In Nietzsche's view, its only salvation lay with the birth of the Superman. As Nietzsche proclaims in *The Will to Power*: In opposition to the dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialized utility, a reverse movement is needed—the production of a synthetic, summarizing, justifying man for whose existence the transformation of mankind into a machine is a precondition, as a base on which he can invent his higher form of being. . . . A dominating race can grow up only out of terrible and violent beginnings. Where are the barbarians of the twentieth century? The answer to Nietzsche's provocative question would soon materialize. Was Nietzsche really apolitical? Though he mercilessly criticized the dominant political movements of his day, he was also a tireless advocate of "great politics," a veritable leitmotif of his later writings. For Nietzsche, cultural and political greatness were necessary corollaries. Not only was he an enthusiast of Homer, Goethe, and Wagner; he was also a profound admirer of Julius Caesar, Cesare Borgia, and Napoleon. In many respects, his reflections on "great politics" were as coherent and systematic as his musings on cultural and philosophical themes. "The time for petty politics is over," Nietzsche confidently announces in *Beyond Good and Evil*; "the very next century will bring the fight for the dominion of the earth—the compulsion to great politics." Here, too, Nietzsche's orientation was shaped by his training in the classics. Surveying the world of antiquity, the West's unsurpassed cultural pinnacle, he concluded that a hierarchical organization of society and politics was entirely natural. He subscribed to his University of Basel colleague Jacob Burckhardt's opinion that the rise of democracy had precipitated Athens' downfall. One of the most felicitous descriptions of his political orientation was provided by his Danish admirer, Georg Brandes, who spoke of Nietzsche's "aristocratic radicalism"—a characterization that Nietzsche may have approved of. Aristocracy means "rule of the best." In Nietzsche's view, it was only natural that "the best—the strongest and most powerful natures—should rule—and rule ruthlessly. As he remarks in *The Genealogy of Morals*, "To expect that strength will not manifest itself as strength, as the desire to overcome, to appropriate, to have enemies. . . . is every bit as absurd as to expect that weakness will manifest itself as strength. . . . No act of violence, rape, exploitation, destruction, is intrinsically 'unjust,' since life itself is violent, rapacious, exploitative, and destructive." Only the Judeo-Christian "slave revolt" in ethics had dared to assume otherwise, insidiously turning the tables on the masters by declaring that strength was evil and weakness good. Nietzsche viewed democracy as merely the political corollary of the pusillanimous Christian view that all persons were equal in the eyes of God.

## AT NIETZSCHE: GENOCIDE DISAD

**If there is no truth, then there is no means of resisting lies—we would be powerless in the face of holocaust denial or conviction of an innocent person at trial. Truth and morality go hand in hand.**

**Comte- Sponville 91** (Andre, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne. "The Brute, the Sophist, and the Aesthete "Art in the Service of Illusion", *Why We are Not Nietzscheans*).

If there is no truth, how are you going to resist lies? What would be the sense of asking, for instance, whether Dreyfus was really guilty or who really set the Reichstag on fire? If there is no knowledge, how will you fight obscurantism and ignorance? If there are no facts but only interpretations, what objections will you make to the revisionists who maintain that the gas chambers are not, precisely, a fact, only a point of view, a mere hypothesis, a mere interpretation by certain historians connected to the Jewish lobby? It may be objected that that was not Nietzsche's point of view. Certainly, those were not his examples. As for his point of view, I wouldn't know. In *The Antichrist*, after having praised Pontius Pilate's attitude ("One Jew more or less-what does it matter?"), Nietzsche adds: The noble scorn of a Roman, confronted with an impudent abuse of the word "truth," has enriched the New Testament with the only saying *that has value* one which is its criticism, even its *annihilation*: "What is truth?". Indeed, any judge can say that when he needs to condemn an innocent man. But can we accept that? Should we accept it? And how do we prevent it, if there are neither facts nor truths? In aphorism of Beyond Good and Evil, after having announced, you will recall, that the falseness of a judgment was not for him an objection against that judgment since the only thing that counts is its vital utility, Nietzsche concludes: To recognize untruth as a condition of life-that certainly means resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks this would by that token alone place itself beyond good and evil. Logic and morality go together.

**Nietzsche's embracing of disorder necessitates an abandonment of traditional morality and justifies mass murder.**

**White, 90** (Alan, online book, Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth, Professor of Philosophy, Williams College, [http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/beauty\\_and\\_goodness.htm](http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/beauty_and_goodness.htm)).

Nietzsche exhorts us to live beautifully; on this point, Nehamas and I agree. A second point of our agreement is in at-tributing to Nietzsche an insistence that the assessment of a specific life's beauty is a matter, primarily, for the individual living that life. From these teachings a serious problem emerges: if beauty is the criterion for goodness, and if there are no universal criteria for beauty, is there anything to prevent the mass murderer and the child molester on the one hand, or the couch potato on the other, from viewing their lives as beautiful, and thus as good -- even as ideal? This question leads me to one of Nehamas's central concerns: "Nietzsche is clearly much more concerned with the question of how one's actions are to fit together into a coherent, self-sustaining, well-motivated whole than he is with the quality of those actions themselves" (166); for this reason, "the uncomfortable feeling persists that someone might achieve Nietzsche's ideal life and still be nothing short of repugnant" (167). This uncomfortable feeling arises, for Nehamas, from the teaching that life is literature. According to Nehamas's Nietzsche, "one should not take one's misdeeds seriously for long, [because] virtue does not depend on *what* one does but on *whether* what one does is an expression of one's whole self, of one's own will." This position makes sense, Nehamas adds, because "these are exactly the considerations that are relevant to the evaluation of literary characters" (166). Continues... Nietzsche rejects the notion that there are human obligations deriving from a different world; yet he is not one of Marcel's fools. Nehamas stresses, and I stress, that Nietzsche does not want to take the position of encouraging sadists and egotists. Unbridled egotism, he insists, would lead only to "universal wars of annihilation" (*BT*:15). His position is made yet more explicit in a passage quoted above, but worth repeating: I deny morality as I deny alchemy, that is, I deny their premises: but I do *not* deny that there have been alchemists who believed in these premises and acted in accordance with them. -- I also deny immorality: *not* that countless people *feel* themselves to be immoral, but that there is any *true* reason so to feel. It goes without saying that I do not deny -- unless I am a fool -- that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged -- but I think the one should be encouraged and the other avoided *for other reasons than hitherto*. (*D*:103) Nietzsche does not want to deny "that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, and that many called moral ought to be done and encouraged"; he agrees with Marcel that only fools could think otherwise. Yet he rejects other-worldly sources of obligation; how then can he answer Marcel's questions? What is to be said, or done, to the mass murderer and the child molester, or to the couch potato? Nehamas responds to this question on Nietzsche's behalf, but his response strikes me as in part inaccurate and in part dangerous, and thus, on the whole, unacceptable. In responding, Nehamas first suggests that Nietzsche severely restricts the audience to whom he addresses his transvaluative teachings: Exemplifying the very attitude that prompts him to reject unconditional codes, Nietzsche does not reject them unconditionally. His demand is only that philosophers, and not all people, "take their stand *beyond* good and evil and leave the illusion of moral judgment *beneath* them" (*TI*VII:1) Here, Nehamas suggests that only philosophers -- who, he seems to assume, are not "fools" of the sort Marcel and Nietzsche are worried about -- are to recognize that moral judgment is illusory. In this central respect, Nehamas's Nietzsche seems to remain a Platonist: he tells noble lies to the masses in order to keep them in line, reserving the truth for the intellectually privileged few. No doubt, Nietzsche does restrict the scope of some of his teachings; he has Zarathustra announce, for example, "It is a disgrace [*Schmach*] to pray! Not for everyone, but for you and me and whoever else has his conscience in his head. For *you* it is a disgrace to pray" (*ZIII*:8.2; 227.27-29). I grant in addition that Nietzsche points philosophers beyond dogmatic morality; he agrees with Marcel that nothing on this earth *obliges* us to be thoughtful or kind. Yet even in the passage Nehamas cites, Nietzsche does not present his teachings to philosophers alone. And if we distinguish more generally between esoteric and ex-oteric strains in Nietzsche's teachings, then his immoralism, his apparent advocacy of violence and oppression, must certainly be included among his teachings for the many. *Continues...* As long as the illusion of moral judgment holds sway, Nietzsche's question cannot be my guiding question, for as long as that illusion holds, Zarathustra's minotaur rules: good for all, evil for all. A post-moral world, one wherein the minotaur was silenced, would be one in which each of us could determine his or her own good; that would have to be a world within which diversity would be encouraged rather than inhibited. But that, it might seem, would entail a new form of moral dogmatism, one with the paradoxical form, "the good for all is that there be no 'good for all'?" How could Nietzsche defend such a perspective, or such affirmation, as one appropriate for everyone?

**AT NIETZSCHE: AT: WE DON'T ADVOCATE THE FASCIST PART OF NEITZSCHE**

**It is impossible to separate Nietzsche's celebration of cruelty, violence, and hierarchy from his other concepts—they are utterly central to his philosophy.**

**Wolin, 06** (The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, Richard Wolin, Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center, City University).

Nietzsche was an apostle of cultural grandeur, but he was also a dogged defender of power, cruelty and the warrior ethos as personified by several of history's more sanguinary tyrants: Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and Napoleon. The problem for interpreters who seek to aestheticize (and thereby, as it were, anesthetize) Nietzsche's doctrines is that, as the following quote from the Nachlass shows, **in his mind conquest and cultural flourishing went hand in hand**: "The new philosopher can arise only in conjunction with a ruling caste, as its highest spiritualization. Great Politics, rule of the earth, are at hand." Of course Nietzsche was anything but a systematic thinker, and the result has been the predictable hermeneutic feeding frenzy that has always surrounded his work. Nevertheless, "will to power" and "great politics" were mainstays of his later thought. Any attempt to interpretively brush these concepts aside risks distorting Nietzsche's central philosophical intentions.

**Nietzsche's writing was instrumental in Nazism. Their argument that his "great politics" was only a metaphor ignores the fact that he did help to inspire one of the worst phases in human history and that other authors cannot be appropriated in that way.**

**Wolin, 06** (The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, Richard Wolin, Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center, City University).

After all, the National Socialists viewed the doctrine of "total war" and the unprecedented genocide and carnage it had unleashed in quintessentially Nietzschean terms: as a Gotzendämmerung or "twilight of the idols," a macabre aesthetic spectacle of the first order. Documentary evidence corroborates the extent to which the SS (Schutz Staffel) adopted as its credo-and thereby found ideological inspiration to carry out the "Final Solution"-Nietzsche's admonitions to "live dangerously" and to practice "self-overcoming." As French fascist Marcel Deat remarked at the height of World War II, "Nietzsche's idea of the selection of 'good Europeans' is now being realized on the battlefield, by the LFV and the Waffen SS. An aristocracy, a knighthood is being created by the war which will be the hard, pure nucleus of the Europe of the future." The Nazis found Nietzsche's self-understanding as a "good European" eminently serviceable for their bellicose, imperialist ends: as an ideological justification for continental political hegemony. The Third Reich's ideology planners considered only three books fit for inclusion at the Tannenberg Memorial commemorating Germany's World War I triumph over Russia: Mein Kampf Alfred Rosenberg's Myth of the Twentieth Century, and Nietzsche's Zarathustra. Although the Nazis also tried to render German poets such as Goethe and Schiller serviceable for their cause, their attachment to the traditional ideals of European humanism represented a formidable hurdle. In Nietzsche's case, however, no such obstacles existed. As Steven Aschheim observes in The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany: Here was a German thinker with what appeared to be genuinely thematic and tonal links, who was able to provide the Nazis with a higher philosophical pedigree and a rationale for central tenets of their weltanschauung. As Franz Neumann noted in 1943, Nietzsche "provided National Socialism with an intellectual father who had greatness and wit, whose style was beautiful and not abominable, who was able to articulate the resentment against both monopoly capitalism and the rising proletariat." Was it really so far-fetched, as Nietzsche's defenders have claimed, that a thinker who celebrated Machtpolitik, flaunted the annihilation of the weak, toyed with the idea of a Master Race, and despised the Jews for having introduced a cowardly "slave morality" into the heretofore aristocratic discourse of European culture-was it really so far-fetched that such a thinker would become the Nazis' court philosopher? Reflecting on Nietzsche's fascination with breeding, extermination, and conquest-all in the name of a "racial hygiene" designed to produce superior Beings-the historian Ernst Nolte speculates that the scope and extent of the wars envisioned by the philosopher might well have surpassed anything Hitler and company were capable of enacting: What Nietzsche had in mind was a "pure" civil war. Yet when one thinks the idea through to its logical conclusion, what needs to be annihilated [vernichtet] is the entire tendency of human development since the end of classical antiquity . . . : Christian priests, vulgar champions of the Enlightenment, democrats, socialists, together with the shepherds and herds of the weak and degenerate. If "annihilation" [Vernichtung] is understood literally, then the result would be a mass murder in comparison with which the Nazis' "Final Solution" seems microscopic.

**AT NIETZSCHE: AT: WE DON'T ADVOCATE THE FASCIST PART OF NIETZSCHE**

**We concede that there are anti-authoritarian readings of Nietzsche but the alternative will be misappropriated as an excuse for violence.**

**Golomb and Wistrich (Professors at the Hebrew University), 02** (Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?

On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, <http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/chapters/i7403.html>).

Nietzsche was clearly an elitist who believed in the right to rule of a "good and healthy aristocracy," one that would, if necessary, be **ready to sacrifice untold numbers of human beings**. He sometimes wrote as if nations primarily existed for the sake of producing a few "great men," who could not be expected to show consideration for "normal humanity." Not surprisingly, in the light of the cruel century that has just ended, one is bound to regard such statements with grave misgivings. From Mussolini and Hitler to Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, and Saddam Hussein, the last eighty years have been riddled with so-called political geniuses imagining that they were "beyond good and evil" and free of any moral constraints. One has to ask if there is not something in Nietzsche's philosophy with its uninhibited cultivation of a heroic individualism and the will to power, which may have tended to favor the fascist ethos. Mussolini, for example, raised the Nietzschean formulation "live dangerously" (*vivi pericolosamente*) to the status of a fascist slogan. His reading of Nietzsche was one factor in converting him from Marxism to a philosophy of sacrifice and warlike deeds in defense of the fatherland. In this mutation, Mussolini was preceded by Gabriele d'Annunzio, whose passage from aestheticism to the political activism of a new, more virile and warlike age, was (as Mario Sznajder points out in his essay) greatly influenced by Nietzsche. Equally, there were other representatives of the First World War generation, like the radical German nationalist writer, Ernst Jünger, who would find in Nietzsche's writings a legitimization of the warrior ethos (as David Ohana makes clear). There have also been Marxist critics like George Lukács, who saw in Nietzsche's philosophy nothing more than an ideological apologia for the rapacious plunder of German capitalist imperialism and a particularly destructive form of irrationalism. Lukács insisted both on the reactionary coherence of Nietzsche's "system" and on the "barren chaos" of his arbitrary language, singling him out as one of the most dangerous "intellectual class-enemies" of socialism. Lukács's own miserable record as an apologist (for the crimes of Stalinism), gave his one-sided reading of Nietzsche (which equated hostility to egalitarian socialism with fascist imperialism) transparently propagandist coloring, yet it is an interpretation that had considerable influence in its day. Many commentators have raised the question as to whether the vulgar exploitation of Nietzsche by fascists, militarists, and Nazis could indeed be altogether arbitrary. While almost any philosophy can be propagandistically abused (as Hans Sluga has shown, Kant was a particular favorite among academic philosophers of the Third Reich!), Nietzsche's pathos, his imaginative excesses as well as his image as a prophet and creator of myths, seems especially conducive to such abuse by fascists. The radical manner in which Nietzsche thrust himself against the boundaries of conventional (Judeo-Christian) morality and dramatically proclaimed that God (meaning the bourgeois Christian faith of the nineteenth century) was dead, undoubtedly appealed to something in Nazism that wished to transgress and transcend all existing taboos. The totalitarianism of the twentieth century (of both the Right and Left) presupposed a breakdown of all authority and moral norms, of which Nietzsche was indeed a clear-sighted prophet, precisely because he had diagnosed nihilism as the central problem of his society--that of fin de siècle Europe.

**AT NIETZSCHE: AT: WE DON'T ADVOCATE THE FASCIST PART OF NIETZSCHE**

**Even if every argument that they make about Nietzsche resisting fascism is right, the fact remains that his anti-democratic rants fueled one of the worst regimes in history.**

**Comte- Sponville 91** (Andre, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne. "The Brute, the Sophist, and the Aesthete "Art in the Service of Illusion", *Why We are Not Nietzscheans*).

We have to stop here for a moment to rule out some false trails and one false conclusion. We know that the Nazis often claimed to be inspired by Nietzsche and that, for example, Hitler made a gift to Mussolini of a luxury edition (that the former had had printed in 1935 of our author's Complete Works. Such facts, and others one could cite, prove nothing. It is doubtful that Hitler ever read Nietzsche, or read more anyway than scattered quotes. And that Nietzsche is in no way suspect of Nazism is a certainty to which both chronology and the reading of the texts are enough to lead us. But the disciples are a little hasty when they conclude that therefore there is no problem and that anyone would definitely have to be ill intentioned to see the least relation between Nietzsche and Hitler. Without, obviously, being one of Nazism's causes, or even one of its real sources, Nietzsche belongs nevertheless to the same spiritual world-antidemocratic, anti-Jewish, antirationalist German thought that will also produce Nazism, and that fact explains to some extent the Nietzschean pretensions of this or that Nazi as well as the Nazi strayings of this or that Nietzschean without in any way authorizing them. "A doctrine," Jankirivitch said about Nazism, "in which Heidegger immediately found himself and which so visibly carries Nietzsche's mark." In both cases, that's going too far. Maybe. But it would not be going far enough-in both cases-to attribute to chance or to misunderstanding the monstrous proximity that made of Heidegger a Nazi and seemed, though erroneously, to give the Nazis Nietzsche's blessing. "The porks will wallow in my doctrine" the latter had foreseen, and that, indeed, is what happened. But why? We can hardly imagine the Nazis laying claim to Kant or Husserl in the same way, and every doctrine, we may say, has the porks it deserves. There will be wars the like of which have never yet been seen on earth," Nietzsche also announced, bragging about it. It is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics. It is of course clear that there is a great deal of derision in these swaggering. But a philosopher turns prophet at his own risk. Whose fault is it if, now that history has gone on further down the road, we have the choice only between the ridiculous and the odious?

AT NIETZSCHE: ANTI-SEMETIC

**Nietzsche rejection of values in favor of accepting disorder has fueled Nazism. Our argument is not that his writing was explicitly anti-Semitic, but the history of misappropriation proves that the alternative is politically undesirable.** **Golomb and Wistrich 02** (Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? (Professors at the Hebrew University), On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy, <http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/chapters/i7403.html>).

At first sight, this sharp rejection of anti-Semitism might seem a good enough reason to answer negatively and decisively the question concerning Nietzsche's responsibility for Nazism. Certainly, a thinker who held a high opinion of Jewish qualities, looked to them as a spearhead for his own free-thinking Dionysian "revaluation of all values," and sought their full integration into European society could hardly be blamed for the Nazi Holocaust. On the other hand, in his sweeping rejection of Judeo-Christian values (as they were mirrored in German Protestantism) Nietzsche constantly referred to their origin in the sublime "vengefulness" of Israel and its alleged exploitation of so-called movements of "decadence" (like early Christianity, liberalism, and socialism) to ensure its own self-preservation and survival (Menahem Brinker). Even though Nietzsche's prime target was clearly Christianity--which he also blamed for the suffering of the Jews--the source of the infection ultimately lay in that fateful transvaluation of values initiated by priestly Judaism two millennia ago. It was a selective reading of this Nietzschean indictment of Judeo-Christianity that led the late Jacob Talmon, an Israeli historian, some forty years ago to see in Nietzsche a major intellectual signpost on the road to Auschwitz. Moreover, even when describing the "Judaization" of the world in terms that mixed admiration with disapprobation, Nietzsche seemed inadvertently to be feeding the myth of Jewish power, so beloved of Christian and racist anti-Semites. Though his intentions were profoundly hostile to anti-Semitism, this provocative technique was undoubtedly a dangerous game to play. While it would be senseless to hold Nietzsche responsible for such distortions, one can find troubling echoes of a vulgarized and debased Nietzscheanism in the later diatribes of Hitler, Himmler, Bormann, and Rosenberg against Judeo-Christianity.

**AT NIETZSCHE: AT: AFFIRMING DIFFERENCE ALTERNATIVE**

**Their theory should be rejected because of dismal empirical results—the politics of difference have justified racial separatism while modernism has mobilized egalitarian social movements.**

**Wolin, 06** (The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, Richard Wolin, Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center, City University).

Paradoxically, whereas a visceral rejection of political modernity (rights of man, rule of law, constitutionalism) was once standard fare among counterrevolutionary thinkers, it has now become fashionable among advocates of the cultural left. Postmodernists equate democracy with "soft totalitarianism." They argue that by privileging public reason and the common good, liberal democracy effectively suppresses otherness and difference. Of course, one could very easily make the converse argument: historically speaking, democracy and rule of law have proved the best guarantors of cultural diversity and political pluralism. During the 1980s the debate on "difference" would take an insidious turn as the European New Right, led by France's Jean-Marie Le Pen, embraced the "right to difference" as a justification for racial separatism. The shock of recognition resulting from Le Pen's electoral successes pushed the European left firmly back into the democratic republican camp. Although Derrida has recently professed a sly interest in a nebulous "democracy to come" ("democratic a venir/avenir"), what he might have in mind by this metapolitical decree-long on rhetoric and short on empirical substance-is anybody's guess. By denying the basic emancipatory potentials of democracy, by downplaying the significant differences between it and its totalitarian anathesis, the postmodern left has openly consigned itself to the political margins. For, whatever their empirical failings, states predicated on rule of law contain a basic capacity for internal political change fundamentally absent from illiberal political regimes. Over the last forty years, the qualified successes of the women's, antiwar, ecological, civil, and gay rights movements have testified to this political rule of thumb.

**Affirmation of differences utterly incompatible with the compromises needed for democracy—authoritarianism is the only government that can control a populace that no longer believes in pluralism.**

**Taguieff, 91** (Pierre-André, director of research at CNRS (in an Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris The "Traditionalist Paradigm- Horror of Modernity and Antiliberalism" *Why We are Not Nietzscheans*).

One cannot be a Nietzschean the way one can be a Kantian, a Hegelian, or a Marxist. Positions and analyses count less than the manner, or the style, which is led by the power to destroy and the capacity to assert with absoluteness. The destructive aim is directed first of all against pluralist/liberal democracy, the object of supreme detestation. Then it is turned against the socialist utopias that intend to fully realize the virtual possibilities of modern egalitarian democracy. After the devastating demystification that is effected by Nietzsche's philosophy, from the moment we attempt to follow it in its ultimate consequences on the political terrain, no expectations become possible that could be fulfilled within the limits of modern democracy. Nothing remains but the exalted call for the "coup de force" and the dream of a redemptive dictatorship. Various generations of Nietzscheanizing aesthetes and pious interpreters have made an effort not to see this terrible logical conclusion, to hide or mask it. It is time to recognize that Nietzsche's pluralism, his hyperrelativistic perspectivism, is, far from being consonant with the regulated pluralism implied by liberal democracy, its total negation. Radical relativism is for Nietzsche but a destructive weapon intended to completely disqualify the value systems and the beliefs of the modern world. Nietzsche does not call for us to settle down comfortably into skeptical doubt, cultural relativism, or doxic pluralism. The "hardness" that his thinking requires, at least in its prophetic mood, is of the kind implied by the assertion of irreducible differences or of hierarchical distances that are also destinies. Do we need to insist on the incompatibility of such an absoluteness of hierarchical difference with the foundational egalitarian requirements of the modern democratic sphere? To be convinced of this, we need to read in their entirety, without evading the letter of the text through this or that angelic reconstruction, fragments as explicit as the following one, of which there are plenty: One of the tendencies of evolution is, necessarily, that which levels humanity . . . The other tendency, my tendency, on the contrary tends to accentuate differences, widen distances, suppress equality, and create monsters of power. The absolute affirmation of difference, the total negation of equality, the cult of hierarchies based on nature: these are the paths that lead to the heroic road, which lead us to the straight road thought out by the "immoralist." It is the only road pointed to by the radical, sovereign negations—the "no of the yes"-uttered against the modern world by the philosopher of the Will to Power. They hardly need to be added to.



## AT NIETZSCHE: NIETZSCHE = RACIST

**Nietzsche is explicitly racist—he praises Aryans and calls others degenerates. They will say that it is only a metaphor but that flies in the face of his repeated emphasis on biological determinism.**

**Comte- Sponville 91** (Andre, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne. “The Brute, the Sophist, and the Aesthete “Art in the Service of Illusion”, *Why We are Not Nietzscheans*).

Nietzsche's thinking is racist in its essence through its conjunction (under cover of heredity) of elitism with biologism. "One pays a price for being the child of one's parents," Nietzsche wrote in *The Gay Science* (348), but he is more precise in *Beyond Good and Evil* (§ 264): "It is simply not possible that a human being should not have the qualities and preferences of his parents and ancestors in his body, whatever appearances may suggest to the contrary. This is the problem of race. If one knows something about the parents, an inference about the child is permissible." For Nietzsche, because of that every human activity depends on what he calls "blood" (Geblut), and even philosophy doesn't escape from this: For every high world one must be born; or to speak more clearly, one must be cultivated for it: a right to philosophy-taking that word in its great sense—one has only by virtue of one's origins; one's ancestors, one's "blood" decide here, too. Many generations must have labored to prepare the origin of the philosopher; every one of his virtues must have been acquired, nurtured, inherited, and digested singly. (BGE, 21 3) The same illumination is, as we might have supposed, also valid for the general history of humanity. In *The Genealogy of Morals* (I, 4, j), after having noted that the "veritable method to follow" was the genealogical one, Nietzsche writes: In the Latinmalus (which I place next to Greek melas) could indicate the common man as the dark one, especially as the black-haired one ("hic niger est -"), as the pre-Aryan dweller of the Italian soil which distinguished itself most clearly through his color from blonds who became their masters, namely the Aryan conquering race. And then he adds this remark (whose status in a philosophy book leads one to wonder): "The Celts, by the way, were definitely a blond race." And he gravely asks himself: Who can say whether modern democracy, even more modern anarchism and especially that inclination for "commune," for the most primitive form of society, which is now shared by all the socialists of Europe, does not signify in the main a tremendous counterattack—and that the conqueror and master race, the Aryan, is not succumbing physiologically, too? (GM, I, 5) And he drives the nail in the wall: "These carriers of the most humiliating and vengeance-seeking instincts, the descendants of all European and non-European slavery, especially of the pre-Aryan people—they represent mankind's regression! These 'instruments of culture' are a shame for human beings, and a cause for suspicion, a counterargument against 'culture' in general!" (GM, I, 11). And he praises, on the contrary, "the blond beast" at the bottom of all the predominant races, "all the "jubilant monsters, who perhaps came out of a terrible sequence of murders, burnings, rapes, tortures with high spirits and tranquility of soul, as if it had all been a case of student high jinks; convinced that the poets would now have something to sing and to praise for a long time" (ibid.)! And, perhaps influenced by Gobineau, whom he greatly admired. At heart in these predominant races we cannot mistake the beast of prey, the blond beast who lusts after booty and victory . . . The deep, icy mistrust the German brings forth when he comes to power, even today, is an echo of the indelible outrage with which Europe looked on the rage of the blond Germanic beast for hundreds of years<sup>31</sup> All of these texts, and many others one could quote, justify my title, or at least its first qualifier. Not of course that Nietzsche was a brute as an individual (the poor man didn't have the means!); but he is the philosopher—and the only one to my knowledge (for though Machiavelli legitimizes immorality politically, he doesn't thereby condemn morality as such)—who justifies brutes and consciously makes models out of them. At this point it will be said—the Nietzscheans will say that these texts should not be taken literally, that they have but a metaphorical meaning, that the "force" they extol is of an intellectual kind, and finally that (as Heidegger is supposed to have demonstrated!) there is in Nietzsche no biologism, and that therefore the "races" he evokes are not really races. . . .Continues. . . To want to absolve Nietzsche of his barbaric or racist remarks on the pretext that, in his case (and contrary, it is specified, to what we see in Mein Kampf or among the theoreticians of national socialism), it is metaphysics is to be mistaken from beginning to end about the status of Nietzschean metaphysics, which, far from escaping from the body's vital order (and therefore from biologism), is but one of its expressions (a "symptom"), neither the most dignified nor the most important one, and one, most of all, that remains de facto and de jure dependent on the body. This is put clearly in one of the posthumously published notes: All our religions and philosophies are the symptoms of our bodily state: that Christianity achieved victory was the result of a generalized feeling of listlessness and of a mixture of races (that is, of conflict and disarray in the organism). (Kroner, XIII, § 600) Thus we must take "the body and physiology [as] the starting point" (WP, §492); consider "all that is 'conscious' . . . only of secondary importance" (Kroner, XIII, § 382), and consequently revise "our beliefs and our very principle of evaluation" and only hold on to the intellect (das Geistige) as "the body's sign language" (ibid.; see also WP, § 707, 676). This is where Nietzsche is closest to materialism—and where the materialist must therefore be the most vigilant. If "in man there is material" (BGE, 225), if the soul is only the symptom of the body and if this symptomatology is itself, as Nietzsche never ceases to repeat, biologically determined, how can we not proceed from physical differences (those that result from heredity) to intellectual differences—and what is that called if not racism? The most radical materialisms escape, or can escape, from this by subordinating life to something other than itself, from a point of view either theoretical (the true is not a symptom) or physical (matter is neither racist nor racial), or practical (it is not morality which must subordinate itself to life; it is life, in human beings, which must subordinate itself to morality: even if the notion of race were biologically pertinent, racism would still be morally damnable). Racism is, in a word, a hermeneutics of the epidermis (that is its theoretical error) that mistakes heredity for a morality (that is its practical flaw). It is a barbarous and superficial materialism. I can't draw out the analysis of all this to the extent the topic demands. But it will already be understood at this point that, rejecting as he does both idealism (which is a nonsense for the body) and, in the end, materialism itself (because, he makes clear, "I do not believe in 'matter'"),<sup>44</sup> Nietzsche can only fall into vitalism (in a large sense: he doesn't believe in the existence of any kind of vital principle either) or, if you prefer, into biologism. That is his ontology, what separates him from materialism: "Being—we have no idea of it apart from the idea of 'living.'—How can anything dead 'be'?"<sup>45</sup> But "the organic was not generated" (Kroner, XIII, § 560). Organic life is essentially will to power, as Nietzsche hammers on repeatedly, and will to power is, as we know, the basis of reality.

**AT NIETZSCHE: AT: NIETZSCHE'S K OF REASON**

**Nietzschean critiques of reason are deeply disempowering—universalism has empirically been successful in the fight against social injustice.**

**Wolin, 06** (The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, Richard Wolin, Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Graduate Center, City University).

Nietzsche certainly was a radical critic of reason. He wished to show that the modern West, by emphatically opting for the values of instrumental rationalism, had systematically precluded other, more distinguished value options. Nietzsche forcefully sought to demonstrate the opportunity costs of the one-sidedness and partiality of, as well as the losses entailed by—"cultural rationalization" (Max Weber). He once lamented that the modern West suffered from a 'hypertrophy of the intellect,' to the detriment of other venerable and worthy human faculties—and on this point who would disagree? Yet in the rush to radicalize Nietzsche, to enlist his services in a series of bitter, internecine intellectual disputes, the Gallic reception willfully suppressed the subtleties and nuances of his position. In French hands Nietzsche was transformed from a principled critic of reason into a devout foe of the same. Beginning with Socrates and culminating with the Enlightenment, the critical employment of reason highlighted the tension between the claims of reason and the unreasonable character of existing social institutions. As such, reason's claims were always inimical to illegitimate social authority. Reason sought to illuminate the cleft between unjustifiable claims to authority and its own more general, "universal" standpoint. If, as later historians contended, the collapse of the ancien regime was a foregone conclusion, its demise had been precipitated by the labor of criticism undertaken by lumieres and philosophes, the so-called party of reason.

**Rejection of all reason is mental suicide and risks repeating the worst politics of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.**

**Wolin 98** (Richard, Distinguished Professor of History @ City U. of New York Graduate Center, "The anti-American revolution," The New Republic, Washington, Aug 17-Aug 24, 1998, Vol. 219, Iss. 7/8; pg. 35-42)

In the postmodernist demonology, it is the Enlightenment that bears direct historical responsibility for the Gulag and Auschwitz. In the eyes of these convinced misologists, or enemies of reason, modern totalitarianism is merely the upshot of the universalizing impetus of Enlightenment reason. Or, as Foucault once observed, "reason is torture." According to the "politics of difference," moreover, reason is little more than the ideological window-dressing for Eurocentrism and its horrors. These wild claims are historically inaccurate. They are also self-defeating: if we abandon rational argument, we have little left to rely on but the "right of the strongest" or "identity politics." (National Socialism was a monumentally monstrous instance of "identity politics.") And they are also self-contradictory. For the enemies of reason can only advance their position through force of the better argument; that is, by giving reasons that aim to convince others. To criticize reason's failings is one thing. To reject it in its entirety is not antirationalism but antiintellectualism, or mental suicide.

AT NIETZSCHE: AT: NIETZSCHE'S K OF REASON

**Truth does not enable domination—the idea that anyone can be wrong is radically democratic.**

**Boyer 91** (Alain, Professor at University of Paris IV [Sorbonne]. “Hierarchy and Truth”, *Why We are Not Nietzscheans*).

A second, no less serious error consists in suspecting the Idea of absolute Truth of all sorts of authoritarian and liberticide effects. A pragmatist and relativist conception would be better suited to our tolerant and pluralist democratic epoch. Nonsense. That truth is, properly speaking, inhuman, meaning that it in no wise depends on human desire or will-any more than the existence of oil under the soil of Saudi Arabia depends on the desires it brings about-does not in and of itself have any dogmatic effects, quite the contrary. It is this inhumanity which permits the assertion that anyone, me, you, all of us perhaps are wrong, because we have not arrived at a truth that does not depend on our means for getting to it. Truth is not an epistemological concept.

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AT CLS: PERMUTATION

**The permutation is the only way to solve the case and save CLS. Any theory that is so strong that it can only advocate individual re-conceptualization is doomed to fail.**

**Hutchinson (York University Law School) 84** (Allan, and Patrick J. Monahan, also from Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, January, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199).

By reassuring people that things need not always be as they now are, the CLS movement can inspire the confidence necessary to reject prevailing arrangements. And because the CLSers believe that "the strength to live with the sober truth will become general [only when] the causes of untruth are removed," "trashing" is viewed as a valid form of legal scholarship. Indeed, to some of the Critical scholars, it is the "most valid form": That trashing may reveal truth seems significant if one's mission as a scholar is to tell the truth. If telling the truth requires one to engage in delegitimation, then that is what one ought to be doing . . . The point of delegitimation is to expose possibilities more truly expressing reality, possibilities of fashioning a future that might at least partially realize a substantive notion of justice instead of the abstract, rightsy, traditional, bourgeois notions of justice that generate so much of the contradictory scholarship. One must start by knowing what is going on, by freeing oneself from the mystified delusions embedded in our consciousness by the liberal legal world view. I am not defending a form of scholarship that simply offers another affirmative presentation; rather, I am advocating negative, Critical activity as the only path that might lead to a liberated future. [T]he task of a scholar is thus to liberate people from their abstractions, to reduce abstractions to concrete historical settings, and, by so doing, to expose as ideology what appears to be positive fact or ethical norm. . . . One must step outside the liberal paradigm, into a realm where truth may be experiential, where knowledge resides in world views that are themselves situated in history, where power and ideas do not exist separately. n128 While such Critical activity may be indispensable, it can only be preparatory. Moreover, trashing may itself prove to be an obstacle to the mapping out of any future vision of society. The object of trashing is to expose and sweep away the prevailing structures of thought that persuade people that present social arrangements are necessary and natural, rather than arbitrary and contingent. Yet, in line with this goal, CLSers must be careful to avoid foisting their own structure of thought on others; to do so would open themselves to the same charges they so vigorously level at others. Any attempt to offer its own vision of a reconstituted society would merely result in the replacement of one form of consciousness with another; "liberal consciousness" would simply be exchanged for "Critical consciousness." The CLS vision would be equally illegitimate and would amount to just another form of domination. The implication of this insight for the Critical scholars seems to be that each individual must be left to act alone, free from the constraints of any inhibiting consciousness. Under such a philosophy of history, the individual is both victim and liberator. The transformation of society must be effected by spontaneous individual action. It cannot be orchestrated in tune with any score, no matter how elaborate or simple. As a theory for political action, therefore, Critical theory alone is impotent. The most it can do is put the individual in the right frame of mind to achieve his or her own emancipation.

AT CLS: PERMUTATION

**The permutation is possible: totally purist read of CLS is silly—you can both advocate on behalf of reforms to and admit that those reforms are limited.**

**Kelman, (Professor of Law, Stanford) 84** (Mark, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES SYMPOSIUM: Trashing).

Just as the Guild lawyer may frequently act in a role that makes it hard to distinguish her work from that of a practitioner with very different political beliefs, so there will be times when a CLS scholar's work is fundamentally indistinguishable from that of colleagues with very different agendas. This confusion is most likely when the CLS academic addresses the "live" policy issues of the day. Of course, we can also adopt roles in which our work looks more "different," but this work is no less constructive or concrete. At times, for instance, we will, in a more radical mode, advocate particular legal reforms, hoping both to better the short-term position of the reform's beneficiaries and to expose the limits of legal reform. This second aim, political education, is perfectly concrete and constructive, even though it is far less relevant to those only interested in whether the reform ought to be enacted to help the beneficiaries. At other times, in our role as purely descriptive academics, hoping to explain the legal culture we all live in, we may simply deconstruct arguments in a way that is of no obvious immediate help whatsoever to those trying to pick and choose particular institutions they might find most desirable, except insofar as they are freed to evaluate their choices differently when their current cultural blinders are labeled, exposed, and, perhaps as a result, partly lifted. With the preliminary points about role restriction in mind, let's take a quick survey of CLS work done in various roles. n13 CLS academics often address the typical legal-political controversies between liberals and conservatives, generally, though not always, tending to argue for relatively traditional liberal positions, usually in reasonably traditional ways. For instance, academics who have associated themselves with the CLS have used traditional neoclassical economic analysis to question the a priori conservative assumption that housing code enforcement or compulsory (nonwaivable) warranties will either be of no moment to or detrimental to their purported beneficiaries; n14 offered arguments against replacing the income tax with an almost inevitably less redistributive consumption tax; n15 been wary of efforts to truncate the income tax base in ways that would contravene [\*300] progressivity; n16 defended affirmative action programs; n17 urged the adoption of universalized clinical legal education programs so as to empower students to avoid traditional law firm jobs and to raise the issue of the validity of the model of the lawyer as advocate-as-agent for a presumed-to-be selfish will; n18 argued against the Bar's attempts to solidify an unwarranted monopoly through unauthorized practice prosecutions; n19 and pressed for state reforms of work rules and child care programs that would better permit working mothers to maintain their careers. As "policy analysts" with a concern for redefining the proper scope of "live" legal and political issues, CLS people have been able to connect inevitably partial legal reform efforts with more radical consciousness-raising programs. Thus, some of our proposals have both met short-term meliorist goals and expanded our understanding that the meliorist programs are limited -- that there are problems that the legal remedies will not address. Perhaps most notable among these efforts has been the work of feminist lawyers/academics in developing legal theories of sexual harassment, which were designed not only to reform practice so as to enable women to use state power to squelch one of the most extreme forms of exploitation (quid pro quo sex-for-advancement) but also to trigger collective exploration into the more general issue of sexual objectification as the form of the expropriation of female sexuality.

AT CLS: PERMUTATION

**The permutation is the best way to access CLS, the way people create a better political community is not just to think about it but to act on it.**

**Sparer, (Law Professor, University of Pennsylvania) 84** (Ed, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, January).

From this background, Gordon traces an emerging "interpretative" Critical legal theory that emphasizes the role of legal doctrine in "belief-systems that people have externalized and allowed to rule their lives." n121 It is "belief systems" that count, even though "many constraints on human social activity," such as finite resources, do exist. Given these belief systems, not even the "organization of the working class or capture of the state apparatus will automatically" produce conditions which lead to "the utopian possibilities of social life." He then concludes: Of course, this does not mean that people should stop trying to organize the working class or to influence the exercise of state power; it means only that they have to do so pragmatically and experimentally, with full knowledge that there are no deeper logics of historical necessity. . . . Yet, if the real enemy is us -- all of us, the structures we carry around in our heads, the limits on our imagination -- where can we even begin? Things seem to change in history when people break out of their accustomed ways of responding to domination, by acting as if the constraints on their improving their lives were not real and that they could change things; and sometimes they can, though not always in the way they had hoped or intended; but they never knew they could change them at all until they tried. Gordon's conclusion is profound. But it contradicts the view that a negative attack on liberal legal doctrine is the key path to a liberated future. People break out of their accustomed ways of responding to domination by acting as if they could change things. "Acting as if they could change things" does not mean confining scholarly endeavor to negative doctrinal analysis, even though negative doctrinal analysis may be one helpful step towards acting. Acting means struggling for and living a different way, even if only "experimentally," and this requires praxis, theory which guides and is in turn influenced by action. Continues... I agree with Karl Klare when he writes: "I regard as inaccurate the view that . . . it is possible to describe the working class as in any sense satisfied with current standards of living in either the material or cultural aspects." n127 But if this is so, then it should be possible to struggle now over the conditions which Gabel describes. Nevertheless, neither Gabel's work nor that of most other Critical legal theorists provides theory that can aid such struggle. Indeed, it does not even recognize the need for new directions in scholarship which [\*560] would aid such struggle. In the course of constant efforts at delegitimation, some Critical legal theorists begin to think and talk about "the law" as if it were no more than litigation, doctrines, and case outcomes -- precisely the narrow view of most conventional legal theorists. Critical theorists rarely conceive of legal strategies to employ outside the courtroom for the purpose of building social movement. Somehow, the affirmative relationship of law to social movement becomes lost. n128

AT CLS: PERMUTATION

**The perm can solve: Liberal legal thought provides space for CLS.**

**Altman, (Professor of Philosophy; Georgia State University) 90** (Andrew, *Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique*, page 8)

In addition, it would be a distortion of liberal theory to suggest that it has no place for nonlegal modes of social regulation, such as mediation. Liberals can and do acknowledge the value of such nonlegal mechanisms in certain social contexts and can insist that the liberal view requires us to recognize that such procedures and rules have a central role to play in resolving fairly and effectively the conflicts that arise in a society characterized by moral, religious, and political pluralism. Thus, the liberal endorsement of legalism does not necessarily involve a commitment to legalism in the sense that Judith Shklar defines the term: “the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.” Shklar, *Legalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 1. Shklar understands full well that a commitment to the liberal rule of law does not entail an acceptance of legalism in her sense of the term. See *Legalism*, pp. xi-xli. And those who reject the rule of law can argue in the political arena for extending the role of such informal mechanisms. Of course, a liberal state could not allow the antinomians to eradicate legal institutions; in that sense, one might say that the liberal rule of law is not neutral. But the kind of political neutrality which the liberal defends does not aim to guarantee that any normative view has an opportunity to remake society wholly in its vision. It does guarantee an opportunity to negotiate and compromise within a framework of individual rights, and there is no reason why those who defend non-legal modes of social regulation cannot seize the opportunity under a liberal regime to carve out a significant role for nonlegal modes of social regulation within the liberal state. The liberal version of political neutrality demands that antinomians have such an opportunity, but there is nothing remotely inconsistent in liberal thought in making that demand or prohibiting antilegalism from going so far as to destroy all legal institutions.



AT CLS: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**The affirmative is better than the alternative because it takes into account the inevitability of a shared social reality and the need for reform.**

**Hutchinson (York University Law School) 84** (Allan, and Patrick J. Monahan, also from Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, January, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199).

Furthermore, people in an Ungerian or Kennedian world, completely purged of the naturalistic impulse, would recognize any "just" social order as simply the contingent interaction of force and circumstance. Thus, unlike the tragic liberal or Marxist, they would appreciate the transformability of society. They [CLSers] would recognize that any attempt to establish stable social relations was only transitory; individuals would only cease struggling if they were in a relatively powerful position or if they needed time to reload. Social life would be an unmitigated Nietzschean battle in which everyone struggled to make his will dominant and to avoid being subordinated to the will of others. One can only conclude, therefore, that if the Critical scholars are serious about pushing the notion of social contingency to its outermost limits, any form of social order must be identified and condemned as the product of interrupted fighting. Even Unger's ingenious scheme ensures that social contingency is "cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd, bound in." Thus, any CLS attempt to describe society as it concretely could be comes up against severe ideological difficulties. They aspire to liberate man from any structure of dominating "consciousness" so as to enable him to pursue and fulfill his essential nature. This seems to suggest that man can function in the world without any ideology or consciousness. This assumption is questionable. n159 It can be plausibly argued that ideology is necessary both for the existence of human society and for the conscious functioning of individuals.

AT CLS: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**CLS critique fails because it both claims that ideology is inescapable and that they transcend ideology.**

**Hutchinson (York University Law School) 84** (Allan, and Patrick J. Monahan, also from Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, January, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199).

Moreover, the CLSers' aspiration is tantamount to a proclamation of the end of ideology. n160 This, of course, is itself an ideological stance and makes Critical legal scholarship an ideology; "any type of political discourse . . . which anticipates an end to ideology carries thereby the potentiality of becoming itself ideological." n161 And because CLS insists that all ideologies are socially contingent, "the end of ideology" is simply another illegitimate form of consciousness rather than a truth about the human condition. Also, in being able to identify and label the prevailing structures of legal and political thought as "false consciousness," they are implicitly claiming that they are able to transcend the particular social situation. In effect, they claim to have access to a nonsocietally conditioned and therefore absolute truth. Yet their whole social theory seems to be premised on the view that truth is socially relative. This undermines the entire Critical enterprise, not just its constructive dimension.

**Theorizing the lack of truth is just as much of a truth claim as the 1AC: CLS structurally fails because its theory is too strong to allow for alternative political space.**

**Hutchinson (York University Law School) 84** (Allan, and Patrick J. Monahan, also from Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, January, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199).

Yet if the CLSers rejected this "transcendental stance," they would have to concede that Critical thought was itself simply another form of ideology. No doubt, the Critical scholars would argue that this "ideology" was somehow truer than the existing "false consciousness." Yet this move would require them to appeal tacitly to some societally external meteward of "true consciousness." The acceptance of any such external standard seems precluded by the very premises of their own social theory. The Critical scholars argue that all social worlds are never natural, but rather the contingent result of interrupted fighting. Any proposal for a future society would only be possible if we were prepared to deny or to hedge on the premise of contingency. It would require the Critical scholars to claim that their proposed society was not merely contained fighting, but was in fact a vision endowed with enduring normative value. Accordingly, the Critical scholars cannot offer a vision of a reconstituted society while remaining faithful to their own basic theoretical assumptions. If they hold that human existence is possible, and indeed can attain its finest fulfillment, without an ideology, they must concede that social transformation is a very personal, instinctive, and individual act. Otherwise, in planning such transformative activity, they would simply be exchanging one form of consciousness for another. Yet if they hold that human existence requires some ideology, they must concede that theirs is merely one more consciousness competing in the unwinnable contest over which is the best ideology for man.

AT CLS: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Indeterminacy claims make social change nearly impossible—even if CLS frees us from believing in a perfect law, it still does nothing to help the oppressed.**

**Solum, (Law Professor at Loyola) 87** (Lawrence B., University of Chicago Law Review, "On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma," Spring, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462).

Far from enabling a progressive transformation of legal practice, the indeterminacy thesis, at least the strong version, disempowers the critique of legal ideology that critical scholars hope will facilitate emancipatory social change. Seen in broad terms, their critique has two parts. First, the mystification thesis will unveil the structures of domination masked by legal doctrine. Second, the indeterminacy thesis will explain how domination circumvents the apparent autonomy of the law and frees legal actors from the apparent constraints imposed by the existing rules. Thus, mystification and indeterminacy are the intellectual foundations both for a program of external critique that will reveal the law to the layman for what it is, and for an internal critique through which progressive legal actors will freely use legal practice to achieve emancipatory ends. My contention is that the strong indeterminacy thesis undercuts, rather than advances, the projects of both internal and external critique. Because the strong indeterminacy thesis calls for disengagement from the form and conventions of discourse that makes legal practice possible, the thesis blunts an internal critique of the law. Stanley Cavell puts the point as follows: The internal tyranny of convention is that only a slave of it can know how it may be changed for the better, or know why it should be eradicated. Only masters of a game, perfect slaves to that project, are in a position to establish conventions which better serve its essence. This is why deep revolutionary changes can result from attempts to conserve a project, to take it back to its idea, keep it in touch with its history. To demand that the law be fulfilled, every jot and tittle, will destroy the law as it stands, if it has moved too far from its origins. Only a priest could have confronted his set of practices with its origins so deeply as to set the terms of Reformation. Cavell's idea can be put into a legal context by examining the critical legal theory of Roberto Unger. Unger identifies "deviationist doctrine" as the positive alternative for legal scholarship. The project of deviationist doctrine must maintain "the minimal characteristics of doctrine" that is "the willingness to take the extant [\*499] authoritative materials as starting points." n106 Like the Reformation, Unger's program acknowledges the structure from which it hopes to deviate. The indeterminacy thesis, however, undercuts the project of deviationist doctrine at its starting point. If there is a measure of determinacy in the law, and legal discourse and reasoning are more than mere apologies for domination, then Unger's deviationist doctrine begins with a flawed, but at least functional, language with which to embark on the creation of a more humane legal order. But if the law is indeterminate, and legal reasoning a sham, then they cannot serve as the raw material for constructing a body of doctrine with emancipatory potential -- deviationist doctrine itself would be incapable of effecting real change. Instead, the social order would remain governed by the underlying ideology or political and economic forces -- and if the forces were to change, then the doctrine would not need to do so. Under the strong indeterminacy thesis, legal doctrine becomes "a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it," and so it "is not part of the mechanism." Another argument made in favor of the liberating potential of the indeterminacy thesis is that it frees legal actors from the constraint of legal rules. One interpretation of this concept of liberation closely resembles Sartre's existentialist conception of human freedom: n108 legal actors must be made to realize that they are radically free to make decisions unconstrained by legal doctrine. Thus Singer argues that acceptance of the indeterminacy thesis will "allow us consciously to assume responsibility for what we do." n109 Similarly, the deconstructionist version of the indeterminacy thesis may be liberating in the sense of enabling what Derrida calls "free play." n110 Legal actors realize that they -- and everyone else -- always have been free to do as they please without bothering to construct interpretations of legal doctrine to justify their actions. This is not the place for extended consideration of this conception of freedom. I do wish, however, to make an observation [\*500] about its implications: the sort of freedom brought about by acceptance of the strong indeterminacy thesis disassociates internal critique from programmatic social change. This radical sort of freedom might enable individual legal adjudicators, practitioners, and scholars to undergo "conversions," liberating them from the constraints of doctrine. But the nature of such a liberation is ambiguous. It is hardly clear that liberating those who wield legal power from the "mistaken" belief that legal doctrine constrains their actions will have a progressive effect.

AT CLS: ALTERNATIVE FAILS

**Indeterminacy arguments undercut the possibility of the alternative and their impacts to the same degree that it impacts the affirmative—it ought to be treated as an FYI.**

**Solum, (Law Professor at Loyola) 87** (Lawrence B., University of Chicago Law Review, “On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,” Spring, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462).

This discussion leads us to the implications of indeterminacy for the other side of the critical agenda for reform: external critique of the law. Critical scholars often rely on the argument that the indeterminacy thesis delegitimizes the legal process. n116 To the extent that legal doctrine constitutes a rhetoric that legitimizes relations of domination, the indeterminacy thesis undercuts the effectiveness of the legitimation. But the indeterminacy thesis also undercuts the mystification thesis. For example, the claim that legal discourse reifies social relationships loses much of its critical bite when considered in tandem with the indeterminacy thesis. James Boyle points out this contradiction: "If the frozen metaphors [of legal discourse] truly do constrain our understanding of texts or our vision of political possibilities, how can doctrine be perceived as indeterminate?" n117 If the indeterminacy thesis is true, then legal reification does not produce the practical ill of bad outcomes in particular cases. Thus, while Gary Peller takes great pains to make it clear that the reification of the public and private spheres, which he argues pervaded legal discourse in the Lochner era, did not actually determine the result in any of the cases that struck down reformist legislation impinging on the liberty of contract, n118 it is not clear what effect, if any, Peller believes the phenomenon he describes did have. If the mystification thesis were weakened so as to be compatible with the indeterminacy thesis, its critical bite would also be weakened. The evil of mystification would produce only false consciousness, not bad decisions. In response, it could be argued that the false consciousness that results from legal mystification prevents the mobilization of change from outside the judicial system. But this will be hard to prove. As Jay Feinman has observed, "People must be aware of ideology if it is to serve as an effective legitimation device. The penetration of contract law doctrines into society is not great; first-year law students' common ignorance of its principles is annual evidence of this." n119 Indeed, one of the few ways that lay actors do learn about the legal system is through decisions in particular cases. If these decisions fail to convey the ideological message of legal discourse, then legal ideology is not likely to be transmitted to the culture at large. Arguments can be made about the effect of legal doctrine on elite groups, but if the indeterminacy thesis is true, the ill effects of legal ideology on society as a whole would appear to be quite modest.

AT CLS: ALTERNATIVE TOTALITARIAN

**Turn: de-legitimizing the liberal state is just as likely to result in a new, more oppressive regime—our solvency may be somewhat indeterminate but it is more concrete than a totally unknown alternative.**

**Solum, (Law Professor at Loyola) 87** (Lawrence B., University of Chicago Law Review, “On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,” Spring, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462).

All this is not to say that the idea of indeterminacy is unimportant. Critical scholars, like those who preceded them -- the realists, sophisticated positivists such as H.L.A. Hart, and even rights theorists such as Dworkin -- are right to identify significant zones of underdetermination and contingency in legal doctrine. This modest version of the thesis can be pressed honestly and productively and, to the extent the polity is unaware of this state of affairs, perhaps it should be pressed. As a matter of political strategy, the claim that a large number of cases presented to judges are underdetermined may have a delegitimizing effect. Indeed, one strategy of the political right in the United States has been to call attention to the political nature of decisions made by the Warren Court and the California Supreme Court in order to delegitimize the courts and thereby undercut liberal reforms. Perhaps critical scholars are right to join the reactionaries in this regard. But delegitimizing the courts should not carelessly be equated with delegitimizing the liberal state. Indeed, it is at least possible that quite the opposite is true: delegitimizing the judiciary might have the effect of increasing the legitimacy of other institutions of the liberal state, such as bureaucracies and legislatures, that may possess a greater potential than courts to become instruments of repression. Without a notion of the possibility of change, no theory of law can claim to be truly critical. As the critical scholar Alan Freeman put it, "The point of delegitimation is to expose possibilities more truly expressing reality, possibilities of fashioning a future that might at least partially realize a substantive notion of justice." n121 The indeterminacy thesis does not have a significant role to play in that enterprise. Critical scholars should put away the dogma of indeterminacy, and try their hands at tasks more difficult than deconstruction. We must imagine a progressive and humane social order, and we must imagine a way to get there from here.

AT CLS: AT UNGER ALTERNATIVE

**The alternative fails: Unger's idea of "structure of no-structure" is just as vulnerable to CLS criticism as any other liberal theory.**

**Hutchinson (York University Law School) 84** (Allan, and Patrick J. Monahan, also from Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, January, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199).

In sum, Unger's "structure of no-structure" is an institutional mode of social life designed to protect freedom better, while guarding against tendencies to naturalize an arbitrary vision of society. Yet, despite the grand style and sweep of Unger's theory, it appears to suffer from a central and potentially fatal flaw. All attempts at constructive theory seek to describe the world as it could and ought to be. Consequently, the major hurdle for any serious theorist is to provide some normative justification for his or her vision. Yet, the very premises underlying Critical legal though appear to preclude such a justification: To sustain any definite vision of future society, the Critical scholars must renege on their basic commitment to social contingency and historical relativity. CLS is ultimately hoisted on its own Critical petard. The Critical scholars proceed from an extremely subjective epistemology. They reject classical Marxism and modern liberalism for equivocating when confronted with the historical contingency of all social worlds. Indeed, they build their whole intellectual program on this "nonnaturalistic" premise: All societies are viewed as nothing more than the product of interrupted fighting. Yet, Unger's "superliberalism" falls into the very trap that he claims has captured liberals and marxists. His "structure of no-structure" cabins the social fighting it is intended to facilitate. It is as illegitimate and objectionable as any other social order.

**The alternative fails: Unger's theory is as flawed as the affirmative reform—the basic truths that he describes are just as vulnerable to an indeterminacy critique as the affirmative.**

**Hutchinson (York University Law School) 84** (Allan, and Patrick J. Monahan, also from Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, January, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199).

Unger's objective is to achieve a society in which individuals are free and independent, but also have guaranteed access to the means necessary to develop their unique personal potentialities. n155 Certain institutional paraphernalia are necessary to achieve that ideal. The state, the market, and the system of rights are placed beyond the reach of transformative politics; they cannot become an object of social fighting. For instance, Unger's destabilization rights could not be relied upon to demand the dismantling of the structure of nostructure. Thus, a ruthless commitment to the nonnaturalistic premise renders Unger's reconstituted society a falsehood and an illusion; it is only another in an endless series of truces that masquerades as a natural order of right. Unger's vision could be dismissed as just another ideology concocted by the weak to fetter the strong, thereby depriving them of the chance to fulfill their own selfhood. On this view, Unger's scheme is simply another variation on the natural law theme: He presents an alleged truth about human personality and proceeds to use that truth to justify a particular social order.

AT CLS: AT GABLE ALTERNATIVE

**Gable's alternative of un-alienated relatedness is too abstract—unless they can describe what the alternative would look like in specific cases, it will be overwhelmed by their own critique of indeterminacy.**

**Kelman, (Professor of Law, Stanford) 84** (Mark, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES SYMPOSIUM: Trashing).

The content of Peter Gabel's ideal is so elusive as to be nondiscernible. He says things like "[t]he project is to realize the unalienated relatedness that is immanent within our alienated situation." But I see too few concrete references to lived experience in this "specification" to know if he is actually describing a blissful state-of-mind or a small household appliance. To the extent that one can discern content, the perils of tautology loom: If what we seek is simply "human fulfillment," the group can quickly adjourn, both unanimous and groggy. Furthermore, Peter's technique seems almost cruelly ironic, given that his primary critique of "mainstream" judicial thought is that it lacks concreteness -- that by conceiving of the parties to a dispute as idealized role-players in a "fact situation" (for instance, "buyers" and "sellers" in a breach of contract suit assumed to be acting in accord with idealized, social expectations of such actors), it elevates their abstract characteristics. n117 But Peter's "real" characters, lurking behind the juridical abstractions, feel at least equally abstract and lifeless to me. My mind goes utterly blank when I try to picture Peter's characters glimpsing liberation by way of unalienated relatedness.

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AT CLS: AT GABLE ALTERNATIVE

**Gable's alternative will fail—changes inter-personal relations cannot translate into broader societal changes. Polleta, (Columbia Professor) 2000** (Francesca Polletta, "The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961-1966," 2000, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 367, Lexis).

Certainly movements have multiple and changing objectives. But one problem with Gabel's characterization is that it ignores tensions among the various goals he identifies. For example, as theorists from Robert Michels ([1915] 1962) to Wini Breines (1989) have recognized, bids for "power" are often jeopardized by what is required of the prefigurative impulse that Gabel seems to have in mind when he refers to "creating an experience of public community that could dissolve people's belief in and obedience to the State itself" (1984:1596). The obstacles between activists' experience of community and communicating that experience to a wider public are likewise unacknowledged. While many activists would speak fondly of the character of interpersonal relations among an intensely committed movement group, few would privilege those relations over securing changes that can be enjoyed outside movement gatherings and after the movement is over. And, indeed, research shows that people are better able to sustain participatory and egalitarian relations among themselves when they believe the movement is transitory (Rothschild-Whitt 1979). The survival of the group, Gabel's first goal, may thus run counter to the movement's personally transformative and prefigurative thrusts. Gabel's ambiguity about the aims of movements stems from the set of oppositions on which his understanding both of a rights-orientation and its alternative depend: on one side, real, authentic, instrumental, effective, determinedly informal, state-challenging, power-oriented politics; on the other, inauthentic, falsely conscious, enervating, formalistic, state-dependent, rights-oriented claimsmaking. Such oppositions account for Gabel's confusing use of the term "power" (meaning, variously, political leverage, the exposure of ideological distortions, and the experience of unalienated sociability). They also account for his failure to explain how experiences of sociability are translated into relations outside the movement, how changes in interpersonal relations lead to changes in people's material circumstances, and why movements should endure once they have secured the rights victories that brought them into being.

**Gabel's "authentic" movement will not solve—it will be caught up in sustaining itself and not achieve social change. Polleta, (Columbia Professor) 2000** (Francesca Polletta, "The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961-1966," 2000, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 367, Lexis).

Indeed, one might ask whether social movements fill the same place in Gabel's scheme as rights do in the legal scheme that he criticizes. Whether "before the law" or in protest, we seem to experience a connectedness with others that is absent in our daily lives, but in neither case is there any indication that that experience will extend beyond the immediate setting and its current participants. Our devotion to maintaining what passes as subjecthood, whether "rights-bearing citizen" or "activist," threatens to overwhelm the aims that drew us to protest in the first place. Sustaining the movement, just like battling in courtrooms for rights, may become the movement's purpose. It may substitute for, rather than contribute to, effecting social change. In other words, Gabel cannot support his claim that experience in social movements is "true," "authentic," and transformative other than by positing it as the opposite of a "false," "inauthentic," and demobilizing rights orientation.



AT CLS: INDETERMINACY GOOD

**Indeterminacy is inevitable but only in the sense that a good government needs some flexibility in the application of rules.**

**Altman, (Professor of Philosophy; Georgia State University) 90** (Andrew, *Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique*, page 8)

Many liberal thinkers, however, have taken a different approach in responding to the features of the twentieth-century legal landscape. They have been unwilling to join Hayek's condemnation of contemporary liberal democracies and have sought to show how such states can be said to conform to the principle of the rule of law. One line of thinking concedes the existence of significant (though not extensive) areas of public and private action that are not closely regulated by the rule of law. But this concession is tempered by three collateral points. First, in any system of rules there will necessarily be significant areas of indeterminacy because of the very nature of human language and social rules. Second, the area of legal indeterminacy in contemporary liberal states is significant but peripheral in the overall operation of the law. Third, some significant degree of legal indeterminacy and government discretion to promote the public good is desirable because it gives the organs of the political community a valuable flexibility in responding to the problems and needs of the community. In light of these points, this line of liberal thinking argues that a sound theoretical model of the rule of law must have more room for indeterminacy than the generic model would allow. It would be a mistake to demand, as the generic model does, that indeterminacy be reduced to the smallest degree humanly possible and an equally serious mistake to build one's theoretical model around such a demand so that any significant departure from it appears to do damage to the rule of law. This line of liberal thinking contends that a sound model would leave liberal states significant flexibility in responding to social problems, though not so much as to destroy vital liberal freedoms. Not every departure from legal determinacy damages the rule of law, and a theoretical model is needed which does not make demands for the reduction of indeterminacy and government discretion that are as stringent as the demands of the generic model.

AT CLS: INDETERMINACY OVERSTATED

**Contradictory justifications do not necessarily create indeterminate applications—they are overstating the indeterminacy argument.**

**Solum, (Law Professor at Loyola) 87** (Lawrence B., University of Chicago Law Review, “On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,” Spring, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462).

It is easy to agree that existing legal rules are not fully determined by any unified and consistent social theory. Even if we had a fully satisfactory theory justifying the broad outlines of the modern state, it would be hard to argue that any such theory required a particular set of legal rules, much less the precise set of rules we have now. However, it does not follow from this admission that critical scholars have made out a case for complete indeterminacy of justification. Some specific legal rules may necessarily follow from a broad social theory; many legal rules may be incompatible with a given theory. Moreover, indeterminacy of justification does not entail indeterminacy in a set of legal rules. A number of competing theories could be used to justify or critique a wide range of legal doctrines, while the legal doctrines themselves nonetheless would constrain the outcome of particular cases. For example, one could make consequentialist arguments for and against the doctrine of promissory estoppel, while the doctrine itself remained determinate in application.

**AT CLS: INDETERMINACY OVERSTATED**

**Even if the law is indeterminate, that conclusion has no particular existential force—cases are still decided based on practical applications that can be consistent even if they are not based on an unshakable foundation.**

**Solum, (Law Professor at Loyola) 87** (Lawrence B., University of Chicago Law Review, "On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma," Spring, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462).

My argument, therefore, relies on the distinction between logical and practical possibility. This distinction can be illuminated by a brief discussion of an analogous problem with epistemological skepticism. An epistemological skeptic might claim that we can never really know anything. An anti-skeptic might respond with an example of an "easy case" of knowledge: you know that you are currently sitting in a chair and reading this peculiar article. The skeptic might respond by raising a skeptical possibility: for all you know you are only a brain in a vat being manipulated by an evil scientist to think you are sitting and reading this essay, when in fact you are doing neither of these things. Very roughly, it is my view that rule-skepticism can be shown to be toothless for the same reason that this sort of epistemological skepticism is toothless: worrying about being a brain in a vat will not have any effect on what you do. Likewise, worrying about rule-skepticism will not have any effect on the way cases are decided. The skeptical possibilities invoked by both rule-skepticism and epistemological skepticism are not practical possibilities, and only practical possibilities affect the way one

acts. This is not to say that there is no point to rule-skepticism. Rule-skeptics are quite right to insist that nothing about verbal formulations of rules requires or guarantees that they be applied in a particular, determinate fashion. Tushnet appreciates this point when he notes that expectations about easy cases "are socially constructed rather than inherent, even to some small degree, in the verbal formulations" of the legal rules. n59 Legal rules in particular, like languages in general, develop meaning in a social context. Because of the truth of this observation, critical scholars are correct when they claim that there is a "possibility" that the legal rules will change meanings if the social context changes dramatically; nothing magical about the verbal formulation of legal rules excludes such a possibility.

However, the question we should ask is whether this possibility creates the sort of indeterminacy that has existential force.

Does the possibility of legal rules changing in response to changes in society "hold terrors in our daily lives"? As far as the sort of skeptical possibilities needed to make a case for the strong indeterminacy thesis, the answer to this question is clearly "No."

**The critique over-states indeterminacy: even if legal principles conflict, legal theory can still act as an effective guide.**

**Altman, (Professor of Philosophy; Georgia State University) 90** (Andrew, *Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique*, page 8)

If there were a single consistent set of principles in terms of which doctrine could be rationally reconstructed, then the judge could appeal to it in resolving some apparent conflict within the settled law. But because there is no such set of principles, judges can only choose one or another of the incompatible principles that underlie the settled doctrine. Different judges can and will choose different principles, but none can provide a convincing legal argument that her choice is the legality correct one. Each judge can. There are serious problems with this CL5 view of the implications of the patchwork thesis. Even if there are incompatible principles that underlie different segments of doctrine, it does not follow that the judge is free to choose which principle to rely on in deciding a case. Recall from the discussion in chapter 2 that our legal culture incorporates a convention that requires that cases be decided in a way that provides the greatest degree of logical coherence with the settled rules and decisions. Suppose that in most cases a decision relying on a particular principle fits better with the settled materials than one relying on a competing principle. The supposition is not inconsistent with the patchwork thesis, but if it is true, then it would be wrong to claim, as Dalton does, that equally forceful legal arguments could be given for both sides in almost any case. The better legal argument would be the one that displays the better fit with the settled decisions and norms, and the law itself would be highly determinate, even if the patchwork thesis were true.

**AT CLS: INDETERMINACY OVERSTATED**

**Even if deconstruction reveals tensions within liberal society, it does not follow that all applications of the law will be indeterminate—laws can be applied consistently even if they are based on societal tensions.**

**Solum, (Law Professor at Loyola) 87** (Lawrence B., University of Chicago Law Review, "On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma," Spring, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462).

Another external line of defense for the strong indeterminacy thesis invokes the deconstructionist techniques of the French post-structuralist Jacques Derrida. n62 As appropriated by literary critics, deconstruction is a technique that permits new readings of familiar texts. n63 As practiced by Derrida himself, deconstruction represents an assault on the whole western philosophical tradition. n64 Like the relationship of the rule-skeptic's defense to Wittgenstein's paradox, the "deconstruction" practiced by critical legal scholars may bear little more than a family resemblance to "deconstruction" as practiced by Derrida. The deconstructionist version of the indeterminacy thesis makes the ambitious claim that the indeterminacy of legal rules is a function of deep contradictions within liberal society, or of the failure of liberal society to reconcile or mediate a deep contradiction within the collective and individual human self. Continues... More fundamentally, the deconstructionist defense of strong indeterminacy falters because it does not provide any real answer to the argument from easy cases. Let us concede, for the moment, that some legal doctrines embody a tension between community and autonomy resulting in indeterminacy. No matter how many such examples can be proffered, they do not prove that all, or even most, of the law is indeterminate; they do not offer a rejoinder to the argument from easy cases. The legal deconstructionist would have to take all cases, including the easiest ones offered in this essay, and demonstrate both that they are indeterminate and that this indeterminacy is a function of some deep conflict between self and other. Neither demonstration has been made. Instead, the deconstructionist defense simply provides another coherent explanation of why some legal rules are underdetermined over the set of all cases.

**Even if the law is indeterminate, it is consistent enough to make legal reforms desirable—non-legal actors can still influence the law.**

**Kellogg, (George Washington University National Law Center) 90** (65 Tul. L. Rev. 15, Frederic, November).

The pragmatic position, on the other hand, does not require legal theory to provide a rationale for the choice of institutional structure. If the choice was a sound one, it most likely was not made by legal philosophers or even just lawyers. Instead, it was made in uncountable incremental steps by actors in every realm of social life. The choices made may have, to some degree, become embedded in the common law by a process of successive approximation, in which strictly "legal" institutions did not impose a "legal" rationale on the choices. The process must permit a controlling role for nonlegal choices, albeit one in which the choices become reflected in sufficiently determinate language to be applied consistently -- language that will unavoidably take on a life of its own, but not intolerably so, if kept faithful to the concrete circumstances it was designed to address. The primary obligation of legal institutions is one of facilitating, and not obstructing, nonlegal means of addressing the indeterminacies of social life -- including those involving the just and right. This is true also of the Constitution, which for Learned Hand was to be regarded as an historical compromise, not a set of durable principles or a resource from which to strengthen or modify the morals of society. n148 As Holmes said in his Lochner dissent, "a constitution . . . is made for people of fundamentally differing views." n149 Hence it is altogether natural that the Constitution should tolerate, reflect, or even incorporate, conflicting principles.

AT CLS: SOLVENCY STILL POSSIBLE

**The negative exaggerates their indeterminacy claims—CLS authors do not argue that there are no predictable outcomes from law, only that the law is arbitrary in the sense that different politics produce different outcomes. Gordon, (Law Professor, Stanford) 84** (36 Stan. L. Rev. 57, January, Robert, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES SYMPOSIUM: Critical Legal Histories).

The Critics who do intellectual-history-of-doctrinal-structures haven't got any theory of the causal relations between legal/doctrinal change and other social change, except their claim that the contradictions within legal structures make such relations completely indeterminate. But this claim of indeterminacy is surely exaggerated -- there are lots of regularities in legal/social relations. This argument has to be broken down a bit to be responded to. I think that, at this stage, the response can be very short because much of it has been answered already. It's true that, for example, the Critics have not produced an analysis along the lines of the traditionalist functionalist histories or of instrumental Marxism that relates changes in the legal system to changes in the economy. The whole point, recall, of the Critics' critique is that the "economy" isn't something separate from the "law," which reacts on law and is in turn reacted upon by it; the idea of their separation is a hallucinatory effect of the liberal reification of "state" and "market" (or "public" and "private") into separate entities. Because the economy is partially composed of legal relations, legal and economic histories are not histories of distinct and interacting entities but simply different cross-cutting slices out of the same organic tissue. Again, if the Critics [\*125] want to make this point convincingly, they will have to start slicing their narratives out of field-level uses of law. The other argument rests, I think, on a misunderstanding of what the Critics mean by indeterminacy. They don't mean -- although sometimes they sound as if they do -- that there are never any predictable causal relations between legal forms and anything else. As argued earlier in this essay, there are plenty of short- and medium-run stable regularities in social life, including regularities in the interpretation and application, in given contexts, of legal rules. Lawyers, in fact, are constantly making predictions for their clients on the basis of these regularities. The Critical claim of indeterminacy is simply that none of these regularities are necessary consequences of the adoption of a given regime of rules. The rule-system could also have generated a different set of stabilizing conventions leading to exactly the opposite results and may, upon a shift in the direction of political winds, switch to those opposing conventions at any time.

AT CLS: AT: LOGOCENTRISM BAD

**The charge that it is logocentric to predict legal outcomes is like saying that there can be no more arguments made in the debate—it is a tautology that would also destroy the arguments made by CLS critics.**

**Solum, (Law Professor at Loyola) 87** (Lawrence B., University of Chicago Law Review, “On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,” Spring, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462).

Dalton offers only poetry in a footnote as explanation. n69 The data -- that is, our ability to predict legal decisions -- contradict the hypothesis that fundamental dualities make all such predictions impossible. Nevertheless, it is possible to postulate that there is some hidden explanation that only awaits discovery to clear up the seeming inconsistency. But a belief that is made unshakeable in this way is dogma -- "irrefutable and beyond the reach of attack." The deconstructionist defender of strong indeterminacy has [\*484] yet another rejoinder: I am employing the very "logocentric" standards that are at issue -- that is, I am also resorting to dogma. In a sense, no reply can be given to the argument that there can be no arguments. I will, however, offer two observations. The first is that critical legal scholarship has not abandoned logocentric standards: the critical scholars do not make the punning, irrationalist arguments characteristic of Derrida. n71 My second observation is that the legal deconstructionist's attempt to argue against rationality is self-defeating. The act of arguing assumes the standards of rationality that the deconstructionist attempts to call into question. n72

AT CLS: AT REIFICATION LINKS

**Reification of the law is not bad if the principles involved contribute to human freedom and rights—the affirmative reification hedges against greater oppression.**

**Sparer, (Law Professor, University of Pennsylvania) 84** (Ed, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, January).

But is it bad to "reify"? In Marxist thinking, to reify a concept such as a right is to invest it with qualities over and above those of the particular human beings who created or use it. It is as if the right had a life of its own. It exists independently of the particular social setting from which it came and continues regardless of the conscious choices of the people in a later setting. Reification, as a general proposition, can have serious and negative consequences but not all "reifying" is necessarily bad. It is true that when we characterize a certain legal right as "universal" or "inalienable," we are reifying it. But this may have a legitimate purpose. For example, we may fear that some group may in the future dominate our society and attempt to stifle all dissent. We should protect as best we can against such an event by today acknowledging that dissent is a human value that needs protection. In so doing, we reify the legal right to dissent in order to protect the human right of self-expression and free conscience. We should do the same with certain rights of working people. In spite of the difficulties of drawing a "coherent" line as to what is "inalienable" and what is not, concern for the human values of free conscience and mutual association, coupled with a deduction from history about what happens in the absence of such legal rights, justifies such an effort. n42

AT CLS: STATE NOT ALL POWERFUL

**The critique over-states the role of the state: they are right that normative values come from individuals and a limited state is precisely what enables that expression.**

**Altman, (Professor of Philosophy; Georgia State University) 90** (Andrew, *Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique*, page 8)

The modern liberal defense of the rule of law severs the connection between law and personal virtue. The notion that the supreme aim of political society is to promote some restrictive conception of the best human life is rejected. A liberal political society is one in which there is a sharp distinction between the state and society. Society is the domain of interaction within and between groups, each organized around a distinctive set of interlocking beliefs, dispositions, and values. The interacting groups have competing conceptions of the good, the virtuous, the divine, the sacred, the right, the just, and the beautiful. The state is the institutional power that is to stand above these diverse groups and regulate their interaction. Citizens do not necessarily see the state as a wholly alien power, yet neither can they embrace it as the full embodiment of the normative vision of the world. It is in their particular social groups that citizens find an objective embodiment of the normative visions. The value of the state resides principally in protecting social groups from one another and preserving the freedom of the individual to mold a normative vision and to join others with a similar vision in pursuing it.



**AT CLS: SPECIFIC SOLVENCY OUTWEIGHS**

**The issue is not “law is good” vs “law is bad” but is whether or not specific applications of the law are desirable. Sparer, (Law Professor, University of Pennsylvania) 84 (Ed, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, January).**

Despite such a warning, the practical relationship of Critical legal theory to social movement and struggle in the United States today is, at best, very limited. Neither lawyers nor political activists receive much enlightenment from Critical legal theory with regard to their actual work. Nor is Critical legal theory itself much affected by the practical work of such people. While there are exceptions to these generalizations, n112 the absence of praxis in current Critical legal work seems to be one of its most marked features. Gordon, a Critical legal theorist, writes: At every meeting of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, one can sense these barriers of puzzlement or irritation being raised between political allies who see themselves for the occasion mainly as "theorists" or "practitioners." It is not -- not at all -- that the "practitioners" are against theory. They are hungry for theory that would help make sense of their practices; that would order them meaningfully into larger patterns of historical change or structures of social action; that would help resolve the perpetual dilemma of whether it is or is not a contradiction in terms to be a "radical lawyer," whether one is inevitably corrupted by the medium in which one works, whether one's victories are in the long run defeats, or one's defeats victories; or that would suggest what tactics, in the boundless ocean of meanness and constraint that surrounds, us, to try next. Gordon attempts to explain why the "practitioners" do not get what they are looking for and why what is produced by the "theorists" is appropriate. My contention, however, is that the "theorists" should be attempting to give the "practitioners" theory which is relevant to their concerns. Because they are not, the "theory" as well the "practice" suffers. Worse, if Critical legal theory's underlying social concerns about domination and exploitation are valid -- and I believe they are -- we all suffer from this failure in praxis. I do not approach the matter of why Critical legal theory is so divorced from social practice with a sense of impatience or easy condemnation. It is very difficult for any complex social theory to relate helpfully to practice and, in turn, by illumined by practice. Critical legal theory is concerned with radical social change at a time when even liberal social movements appear to be at a standstill. And, of course, it is particularly difficult for what is essentially a nascent legal theory to accomplish a praxis which has historically eluded most other radical theory in the United States. Nevertheless, my argument is that Critical legal theory is frequently divorced from and useless to social practice for reasons which are closely related to the attack on rights discussed in Part I. The first reason for Critical legal theory's separation from practice is the view of some leading Critical scholars that so sweeping is the hold of liberalism's belief systems and so instrumental are rights notions to the maintenance of dominance and oppression that only negative critique aimed at delegitimation constitutes a useful path for theory today. This focus on delegitimation, including the attack on rights, hinders Critical theorists from pursuing affirmative programs. [\*555] A second reason for the practice-theory separation is that, despite the emphasis on dualities and contradictions in Critical legal theory, Critical theorists have not grasped the dual nature and potential of legal rights and entitlement programs. As much as rights are instruments of legitimizing oppression, they are also affirmations of human values. As often as they are used to frustrate social movement, they are also among the basic tools of social movement.

AT CLS: LAW IS REAL

**We perceive law, which makes it real.**

**Carlson '99** (David Gray, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, "Review Essay: Duellism In Modern American Jurisprudence", Columbia Law Review, November 1999, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, LexisNexis)

Law resists manipulation by a single subject. It may not be perfectly determinate, but neither is the rock. As things, both law and rock are negative unities that cannot be known directly and can be known only indirectly through the perceptions of specific properties.<sup>n102</sup> Indeed, Schlag himself, at times, "perceives" law<sup>n103</sup> and hence concedes its existence, as when he writes: "Law is quite obviously a rich amalgamation of feudal social aesthetics, nineteenth-century juristic science, early twentieth century legal realist policy analysis, legal process proceduralisms, Warren Court normativity...."<sup>n104</sup> Here on display are law's various properties and the cosmological unity<sup>n105</sup> called "law" that organizes this set of particulars. In this formulation, Schlag confesses the existence of law. [\*1925] Because of the negativity of this unifying essence, law and rocks are metonymic entities,<sup>n106</sup> as even analytic philosophy has discovered.<sup>n107</sup> We can name only the context and properties of the thing. We cannot name the thing itself.<sup>n108</sup> This is true of rocks and of law. One exists just as surely as does the other. Diogenes liked to defeat Plato by kicking a rock and thereby proving it "existed." But all this showed was the utility of the rock - its status as an object for actual consciousness,<sup>n109</sup> or the "being-for-other" of the rock.<sup>n110</sup> Such a reality is one-sided, in that it emphasizes the negativity (being-for-other) of the thing and excludes the side of being-for-self.<sup>n111</sup> Such an insistence on the factum brutum - the "being-for-us" of the rock - paradoxically renders the rock entirely subjective and denies the rock the very integrity that the attribute of "reality" should have provided for it.<sup>n112</sup> Tangibility is not a property of law in the first place, and this makes law a different kind of thing than a rock or tree. Nevertheless, law has an objective - i.e., inter-subjective - existence.<sup>n113</sup> It exists in the minds of the multitude. It is "social substance."<sup>n114</sup>

**Law exists, the effects of it can be seen.**

**Carlson '99** (David Gray, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, "Review Essay: Duellism In Modern American Jurisprudence", Columbia Law Review, November 1999, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, LexisNexis)

In assessing whether law exists, two points have been made: (1) To identify law as a "thing" one must postulate what cannot be perceived directly - the negative unity of properties; (2) Free will, like negative unity, can only be postulated. In this section, by way of disagreeing with Schlag's accusation that law does not exist, I would like to show that, if law causes actions in the world, then law exists and therefore enjoys an objective status. Schlag does not often describe what he takes law to be.<sup>n146</sup> In his two new books, he generally relies on the reader's common sense to provide a definition; and then, whatever common sense produces, he asserts that law does not exist<sup>n147</sup> or that it is a fantasy. In "Law and Phrenology,"<sup>n148</sup> however, Schlag suggests that law refers to two distinct concepts, which he takes to be contradictory. (1) Law refers to what courts do. That is, it refers to action, observable in the world. (2) Law simultaneously refers to a cause of action.<sup>n149</sup> Causation is strictly a temporal relation. It is nothing more than the observation that State A necessarily precedes State B.<sup>n150</sup> And so, in its second dimension (law causes action), law is a pre-existing thing that causes judicial action - or takes itself to be such. A judge has conscious knowledge of what the law requires and acts accordingly.<sup>n151</sup> Action, in Schlag's philosophy, is a real thing. We can know law's passage a l'acte [\*1930] because we can feel law's potent consequences.<sup>n152</sup> It is violent.<sup>n153</sup> It imprisons, impoverishes and sentences to death.<sup>n154</sup> What caused the legal action, however, would appear to be supersensual - i.e., not verifiable. These points are probably best read as follows: Actions are real, but the causes of actions are fictions. Hence (Schlag makes clear) law-as-cause is overdetermined: "This ambiguity... enables legal thinkers to claim for themselves rather remarkable powers to say what the law is: given enough will, it always remains possible to affirm that intelligent knowledge governs authoritative action."<sup>n155</sup> Schlag refers to this dialectical structure of law as "circular ambiguity."<sup>n156</sup> In fact, if law causes action, the structure that Schlag locates is not circular but linear.<sup>n157</sup> Action, real and knowable, projects infinite causes - i.e., infinitely possible laws that caused the knowable action. It is at least possible, in Schlag's logic, that the true cause was that the judge read a specific pre-existing law, worked it in her mind into a coherent command, and then followed that command.

AT NORMATIVITY: NORMATIVE THOUGHT GOOD

**Normative legal thought is effective at creating order, salvation, and progress.**

**Carlson '99** (David Gray, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, "Review Essay: Duellism In Modern American Jurisprudence", Columbia Law Review, November 1999, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, LexisNexis)

Perhaps Pierre Schlag's most famous point is his imperative, "Don't be normative." The values of the legal academy are little better than advertising purveyors<sup>n192</sup> - hypocrites who try "to achieve strategic advantages largely (if not entirely) unrelated to the observance or realization of those professed values."<sup>n193</sup> Values are used as totems or tools to induce guilt or shame.<sup>n194</sup> Stifling and narrow,<sup>n195</sup> normativity is not even a thought - only an unthinking habit.<sup>n196</sup> Normativity argues that, if it does not hold sway, terrible social consequences would follow.<sup>n197</sup> Normative thought is designed to shut down critical inquiry into the nothingness of law.<sup>n198</sup> Not only are values deceitfully strategic, but they are ineffective.<sup>n199</sup> They are too vague to be self-determining.<sup>n200</sup> Normative legal thought's only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students - persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.<sup>n201</sup> Judges are not listening.<sup>n202</sup> Even if judges had the time to read and study all of academia's suggestions, they would be unlikely to implement any which would require radical changes in the status quo, since, Schlag notes, "only those kinds of norms that already conform to the audience's belief are likely to meet with any sort [\*1937] of wide-scale approval."<sup>n203</sup> Thus, Schlag concedes, sometimes normativity is empirically effective after all - but not because of intrinsic authenticity. Normativity is effective because it tracks and incorporates "folk-ontologies," such as order, salvation, or progress.<sup>n204</sup> Like Antony, norms tell the people only what they already know. Norms and values are lies, Schlag says, when proffered by legal academics, but it was otherwise with Sophocles<sup>n205</sup> or the Warren court,<sup>n206</sup> who were authentically in touch with real pain. By implication, values are authentic when immediately connected to feelings.<sup>n207</sup> Values, properly used, are worthy of commendation.<sup>n208</sup> But the mere invocation of values does not guarantee their authenticity. The proof of values is in context.<sup>n209</sup>

**AT NORMATIVITY: ALTERNATIVE FAILS**

**Alternative Fails- it is impossible to break down the maze of legal normativity.**

**Mootz '94** (Francis J., Associate Prof. of Law at Western New England College School of Law, "The Paranoid Style in Contemporary Legal Scholarship", *Houston Law Review*, 31 *Hous. L. Rev.* 873, 1994-1995, Hein Online)

The epistemological problems posed by modernist critical projects are only partially answered by adding a postmodern gloss. Schlag's effort to analyze legal scholarship from outside the maze is extremely problematic. Schlag believes that most scholars reside within a maze characterized by "dreariness," but that a select few have found a way out, gained perspective on the maze, and now engage in a fruitful questioning that reveals rather than obscures the law. 20 In sharp contrast, I reject the idea that such a dramatic escape can take place. Just when a scholar believes that she has scaled the last wall of the maze, she will be confronted by a boundless horizon of paths endlessly circling within the ambit of the same maze. Hope for escape must always be dashed in the end, but this does not mean that an individual's compartment within the maze is without ethical or political significance. The central problem for contemporary jurisprudence is not the maze of normative legal discourse, but the failure to recognize the maze as an avoidable condition that is productive of knowl-edge.

**Talking about normativity cannot convince anyone and will just be seen as contradictory.**

**Radin and Michelman '91** (Margaret and Frank, Professor of Law at Stanford University and Professor of Law at Harvard University, "Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice", *The University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, Vol. 139, No. 4 (Apr., 1991), pp. 1019-1058, JSTOR)

"We should talk more normatively" (WSTMN, for short) is the name of a certain sentence-the one that says we should talk more normatively. If uttering WSTMN is contemptible as just talk or as normative talk (and, to boot, as naively presupposing that how we talk, what we do, is within our power to decide<sup>15</sup>), then what is a reader supposed to make of the sentence that says that uttering WSTMN is contemptible on those grounds? It seems that saying that cannot (coherently) be an argument about whether or how we should (or should not) talk. How can one argue that what makes an utterance (or a genre) unworthy of attention or respect is that it is normative talk? To argue is to invoke the practice of argument, and that practice consists of normative talk. (Maybe you could try by some other means to remove that practice from society's repertoire, but you can't well do that by arguing about it.) But if this utterance of Schlag's is not argument, then what is it? We believe that too many in the community to whom these writings are addressed will see Schlag here doing the very thing his utterance says should not be done-arguing prescriptively-and so charge him with a lapse of logic or consistency. We think such a charge would be too hasty. Schlag has not only been the first in these pages to call attention to the issue, he has been explicitly (and helpfully) attentive to the delicacy of his position as an ardent assailant of normativity in scholarship.<sup>16</sup> He directs our attention to the ubiquity and pertinacity of the problem he perceives.<sup>17</sup>

AT NORMALITY: PARANOIA TURN

**Schlag's paranoia forces him to advocate a philosophy that is too radical – destroys solvency.**

**Mootz '94** (Francis J., Associate Prof. of Law at Western New England College School of Law, "The Paranoid Style in Contemporary Legal Scholarship", Houston Law Review, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 873, 1994-1995, Hein Online)

As described by Schlag, the postmodern legal critic bears an uncanny resemblance to a paranoid individual. I have no doubts that Schlag, as a person dealing with everyday life, is entirely free from paranoid tendencies. Why, then, does his asserted intellectual persona assume such a counterproductive posture? Quite simply, the imperative to radicalize the critique of foundationalism and formalism eventually carries theory, and the persona adopted by the theorist, beyond the realm of ordinary discourse. Schlag does not engage his readers in a shared quest for decency and happiness in an often brutal and traumatic world, but instead challenges such a normative quest as being symptomatic of deeper-seated problems. Schlag's radicalism is extended to the point of cannibalizing its own presuppositions. "A collection of discourses that in their strategic maneuvering have precluded the possibility of being discursive, have succeeded not just in being destructive, but in being self-destructive."<sup>35</sup> When the hermeneutics of suspicion is pushed to the point of paranoia, the critical effort dissolves into a self-described irrelevance.

**AT NORMALITY: SCHLAG WRONG**

**Schlag is wrong –seven reasons.**

**Carlson, 99** (Columbia Law Review, David Gray, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, (Professor, Cardozo School of Law)).

If this psychoanalytic suggestion explains the angry tone of Schlag's work, it also explains the basic errors into which he falls. When one considers this work as a whole, most of these errors are obvious and patent. Indeed, most of these errors have been laid by Schlag himself at the doorstep of others. But, in surrendering to feeling or, as perhaps Schlag would put it, to context (i.e., the pre-theoretical state), Schlag cannot help but make these very same errors. Some examples:

(1) Schlag's program, induced from his critiques, is that we should rely on feeling to tell us what to do. Yet Schlag denounces in others any reliance on a pre-theoretical self.

(2) Schlag warns that, by definition, theory abstracts from context. He warns that assuming the right answer will arise from context unmediated by theory is "feeble." Yet, he rigorously and repetitively denounces any departure from context, as if any such attempt is a castration - a wrenching of the subject from the natural realm. He usually implies that context alone can provide the right answer - that moral geniuses like Sophocles or Earl Warren can find the answer by consulting context.

(3) Schlag complains that common law judges are "vacuous fellows" when they erase themselves so that law can speak. Yet, Schlag, a natural lawyer, likewise erases himself so that context can speak without distortion.

(4) Schlag warns that merely reversing the valences of polarities only reinstates what was criticized. Yet he does the same in his own work. In attacking the sovereignty of the liberal self, he merely asserts the sovereignty of the romantic self. Neither, psychoanalytically, is a valid vision. One polarity is substituted for another.

(5) Schlag scorns the postulation of ontological entities such as free will, but makes moral arguments to his readers that depend entirely on such postulation.

(6) Schlag denounces normativity in others, but fails to see that he himself is normative when he advises his readers to stop being normative. The pretense is that Schlag is an invisible mediator between his reader and context. As such, Schlag, the anti-Kantian, is more Kantian than Kant himself. Thus, context supposedly announces, "Stop doing normative work." Yet context says nothing of the sort. It is Schlag's own normative theory that calls for the work slowdown.

(7) Schlag urges an end to legal scholarship when he himself continues to do legal scholarship. He may wish to deny that his work is scholarship, but his denial must be overruled. We have before us a legal scholar, like any other.

AT NORMALITY: ALT FAILS

**No alternative: Language itself is the real culprit of Schlag's frustration with the law. The idea that there is pure communication outside of the law, is to ignore how all language operates.**

**Carlson, 99** (Columbia Law Review, David Gray, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, (Professor, Cardozo School of Law)).

Schlag blames law, conceived here as a historically situated, vaguely defined American linguistic practice, for its want of a "robust referent." Instead of delivering any such referent, as it promises to do, law tenders an endless set of signifiers (which Schlag likes to call "ontological entities"), each of which disappointingly refers only to other signifiers. In the end, law signifies nothing. It literally does not exist. Law engages in the petty pace of an infinite regress - a bad infinity - without ever reaching the ultimate signified. Law, in Schlag's opinion, is pseudoscience; nonsense rendered plausible; madness; deficient in its authority and ontology;"faked, bluffed, or simulated;" mere belief and not knowledge of a Real Thing; a Mobius strip; a language game circling around nothing at all. In Austinian terms, it pretends to be constative (i.e., reporting a pre-existing reality), but is merely performative. It illegitimately reifies (i.e., "thingifies") imaginary concepts. Schlag excoriates legal practice for its want of a "robust referent," but never quite defines what he means by this. What would count as a "robust referent"? We can only infer his meaning by studying what he thinks law is not. Thus, we learn from Schlag that natural things have robust referents. n27 Hence, one may infer that the absent robust referent is some "natural" thing beyond language. Law cannot signify the thing-beyond-language. This is a good Lacanian insight. But does this fault differentiate law from any other linguistic practice that we might identify? Is law different from politics or mathematics or geology? No. These practices likewise do nothing but refer to other signifiers in the same infinite regress that law does. One must conclude that law is not and never was the culprit. Language is. If language always reduces to a chain of signifiers without end, why single law out for abuse?

## AT NORMALITY: ALT FAILS

**Schlag argues that the law is bad because it fails to deliver justice. Schlag may be right that perfect justice is not possible in the law but it is actually never possible because language is imperfect.**

**Carlson, 99** (Columbia Law Review, David Gray, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, (Professor, Cardozo School of Law)).

Justice is law's Master Signifier - its "exceptional element." n33 Yet just because justice is exceptional, law cannot deliver it. The inability of law to deliver what it promises can best be appreciated in the context of Lacanian theory. According to Lacan, the human subject is angry at language itself. This anger is inscribed in a false autobiography, n35 according to which there once was a time in which the human subject felt no pain or desire; but something bad intervened to harm, maim or reduce our integrity. This story has been told a thousand times in myth, in the doctrine of Original Sin, in romantic nostalgia, in conservative or radical politics, even in Hegelian philosophy, where the human subject is portrayed as the diremption of Spirit into the world. In Lacanian theory, a subject who enters the symbolic realm of language can speak words recognized by other subjects who can speak back. The very idea of speaking presupposes some other subject who can listen and understand. Hence, our ability to differentiate (and thus identify) ourselves in language can only be bestowed on us by other speaking subjects. On this dialectical view of human subjectivity, we are, by definition, not whole - not entirely present to ourselves. A basic part of ourselves is beyond us. We are alienated in language. n38 We suffer from "being-for-other." From this basic position of depending on linguistic material for self-identification, we are not, and cannot be, happy consciousnesses. By entering the symbolic realm, we feel "castrated." Castration, in Lacanian terms, is "the understanding that we only exist as subjects within law and language, yet law and language are external to, and imposed on, our subjectivity." n40 Castration refers to "the subject's alienation by and in the Other and separation from the Other." The castrated subject thus experiences a split between its symbolic existence (being-for-other) and that part of the self that language fails to express (being-for-self). Indeed, self-consciousness is nothing but the experience of a scissiparous intervention - a gap between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds. It is not merely that the Lacanian subject has a split as one of its characteristics. Rather, "the subject is nothing but this very split." n42 The subject is, if you will, the very absence of a robust referent that might underwrite linguistic practice. nAccording to Lacan, this submission to the realm of the symbolic is experienced as a kind of failed bargain. The subject supposes that he was forced to give up the primeval unity with otherness when he submitted to the symbolic realm. n44 The subject constantly wants to go back to a state of wholeness, n45 yet the symbolic realm seems to forbid this (impossible) retreat into "jouissance." n46 The subject has submitted to the painful discipline of the symbolic - the "universal initiation rite of subjectivity." n47 The pain experienced is precisely the sense that jouissance has been lost. Accordingly, the subject feels that the symbolic realm owes restitution. n48 This thing allegedly being wrongly withheld, this missing part, Lacan calls the phallus - that which would render whole the castrated subject. n49 This metaphor comes from the conceit that a man "has" the phallus. That is, a [\*1917] man is complete and whole, and his phallus is evidence of it. n50 But man of necessity does not have the phallus. The subject is by his very constitution castrated - an "emasculate conception." Returning to Schlag's brief against law, Schlag is angry at law (i.e., language). In particular, law does not deliver a robust referent - a signified. Justice is what law signifies. Justice is the robust referent - the phallus. If law committed a primordial crime on the subject by castrating him, the subject demands justice - the restitution of the missing parts. The phallus purports to be a "signified." But there is no signified as such; only the mere vacant place where the signified should be. When called upon to define the signified, we can only fill the air with additional signifiers about it. This, as Schlag correctly emphasizes, is all the practice of law reduces to. The phallus, however, is precisely what is beyond all these signifiers. It cannot be reduced to propositional form. For this very reason, justice is quite opaque to general definition. Being a phallic trope, justice never has been and never will be defined. Any definition of justice could only occur by use of signifiers, yet justice is precisely what is beyond signification. n51 So conceived, it is clear that justice must always fail. Doing justice is therefore always an act of "sublimation" - in sublimation, I "elevate an object to the dignity of the Thing." n53 Justice, as this void between legal concepts, participates in what Slavoj Zizek calls the "ethics of the Real," which is the moral Law in its impenetrable aspect, as an agency that arouses anxiety by addressing me with the empty, tautological and, for that very reason, enigmatic injunction 'Do your duty!', leaving it to me to translate this injunction into a determinate moral obligation - I, the moral subject, remain forever plagued by uncertainty, since the moral Law provides no guarantee that I "got it right"... Justice, I contend, is Professor Schlag's "robust referent." Yet what Schlag does not consider is that justice always necessarily fails. Justice is a negative located in the interstices of law. Any attempt to legislate justice is mere sublimation. To deliver on this promise of justice, law would have to fill the legal universe and crowd out the negative moment of justice. To the extent law fails to deliver on its promise - when it fails to fill the legal universe - it precisely leaves open the possibility of justice itself. Justice is designed to fail! According to the false Lacanian autobiography, law has promised justice, but it cannot deliver. Law has castrated the subject but has not lived up to its side of the bargain. It has defaulted on its promise of restitution. Law only fills the field of justice with more signifiers, on a logic by which law is remade with every instance of legal practice. Revealingly, Schlag writes: "To be really good at 'doing law,' one has to have serious blind spots and a stunningly selective sense of curiosity." Professor Schlag captures the practice of law acutely in this remark. "Doing law" is filling the gap with signifiers, a practice that does indeed require serious blind spots in the performance of it. To speak or to act is literally to forget - that the castrated subject is not whole. There is no sense, however, in being angry about judicial failure. Law cannot be blamed for what it cannot deliver.



AT NORMATIVITY: THEORY TOO TOTALIZING

**No alternative: If the law is a totalizing theory with no concrete existence, then so is the free will that he postulates as his alternative.**

**Carlson, 99** (Columbia Law Review, David Gray, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, (Professor, Cardozo School of Law)).

Cosmology is postulation writ large. It refers to the totality of all phenomena. A cosmological solution is a totalization of all of the conditions or properties given in an object. n126 For Schlag, cosmological solutions to infinite regresses are doubly unacceptable. Any attempt to end the infinite regress in a cosmological proposition creates new contradictions. n127 No such proposition is any better than any other. n128 Even Wittgenstein is chastised for merely producing another unacceptable postulative [\*1927] turtle. n129 A chapter in Laying Down the Law is spent on criticizing Stanley Fish for constantly imposing cosmological solutions to fix meaning. Thus, by asserting that any interpretive rule must itself be interpreted ad infinitum, Fish ultimately concedes that meaning exists. Such a solution is cosmological and hence unacceptable. Since he insists on tangibility, Schlag has no patience whatever for such ideas as God, conscience, or reason (even while he insists on the robust reality of justice). Reason, law and morality are, like God, quite dead. Being supersensible, they are beyond the domain of feeling, and so are disqualified from the field of romantic reality. In lieu of postulation, Schlag favors thought that is not totalizing, but rather is conflicted, and interstitial. n135 Coherence is but an aesthetic n136 [\*1928] criterion, and hence not authentic. n137 Because a given person modulates between different cognitive modes, coherence according to any one mode prevails only by ignoring and suppressing the other cognitive modes. This entire position, however, is a misinterpretation. First, we have already seen that Schlag himself refers to law as "a rich amalgamation of feudal social aesthetics, nineteenth-century juristic science, early twentieth-century legal realist policy analysis, legal process proceduralisms, Warren Court normativity." n139 This is precisely a cosmological conclusion about law as a totality. Indeed, Schlag could not speak of law without indulging in such totalizing behavior. Totalization is a necessary (but inadequate) moment in symbolic existence. More fundamentally, if I have correctly inferred that Schlag's program is a romantic "law of the heart," then this very program is a cosmological postulation. Such a program, as we have seen, is based on the hypothesis that the subject was once a whole, and might be a whole again. This postulation - to which feeling testifies - is just as much a "totalization" or "ontological entity" as law is. Indeed, postulation is necessary to the very program that Schlag implicitly promotes - liberation of the concrete self from legal scholarship, law, and language. For the concrete subject to be free, it must have a two-sided nature - one natural and one supersensible. The supersensible side - free will, or the moral capacity to choose - is presupposed by Schlag in his very appeal against legal scholarship. If his readers were incapable of heeding his appeal, there would be little point in making it. There would be nothing to liberate. Once free will is abolished, the self would be a mere automaton in the thrall of legal scholarship. The supersensible side of personality can only be postulated. n143 If, however, we postulate free will, as something separate and apart from inclination, then it is possible to presuppose a pre-existing law that a judge, in the exercise of her moral capacity, is free to follow (in lieu of her inclination).

AT NORMATIVITY: THEORY TOO TOTALIZING

**There is no impact to the legal contradictions argument. Schlag is right that there are contradictions in the law but is wrong about what that means. Contradictions allow for the positive evolution of the law.**

**Carlson, 99** (Columbia Law Review, David Gray, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, (Professor, Cardozo School of Law)).

Schlag offers this critique of the law's inability to withstand its internal contradiction:

This stratagem for the denial of contradiction seems to be a hybrid of Zeno's paradox and marginal analysis. The idea behind sectorization [i.e., synthesis] is that if one produces distinctions [i.e., reconciliations] at a rate marginally faster than the production of contradiction, then the sum of these curves will always yield coherence, not contradiction. This is a great denial strategy, and it would work just fine except for one thing: it is hardly self-evident that the production of distinction [i.e., synthesis] and the production of contradiction are independent functions. This criticism properly recognizes the internality of contradiction, but, in the end, it is not well taken. When a judge reconciles conflicting accounts of what the law is, law enjoys a moment of coherence - one that will not last but one that nevertheless validly claims its moment, thanks to the free will of the honest judge. It follows, then, that the judge-as-tortoise stays ever ahead of the deconstructive Achilles. n181 But the precise solution reached by the judge is only a moment. This moment will be subjected to future interpretation and hence further change. n182 And the reason why the law must change is that it contains contradiction. This is so in two senses. It both restrains and suffers from contradiction. In Hegel's system, a "thing" is precisely that which contains contradiction over time. Contradiction is the very essence of things that come to be and cease to be - the enduring aspect to which all "things" refer. n183 Yet, because things are finite (and hence contradictory), they must become something other than what they are. Finitude implies that what a thing ought to be is already implicit in the thing. Accordingly, if law is a thing, implicit in law is what it ought to become. Contradiction is by no means an evil in Hegel's system. Being the ground of things, there is no possibility of abolishing it. Contradiction is what makes law a dynamic "thing." Law is therefore always in a state of becoming - of growth. When a judge follows the law, law is presented in a necessary moment of stasis and synthesis. Law is transformed at the moment it is pronounced and performed. But law cannot remain in this static state. The next judge to confront the law must likewise transform it, producing a static moment that cannot entirely replicate the previous static moment. In this way law changes, but remains a "thing" nevertheless. This is law in its autopoietic mode. **In this account, and contrary to Schlag, synthesis and contradiction are dependent forms - logical correlatives. Synthetic activity is possible only because dialectical opposition precedes it. Contradiction causes synthesis, and so synthesis is ever marginally ahead of it - precisely the opposite of what Schlag contends.**

AT NORMATIVITY: LAW SUPPORTS FREEDOM

**No alternative and no impact: erasing normativity is impossible because it postulates the very type of Kantian subject that Schlag critiques.**

**Carlson, 99** (Columbia Law Review, David Gray, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, (Professor, Cardozo School of Law)).

Perhaps Pierre Schlag's most famous point is his imperative, "Don't be normative." The values of the legal academy are little better than advertising purveyors n192 - hypocrites who try "to achieve strategic advantages largely (if not entirely) unrelated to the observance or realization of those professed values." n193 Values are used as totems or tools to induce guilt or shame. Stifling and narrow, normativity is not even a thought - only an unthinking habit. n196 Normativity argues that, if it does not hold sway, terrible social consequences would follow. n197 Normative thought is designed to shut down critical inquiry into the nothingness of law. Not only are values deceitfully strategic, but they are ineffective. n199 They are too vague to be self-determining. n200 "Normative legal thought's only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students - persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect." n201 Judges are not listening. n202 Even if judges had the time to read and study all of academia's suggestions, they would be unlikely to implement any which would require radical changes in the status quo, since, Schlag notes, "only those kinds of norms that already conform to the audience's belief are likely to meet with any sort [\*1937] of wide-scale approval." n203 Thus, Schlag concedes, sometimes normativity is empirically effective after all - but not because of intrinsic authenticity. Normativity is effective because it tracks and incorporates "folk-ontologies," such as order, salvation, or progress. n204 Like Antony, norms tell the people only what they already know. Norms and values are lies, Schlag says, when proffered by legal academics, but it was otherwise with Sophocles n205 or the Warren court, n206 who were authentically in touch with real pain. By implication, values are authentic when immediately connected to feelings. n207 Values, properly used, are worthy of commendation. n208 But the mere invocation of values does not guarantee their authenticity. The proof of values is in context. At first impression, Schlag's imperative against normativity seems startlingly contradictory. Is it not a norm that one should not be normative? If so, how is it that the norms of the legal academy are lies, while Schlag's very meta-norm is legitimate? Schlag's view is not at all contradictory within the context of romantic psychology. Norms and values are defined by Schlag as concepts which are severed from what Schlag likes to call "context" - understood as nature, or the state that precedes the introduction of legal distortion. n210 In fact, norms and values are the same non-thing or non-sense as law. They are the corruptions and mutilations that destroy context. They are castration itself. If, however, context could speak directly, what it would say would not be a norm. When context says, "Don't be normative," then context is not itself normative. Rather, context would be speaking a natural, well-grounded, immediate truth - not a mere norm. This is, I think, what organizes Schlag's critique of norms. The norms offered by legal academics are inauthentic because they are universals, standing apart from context. Schlag, Sophocles, and Chief Justice Earl Warren, however, are in touch with context (through sense-certainty or immediate feeling), and what they speak is the concrete truth, not a norm. In short, Schlag appeals to a natural law which is, while other legal academics appeal to mere "ontological identities," which merely ought to be. This is precisely the claim of the romantic, who, "exempt from public haunt, Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, Sermons in stones, and good in every thing." In the world of the romantic, things speak directly. Thus, when Schlag reports what natural context says, no thought or "norm" enters to distort the message sent by nature itself. Schlag thus puts himself forth as what has been called a "rational observer" of natural law - a vanishing mediator, in Zizekian terms. Schlag complains that positive lawyers are empty vessels. Thus, Dworkin's Hercules is said to be a "vacuous fellow." Ironically, it turns out that Schlag himself is just as vacuous. In order for context to speak, Schlag must erase himself and be the vanishing mediator between nature (i.e., context) and legal audience. In short, Schlag, who vociferously opposes the Kantian subject, puts himself forth as the perfect Kantian.

AT NORMATIVITY: LAW IS AN EXERCISE IN MORAL JUDGMENT

**No impact: Schlag is wrong about the relationship between the law and morality. We are able to choose among moral arguments, such as those posited by the law. The law is an exercise in human freedom.**

**Carlson, 99** (Columbia Law Review, David Gray, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, (Professor, Cardozo School of Law)).

Philosophies thrive and ripen for a reason, and one of the reasons liberal philosophy thrives is that it enjoys some degree of descriptive accuracy, albeit one-sided. The very idea of self-consciousness suggests a negativity toward the natural self. The positive aspects of this natural self are placed on one side and treated as alien, external objects. Self-consciousness stands in utter negativity to contemplate that natural material. The moral position in liberal philosophy emphasizes the disentanglement of the universal part of personality at the expense of the particular. When free of inclination (natural passion), the self is able to follow the moral law. Only then can the subject enunciate fully who he is - when all content has been abolished. On this view, inclination is morally arbitrary and imposed by nature. Hence, to listen to inclination is to renounce our freedom. Taken to its extreme, our natural side would submerge self-consciousness and make it disappear back into nature. The self becomes indistinguishable from the object world. But taken to its own extreme, the moral or universal position likewise deprives the subject of any distinction from the object world. From the position of pure reason, the person is without visible properties. Indeed, in the extreme of abstraction, there is only one person. There are not the materials to distinguish between persons at all. If self-consciousness is to perpetuate itself, it must exist between these extremes of pure being and pure nothing. It must act and thereby prove it exists, but, on the other hand, it must act from the position of "relative" autonomy. Self-consciousness is therefore always in a dialectic relation between the pure negativity of morality and the pure being of inclination - with the proviso that, in Hegelian thought, pure being and pure nothing are the same thing. **Contrary to Schlag's account, abstraction from heteronomy must be seen as a legitimate and necessary side to the human story. It is from this side that the human being listens to reason.** The empirical self as such is not licensed to legislate universally. As Kant put it:

Our pathologically affected self, although it is in its maxims quite unfit for universal legislation; yet, just as if it constituted our entire self, strives to put its pretensions forward first, and to have them acknowledged as the first and original. This propensity to make ourselves... serve as the objective determining principles of the will generally may be called self-love, and, if this pretends to be legislative as an unconditional practical principle, it may be called self-conceit.

The concrete self, therefore, lacks the perspective of the universal. What it produces is mere self-conceit. Schlag has stated that reason is a trick upon the prerogative of the concrete self. But this is so only if the natural self views itself as completely divorced from its moral side. It is not so divorced. Its moral side is an essential part of the concrete self. The moral side speaks to its own concrete self when it regulates inclination according to moral law. The natural side drives the self to makes its existence known in the world. Reason is not a trick, but a program by which the self might posit itself in the world in a way that is true to the universal side of personality. Indeed, if reason were abolished, the mind would lapse back into "the Real," and personality would submit to the night of psychosis. This is the true result of abolishing legal scholarship and of permitting the romantic self to call the shots. The abolition of legal scholarship (i.e., language) is very much a death wish.

AT NORMATIVITY: LAW IS AN EXERCISE IN MORAL JUDGMENT

**No impact: Law appeals to the moral dimension of human freedom—one can be both law abiding and free because the law still allows for personal choice.**

**Carlson, 99** (Columbia Law Review, David Gray, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, (Professor, Cardozo School of Law)).

In fact, tied into the very idea of following the law is the idea of a free will that might choose not to follow the law. The free will that aspires to follow the law never truly binds itself. A subject that puts itself forward as lawful could give into impulse tomorrow and is therefore "free" (in the negative sense) to violate the law. Lawfulness is therefore a constant struggle - the ongoing achievement of the concrete self. Furthermore, it is a struggle in which the subject must fail: Freedom realizes itself through a series of failures: every particular attempt to realize freedom may fail; from its point of view, freedom remains an empty possibility; but the very continuous striving of freedom to realize itself bears witness to its "actuality." Freedom is thus "powerful." It exhibits the "primacy of possibility over actuality." n253 Forever potential, it is nevertheless a possibility that transforms the world. In contrast to this view, Professor Schlag wants to say that freedom means the concrete self can do what it feels like. But he should know better than to exalt the authenticity of the pre-legal natural self, and he has on occasion chastised others for doing just that. nTo exalt the sovereignty of such a self (that may be in the thrall of criminal passion) instead of the liberal self is to permit the contingent side of the self to govern in its moral arbitrariness. In other words, the essence of personality is the rationality of the liberal self. **Negative freedom denies the essence of personality and therefore ends up destroying its own self.** To summarize, Schlag's work is based on a romantic psychology. If only the concrete self were freed from law, Schlag implies, it would know what to do. Law offers mere "norms" and presents the subject with empty choices. Such a theory of the self ignores the fact that human nature has two sides - the natural and the moral. One side cannot be privileged at the expense of the other. To be sure, many of Schlag's criticisms of liberal psychology are well taken. Liberal psychology absolutely denies a place for the unconscious and irrational. His accusation that liberal philosophy does not consider the challenge of deconstruction to liberal psychology is an excellent contribution. Liberal philosophy in recent times deserves criticism for not peering very deeply into the soul of the legal subject. But liberal philosophy is also on to something: **The moral dimension of personality is constitutive and cannot be abolished without destroying personality entirely.**

AT SCHLAG: PROTEST FUELS THE LAW

**Turn: Schalg's protest ultimately fuels the law. The ballot is an empty gesture of theoretical resistance that has no effect on the actual operation of the system. It simply makes you feel better about your place in it as a critical objector.**

**Carlson, 99** (Columbia Law Review, David Gray, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, (Professor, Cardozo School of Law)).

Schlag presents a dark vision of what he calls "the bureaucracy," which crushes us and controls us. It operates on "a field of pain and death." n259 It deprives us of choice, speech, n260 and custom. As bureaucracy cannot abide great minds, legal education must suppress greatness through mind numbing repetition. n262 In fact, legal thought is the bureaucracy and cannot be distinguished from it. n263 If legal thought tried to buck the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy would instantly crush it. Schlag observes that judges have taken "oaths that require subordination of truth, understanding, and insight, to the preservation of certain bureaucratic governmental institutions and certain sacred texts." n265 Legal scholarship and lawyers generally n266 are the craven tools of bureaucracy, and those who practice law or scholarship simply serve to justify and strengthen the bureaucracy. "If there were no discipline of American law, the liberal state would have to invent it." n267 "Legal thinkers in effect serve as a kind of P.R. firm for the bureaucratic state." n268 Legal scholarship has **sold out to the bureaucracy**: Insofar as the expressions of the state in the form of [statutes, etc.] can be expected to endure, so can the discipline that so helpfully organizes, rationalizes, and represents these expressions as intelligent knowledge. As long as the discipline shows obeisance to the authoritative legal forms, it enjoys the backing of the state... Disciplinary knowledge of law can be true not because it is true, but because the state makes it true. Scholarship produces a false "conflation between what [academics] celebrate as 'law' and the ugly bureaucratic noise that grinds daily in the [\*1946] [ ] courts..." n270 Scholarship "becomes the mode of discourse by which bureaucratic institutions and practices re-present themselves as subject to the rational ethical-moral control of autonomous individuals." n271 "The United States Supreme Court and its academic groupies in the law schools have succeeded in doing what many, only a few decades ago, would have thought impossible. They have succeeded in making Kafka look naive." Lacanian theory allows us to interpret the meaning of this anti-Masonic vision precisely. Schlag's bureaucracy must be seen as a "paranoid construction according to which our universe is the work of art of unknown creators." In Schlag's view, the bureaucracy is in control of law and language and uses it exclusively for its own purposes. The bureaucracy is therefore the Other of the Other, "a hidden subject who pulls the strings of the great Other (the symbolic order)." The bureaucracy, in short, is the superego (i.e., absolute knowledge of the ego), but rendered visible and projected outward. The superego, the ego's stern master, condemns the ego and condemns what it does. Schlag has transferred this function to the bureaucracy. As is customary, by describing Schlag's vision as a paranoid construction, I do not mean to suggest that Professor Schlag is mentally ill or unable to function. Paranoid construction is not in fact the illness. It is an attempt at healing what the illness is - the conflation of the domains of the symbolic, imaginary, and real. This conflation is what Lacan calls "psychosis." Whereas the "normal" subject is split between the three domains, the psychotic is not. He is unable to keep the domains separate. The symbolic domain of language begins to lose place to the real domain. The psychotic raves incoherently, and things begin to talk to him directly. The psychotic, "immersed in jouissance," n280 loses desire itself. Paranoia is a strategy the subject adopts to ward off breakdown. The paranoid vision holds together the symbolic order itself and thereby prevents the subject from slipping into the psychotic state in which "the concrete 'I' loses its absolute power over the entire system of its determinations." This of course means - and here is the deep irony of paranoia - that bureaucracy is the very savior of romantic metaphysics. If the romantic program were ever fulfilled - if the bureaucracy were to fold up shop and let the natural side of the subject have its way - subjectivity would soon be enveloped, smothered, and killed in the night of psychosis. Paranoid ambivalence toward bureaucracy (or whatever other fantasy may be substituted for it) is very commonly observed. Most recently, conservatives "organized their enjoyment" by opposing communism. By confronting and resisting an all-encompassing, sinister power, the subject confirms his existence as that which sees and resists the power. As long as communism existed, conservatism could be perceived. When communism disappeared, conservatives felt "anxiety" - a lack of purpose. Although they publicly opposed communism, they secretly regretted its disappearance. Within a short time, a new enemy was found to organize conservative jouissance - the cultural left. (On the left, a similar story could be told about the organizing function of racism and sexism, which, of course, have not yet disappeared.) These humble examples show that the romantic yearning for wholeness is always the opposite of what it appears to be. We paranoids need our enemies to organize our enjoyment. Paranoid construction is, in the end, a philosophical interpretation, even in the clinical cases. n287 As Schlag has perceived, the symbolic order of law is artificial. It only exists because we insist it does. We all fear that the house of cards may come crashing down. Paradoxically, it is this very "anxiety" that shores up the symbolic. The normal person knows he must keep insisting that the symbolic order exists precisely because the person knows it is a fiction. The paranoid, however, assigns this role to the bureaucracy (and thereby absolves himself from the responsibility). Thus, paranoid delusion allows for the maintenance of a "cynical" distance between the paranoid subject and the realm of mad psychosis. In truth, cynicism toward bureaucracy shows nothing but the unfronted depth to which the cynic is actually committed to what ought to be abolished.

**\*\*POVERTY K\*\***

**AT POVERTY: PERMUTATION**

**Only through redistributions of power like the aff can we change the politics of poverty.**

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Hence, despite the new technologies being instituted under capital's auspices, it should not be surprising to find the economic situation of Americans, both in and out of the academy, worsening as a neomalthusian pessimism and resurgent individualism, as well as a fiscal tight-fistedness in matters of public policy, takes hold in almost every sector of American life. And as postmodern sociology has increasingly neglected class and class conflict in favor of interpretative studies of culture and subjectivity, its perception of the poor and its assessment of the possibilities of eliminating material poverty, have changed accordingly. In an age of diminished expectations, the poor remind us of the possible fate awaiting us in this brave new world of flexible accumulation and just-in-time production. In contrast to the euphoria of the 1960s, when poverty was something to be eliminated through collective effort, poverty is regarded today as something that threatens even those who are presently well-off. It is no longer a problem from which we can safely distance ourselves, for now poverty has assumed a discomfiting immediacy. The superfluity and impoverishment we once identified as the exclusive property of the urban slum dweller or rural proletarian is now a pending problem for those of us working in the academy as well. Hence, something which may well be our future fate can no longer be studied with the social distance and clinical calm it once was. As society has changed in the last three decades, so has the politics of science that undergird poverty research. Instead of being a problem to be eliminated by the mobilization of national resources, poverty has become a powerful specter to be feared by all but the very rich. Instead of being victims of a flawed system of production, the poor today are criminalized, much as they were in the 1950s. Having been reschooled in the old fears of the Depression Era, two new generations of rich and poor alike have been indoctrinated in the ideology of diminished expectations, while simultaneously being handed new justifications for individual greed and anti-social aspirations. Not immune to this shift in world view, nor the accompanying reallocation in the relative wealth and power among the classes, a new ideological landscape has taken shape in the academy as public policy questions have been reformulated and debated on new grounds. The general parameters of that debate have been hegemonically truncated so that the traditional left and its proactive conception of government planning and programs have been all but eliminated from "serious discourse." Such a truncation has given neoconservatives and baby boomer liberals alike a virtual monopoly in staking out the "realistic parameters" and limits of "reasoned" policy discussions. And given the vested interests of these groups, neither can countenance a theory of poverty grounded in an analysis of capital's class-based contradictions. Neither baby-boomers nor neoconservatives, given their present political agendas, have an interest in exploring the possibilities made manifest by a class-based analysis of poverty. Needless to say, both parties, for widely differing reasons, would find equally objectionable that part of Lewis's work claiming that the culture of poverty contains a positive, redemptive kernel. The possibility that the poor could possess either alternative wisdoms or cultural virtues cannot be countenanced. If the poor were to appear as relatively competent partners in solving their predicament, they would once again, as they were in the 1960s, have to be given a significant voice-some degree of "maximum feasible participation"-in charting their path out of poverty. This contingency was unsettling enough 30 years ago when America was economically and morally solvent. To suggest the poor are something more than a pathological residue would require a redistribution of power and social resources that neither faction to the current poverty debate is willing to countenance seriously, much less implement.



**AT POVERTY: NO LINK- STATIC MEANING**

**You can't stick us with one meaning of poverty- Poverty means many different things, but all definitions surround the normative concept that it's an unacceptable hardship**

**Spicker, 07** Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University, 2007 (Paul, few more qualifications The Idea of Poverty, University of Britain: The Poverty Press., Edited the book pg. 5). IA

These are clusters of meaning, rather than definitions in themselves. Each of them refers to several different ways of looking at the issues of poverty, and there are competing definitions in each of them. Some well-known definitions like Townsend's idea of 'relative deprivation', or Paugam's 'social disqualification', cut across many of the categories at the same time. The clusters are not very sharply defined; each of them overlaps with some of the others. Figure 1.1 shows this material in the form of a diagram. Each definition is similar to the meanings next to it, and there are some links across the circle—for example, lack of resources is closely linked to the lack of entitlement. However, as we move around the circles, the definitions grow further apart. Lack of entitlement is very different from economic distance; dependency is not the same as a low standard of living; patterns of deprivation cannot simply be identified with economic class. The normative concept—the view of poverty as unacceptable hardship—lies at the centre, because all the other concepts are linked directly to that kind of normative evaluation.

**No Link – the term “poverty” has evolved beyond the rhetoric they criticize, solves the K**

**Bhalla & Lapeyre, 04** Chief of the Technology and Employment Division of the International Labor Office & Professor at the Institute of Development Studies of the Catholic University of Louvain, 2004 (A.S. & Frederic (member of the United Nations Intellectual History Project), Poverty and Exclusion in a Global World, Second Edition. “Defining Exclusion” pg. 12-13, Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan; Editor: Ajit Bhalla). IA

Non-economists generally believe that the economists' concept of poverty is narrowly focused on material aspects such as the level, size or distribution of incomes. While this may have been true in the 1970s, it is no longer the case. Lipton and Maxwell (1992) show how the new conceptualization of poverty embraces such elements as the importance of civil society (besides just NGOs) and security of livelihood. Sen has also developed a comprehensive approach to poverty which goes beyond economics. At the heart of Sen's theory is the notion of individuals' 'capabilities' which are opportunities to achieve valuable 'functionings' or 'states of being'. Thus 'living may be seen as consisting of a set of interrelated "functionings", consisting of beings and doings' (Sen, 1992a, p. 38). In addressing poverty issues, Sen focuses on valuable functionings which represent different factors of well-being. Functionings may include both physical elements such as being adequately fed and sheltered and 'more complex social achievements such as taking part in the life of the community, being able to appear in public without shame, and so on' (Sen, 1992a, p. 110). As the capabilities set reflects the various combinations of functionings individuals can achieve -and so their positive freedom to choose between different ways of living -it embraces the political and social dimensions of poverty.

**AT POVERTY: PERMUTATION**

**Perm – combining discursive change with action is key to accurately represent those in poverty and successfully address material inequalities.**

**Swartz, 06** Ph.D. in Communication from Purdue University in 1995, 2006, (Omar, “Social justice and communication scholarship,” pg. 43-44)

The reason such rhetorical criticism does not necessarily produce social change is because of the great divide between the symbolic and material worlds. As Cloud (1994) persuasively argued, although the study of rhetoric is “vital to the projects of critique and social change ... discourse is not the only thing that ‘matters’ in these projects” (p. 141). She cautioned against falling victim to the “materiality of discourse hypothesis”: the belief that “discourse itself is influential or even constitutive of social and material reality” (p. 141). The materiality of discourse hypothesis draws no distinction between symbolic and material acts, because reality is viewed as being a discursive formation. However, as McGee (1986) pointed out: Action is doing to the world, the chopping of trees. ... There is a tremendous gulf between action and discourse, the distance between murder, for example, and the “symbolic killing” of name-calling. In truth, the only actions that consist in discourse are performed on discourse itself. Speech will not fell a tree, and one cannot write a house to dwell in. One can act through discourse on discourse to guide or control the meaning people see in selected representations of the world. Discursive action, however, always stands in anticipation of its consequences, an act that requires additional acts before one is clear that it was ever more than “mere talk.” (p. 122) Hence, as Cloud (1994) maintained, When discourse counts as material, emancipation is seemingly possible in “mere talk” (p. 154), but it is not only discourses and codes from which many people need liberation. A politics of discourse ... assumes that those who are oppressed or exploited need discursive redefinition of their identities, rather than transformation of their material conditions as a primary task (p. 157). Cloud pointed out that “to say that hunger and war are rhetorical is to state the obvious; to suggest that rhetoric is all they are is to leave critique behind” (p. 159). Thus, criticism alone, the textualizing of politics, as Farrell (1993) called it, does not produce social change unless it leads “to some kind of concrete oppositional action – a successful strike, a demonstration that builds a mass movement, or other collective and effective refusal of the prevailing social order” (Cloud, 1994, p. 151); that is, action that results in changes in the material world. As Wander (1984) exclaimed, “Cries of help call for much more than appreciation” (p. 199)

**Permutation- Rhetoric alone is irrelevant – We all have a shared responsibility to act and if we don’t there are consequences for those who suffer from poverty.**

**Poole 95** – Dennis L., “Beyond the rhetoric: shared responsibility versus the Contract with America”, Health and Social Work, Vol. 20, 1995 K. Ward (Qualifications)

The Republican National Committee's (1994) Contract with America reminds us that social work is a normative discipline. The things we do and the programs we support have consequences for people. What we regard as good and obligatory, others view as bad and irresponsible. This is a time for action. But it is also a time for reflection - about our first principles. We need to cut through all rhetoric - right and left - that might blind us in our discussion of the Contract. We need to understand why the American public is disillusioned with many social programs. And we need to be accountable for our share of the problem. One first principle that I believe helps us sort out the current situation is shared responsibility. WHAT IS SHARED RESPONSIBILITY? Shared responsibility refers to common duties and obligations of caring to which all members and institutions of society are morally bound and answerable. In his thoughtful book on the subject, Moroney (1986) pointed out that sharing responsibility has always been part of community life, in all cultures and throughout all history. Families, neighbors, and other extrafamilial institutions have always helped care for people in need, and governments have always assisted with these efforts. History also shows that when either party fails to meet its share of the responsibility, the consequences for society are grim.

AT POVERTY: AT SOCIAL EXCLUSION ALT

**Social exclusion and inclusion are intermingled – this obscures gender biases, preventing alt solvency**  
**Lister, 04** Professor of Social Policy at Loughborough University, 2004, (Ruth, “Poverty”, Ch: Poverty and Social Exclusion, p. 91-92, Pub: Polity Press, TH)

However, this recognition stands in tension with the centrality commonly ascribed to labour market participation in social inclusion policies: the possibility that 'social inclusion can take place in conditions of exclusion' is rarely recognized (2002: 98). Thus, a lone mother's care responsibilities, for example, could simultaneously be a source of exclusion from the labour market and of integration into local social networks.<sup>6</sup> Conversely, social exclusion can take place in conditions of inclusion when long or unsocial working hours impede social and political participation outside the workplace (Gordon et al., 2004). A gendered analysis of social exclusion illuminates how such tensions affect women and men differently, reflecting their respective positions in relation to family and labour market (Daly and Saraceno, 2002; Bradshaw et al., 2003). It also reinforces and genders the conclusion that social exclusion is better understood as a differentiated rather than monolithic process, as 'gendered subjects experience simultaneous exclusion and inclusion' (Jackson, 1999: 132). In terms of women's position more generally, though, Daly and Saraceno conclude that 'while a critical gender perspective enriches the social exclusion discourse in referring to specific gender-based risks and vulnerabilities' and while 'social exclusion is certainly gendered', it does not follow that women as a category are socially excluded (2002: 101). Overall, this discussion suggests that, while social exclusion provides a helpful conceptual link to the social divisions that interact in different ways with material poverty, it does not provide a broad 'synthesizing umbrella' under which these divisions can best be understood (Gore and Figueiredo, 1997: 45; Anthias, 2001). Analysis needs to examine the specificities of different forms of exclusion as well as any commonalities.

**AT POVERTY: AT SOCIAL EXCLUSION ALT**

**Social exclusion is a way of looking at poverty, not an alternative to the word “poverty”**

**Lister, 04** Professor of Social Policy at Loughborough University, 2004, (Ruth, “Poverty”, Ch: Poverty and Social Exclusion, p. 74, Pub: Polity Press, TH)

The concept of social exclusion has partially eclipsed that of poverty in European political and academic debate. Despite its popularity, there is only limited consensus as to either its meaning or its relationship to poverty. While some write of it as a novel empirical phenomenon describing a particular group of people, a state or a process, others argue that it is better understood purely at the level of concept or political discourse. The flexibility and ambiguity of the concept have tended to favour political expediency over analytical clarity. Nevertheless, in this chapter I will pull out some common threads running through much of the burgeoning literature on the topic. The chapter first traces its emergence before reviewing the range of discourses and paradigms (shared frameworks of understanding) in which the concept is embedded. It then focuses on the relationship - empirical and conceptual - between poverty and social exclusion. I will argue that, provided it is not used politically to camouflage poverty and inequality, social exclusion can usefully be understood and used as a lens that illuminates aspects of poverty discussed in subsequent chapters (see also de Haan, 1999). In other words, it is a way of looking at the concept of poverty rather than an alternative to it. It is moreover a multi-focal lens that can encompass the social divisions that were the subject of the previous chapter, thereby encouraging the analytic and policy integration argued for there.

**The politics of inclusion leave inequalities intact—they just invite certain people to cross the line to “us.”**

**Lister, 04** Professor of Social Policy at Loughborough University, 2004, (Ruth, “Poverty”, Ch: Poverty and Social Exclusion, p. 80-81, Pub: Polity Press, TH)

From an empirical perspective, it is argued that the model represents an oversimplification of more complex social structures and dynamics (Rosanvallon, 2000; Born and Jensen, 2002). Empirical analysis in the UK by the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE), for instance, indicates 'a more fluid picture of people along a continuum of exclusion, rather than a clear division between those who are "in" and "out"' (Richardson and Le Grand, 2002: 499; Burchardt et al., 2002a). It is, though, the political implications of the in/out model that have been the subject of particular criticism, for the model aggravates an all-too-common 'us' and 'them' relationship between 'non-poor' and 'poor'. In this way, groups defined as 'excluded' are constructed as problems outside mainstream society. It obscures the dynamics of inequality and polarization at the heart of society, affecting the 'included' majority also (Levitas, 1998, 2000). A preoccupation with the boundary between 'included' and 'excluded' encourages a minimalist policy response of 'treating marginal people marginally', in which the goal is merely to move them across the boundary, leaving underlying structural divisions largely undisturbed (Goodin, 1996: 357).

AT POVERTY: AT SOCIAL EXCLUSION ALT

**There is no empirical link between social exclusion and poverty – the alternative is useless.**

**Lister, 04** Professor of Social Policy at Loughborough University, 2004, (Ruth, "Poverty", Ch: Poverty and Social Exclusion, p. 86-87, Pub: Polity Press, TH)

The discussion so far has cast doubt on the strength of the empirical link between material poverty and the pivotal social isolation dimension of social exclusion. Another key question raised by the existing empirical evidence in the UK is whether it is even possible to identify a significant group of people who can be categorized as socially excluded. Burchardt et al.'s study found that under half a per cent of the population were excluded on all the dimensions measured and none were so over the full five years of the panel. The conclusion reached, and endorsed by John Hills (2002) in a major book on social exclusion, was that: given the complexity of the associations between the different dimensions of exclusion, and the relatively high proportions of those excluded on one dimension who are not excluded on others, no clear-cut multidimensional category of socially excluded people can be identified using these indicators. The results suggest that the dimensions of exclusion are best treated separately rather than amalgamated into a single category of the 'socially excluded'. (Burchardt et al., 1999: 241) A study of London comes to a similar conclusion and warns against over-dramatizing social exclusion at the expense of overlooking 'a very great deal of old-fashioned poverty' (Buck et al., 2002: 371). The evidence is not yet conclusive - for instance, a different set of indicators might produce variant results and it is possible that the 'truly excluded' are under-represented in the kind of surveys undertaken. The authors of a more in-depth study of young people in a 'severely excluded' locale in north-east England, for example, suggest that, insofar as the phenomenon of social exclusion exists, it can be found in its 'most entrenched forms' among the small number whose lives revolve around the 'poverty drug' of heroin (MacDonald and Marsh, 2002: 27,38).

**"Social exclusion" is a false conceptualization of poverty which lets inequality continue and prevents political action**

**Lister, 04** Professor of Social Policy at Loughborough University, 2004, (Ruth, "Poverty", Ch: Poverty and Social Exclusion, p. 87-88, Pub: Polity Press, TH)

Having explored the empirical relationship between poverty and social exclusion, we turn now to the conceptual level. Here, the debate largely centres on the issue of the 'value added' that social exclusion brings to the analysis of poverty (Micklewright, 2002: 28). Very broadly, three main positions can be identified. The first is represented by a relatively small number who are, at best, unconvinced of the value of the concept of social exclusion and, at worst, dismiss it as unhelpful or even dangerous. Oyen is particularly critical of what she considers to be a political rather than analytical concept, with 'limited theoretical underpinning'. Its usage, she contends, means that 'poverty, the real and nasty poverty, becomes invisible because it is being hidden under the umbrella of social exclusion which embraces several other phenomena' (1997: 63, 64). Although less hostile, Nolan and Whelan are similarly sceptical of this 'amorphous' concept. While they concede that social exclusion may sensitize researchers and policy-makers to important aspects of poverty, they fear that this is 'at a cost': loss of 'the spark that "poverty" ignites because of its everyday usage and evaluative content' (1996: 190, 195). They also argue that those who favour social exclusion over poverty tend to base their comparisons on a caricature that confuses the conceptualization of poverty with its narrower, often uni-dimensional, measurement. Perceptions of social exclusion's 'value-added' are, in part, a function of how poverty itself is conceptualized (Sen, 2000).

AT POVERTY: ALT BAD (YAPA)

**Yapa is wrong – his solutions to poverty obscure discursive relations and historical reality, alt can't solve**  
**Shrestha, 97** professor of resource and cultural management in the School of Business & Industry at Florida A&M University, 97 (Nanda, "On "What Causes Poverty? A Postmodern View" A Postmodern View or Denial of Historical Integrity? The Poverty of Yapa's View of", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 87 No. 4, December 1997, pg. 710)

I raise these questions, not because I intend to explore the depth of PoMo in these pages of the *Annals*, nor does the scope of this commentary permit me to take on such a task. I raise them because Yapa's revisionist PoMo view of poverty is a view that is analytically unsettling and historically misleading. Camouflaged in the dense language of complex vocabulary and syntax that PoMos have invented for themselves as a medium of their "tribal" communication, there is poverty in Yapa's postmodern view of poverty. It is not so much the language, however, that concerns me most, although I do find it amusing, especially when juxtaposed against the backdrop of poverty that is the focus of his article. How can such a dense, muddled language empower the poor and those who are fighting against poverty day and night in urban trenches as well as rural fringes? How are they going to grasp its message (if there is one)? Language, after all, is not simply a set of words and sentences with particular meanings. It also communicates, as Yapa himself notes, distinct messages. It is the prevailing social science discourse, Yapa emphasizes, that lies at the core of poverty and its perpetuation. Part of his argument, therefore, calls for the deconstruction of this discourse so that poverty can be addressed through "substantive action, ... [i.e.] the postmodernizing of social science" (p. 721). But, the more PoMos rely on such dense language to break the heavy hands of social science, the more impenetrable and inaccessible their "discourses" become. Postmodernism as an intellectual current has gotten as thick and academic as it can get (Wood and Foster 1996:44). Admittedly, Yapa states that " 'My solution' is aimed at fellow academics who, like myself, are deeply implicated in the problem and whose power lies primarily in our capacity to engage the discourse critically" (p. 723j my emphasis). This position is saddled with two problems, however. First, this is no justification for complicating the language of discourse. Second, his aim is tantamount not only to aimless intellectual pontification of the poverty problem with little ability to capture its ground-level truth, but also to intellectual defeatism and hence political resignation. If the primary power of academics is to engage the discourse, then we have truly reached the pinnacle of academic priesthood where poverty becomes a fascinating intellectual toy. Any wonder why academicians are, to use Marsha Hewitt's (1993) phrase, often labeled the "verbal radicals" (or should I say, "verbose rascals")? To repeat, my concern is mainly with Yapa's flirtation with the postmodernization of poverty, a conceptual position that represents a notable digression from his previous critical and illuminating research on development and diffusionism. At any rate, lacking any historical integrity, Yapa's postmodern view is suspect. It is like the naked emperor who was profusely praised for his nonexistent magnificent clothes until a little boy broke the code of silence that everybody shared, but nobody dared to utter about the emperor's nakedness. I now focus on Yapa's postmodern view of poverty and its fundamental discord with, and distance from, the historical reality of poverty. My discussion is divided into two parts: Yapa's postmodern perspective and his view of poverty.

**AT POVERTY: ALT BAD (YAPA)**

**Postmodernism's failure to view class relations as a contributor to poverty embraces greed and self-centeredness, intensifying poverty throughout the world**

**Shrestha, 97** professor of resource and cultural management in the School of Business & Industry at Florida A&M University, 97 (Nanda, "On "What Causes Poverty? A Postmodern View" A Postmodern View or Denial of Historical Integrity? The Poverty of Yapa's View of", Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 87 No. 4, December 1997, pgs. 712-713) MGM

One of Yapa's postmodern arguments, to repeat, relates to the social construction of scarcity and poverty, a process which he ties to "the nexus of production relations" (Le., multiple roots of scarcity and poverty). Also included in this nexus is the academic discourse. He writes about the fundamental inability of contemporary development to alleviate poverty. There is no substantial dispute here, for I, too, have made these arguments, documenting how scarcity and poverty are socially produced, how they are class specific, how their social manifestations have changed over time, and how the growing pressure of official development and intrusive global capitalism has exacerbated both (Shrestha 1997). The main problem is Yapa's failure to reveal poverty's direct connection to class relations. One may, of course, argue that, since Yapa rejects a political economy or Marxist perspective on poverty and instead pursues a postmodern line, the question of class relations is moot in his discourse. But such an argument is flawed. How can one talk about the social construction of scarcity and hence poverty without discussing class relations? The social construction of scarcity itself is rooted in the class process, both historically and currently. While the absolute scarcity of resources may exist in certain geographical areas due to physiographic limitations, social (relative) scarcity rarely occurs in the absence of class relations whether defined in terms of production or power. So, to talk about the social construction of scarcity divorced from its class roots is theoretically marred and historically myopic. Yapa does, to be sure, suggest that capitalist production is responsible for creating wants, but he fails to expose its various sinister nodes at which capitalist relations generate undue wants and thus social scarcity ad nauseam. Nor does he show how the social relations of capitalist production are linked to the various points in his nexus of production relations, including academic. To deal with poverty so superficially from a consumerist angle (p. 715) is, therefore, fundamentally problematic. His quick insertion of the "semiotic theory of signs" and the "concept of polysemy" adds little to his explanation of poverty. No matter how one cuts it, his analysis is largely a sort of intellectual massage with little social conviction to the cause of struggles against poverty. Such a postmodern discursive approach sheds little light on the historical role of capitalist production in generating and regenerating poverty. Also conspicuously absent from his article is any careful discussion of how capitalist globalization has fractured local production relations (e.g., patron-client relations that traditionally provided some cushion against poverty), as well as heightened already existing social scarcity and class divides. Surprisingly, Yapa does not even pay attention to how the postmodern tendencies of excessive greed and self-centeredness (self-absorption with the materiality of life) brought on by rabid capitalist globalization have intensified both social scarcity and poverty across the world (Broad 1995; Cox 1997; Henwood 1996; Polyani 1957; Robinson 1996; Shrestha 1997). Nor does he furnish any insight into the feudal/agrarian relations of production that construct scarcity and therefore poverty, ever deepening in many agriculturally dependent countries. Nor is there anything on the colonial relations of power and production that reinforced indigenous class relations and ravaged colonized countries, leaving them in a sinkhole of underdevelopment, out of which many have yet to crawl. He ignores all these stories of the social construction of scarcity and poverty, relegating their whole history and profound social reality to conveniently omitted memories. To express it simply, class is a concrete social structure, and class relations form the meta roots of poverty no matter where it occurs in space and time. Yet, amazingly, class is entirely missing from Yapa's fuzzy view of poverty. Is Yapa ready to believe, let alone prove, that class relations are no longer relevant to the social origin and perpetuation of poverty, and to pronounce the death of class as a central social construct? Or does he believe that PoMo has totally erased "class" from the vast plain of poverty? To the dismay of his torical reality and commonsense, Yapa's treatment of poverty personifies a discursive spaghetti of his "ideas, matter, discourse, and power." So it is not the political or Marxist economy (or this genre of social science discourse) that "conceals the social origin of scarcity," as he contends. Rather it is his much-touted "postmodern discursive approach" that fails to reveal the social origin of scarcity in its totality and subsequently to outline a concrete plan of determined action against the class roots of poverty (p. 707). That is the poverty of Yapa's view of poverty. To be blunt, it is simply a misguided postmodern fiasco, a historical folly, a pure diversion from his previous line of original and substantive scholarship.

**AT POVERTY: POVERTY LINE/DEFINITION GOOD**

**Needs are relative and obscure any possible conceptualization of poverty –a poverty line, even if flawed, is necessary to policy making.**

**Karelis, 07** research professor of philosophy at George Washington University, 2007 (Charles H. (Formerly professor of philosophy at Williams College, director of the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education, and president of Colgate University) *The Persistence of Poverty: Why the Economics of the Well-Off Can't Help the Poor*, "What Poverty Is" pg. 7-8, Publisher: Yale University Press; Editor: Charles H. Karelis).

Within a Given Society Varying Conceptions of Basic Need Have Little Impact on What Counts as Poverty The case of varying views of need in the same society is the simplest. There does seem to be a bit of variation within a given society in what counts as being poor, depending on variations in the level of consumption where people begin to feel the pinch. It makes some sense to say that Smith is poor at a certain level of resources, though his neighbor Jones would not be poor at that same level of resources, if Smith and Jones have different needs. But the concept of poverty is such that any variation in the poverty thresholds between individuals in the same society is bound to be small, even if the variation in their pain thresholds is great. That is because, as others have noted, judgments of poverty put a lot of weight on what are typically seen as basic needs within the society. For instance, a spoiled millionaire in modern America who has developed extraordinary needs for material goods, and who is miserable for lack of billions, does not count as poor. And a monk who happens to be contented with his standard of living is poor nonetheless. Since the millionaire has more than enough to meet what would typically be seen as basic needs in modern America, he is not poor, regardless of the fact that his own needs are unmet, and he is miserable. (Behind this semantic fact there may lie the moral judgment that such a person does not deserve the sympathy implied by the label "poor." For could he not have made himself less vulnerable to frustration by staying in the cultural mainstream and not letting himself develop these needs in the first place?) And conversely for the monk: he counts as poor because a typical person in his position would consider his needs unmet, whether the monk does or not. In theory, then, it should be possible to draw a line below which people count as poor in a given society, even granting that the point at which individuals feel the pinch of material shortages will vary. The poverty line for a particular society will be that level of consumption below which needs that are typically considered basic in that society are unmet.

**Using the word "poverty" is key to pragmatic solutions and doesn't preclude recognizing ambiguities or problems with the term**

**Karelis, 07** research professor of philosophy at George Washington University, 2007 (Charles H. (Formerly professor of philosophy at Williams College, director of the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education, and president of Colgate University) *The Persistence of Poverty: Why the Economics of the Well-Off Can't Help the Poor*, "What Poverty Is" pg. 8-9, Publisher: Yale University Press; Editor: Charles H. Karelis).

In the end, there seems to be no way to get around saying that "poverty" is always short for "poverty in place x and time y)" and what it means is "having insufficient resources to meet what are typically seen as basic needs in that place and time:' This is the best we can do in defining poverty, even if it leaves us in the uncomfortable position of having to say that we do not care much about some of the poverty that exists in richer times and places than our own. Note that to accept this definition is not to grant that "poverty" is ambiguous. Compare the word "edible:' "Edible" is not ambiguous just because what horses can digest is different from what humans can digest. What "edible" is is elliptical: the claim that something is edible is always short for "edible by such-and-such a species;' but it means the same thing in each context. Likewise, poverty judgments are not ambiguous but elliptical, and once they are fleshed out the meaning is perfectly singular.



## AT POVERTY: THESIS WRONG

**They are just wrong—governments have started using multidimensional poverty analysis that has been crucial in crafting effective policy.**

**Robb, 2000** works at the International Monetary Fund, 2k (Caroline, “How the Poor can have a voice in government policy”, Finance and Development, December 2000, Accessed via General OneFile) MGM

Development thinking has changed significantly in recent years. Policymakers have recognized the ability of the poor to make a valuable contribution to the analysis of poverty and are consulting them directly. This new participatory approach has resulted in a broader definition of poverty and better-informed public policies that are more responsive to the needs of the poor. BY THE END of the 1990s, there was growing recognition by governments and civil society of the need to change the way national strategies to reduce poverty were developed and implemented. Previous strategies had met with little success in Latin America and Africa, and poverty was on the rebound in East Asia after the financial crisis of 1997-98. It had become clear that, to succeed, poverty reduction programs needed to be developed by the countries themselves--rather than imposed from the outside--and that the input of the poor was critical to the development of effective poverty reduction strategies. In September 1999, the World Bank and the IMF agreed to major changes in their operations to help low-income countries achieve sustainable poverty reduction. Henceforth, programs supported by the two institutions will be based on government-driven poverty reduction strategies (PRSS) developed in consultation with civil society and summarized in poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). In addition, the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, launched in 1999 by the World Bank and the IMF, links debt relief with poverty reduction. The PRSPs provide the basis for debt relief under HIPC as well as for all World Bank and IMF concessional lending. In formulating poverty reduction strategies, policymakers have begun consulting the poor directly through participatory poverty assessments (PPAs), a methodology developed during the 1990s by governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), academic institutions, and donors. Although many methods have long existed for consulting the poor on the development of projects, PPAs are different in that their findings are intended to be used in national policymaking. To date, more than 50 countries have undertaken PPAs with assistance from the World Bank; an equal number of PPAs have been conducted by other agencies, including the United Nations Development Program, bilaterals, and NGOs. What is a PPA? A PPA is a tool that allows us to consult the poor directly; findings are transmitted to policymakers, thereby enabling the poor to influence policy. Unlike a household survey, which consists of a predetermined set of questions, a PPA uses a variety of flexible methods that combine visual techniques (mapping, matrices, diagrams) and verbal techniques (openended interviews, discussion groups) and emphasizes exercises that facilitate information sharing, analysis, and action. The goal is to give the intended beneficiaries more control over the research process. PPAs are usually carried out by intermediaries such as NGOs, academic institutions, government extension workers, and local consulting firms. The approach "stresses changes in the behavior and attitudes of outsiders to become not teachers but facilitators, not lecturers but listeners and learners" (Chambers, 1997). To ensure follow-up at the community level (a principle of participatory research), many PPAs (for example, those in The Gambia, Tanzania, and Uganda) have involved the development of community action plans subsequently supported by local governments or NGOs. Using PPAs to extract information just for research purposes, with limited participation and no link to policymaking, is considered bad practice. Policy analysis in the past was focused on a classic statistical approach to poverty based on indicators of income, health, and education; poverty itself was measured by a moneymetric poverty line derived from traditional household surveys. It has been recognized that an approach dominated by economic analysis fails to capture the many dimensions of poverty, while a multidisciplinary approach can deepen our understanding of the lives of the poor. PPAs, with their focus on well-being and quality of life, have consistently shown that such problems as vulnerability, physical and social isolation, insecurity, lack of self-respect, lack of access to information, distrust of state institutions, and powerlessness can be as important to the poor as low income (Box 1). Moreover, because PPAs go beyond the household unit of traditional surveys to focus on individuals, intrahousehold dynamics, social groups (based on variables such as gender, ethnicity, class, caste, age), and community relationships, they capture the diversity of poverty. They have shown that people's priorities and experiences are affected by such variables as gender, social exclusion, intrahousehold allocation of resources, the incidence of crime and violence, geographical location, access to networks of support, and relations with those in power. PPAs have three key elements. First, they increase our understanding of the multidimensional nature of poverty and enable us to include the perspective and priorities of poor people in our analysis of poverty and formulation of policies. Second, they promote wider ownership of researchers' findings and increase the influence of these findings on policymaking by including a cross section of other groups (for example, NGOs, policymakers, administrators, civic groups) in the process. Third, they can help countries increase their capacity to analyze and monitor poverty, as has happened, for example, in Mongolia, Vietnam, and Zambia. PPAs often take less time and cost less than household surveys because they use a selected sample of communities (Box 2). As a result, they are not as extensive, representative, or standardized. They nonetheless provide more in-depth analysis of the views of the poor and the political, social, and institutional context, as well as insights into the reasons people become--or cease being--poor and their survival strategies.

AT POVERTY: ALT BAD

**The alt fails—rhetorical space is not the same as real political influence.**

**Lister, 04** Professor of Social Policy at Loughborough University, 2004, (Ruth, "Poverty", Ch: Poverty, Human Rights and Citizenship, p. 170-1, Pub: Polity Press, TH)

The growing acceptance of the principle of participation does not, however, necessarily translate into 'voice with influence' (Gaventa, 2002: 2). There is often a reluctance to accept that 'a human rights perspective on participation means moving beyond and above local-level processes of consultation through to ensuring poor people's participation in broader formal and informal systems of decision-making' (DfID, 2000b: 19). More generally, the literature identifies two main forms of participation. The first creates genuinely democratic and participatory 'spaces for citizen action', in which the role of citizens is transformed from 'users and choosers to makers and shapers' (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000: 59, 50; Cornwall, 2002). More common, though, are 'instrumental' or 'consumerist/managerialist' approaches, in which agendas are still set from above (Cornwall, 2000; Beresford, 2002). These can too easily become 'devices for managing rather than "hearing" the voices of the poor' (Rademacher and Patel, 2002: 180). One of the clear messages received by the Commission on Poverty, Participation and Power was that 'people experiencing poverty see consultation without commitment, and phoney participation without the power to bring about change, as the ultimate disrespect' (CoPPP, 2000: 18). Lack of feedback on consultation invalidates the process and can leave participants feeling as if they do not matter (Cook, 2002). Such phoney participation serves to reinforce the distrust that many people in poverty have of the formal political system (Bennett, 1999; ATD Fourth World, 2000a). Not surprisingly, it can mean that people are reluctant to participate when offered the opportunity. It thus represents one of a number of institutional barriers to participation identified by the Commission and others (see also DWP 2003c: annexe F). Professional cultures and practices can mean that participation exercises are experienced as exclusionary (Scottish Executive, 1999). Jargonistic and complex language 'that doesn't connect can simply create another barrier' (CoPPP, 2000: 29). Professional norms of communication and 'articulateness' can intimidate and silence people who feel that they lack the necessary communication skills to participate (Young, 2000: 56; Charlesworth, 2000; Richardson and Le Grand, 2002

**\*\*RIGHTS GOOD\*\***

**RIGHTS GOOD**

**Rights are not perfect but can be effectively used to leverage the state.**

**Daly, Research Fellow in Philosophy, 04** (Frances, Australian National University, "The Non-citizen and the Concept of Human Rights", *borderlands*, [http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1\\_2004/daly\\_noncitizen.htm](http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm))

At its most fundamental, right is the right to something, and within the realm of natural rights or rights of the human being, it has been principally concerned with rights against oppression and inequality in order to realize a potential for freedom. Citizen rights have at their basis quite different values, namely, a range of political and property rights to be realized within and not against the State. This is not to say that law associated with human rights is not, at times, itself an external form of oppression - but natural or human right is also able to offer something quite different. The term needs to be used advisedly because of the problematic connotations it has - but there is a tradition of natural right containing anticipatory elements of human dignity in which forms of justice as ethically-based community survive, and it is this tradition, I would argue, which needs to be renewed. We can see this in all struggles for human dignity in which unsatisfied demands exist for overcoming the lack of freedom of exploitation and constraint; the inequality of degradation and humiliation; the absence of community in egoism and disunity. And so too can we view this via the necessary reference point that a critique of right provides: by acknowledging the hypocrisy of law or the distance between intention and realization we have an important basis for distinguishing between the problem of right and its complete negation, such as we would see under despotic, fascistic rule. The use and abuse of right is not the same thing as a complete absence of right, and understanding this is vital to being able to comprehend where and in what ways democratic, constitutional States become, or are, fascistic. Natural right, or the right of the human being, occupies a space of interruption in the divide between law and ethicality that can, on occasion, act as to reintroduce a radical pathos within right.

**Rights do not create a fixed identity. When we appeal to rights in terms of universal justice they are deeply radical and able to create open communities.**

**Daly, 04** ([http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1\\_2004/daly\\_noncitizen.htm](http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm),

The non-citizen and the concept of 'human rights', Frances Daly, Australian National University 2004).

Legal positivism assumes or sets out the basis for rights within a normative framework of the State that merely takes for granted judicial postulates of the inalienability of rights, the basis of rights in property and assumptions that people are in fundamental accord on matters of right. It is unable to imagine a realm of freedom against the State. But within rights, I would argue, we can detect unsatisfied demands that have nothing to do with essentialist assumptions about 'man' or 'citizen'. These demands are concerned with an understanding of human freedom in relation to values of solidarity, justice and the overcoming of alienation; they are historical and contingent, shifting and alive, and are not about a fixed, static, generic essence of the person, or some ahistorical or superhistorical immutable totality. What it is to be human is open and changeable, although not without determinations, commonalities and shared properties that can emerge at various times. With the rise of individualism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the idea of natural rights of the individual, of liberty, fraternity, and equality of the individual - of 'inalienable' rights and normative ideals - was quite clearly conceived in terms of the citizen. What persisted of a sense of natural justice for all, whose standard had been derived from various sources - in nature, God, a view of reason or human nature - was undoubtedly distorted by a sense of individualism defined in terms of possession and property rights. But this sense was not completely extinguished. It is certainly on the basis of a realm of legal positivism and its doctrines of positive law, a realm which assumes that no element of law or right pre-exists an act of the State, that some of the basic contradictions that Agamben highlights are likely to emerge. For it is the State that institutes types of validity for its laws on the basis of procedure rather than any sense of morality or principles of justice. But there are other pathways to rights, other forms in which principles of justice have been derived and enacted. And if this is the case, why must we then necessarily conclude from a critique of legal positivism that there can be no ethical basis to rights?

RIGHTS GOOD

**Rights must be judged by their specific deployment, not abstract theory. Even if there are flaws between norms and application, rights contain a radical element of universal dignity that can be used to leverage real change.**

**Daly, 04** ([http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1\\_2004/daly\\_noncitizen.htm](http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm),

The non-citizen and the concept of 'human rights', Frances Daly, Australian National University 2004).

An ahistorical disdain for legal action is merely the obverse of the process of fetishizing legality. Much theory that merely substitutes the idea of the static essence of the person to explain the consequence of good and evil in the world with an equally static, invariant view of authority and the State is, I would argue, ultimately eternalizing such concepts. Undoubtedly, some sort of move beyond categories underscoring divisions within the ways people are entitled to live their lives is necessary. But much of the power of any such critique must depend upon the manner in which the context of this life – the possible experience of acting in the world, or 'form-of-life' - is itself understood. In the absence of any such context, what tends to emerge is a return to the problem of rights reduced to a division of form and content, rather than the overturning of this very problematic. Only in this case, because the content is seen to fall short of the abstraction of, for example, a "whatever singularity", the form is wholly discarded. More importantly, by revisiting this problem via a dismissal of the context of rights, and more specifically of the possibility of traces of the intention towards human dignity, a rich heritage of critique is sidelined. Continues... The use and abuse of right is not the same thing as a complete absence of right, and understanding this is vital to being able to comprehend where and in what ways democratic, constitutional States become, or are, fascistic. Natural right, or the right of the human being, occupies a space of interruption in the divide between law and ethicality that can, on occasion, act as to reintroduce a radical pathos within right.

**Rights for refugees tap into the radical core of rights—the idea that there is a universal human dignity. Past failures of rights are not reasons to abandon the concept, they are reasons why rights must be more aggressively extended.**

**Daly, 04** ([http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1\\_2004/daly\\_noncitizen.htm](http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/daly_noncitizen.htm),

The non-citizen and the concept of 'human rights', Frances Daly, Australian National University 2004).

Let us look then at the more specific example of the right of the refugee or right of asylum. In the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen there is a perceived need to set out what are described as "the natural, sacred, and inalienable rights of man". These rights, as is well known, concern freedom, equality, the right to liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression, the presumption of innocence, the right to opinion and religious expression and free communication. Likewise, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights restates these rights and extends an understanding of right to economic, social and cultural rights and, perhaps most importantly from the perspective of this paper, the right to a freedom of movement and residence and the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. We have already mentioned the institutionalization of these rights in citizen rights, and that this sense of right was a creation of the nation-State. And along with this is the problematic nature of the inclusion of the right of property as an inalienable right, which first arose as the consequence of the division of labour and has little to do with anything inherently human, and the basic difficulty that arises with a sense of innate rights, as all rights have been acquired. We detect as well the formalism of general juridical equality with the much more normative content of the constitutional state of fundamental social division – those whose access to education, security, work and freedom from detention can be assumed, and those whose lack of this assumption is outlined in their right to seek its guarantee. However, it would be a clear distortion of the struggles involved in the emergence of codified natural rights to not also mention that an essential part of a sense of the absolute inalienability of the person was a view of individual freedom within community (the sort of idea we find Rousseau, for instance) and the attempt to exercise limits upon the power of tyrants to curtail that freedom. That there has been a highly variable degree of protection of these rights, or in certain cases no protection of them at all, is naturally problematic but cannot of itself be attributed to the fact of rights themselves. The context of rights is one that is frequently unstable, and, as such, it is important to clearly assess the place of rights within our present conditions of unfreedom. Often as a result of their denial, human rights currently act so as to allow a questioning of the assumed authority of the State. Indeed, without a sense of rights it would be difficult for us to understand the current absence of real freedom. If we consider the contemporary struggles of the 'Sans Papiers' in France, the several hundred thousand people whose refusal of the label 'illegal' and fight for documentation is premised on the basis that the undermining of rights is merely a way of attacking the value of dignity for all, we can see a clear example of the possibility that can be realized through right. The Sans Papiers are well-known for their questioning of the assumptions of immigration policies, such as the existence of quotas, detention camps and deportations, and they argue cogently for an end to frontiers themselves. Madjiguène Cissé argues that the initiatives of those claiming their rights are basic to the survival of communities (Cissé, 1997: 3). This is done on the basis of an appeal to rights of justice and egalitarianism. Indeed, it is not possible to understand this emancipatory struggle outside a conception of rights.

25. Agamben views all such setting out of rights as essentially reintegrating those marginalized from citizenship into the fiction of a guaranteed community. Law only "wants to prevent and regulate" (Agamben, 2001: 1) – and it is certainly the case that much law does – but within rights, I argue, we can also detect a potential for justice. In contrast, Agamben contends that legal right and the law always operate in a double apparatus of pure violence and forms of life guaranteed by a Schmittian 'state of emergency' (Agamben, 2000: 43). And although he recognizes the dire consequences of a state of emergency with the eradication of the legal status of individuals, he views this as the force of law without law, as a mystical or fictional element, a space devoid of law, an 'empty legal space', or 'state of exception' as Carl Schmitt refers to it, that is essential to the legal order (Carl Schmitt, 1985: 6). What is then eliminated here is any sense of how the appeal to rights brings into question institutionalized unfreedom and why this underlying insufficiency between the idea of right and real need is opposed by those attempting to expand the realm of human rights. The problem with this strategy for doing away with any distinction and placing the refugee in a position of pure potentiality is that, instead of liberating or revolutionizing the place of the refugee, it creates an eternal present that is unable to connect the very real reality of difference with a critique of the society that victimizes the refugee in the manner with which we are currently so familiar.



**RIGHTS GOOD**

**Even if the law is not perfect and culture values matter, rights still protect us from oppression.**

**Altman, 90** (Andrew, (Professor of Philosophy; Georgia State University) *Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique*, page 8)

There are undoubtedly elements of the liberal tradition which exaggerate the extent to which the law alone gives contemporary liberal societies the degree of humanity and decency they have. There are undoubtedly elements of the liberal tradition which exaggerate the power of law to work its will against the entrenched customs and traditions of a culture. We would be wise to keep in mind Tocqueville's lesson about the failures of law in cultural settings where it has tried to operate in opposition to pervasive and deep-seated social norms. But it would be equally wrong to dismiss the protections offered by the law as superfluous or useless. Between the area in which law is useless because it receives insufficient support from the rest of the culture and the area in which law is superfluous because the rest of the culture provides all of the protections we can reasonably ask for, there is a wide expanse of territory. It is within the borders of that territory that law can and does make a difference. It is within the borders of that territory that legal rights can and do work to protect people from the evils of intolerance, prejudice, and oppression. This is the heart of the liberal tradition in legal philosophy. It is a tradition worthy of allegiance.

**Rights are the best path to liberation—if you take their alternative seriously, it would require massive coercion to create a collective voice capable of challenging the law.**

**Sparer, 84** (Ed, (Law Professor, University of Pennsylvania) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 509, January).

We would do well to follow the radical approach of building upon our core human rights tradition, demonstrating the contradiction between that tradition and our social institutions, and developing ways to fuse human rights into new cooperative institutions of our own making. Such work requires a concern for theory which feeds social movement, but successful social movement comes from the struggle for the realization of our basic rights, not from their disparagement. One must step outside the liberal paradigm into a realm where truth may be experiential, where knowledge resides in world views that are themselves situated in history, where power and ideas do not exist separately. Continues... Central to the argument I have made thus far is the notion that individual autonomy and community are not contradictions at all; rather, they shape and give meaning and richness to each other. Kennedy and other Critical legal theorists of the dominant school recognize the latter thought. At the same time, they argue that the very interdependence of these concepts leads to the fundamental and seemingly unresolvable contradiction they embody. In an oft-quoted passage, Kennedy states: Even when we seem to ourselves to be most alone, others are with us, incorporated in us through processes of language, cognition and feeling that are, simply as a matter of biology, collective aspects of our individuality. Moreover, we are not always alone. We sometimes experience fusion with others, in groups of two or even two million, and it is a good rather than a bad experience. But at the same time that it forms and protects us, the universe of others (family, friendship, bureaucracy, culture, the state) threatens us with annihilation and urges upon us forms of fusion that are quite plainly bad rather than good. A friend can reduce me to misery with a single look. Numberless conformities, large and small abandonments of self to others, are the price of what freedom we experience in society. And the price is a high one. Through our existence as members of collectives, we impose on others and have imposed on us hierarchical structures of power, welfare, and access to enlightenment that are illegitimate, whether based on birth into a particular social class or on the accident of genetic endowment. The kicker is that the abolition of these illegitimate structures, the fashioning of an unalienated collective existence, appears to imply such a massive increase of collective control over our lives that it would defeat its purpose. Only collective force seems capable of destroying the attitudes and institutions that collective force has itself imposed. Coercion of the individual by the group appears to be inextricably bound up with the liberation of that same individual. If one accepts that collective norms weigh so heavily in favor of the status quo that purely "voluntary" movement is inconceivable, then the only alternative is the assumption of responsibility for the totalitarian domination of other people's minds -- for "forcing them to be free."

**RIGHTS GOOD**

**Even if the law is not perfect and culture values matter, rights still protect us from oppression.**

**Altman, (Professor of Philosophy; Georgia State University) 90** (Andrew, *Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique*, page 8)

There are undoubtedly elements of the liberal tradition which exaggerate the extent to which the law alone gives contemporary liberal societies the degree of humanity and decency they have. There are undoubtedly elements of the liberal tradition which exaggerate the power of law to work its will against the entrenched customs and traditions of a culture. We would be wise to keep in mind Tocqueville's lesson about the failures of law in cultural settings where it has tried to operate in opposition to pervasive and deep-seated social norms. But it would be equally wrong to dismiss the protections offered by the law as superfluous or useless. Between the area in which law is useless because it receives insufficient support from the rest of the culture and the area in which law is superfluous because the rest of the culture provides all of the protections we can reasonably ask for, there is a wide expanse of territory. It is within the borders of that territory that law can and does make a difference. It is within the borders of that territory that legal rights can and do work to protect people from the evils of intolerance, prejudice, and oppression. This is the heart of the liberal tradition in legal philosophy. It is a tradition worthy of allegiance.



## RIGHTS GOOD: KEY TO STOP RACISM

**Relationships outside of the law only work in a world without systemic discrimination—rights are key to protections.**

**Zietlow, (Professor, University of Toledo Law), 96** (“Two Wrongs Don’t Add up to Rights: the Importance of Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures,” 45 Am. U.L. Rev. 1111, Lexis, Rebecca E.)

Professor Patricia Williams tells a story about renting an apartment at the same time as her colleague, Peter Gabel. n45 Williams recounts that Gabel, a white man who was sensitive about not alienating people with his legal knowledge and status as a lawyer and law professor, wanted an informal relationship with his landlord. n46 He did not sign a lease, and gave a deposit in cash without receiving a receipt. n47 In contrast, Williams, an African-American woman who grew up in low-income neighborhoods where landlords refused to give their tenants the protection of a lease, rented an apartment from a friend, but still insisted on a detailed, lengthily negotiated lease that established an arm’s length relationship with her landlord. n48 That lease set forth the structured rights that she considered important to her as an African-American woman. Procedural rights are particularly important for women of color because women of color have been historically discriminated against in our society. n49 Poor women of color have felt the brunt of discrimination on many levels. n50 They encounter discrimination when seeking jobs, housing, and financial assistance. n51 As a result, [\*1120] many are relegated to the most run-down, dangerous neighborhoods in urban areas. n52 Historically, the government also has discriminated against women of color with respect to welfare benefits. For example, when the Social Security Act was first enacted in 1934, states were allowed to set eligibility standards for receiving benefits, and to set the amount of benefits. n53 At that time, Congress considered a provision that would have forbidden racial discrimination in the allocation of benefits, but rejected that measure. n54 As a result, many southern states discriminated against black welfare applicants, refusing them benefits and/or setting benefit levels so low that they were impractical, in order to maintain the low-wage market of women of color, who typically performed domestic and field work. n55 Discrimination against poor people of color, in the allocation of government benefits, continues to this day. In 1992, a study conducted by the Social Security Administration found evidence of discrimination against African-American applicants for Social Security and Supplemental Security Income benefits. n56 As a result of the investigation, the Social Security Administration created a special unit to process complaints of discrimination made by applicants for Social Security benefits. n57 As Patricia Williams notes, “While rights may not be ends in themselves, it remains that rights rhetoric has been and continues to be an effective form of discourse for blacks.” n58 Williams’ example, comparing her approach to lease negotiation with that of Peter Gabel, and the Judgment, Landlord study, which showed that landlords did not need attorneys to win their cases, illustrate an important point: The powerful may willingly choose to give up their structured rights, but those who perceive themselves as less powerful are less willing to give up the empowerment of structured rights, such as due process. In fact, people not in power require structured rights, and cannot do without them. Many African Americans in the civil rights movement risked their lives in the fight for the structured right to vote in southern states, so that they could participate in the political process. People who are disempowered due to their race, class, or gender need a formalized, structured process so that their rights can be protected.

**Non-legal relations allows racism to flourish—those without power need the law.**

**Polleta, (Columbia Professor) 2000** (Francesca Polletta, “The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961-1966,” 2000, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 367, Lexis).

Another analytical liability of Gabel’s view of social movements as directed “fundamentally” to forging new experiences of authentic sociability is revealed in his preferences for informality over formality and appeals to empathy over appeals to legal justiciability. If progressive movements by definition seek to expose the illusoriness of the state’s claim to authority, and if that exposure is seen as adequate to the task of political transformation, then challenging rituals of formality makes eminent sense. But for people who have been without power, appeals to formal procedures and standards are not so easily dismissed. Informality, like tradition and discretion, is often just the gentler face of domination (Rollins 1985; Merry 1990). Patricia Williams (1987) makes this point in describing her and Gabel’s experiences looking for apartments in New York. Gabel found a sublet and, after a brief conversation with its tenants, handed over \$ 900 in cash, with no lease, receipt, or keys. “The handshake and good vibes were for him indicators of trust more binding than a distancing formal contract” (406). Williams secured an apartment in a building owned by friends and “signed a detailed, lengthily negotiated, finely printed lease firmly establishing me as the ideal arm’s length transactor” (407). As a white man, Gabel could afford the informality of relations that had historically provided license for African Americans’ exploitation by whites, Williams argues. Where she grew up, landlords had often rented flats to poor black tenants without leases and with rent paid in cash, but those arrangements were demands on the part of landlords and signaled distrust not trust. To engage in formal, legal transactions was for Williams to assert her worth as a legal person. “As a black, I have been given by this society a strong [\*376] sense of myself as already too familiar, too personal, too subordinate to white people” (407). We can assume that Gabel recognizes a distinction between good informality and bad informality. Indeed, he argues that “an alternative approach to politics based on resolving difference through compassion and empathy would presuppose that people can engage in political discussion and action that is founded upon a felt recognition of one another as human beings, instead of conceiving of the political realm as a context where one abstract ‘legal subject’ confronts another” (Gabel & Harris, 1982-83:377, my emphasis). But the set of oppositions on which his definition of effective politics rests elides it with informality in a way that obscures that point. Without denying that the formality of the courtroom can buttress the state’s authority and inscrutability at the same time as it discourages expressions, and experiences, of compassion and empathy, we should be aware that formality can also make visible discriminatory and exploitative practices that were previously unscrutinized (see Massaro 1989 on empathy). And we should be aware that informality may conceal not illusory but very real power.

## RIGHTS GOOD: KEY TO THE ALTERNATIVE

**Even if the alternative were enacted, people would need a way to fight intrusions from the state— rights are useful even in the world of the alternative.**

**Forbath, (Law Professor, UCLA) 92** ( William E. Forbath, Professor of Law, UCLA, “BOOK REVIEW: Taking Lefts Seriously, The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique,” 92 Yale L.J. 1041, May, 1983, Lexis).

If Freeman leaves one confused about what part law may play in overcoming inequality and building the good society, Peter Gabel is more forthcoming. In a number of essays, including the one he co-authored for this volume, Gabel has developed the notion that law is a "reified" form of communication. n58 To clothe a person in legal forms is to impose on her a self transformed or "alienated" into a "thing-like function of the 'system.'" n59 Gabel's response is to dispense with law and cease talking about justice and human needs "in abstract legal terms." n60 Since capitalist production gives rise to "alienation," and since law is "only a recast form" of "underlying socio-economic relations," we must focus instead on the production process to create "the possible conditions for a concrete justice." n61 Gabel has introduced valuable new perspectives into CLS, but certain key formulations of his law-as-reification thesis seem disconcertingly familiar. The idea that talking about justice "in legal terms" is a kind of false necessity imposed by capitalism ultimately rests on the conviction that in the good society -- one with transformed relations of production--government will become nothing more than the technical "administration of things." n63 In this view, the state -- and therefore, talk of law and rights -- exists only because in a class-based society government means ruling over people. n64 In other words, the argument for "junking" law turns on the treacherous notion that one can rigorously distinguish administering things from governing or ruling people. This notion might have seemed plausible in the nineteenth century, but our subsequent experience suggests that all structures of "merely technical" or "economic" administration are also power structures. n65 Thus, it is folly today to believe that even the good society, with its democratic relations of production, would require merely the "administration of things" to coordinate its affairs. This belief assumes that all the various purportedly technical decisions entailed by "administration" would enlist everyone's spontaneous consent. Once we acknowledge that power over people inevitably inheres in such decisions, we must add that the good society would require not merely a framework for coordinating its economic affairs, but also a means to contest and revise that framework's organization, procedures, and results. Even in the sphere of economic relations, the good society would therefore need institutions much like law-making and adjudication. Having conceded that "administration" entails power structures, we must also confront the problem of legitimating power. Means for contest and revision, while necessary, are not sufficient. Legitimate power arises only from consent, and consent of the active sort that this radical, democratic scheme obviously entails is generated only by citizens participating in a vital, public, political sphere. n66 So, the good society would need measures to secure a sphere or, rather, many "spaces" throughout the society for free and undominated political involvement and deliberation. Moreover, having enlarged the public realm of participation to embrace productive and economic affairs as well as other now remote decisionmaking, the good society would also need to secure the private spaces that protect individuals from coerced "involvement" and, thereby, make freedom authentic. It would need to provide what Unger has called "immunity rights," including those traditional "liberal rights," which ensure personal freedom from external, state, or collective coercion. Thus, the good society, though grounded in "transformed relations of production," may contain many things that look suspiciously like "law" -- not only activities that resemble "legislating" and "adjudication," but also a variety of measures that can only be called "rights." Perhaps then, not all "rights talk" is reducible to an estranged, reified individualism in the manner that Gabel, Kennedy, and others often suggest.

**Legal victories are not alienating—they are key to spurring activism.**

**Polleta, (Columbia Professor) 2000** (Francesca Polletta, “The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961-1966,” 2000, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 367, Lexis).

What I found should assuage CLS writers' worries that rights claims making fosters a demobilizing dependence on the state to recognize rights-bearers, that litigation always displaces alternative, more power-oriented strategies, and that activists' political vision is progressively circumscribed by the limits of the law. With respect to the first, black Mississippians did indeed seek recognition as rights-bearers - as "first class citizens" - but less from federal and local officials than from congregation, kin, and community. Legal proceedings inside the courtroom supplemented the rights-talk that took place outside it by publicly recognizing people's willingness to "stand up" to white oppression. Far from substitutes for collective action, as Critical Legal Studies writers worry, legal victories were interpreted as prods to further action. Finally, with respect to critics' concern that rights-talk narrows activists' political vision and strategic options, I find that activists' extension of rights claims to the "unqualified" proved important in challenging prevalent notions of political representation. It helped to shape a collective action frame that went on to animate struggles around economic inequality, governmental decisionmaking in poverty programs, and the Vietnam War. Activists' engagement with conventional rights-talk pushed them beyond legal liberalism to a more radicalized but still resonant frame.

**RIGHTS GOOD: KEY TO THE ALTERNATIVE**

**Rights are transformative. And, we will argue that our use of rights rhetoric to advocate against unfettered power in this debate is proof of this argument.**

**Polleta, (Columbia Professor) 2000** (Francesca Polletta, "The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961-1966," 2000, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 367, Lexis).

The formality of legal processes can make visible, and contestable, actions that have been insulated from critique by their status as traditional, informal, personal, or idiosyncratic. More broadly, the way to avoid the reified conceptions both of rights and social movements that underpin Gabel's scheme is to pay closer attention to how rights claims and strategies figure in actual movements. Among the possibilities not considered by Gabel or CLS generally are that some rights are more amenable to communal rather than individualist interpretations (Lynd 1984), that some kinds of movements are more likely to privilege litigation over other strategies, that litigation may have different costs and benefits at different points in a movement trajectory (McCann 1994), and, most importantly, that the meanings of rights are defined and modified in interaction with the state, opponents, and competitors, rather than defined solely by judges. The latter insight informs a group of linked perspectives on legality in everyday settings (Ewick & Silbey 1998; Merry 1990; Yngvesson 1989). Such work has shown the extent to which people's understandings of self and social interaction are informed by legal concepts such as "fairness," "property," and "entitlement" before they have any formal contact with the state, but concepts defined in ways that are quite often at odds with those currently acceptable in a court of law. Legal discourse affords possibilities for negotiating the limits of the law in novel ways. Sally Engle Merry writes that its "ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions provide multiple opportunities for interpretation and contest" (1990:9). When this view of the law is extended into the realm of collective action, it suggests that rights-talk can serve as a springboard to envisioning change beyond legal reform (Hunt 1990; McCann 1994; Schneider 1986; Villmoare 1985). "Rights' can give rise to 'rights consciousness,'" Martha Minow argues, "so that individuals and groups may imagine and act in light of rights that have not been formally recognized or enforced by officials" (Minow 1987:1867). People can widen the scope of rights to encompass new institutional domains, subjects, and enforcement mechanisms. They can supplement a legal idiom with that of another normative system (religion, say, or the moral responsibilities of parenthood). Critical legal theorists' view of the hegemonic function of rights is thus simultaneously too weak and too strong. It is too weak in maintaining that people's political consciousness is non-legal before they come into direct contact with the state. It is too strong in assuming that relying on rights-talk necessarily limits challengers' capacity to envision alternatives.

**RIGHTS GOOD: ENFORCEABLE**

**Even when court cases do not achieve desired outcomes, they mobilize movements and prompt the powerful to change behavior so that they can avoid future legal battles.**

**Polleta, (Columbia Professor) 2000** (Francesca Polletta, "The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961-1966," 2000, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 367, Lexis).

In arguing that legal claimsmaking has helped oppressed groups to gain power, critics of Critical Legal Studies refuse its sharp distinction between rights and politics. They draw attention instead to "the ways in which rights claims can be linked to claims for power" (Schneider 1986:629). Echoing points made earlier by Stuart Scheingold (1974), Elizabeth Schneider argues that rights, and specifically litigation, can mobilize people by casting grievances as legitimate entitlements and by fostering a sense of collective identity; can help to organize political groups through lawyers' resources of organizational skills and legitimacy; and can contribute to processes of political realignment, though in ways that are less predictable and conclusive than "ideologists" of a rights strategy would suggest. Litigation can force those in power to account for their actions; it renders them less invulnerable, exposes them to evaluation, and challenges the practices implicitly justified by tradition or habit. Together, these can motivate other forms of political action: lobbying for legislation, direct action demonstrations, economic boycotts, and so forth. Legal victories may not be necessary to realize those benefits. For the targets of litigation, the possibility of a defeat in court may be enough to convince them to institute changes. In a study of wage equity activism, Michael McCann (1994) found that organizers used litigation not only to mobilize women workers but also to pressure employers to negotiate contracts under the threat that judges might impose a new wage structure. Even though "the courts were unreliable allies ... employers, especially in the public sector, were vulnerable to the adverse publicity, financial costs, and administrative uncertainties that legal action threatened" (280). For the rights claimants, meanwhile, making public their demands and putting opponents on the hot seat, however briefly and unsuccessfully, may be enough to motivate them to engage in other kinds of insurgency. Recognizing the multivalent character of rights should not lead us to an overoptimistic faith in the power of challengers to replace hegemonic meanings with subversive ones, however. As Didi Herman cautions, "There is no reason why progressive social movements necessarily rearticulate rights in such a way as to challenge power relations. Rights' meanings cannot simply be 're-invented' and disseminated at will" (1993:35-36). To be sure, people can assert anything as a "right," which can be defined as an "entitlement" without requiring that the entitlement be legally authorized or enforced. But we usually think of rights as claims backed up by the force of law - or potentially done so. This conception of rights allows for innovation, but not wild invention. What makes legal rights claims powerful is the conjunction of moral principle and the force of the state.

**RIGHTS GOOD: NOT MONOLITHIC**

**Human rights are not a monolith—they can be adapted by local cultures.**

**Ibhawoh, 00** – Lecturer in African History and International Development Studies at the Edo State University in Nigeria – 2000 (Bonny Ibhawoh, “Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluation the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the Africa State”, human rights quarterly 2.2, Project Muse).

This assumption tends to ignore the fact that societies are constantly in the process of change wrought by a variety of cultural, social, and economic forces. It seems an elementary but necessary point to make that so-called traditional societies--whether in Asia, Africa, or in Europe--were not culturally static but were eclectic, dynamic, and subject to significant alteration over time. Traditional cultural beliefs are also neither monolithic nor unchanging. In fact they could--and were--changed in response to different internal and external pressures. Cultural change can result from individuals being exposed to and adopting new ideas. Individuals are actors who can influence their own fate, even if their range of choice is circumscribed by the prevalent social structure or culture. In doing so, those who choose to adopt new ideas, though influenced by their own interest, initiate a process of change which may influence dominant cultural traditions. Culture is thus inherently responsive to conflict between individuals and social groups.<sup>2</sup> It is a network of perspectives in which different groups hold different values and world views, and in which some groups have more power to present their versions as the true culture. The significance of this is that we proceed from the assumption that certain cultural traditions inherently appearing in conflict with national and universal human rights standards may in fact have the potential of being influenced through a process of change and adaptation to meet new human rights standards.

**Human rights concepts are universal but their implementation varies widely.**

**Donnelly, 07** – Andrew Mellon Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver – 2007 (Jack Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 29 page 281-306, Project Muse).

Human rights are (relatively) universal at the level of the *concept*, broad formulations such as the claims in Articles 3 and 22 of the Universal Declaration that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person" and "the right to social security."<sup>50</sup> Particular rights concepts, however, have multiple defensible *conceptions*. Any particular conception, in turn, will have many defensible *implementations*. At this level—for example, the design of electoral systems to implement the right "to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives"—relativity is not merely defensible but desirable.<sup>51</sup> Functional and overlapping consensus universality lie primarily at the level of concepts. Most of the Universal Declaration lies at this level as well. Although international human rights treaties often embody particular conceptions, and sometimes even particular forms of implementation,<sup>52</sup> they too permit a wide range of particular practices. Substantial second order variation, by country, region, culture, or other grouping, is completely consistent with international legal and overlapping consensus universality.

**Rights enable cultural expression.**

**Donnelly, 07** – Andrew Mellon Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver – 2007 (Jack Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 29 page 281-306, Project Muse).

Human rights seek to allow human beings, individually and in groups that give meaning and value to their lives, to pursue their own visions of the good life. Such choices—so long as they are consistent with comparable rights for others and reflect a plausible vision of human flourishing to which we can imagine a free people freely assenting—deserve our respect. In fact, understanding human rights as a political conception of justice supported by an overlapping consensus requires us to allow human beings, individually and collectively, considerable space to shape (relatively) universal rights to their particular purposes—so long as they operate largely within the constraints at the level of concepts established by functional, international legal, and overlapping consensus universality.

**RIGHTS GOOD: NOT WESTERN**

**Human rights are not inherently Western.**

**Donnelly, 07** – Andrew Mellon Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver – 2007 (Jack Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 29 page 281-306, Project Muse).

The social-structural "modernity" of these ideas and practices, however, not their cultural "Westernness," deserves emphasis.<sup>15</sup> Human rights ideas and practices arose not from any deep Western cultural roots but from the social, economic, and political transformations of modernity. They thus have relevance wherever those transformations have occurred, irrespective of the pre-existing culture of the place.

**Human rights not exclusive to Western countries—it is essentialist to imply that other cultures inherently oppose rights.**

**Donnelly, 07** – Andrew Mellon Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver – 2007 (Jack Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 29 page 281-306, Project Muse).

It is important to remember that virtually all Western religious and philosophical doctrines through most of their history have either rejected or ignored human rights. Today, however, most adherents of most Western comprehensive doctrines endorse human rights. And if the medieval Christian world of crusades, serfdom, and hereditary aristocracy could become today's world of liberal and social democratic welfare states, it is hard to think of a place where a similar transformation is inconceivable. Consider claims that "Asian values" are incompatible with internationally recognized human rights.<sup>24</sup> Asian values—like Western values, African values, and most other sets of values—can be, and have been, understood as incompatible with human rights. But they also can be and have been interpreted to support human rights, as they regularly are today in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. And political developments in a growing number of Asian countries suggest that ordinary people and even governments are increasingly viewing human rights as a contemporary political expression of their deepest ethical, cultural, and political values and aspirations.<sup>25</sup> No culture or comprehensive doctrine is "by nature," or in any given or fixed way, either compatible or incompatible with human rights.

**RIGHTS GOOD: CHECK ON STATISM**

**Rights are the best model for protecting people against modern states and markets—no viable alternative has worked as well.**

**Donnelly, 07** – Andrew Mellon Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver – 2007 (Jack Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 29 page 281-306, Project Muse).

The spread of modern markets and states has globalized the same threats to human dignity initially experienced in Europe. Human rights represent the most effective response yet devised to a wide range of standard threats to human dignity that market economies and bureaucratic states have made nearly universal across the globe. Human rights today remain the only proven effective means to assure human dignity in societies dominated by markets and states. Although historically contingent and relative, this functional universality fully merits the label universal—for us, today. Arguments that another state, society, or culture has developed plausible and effective alternative mechanisms for protecting or realizing human dignity in the contemporary world deserve serious attention. Today, however, such claims, when not advanced by repressive elites and their supporters, usually refer to an allegedly possible world that no one yet has had the good fortune to experience. The functional universality of human rights depends on human rights providing attractive remedies for some of the most pressing systemic threats to human dignity. Human rights today do precisely that for a growing number of people of all cultures in all regions. Whatever our other problems, we all must deal with market economies and bureaucratic states. Whatever our other religious, moral, legal, and political resources, we all need equal and inalienable universal human rights to protect us from those threats.

**\*\*SAID\*\***



## AT SAID: NO ALTERNATIVE

**Post-colonialism essentializes oppression and makes resistance impossible.**

**Ong 99** Aihwa Ong, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logic of Transnationality*, 1999, p. 33-34

More broadly, postcolonial theorists focus on recovering the voices of subjects silenced by patriarchy and colonial rule (*The Empire Writes Back* is the title of one popular collection); they assume that all contemporary racial, ethnic, and cultural oppressions can all be attributed to Western colonialisms. American appropriations of postcolonial theory have created a unitary discourse of the postcolonial that refers to highly variable situations and conditions throughout the world; thus, Gayatri Spivak is able to talk about "the paradigmatic subaltern woman," as well as "New World Asians (the old migrants) and New Immigrant Asians (often 'model minorities') being disciplinized together?" Other postcolonial feminists also have been eager to seek structural similarities, continuities, conjunctures, and alliances between the postcolonial oppressions experienced by peoples on the bases of race, ethnicity, and gender both in formerly colonized populations in the third world and among immigrant populations in the United States, Australia, and England.<sup>16</sup> Seldom is there any attempt to link these assertions of unitary postcolonial situations among diasporan subjects in the West to the historical structures of colonization, decolonization, and contemporary developments in particular non-Western countries. Indeed, the term postcolonial has been used to indiscriminately describe different regimes of economic, political, and cultural domination in the Americas, India, Africa, and other third-world countries where the actual historical experiences of colonialism have been very varied in terms of local culture, conquest, settlement, racial exploitation, administrative regime, political resistance, and articulation with global capitalism. In careens hands, postcolonial theory can represent a kind of theoretical imperialism whereby scholars based in the West, without seriously engaging the scholarship of faraway places, can project or "speak for" postcolonial situations elsewhere. Stuart Hall has warned against approaches that universalize racial, ethnic, and gender oppressions without locating the "actual integument of power...in concrete institutions." A more fruitful strand of postcolonial studies is represented by subaltern scholars such as Partha Chatterjee, who has criticized the Indian national projects, which are based on Western models of modernity and bypass "many possibilities of authentic, creative, and plural development of social identities," including the marginalized communities in Indian society. He suggests that an alternative imagination that draws on "narratives of community" would be a formidable challenge to narratives of capital. This brilliant work, however, is based on the assumption that both modernity and capitalism are universal forms, against which non-Western societies such as India can only mobilize "pre-existing cultural solidarities such as locality, caste, tribe, religious community, or ethnic identity." This analytical opposition between a universal modernity and non-Western culture is rather old-fashioned it is as if Chatterjee believes the West is not present in Indian elites who champion narratives of the indigenous community. Furthermore, the concept of a universal modernity must be rethought when, as Arif Dirlik observes, "the narrative of capitalism is no longer the narrative of the history of Europe; non-European capitalist societies now make their own claims on the history of capitalism."<sup>20</sup> The loose use of the term "the postcolonial," then, has had the bizarre effect of contributing to a Western tradition of othering the Rest; it suggests a postwar scheme whereby "the third world" was followed by "the developing countries," which are now being succeeded by "the postcolonial." This continuum seems to suggest that the further we move in time, the more beholden non-Western countries are to the forms and practices of their colonial past. By and large, anthropologists have been careful to discuss how formerly colonized societies have developed differently in relation to global economic and political dominations and have repositioned themselves differently vis-a-vis capitalism and late modernity. By specifying differences in history, politics, and culture, anthropologists are able to say how the postcolonial formation of Indonesia is quite different from that of India, Nicaragua, or Zaire.

**\*\*SCIENCE\*\***

AT CRITIQUES OF SCIENCE

**Science is the opposite of domination – scientific knowledge liberates and improves lives.**

**Bronner 04** Stephen Eric Bronner, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, 2004, Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, p. 21-23

Something will always be missing: freedom will never become fully manifest in reality. The relation between them is asymptotic. Therefore, most philosophes understood progress as a regulative ideal, or as a postulate,<sup>13</sup> rather than as an absolute or the expression of some divine plane or the foundation for a system.<sup>14</sup> Even in scientific terms, progress retained a critical dimension insofar as it implied the need to question established certainties. In this vein, it is misleading simply to equate scientific reason with the domination of man and nature.<sup>15</sup> All the great figures of the scientific revolution —Bacon, Boyle, Newton—were concerned with liberating humanity from what seemed the power of seemingly intractable forces. Swamps were everywhere; roads were few; forests remained to be cleared; illness was rampant; food was scarce; most people would never leave their village. What it implied not to understand the existence of bacteria or the nature of electricity, just to use very simple examples, is today simply inconceivable. Enlightenment figures like Benjamin Franklin, “the complete philosophe,”<sup>16</sup> became famous for a reason: they not only freed people from some of their fears but through inventions like the stove and the lightning rod they also raised new possibilities for making people’s lives more livable. Critical theorists and postmodernists miss the point when they view Enlightenment intellectuals in general and scientists in particular as simple apostles of reification. They actually constituted its most consistent enemy. The philosophes may not have grasped the commodity form, but they empowered people by challenging superstitions and dogmas that left them mute and helpless against the whims of nature and the injunctions of tradition. Enlightenment thinkers were justified in understanding knowledge as inherently improving humanity. Infused with a sense of furthering the public good, liberating the individual from the clutches of the invisible and inexplicable, the Enlightenment idea of progress required what the young Marx later termed “the ruthless critique of everything existing.” This regulative notion of progress was never inimical to subjectivity. Quite the contrary: progress became meaningful only with reference to real living individuals.

\*\*\*SPANOS\*\*\*

AT SPANOS: CEDE THE POLITICAL

**Spanos's rejection of humanism marginalizes his theory and makes leftist coalition impossible.**

**Perkin, 93** – Associate Professor of English at Saint Mary's University – 1993 (J. Russell Perkin, *Postmodern Culture* 3.3, "Theorizing the Culture Wars," Project Muse).

My final criticism is that Spanos, by his attempt to put all humanists into the same category and to break totally with the tradition of humanism, isolates himself in a posture of ultraleftist purity that cuts him off from many potential political allies, especially when, as I will note in conclusion, his practical recommendations for the practical role of an adversarial intellectual seem similar to those of the liberal pluralists he attacks. He seems ill-informed about what goes on in the everyday work of the academy, for instance, in the field of composition studies. Spanos laments the "unwarranted neglect" (202) of the work of Paulo Freire, yet in reading composition and pedagogy journals over the last few years, I have noticed few thinkers who have been so consistently cited. Spanos refers several times to the fact that the discourse of the documents comprising *The Pentagon Papers* was linked to the kind of discourse that first-year composition courses produce (this was Richard Ohmann's argument); here again, however, Spanos is not up to date. For the last decade the field of composition studies has been the most vigorous site of the kind of oppositional practices *The End of Education* recommends. The academy, in short, is more diverse, more complex, more genuinely full of difference than Spanos allows, and it is precisely that difference that neoconservatives want to erase. By seeking to separate out only the pure (posthumanist) believers, Spanos seems to me to ensure his self-marginalization. For example, several times he includes pluralists like Wayne Booth and even Gerald Graff in lists of "humanists" that include William Bennett, Roger Kimball and Dinesh D'Souza. Of course, there is a polemical purpose to this, but it is one that is counterproductive. In fact, I would even question the validity of calling shoddy and often inaccurate journalists like Kimball and D'Souza with the title "humanist intellectuals." Henry Louis Gates's final chapter contains some cogent criticism of the kind of position which Spanos has taken. Gates argues that the "hard" left's opposition to liberalism is as mistaken as its opposition to conservatism, and refers to Cornel West's remarks about the field of critical legal studies, "If you don't build on liberalism, you build on air" (187). Building on air seems to me precisely what Spanos is recommending.

**Spanos's theory has no real-world applications.**

**Lewandowski, 94** - Associate Professor and Philosophy Program Coordinator at The University of Central Missouri – 1994 (Joseph D. Lewandowski, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, "Heidegger, literary theory and social criticism," ed. David M. Rasmussen, P. 119)

Spanos rightly rejects the 'textuality' route in Heidegger and Criticism precisely because of its totalizing and hypostatizing tendencies. Nevertheless, he holds on to a destructive hermeneutics as disclosure. But as I have already intimated, disclosure alone cannot support a critical theory oriented toward emancipation. I think a critical theory needs a less totalizing account of language, one that articulates both the emphatic linguistic capacity to spontaneously disclose worlds - its innovative 'worlding' possibilities - and its less emphatic, but no less important, capacity to communicate, solve problems in and criticize the world. The essential task of the social critic - and any literary theory that wants to be critical - is to couple world disclosure with problem-solving, to mediate between the extra-ordinary world of 'textuality' and the everyday world of 'texts'. In this alternative route, literary theory may become the kind of emancipatory oriented critical theory it can and should be.

## AT SPANOS: NO ALTERNATIVE

**Spanos does not sufficiently connect his genealogy to specific policy recommendations—the alternative fails to influence the real world.**

**Lewandowski, 94** - Associate Professor and Philosophy Program Coordinator at The University of Central Missouri – 1994 (Joseph D. Lewandowski, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, “Heidegger, literary theory and social criticism,” ed. David M. Rasmussen, P. 115-116)

The point to be made here is that Heidegger's politics are not the only (or necessarily the largest) obstacle to coupling him with critical theory. Hence much of Spanos's energetic defense of Heidegger against his 'humanist detractors' (particularly in his defiant concluding chapter, 'Heidegger, Nazism, and the "Repressive Hypothesis": The American Appropriation of the Question') is misdirected. For as McCarthy rightly points out, the basic issues separating critical theory from Heideggerean ontology were not raised post hoc in reaction to Heidegger's political misdeeds but were there from the start. Marcuse formulated them in all clarity during his time in Freiburg, when he was still inspired by the idea of a materialist analytic of Dasein' (p. 96, emphasis added). In other words, Heidegger succumbs quite readily to an immanent critique. Heidegger's aporias are not simply the result of his politics but father stem from the internal limits of his questioning of the 'being that lets beings be', truth as disclosure, and destruction of the metaphysical tradition, all of which divorce reflection from social practice and thus lack critical perspective. Spanos, however, thinks Foucault can provide an alternative materialist grounding for an emancipatory critical theory that would obviate the objections of someone such as Marcuse. But the turn to Foucault is no less problematic than the original turn to Heidegger. Genealogy is not critical in any real way. Nor can it tame or augment what Spanos calls Heidegger's 'overdetermination of the ontological site'. Foucault's analysis of power, despite its originality, is an ontology of power and not, as Spanos thinks, a 'concrete diagnosis' (p. 138) of power mechanism. Thus it dramatizes, on a different level, the same shortcomings of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The 'affiliative relationship' (p. 138) that Spanos tries to develop between Heidegger and Foucault in order to avoid the problem Marcuse faced simply cannot work. Where Heidegger ontologizes Being, Foucault ontologizes power. The latter sees power as a strategic and intentional but subjectless mechanism that 'endows itself' and punches out 'docile bodies', whereas the former sees Being as that neutered term and no-thing that calls us. Foucault (like Spanos) never works out how genealogy is emancipatory, or how emancipation could be realized collectively by actual agents in the world. The 'undefined work of freedom' the later Foucault speaks of in 'What Is Enlightenment?' remained precisely that in his work.<sup>4</sup> The genealogy of power is as much a hypostatization as is fundamental ontology: such hypostatizations tend to institute the impossibility of practical resistance or freedom. In short, I don't think the Heideggerian 'dialogue' with Foucault sufficiently tames or complements Heidegger, nor does it make his discourse (or Foucault's, for that matter) any more emancipatory or oppositional. Indeed, Foucault's reified theory of power seems to undermine the very notion of 'Opposition', since there is no subject (but rather a 'docile' body) to do the resisting (or, in his later work, a privatized self to be self-made within a regime of truth), nor an object to be resisted. As Said rightly points out in *The World, the Text, and the Critic*, 'Foucault more or less eliminates the central dialectic of opposed forces that still underlies modern society' (p. 221, emphasis added). Foucault's theory of power is shot through with false empirical analyses, yet Spanos seems to accept them as valid diagnoses. Spanos fails to see, to paraphrase Said's criticisms of Foucault's theory of power, that power is neither a spider's web without the spider, nor a smoothly functioning diagram (p. 221).

**AT SPANOS: NO TRUTH DISEMPOWERING**

**Spanos's rejection of objective truth removes any way to measure the theory's emancipatory effects.**

**Lewandowski, 94** - Associate Professor and Philosophy Program Coordinator at The University of Central Missouri – 1994 (Joseph D. Lewandowski, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, "Heidegger, literary theory and social criticism," ed. David M. Rasmussen, P. 117-118)

But radicalized or not, Spanos's trading of any possibility of 'determinate truth' for Heideggerian disclosure as eventing of truth/untruth robs his critical theory of the necessary yardstick needed to measure 'emancipation'. Heidegger's disclosure is a cryptonormative truth; it is an event before which any *critical* judgment necessarily *fails*. Disclosure is *not* a process of inquiry, but rather a revealing/concealing that befalls or overtakes us. In his eagerness to draw out the enabling features and 'post'-humanist dimension of Heidegger's disclosure, Spanos fails to see the inevitable and internal limits to truth as disclosure. Gadamer encounters similar problems, despite his keen insights, when he holds on to a Heideggerian disclosure that too often undermines the power of critical reflection. And the postmodern Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo encounters a related problem when he attempts to take leave of modernity and proclaim a liberating postmodernity via Heidegger's disclosure. But while a purely aesthetic theory interested in 'textuality' can quite justifiably be grounded in truth as disclosure (as American deconstruction or Vattimo's *il pensiero debole* is), a truly *critical* theory interested in emancipation simply cannot: some types of 'emancipation' are false and need to be rejected. Texts may very well 'disclose' worlds in the same way that, say, the Greek temple does for Heidegger. But a genuinely critical theory needs to be able to say what worlds are better or worse for actual agents in actual worlds - a need, I might add, that Spanos is constantly aware of and typifies in his denunciation of American imperialism in Vietnam (and elsewhere) in Heidegger and Criticism.

AT SPANOS: HUMANISM GOOD

**Humanist reforms are more effective than totalizing critique.**

**Good, 01** - Professor of English at the University of British Columbia – 2001 (Graham Good, *Humanism betrayed*, P. 7)

Liberal humanism, in my view, offers a more cogent critique of capitalist society because it generally accepts capitalism as an economic system that is more productive and efficient than the alternatives. Yet liberal humanism seeks to limit capitalism's social and cultural effects by preserving certain spheres - politics, art, education - as having a limited autonomy from the imperatives of the market. This attitude of partial acceptance and partial critique is much more realistic and effective, for example, in protesting the commercialization of the university, or in preserving artistic standards, than the total rejection of "late-capitalist society" that is common among academic pseudoradicals. Total opposition is more readily co-opted by the system because it forms a mirror image. If the system is all-powerful, how can Theorists explain the possibility or acceptability of their own opposition to it? This problem is usually evaded; but when it is confronted, a doctrine of "necessary complicity" is often evoked. If you disbelieve in your own autonomy as an individual, you must be liable in dark moments to suspect that you are actually working *for* the system. Resistance to the system is part of the system. Total rejection flips into total acceptance and opens the way for a personal exploitation of the academic system. Political correctness covers up careerist realpolitik.



AT SPANOS: VIETNAM GOOD

**Communism was spreading in Vietnam – it had to be stopped.**

**Podhoretz, 82** – adviser to the US Information Agency and laureate of the Presidential Medal of Freedom – 1982 (Norman Podhoretz, *Why We Were in Vietnam*, P. 11)

Indeed, for many people whose original support of American intervention in Vietnam had been based on memories of Munich, Vietnam not only replaced it but canceled it out. To such people - the lesson of Munich had been that an expansionist totalitarian power could not be stopped by giving in to its demands and that limited resistance at an early stage was the only way to avoid full-scale war later on. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, returning to England from the conference in Munich at which Nazi Germany's claims over Czechoslovakia had been satisfied, triumphantly declared that he was bringing with him "peace in our time." But as almost everyone would later agree, what he had actually brought with him was the-certainty of a world war to come-a war that Winston Churchill, the leading critic of the policy of appeasement consummated at Munich, would later call "unnecessary." According to Churchill, if a line had been drawn against Hitler from the beginning, he would have been forced to back away, and the sequence of events that led inexorably to the outbreak of war would have been interrupted. Obviously, Vietnam differed in many significant ways from Central Europe in the late 1930s. But there was one great similarity that overrode these differences in the minds of many whose understanding of such matters had been shaped by the memory of Munich. "I'm not the village idiot," Dean Rusk, who was Secretary of State first under Kennedy and then under Johnson, once exploded. "I know Hitler was an Austrian and Mao is a Chinese...But that is common between the two situations is - - the phenomenon -of aggression." In-other words, in Vietnam now as in central Europe then, a totalitarian political force - Nazism then, Communism now-was attempting to expand the area under its control. A relatively limited degree of resistance then would have precluded the need for massive resistance afterward. This was the lesson of Munich, and it had already been applied successfully in Western Europe in the forties and Korea in the fifties. Surely it was applicable to Vietnam.

**Vietnam was crucial for American hegemony and democracy promotion.**

**Podhoretz, 82** – adviser to the US Information Agency and laureate of the Presidential Medal of Freedom – 1982 (Norman Podhoretz, *Why We Were in Vietnam*, P. 19-20)

Thus, on June 1, 1956, two years after delivering Schlesinger's favorite speech, Kennedy spoke before the American Friends of Vietnam on "America's Stake in Vietnam." By this time the French had been defeated, and Vietnam had been partitioned under a set of agreements negotiated in Geneva, with a Communist regime under Ho Chi Minh established in the North and a non-Communist government under Ngo Dinh Diem set up in the South. According to the Geneva agreements, Vietnam was to be unified under a government to be elected in 1956, but Kennedy declared that "neither the United States nor Free Vietnam [was] ever going to be a party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance" by the Communists of the North and their agents and allies in the South. To Kennedy, Vietnam represented "the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia," the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia . . . would be threatened if the red tide of Communism overflowed into Vietnam. " This was the first of the four reasons Kennedy gave for "America's stake in Vietnam." The second was that Vietnam represented "a proving ground for democracy in Asia... the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experience fails, if some one million refugees have fled the totalitarianism of the North only to find neither freedom nor security in the South, then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians." It was, Kennedy said, an experiment we could not "afford to permit to fail." The third reason was that Vietnam, in addition to representing, a test of democracy in Asia, also represented "a test of American responsibility and determination" there. Characterizing the United States as the "godparents" of "little Vietnam" and Vietnam as "our offspring" ("We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future"), Kennedy concluded that if Vietnam were to fall "victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence-Communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest," we would be held responsible and our prestige in Asia would "sink to a new low." Finally (and most prophetically), America's stake in Vietnam was "a very selfish one" in the sense that "American lives and American dollars" would inevitably have to be expended if "the apparent security which has increasingly characterized that area I under the leadership of President Diem" were to be jeopardized.

AT SPANOS: VIETNAM GOOD

**Containment of Vietnam was necessary to prevent nuclear war with Russia.**

**Podhoretz, 82** – adviser to the US Information Agency and laureate of the Presidential Medal of Freedom – 1982 (Norman Podhoretz, *Why We Were in Vietnam*, P. 22-23)

The answer was unclear. On the one hand, the most authoritative and highly articulated public statement of the assumptions behind containment, the famous article by the then Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, George F. Kennan (published in 1947 in *Foreign Affairs*, under the pseudonym "Mr. X"), could only be read to imply that in principle at least containment was global in scope. "The main element," said Kennan, "of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy." Nor did Kennan leave any doubt as to the relation between local Communist parties and the Soviet Union: the duty of "all good Communists" everywhere in the world, he wrote, "is the support and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow." 12 Yet on the other hand, three years later, Kennan's boss, Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, seemed to suggest that the United States did not regard the independence of South Korea as a vital interest. This the Soviet Union, the Chinese, and the North Koreans evidently all took as a signal that the forcible extension of Communist rule to the South would not be met by the application of American counterforce. It seems unlikely that Acheson, who as much as any one individual was the father of containment-"present," as he put it in the title of his memoirs, "bt the creationw-really intended to send such a signal. But whether there was a misunderstanding here or a lastminute change of mind, the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, triggered an immediate American response. Only two days after the outbreak of the war, President Truman declared that "the attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that 4 Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war." 14 Not only was the United States now extending the principles of containment from Europe to Asia, then; it was going even further in practice.

**\*\*SPEAKING FOR OTHERS\*\***

AT SPEAKING FOR OTHERS: SPEAKING FOR OTHERS GOOD

**The alternative fails – speaking for others is a prerequisite for successful policymaking.**

**Alcoff, 92** (Linda, *Cultural Critique*, Winter 1991-92, pp. 5-32, Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies and Political Science and currently the Director of Women's Studies at Syracuse University, <http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html>)

In her autobiographical book Menchu opens with the claim that her story is "not only my life, it's also the testimony of . . . all poor Guatemalans. My personal experience is the reality of a whole people" (1). Thus, throughout the book she asserts that she is speaking not only for her family and her community of Quiche Indians, but for all of the 33 other Indian communities of Guatemala, who speak different languages and have different customs and beliefs than the Quiche. She explains their situation with force and eloquence, and decisively refutes any "hierarchy of civilizations" view that would render her agrarian culture as inferior and therefore responsible for its own destruction. As a representative of the Fourth World, she offers a vivid critique of the genocidal practices from which these groups of people are still suffering. Menchu's words have helped publicize the situation in Guatemala, raise money for the revolution, and bring pressure against the Guatemalan and U.S. governments who have committed the massacres in collusion. The point of this example is not to argue that for Menchu there is no problem of speaking for others. She herself is very aware of the dangers and instructively recounts how this problem was addressed in the revolutionary movement of the Indians. Attempts were made to train each resistance activist to perform all the necessary tasks, from building traps for the soldiers, to learning how to use a rifle, to going to the city for help. Structures of general training as opposed to specialization were emphasized in order to reduce the vulnerability of the movement to the death or betrayal of specific individuals. This was also the reason Menchu went to the city to become a house servant in order to learn Spanish: so the Quiche would no longer have to rely on others to represent their situation. (In many cases translators were paid by the government or landowners purposefully to mistranslate the Quiche words.) Also, she speaks with wry humor about a group of progressive Europeans who came to Guatemala and tried to help her village with new farming products. The village was not interested; the Europeans' assessment of what they needed was off the mark. Menchu and her family maintained friendly relations with the Europeans but patiently resisted their interpretations of the village's needs. Thus, Menchu cannot be constructed as a "naive" speaker unaware of the dangers and difficulties of speaking for others; she and her compafieros are well aware of the dangers since they have so often been the unhappy recipients of malicious or wellintentioned but wrongheaded attempts by others to speak for them. Yet instead of retreating from speaking for others, Menchu and her compafieros devised methods to decrease the dangers. And despite the significant and complex differences between the many Indian communities in Guatemala, she has not flinched from the opportunity to speak on behalf of all of them. Trebilcot's version of the retreat response needs to be looked at separately because she agrees that an absolute prohibition of speaking for would undermine political effectiveness. She applies her prohibition against the practice only within a lesbian feminist community. So it might be argued that the retreat from speaking for others can be maintained without sacrificing political effectivity if it is restricted to particular discursive spaces. Why might one advocate such a retreat? Trebilcot holds that speaking for and attempting to persuade others inflicts a kind of discursive violence on the other and her beliefs. Given that interpretations and meanings are discursive constructions made by embodied speakers, Trebilcot worries that attempting to persuade or speak for another will cut off that person's ability or willingness to engage in the constructive act of developing meaning. Since no embodied speaker can produce more than a partial account, everyone's account needs to be encouraged (that is, within a specified community, which for Trebilcot is the lesbian community). There is much in Trebilcot's discussion with which I agree. I certainly agree that in some instances speaking for others constitutes a violence and should be stopped. But there remains a problem with the view that, even within a restricted, supportive community, the practice of speaking for others can be abandoned. This problem is that Trebilcot's position, as well as a more general retreat position, presumes an ontological configuration of the discursive context that simply does not obtain. In particular, it assumes that one can retreat into one's discrete location and make claims entirely and singularly based on that location that do not range over others, that one can disentangle oneself from the implicating networks between one's discursive practices and others' locations, situations, and practices. (In other words, the claim that I can speak only for myself assumes the autonomous conception of the self in Classical Liberal theory—that I am unconnected to others in my authentic self or that I can achieve an autonomy from others given certain conditions.) But there is no neutral place to stand free and clear in which one's words do not prescriptively affect or mediate the experience of others, nor is there a way to decisively demarcate a boundary between one's location and all others. Even a complete retreat from speech is of course not neutral since it allows the continued dominance of current discourses and acts by omission to reinforce their dominance. As my practices are made possible by events spatially far from my body so too my own practices make possible or impossible practices of others. The declaration that I "speak only for myself" has the sole effect of allowing me to avoid responsibility and accountability for my effects on others; it cannot literally erase those effects.

**Speaking for others is necessary when the other needs representation.**

**Alcoff, 92** (Linda, *Cultural Critique*, Winter 1991-92, pp. 5-32, Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies and Political Science and currently the Director of Women's Studies at Syracuse University, <http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html>)

However, while there is much theoretical and practical work to be done to develop such alternatives, the practice of speaking for others remains the best possibility in some existing situations. An absolute retreat weakens political effectivity, is based on a metaphysical illusion, and often effects only an obscuring of the intellectual's power. Therefore, in the remainder of this paper I will ask, how can we lessen the dangers of speaking for? In rejecting a general retreat from speaking for, I am not advocating a return to an un-self-conscious appropriation of the other, but rather that anyone who speaks for others should only do so out of a concrete analysis of the particular power relations and discursive effects involved. I want to develop this point through elucidating four sets of interrogatory practices that are meant to help evaluate possible and actual instances of speaking for. In list form they may appear to resemble an algorithm, as if we could plug in an instance of speaking for and factor out an analysis and evaluation. However, they are meant only to suggest a list of the questions that should be asked concerning any such discursive practice. These are by no means original: they have been learned and practiced by many activists and theorists.

AT SPEAKING FOR OTHERS: SPEAKING FOR OTHERS GOOD

**Speaking for others is necessary to empower the silence and have a real political impact.**

**Sells 97** (Laura, Instructor of Speech Communication at Louisiana State University, "On Feminist Civility: Retrieving the Political in the Feminist Public Forum", this paper was presented at a Roundtable on "Public Speaking and the Feminist Public Sphere: Doing Difference Differently," at the Western States Communication Association conference, 1997.) //khirn

In her recent article, "The Problems of Speaking For Others," Linda Alcoff points out the ways in which this retreat rhetoric has actually become an evasion of political responsibility. Alcoff's arguments are rich and their implications are many, but one implication is relevant to a vital feminist public forum. The retreat from speaking for others politically dangerous because it erodes public discourse. First, the retreat response presumes that we can, indeed, "retreat to a discrete location and make singular claims that are disentangled from other's locations." Alcoff calls this a "false ontological configuration in which we ignore how our social locations are always already implicated in the locations of others." The position of "not speaking for others" thus becomes an alibi that allows individuals to avoid responsibility and accountability for their effects on others. The retreat, then, is actually a withdrawal to an individualist realm, a move that reproduces an individualist ideology and privatizes the politics of experience. As she points out, this move creates a protected form of speech in which the individual is above critique because she is not making claims about others. This protection also gives the speaker immunity from having to be "true" to the experiences and needs of others. As a form of protected speech, then, "not speaking for others" short-circuits public debate by disallowing critique and avoiding responsibility to the other. Second, the retreat response undercuts the possibility of political efficacy. Alcoff illustrates this point with a list of people--Steven Biko, Edward Said, Rigoberta Menchu--who have indeed spoken for others with significant political impact. As she bluntly puts it, both collective action and coalition necessitate speaking for others.

**Speaking for others is justified – it brings the collective experience of the group into perspective.**

**Marino 5** [Lauren, "Speaking for Others", *Macalester Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 4 <http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/phil/vol14/iss1/4/>] //khirn

We return to the intuitive response to the struggle of oppressed groups: have the group speak for itself. Speaking becomes a type of agency in which I construct myself because contrary to a Cartesian self, selves do not exist prior to or separate from language. To lose my speech is to lose myself. The oppressed have the ability to communicate with each other and through their language game they are able to discuss their struggle with one another. Sharing languages games enables the oppressed to a specific, limited dimension of power. Their language game will always fail to communicate their struggle to those who have not been initiated into it. They have direct access to the experience of oppression and their agency, but they can only reach their own group. Those on the margin cannot reach those in the center. On the other hand, those in the center, the elites, share a language that can reach the majority of society. It is a language game they are familiar with and can use adeptly. However, they do not have the experience with or access to the language game of the oppressed. They have the power to use their language but nothing to say. The catch-22 is the choice between a group who embodies the agency and the dimensions of political struggle against oppression without a way to communicate it to the larger community, and a group with the language to reach society but is ignorant of the political struggle. There lies a need for a synergy between the experience of the oppressed on the margins and the language game of those in the center. The synergy requires a speaker who comes from the oppressed but has knowledge of the language game of the center. Such a person could incorporate the experience of the oppressed into a new language game that could be accessed by those in power. The concern is what is lost and sacrificed in translation. If the language games are so disparate that initiation in one, offers no insight into the rules of the other, than there is doubt that translation can be done at all. If translation cannot be done, the best to be hoped for is cooption forcing the margins into the mainstream. What then is the solution? I agree with bell hooks that the oppressed must celebrate their position on the margins. The oppressed should not try to move into the center but appreciate their counterculture. The oppressed must produce intellectuals so that the dominated can speak to the dominating. The idea goes back to Antonio Gramsci's concept of the organic intellectual.<sup>7</sup> The elites are indoctrinated in the ruling ideology and have an investment in the current order. No matter how progressive their politics may be, the elite will always be the elite. Their investment in the current social order precludes offers of true systemic change. Gramsci writes of the need for the working class to develop its own intellectuals who are organically tied to their class. This argument is similar to hooks' argument. The margin must produce organic intellectuals. It might be thought that these organic intellectuals should translate between language games. But as hooks points out, using "the oppressor's language" is not adequate because it cannot articulate the experience of the oppressed. Yet, it is the only language game the oppressing can play. Organic intellectuals affect the center from the margins if they are able to incorporate multiple voices in the texts they create.

**\*\*\*SPECIFIC SOLVENCY OUTWEIGHS\*\*\***

**SPECIFIC SOLVENCY OUTWEIGHS THE K LINK**

**Specific solvency outweighs general theory—theories are only as good as their applications and excessively generic arguments are a very weak form of reasoning.**

**Zournazi and Massumi, 02 -** , PhD in cultural theory, philosophy, and politics & professor of communications/literature at the University of Montreal – 2002 (Mary Zournazi and Brian Massumi, “Navigating Movements,” *Hope: new philosophies for change*)

Critical' practices aimed at increasing potentials for freedom and for movement are inadequate, because in order to critique something in any kind of definitive way you have to pin it down. In a way it is an almost sadistic enterprise that separates something out, attributes set characteristics to it, then applies a final judgment to it - objectifies it, in a moralising kind of way. I understand that using a 'critical method' is not the same as 'being critical'. But still I think there is always that moralising undertone to critique. Because of that, I think, it loses contact with other more moving dimensions of experience. It doesn't allow for other kinds of practices that might not have so much to do with mastery and judgment as with affective connection and abductive participation. The non-judgmental is interesting, you know, because you are always somehow implicated in trying to make judgments ... To not make judgments in critical thought is a very hard thing to do. It takes a lot courage to move in that direction, because otherwise ... Well, it requires a willingness to take risks, to make mistakes and even to come across as silly. A critical perspective that tries to come to a definitive judgment on something is always in some way a failure, because it is happening at a remove from the process it's judging. Something could have happened in the intervening time, or something barely perceptible might have been happening away from the centre of critical focus. These developments may become important later. The process of pinning down and separating out is also a weakness in judgment, because it doesn't allow for these seeds of change, connections in the making that might not be activated or obvious at the moment. In a sense, judgmental reason is an extremely weak form of thought, precisely because it is so sure of itself. This is not to say that it shouldn't be used.

**\*STATE GOOD\***



**STATE GOOD: KEY TO MOVEMENTS**

**Turning away from the state prevents mobilization for good causes.**

**Goble 98** (Paul, Publisher of RFE/RL, "THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEPOLITICIZATION," Radio Free Europe, October 12, 1998, [http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981012I.html\(opt,mozilla,unix,english,,new\)](http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981012I.html(opt,mozilla,unix,english,,new)), accessed July 07)

First, as people turn away from the state as the source of support, they inevitably care less about what the state does and are less willing to take action to assert their views. That means that neither the state nor the opposition can mobilize them to take action for or against anything. As a result, the opposition cannot easily get large numbers of people to demonstrate even if the opposition is taking positions that polls suggest most people agree with. And the government cannot draw on popular support even when it may be doing things that the people have said they want. That means that the size of demonstrations for or against anything or anyone are an increasingly poor indicator of what the people want or do not want the state to do. Second, precisely because people are focusing on their private lives and taking responsibility for them, they are likely to become increasingly upset when the state attempts to intervene in their lives even for the most benign purposes, particularly if it does so in an ineffective manner. Such attitudes, widespread in many countries and important in limiting the power of state institutions, nonetheless pose a particular danger to countries making the transition from communism to democracy. While those views help promote the dismantling of the old state, they also virtually preclude the emergence of a new and efficient one. As a result, these countries are often likely to find themselves without the effective state institutions that modern societies and economies require if they are to be well regulated. And third, countries with depoliticized populations are especially at risk when they face a crisis. The governments cannot count on support because people no longer expect the governments to be able to deliver.

**STATE GOOD: CHECKS CAPITALISM**

**The state is necessary to check the free market.**

**Kamiya 97** (Gary, Executive Editor, "Smashing the State," Salon.com, The Brainwave Project, January 20, 1997, <http://www.salon.com/jan97/state2970120.html>)

Perhaps the most depressing thing about libertarianism is its almost unconscious aversion to the notion that in a representative democracy, we are the government. Of course, our democracy is plagued with big-money corruption and a thousand other problems, but when a significant percentage of people begin to think of government as "them," democracy itself is in trouble. There is a discomfoting family resemblance between libertarianism and the militia movement. The libertarian insistence on seeing government as a malevolent or at best obstructionist external force fails to acknowledge its organic, changing nature. Government does, of course, set policy and attempt to dictate the course of events, but much of what it does is respond to, and referee, conflicts in society. Far from being a reified Other, government exists precisely to grapple -- through the instrument of law -- with issues that individuals cannot resolve by themselves. The libertarian failure to recognize the flexibility of law gives a scholastic, how-many-angels-can-dance-on-the-head-of-a-pin quality to many of its arguments. When property rights clash with environmental rights, for example, who adjudicates? Government does, through law: No libertarian solution would produce a different framework. Government will not resolve those problems to the liking of all interested parties -- but neither would any other process. We have big government in large part because we live in an enormously complex society -- because we have big problems. Libertarians are fond of saying the regulatory welfare state is somehow a continuation of despotic power -- as if there were a historical thread running between the Sun King and Sweden's social democracy. This tendentious view, verging on paranoia, is not only ahistorical, it ignores the role modern governments play in moderating corporate power.

STATE GOOD: ANARCHY = EXTINCTION

**Collapse of the nation state causes extinction.**

**Rubin, 08.** 1/9/, Dani, Earth Editor for PEJ News. "Beyond Post-Apocalyptic Eco-Anarchism,"

<http://www.pej.org/html/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=7133&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0>.

Unlike twenty-five years ago, increasingly, people are adopting the anarcho-apocalyptic, civilization-must-fall-to-save-the-world attitude. It is a fairly clean and tight worldview, zealously bulletproof, and it scares me. I want the natural world, the greater community of life beyond our species, with all its beautiful and terrifying manifestations, and its vibrant landscapes to survive intact – I think about this a lot. **A quick collapse of global civilization, will almost certainly lead to greater explosive damage to the biosphere, than a mediated slower meltdown.** When one envisions the collapse of global society, one is not discussing the demise of an ancient Greek city-state, or even the abandonment of an empire like the Mayans. The end of our global civilization would not only result in the death of six billion humans, just wiping nature's slate clean. We also have something like 5,000 nuclear facilities spread across the planet's surface. And this is just one obvious and straightforward fact cutting across new radical arguments in favor of a quick fall. We have inserted ourselves into the web of life on planet Earth, into its interstitial fibers, over the last 500 years. We are now a big part of the world's dynamic biological equation set – its checks and balances. If we get a "fever" and fall into social chaos, even just considering our non-nuclear toys laying about, the damage will be profound. It will be much more devastating than our new visionaries of post-apocalyptic paradise have prophesized. If one expands upon current examples of social chaos that we already see, like Afghanistan or Darfur, extrapolating them across the globe, encompassing Europe, Asia, North and South America, and elsewhere, then one can easily imagine desperate outcomes where nature is sacrificed wholesale in vain attempts to rescue human life. The outcomes would be beyond "ugly"; they would be horrific and enduring. That is why I cannot accept this new wave of puritanical anarcho-apocalyptic theology. The end-point of a quick collapse is quite likely to resemble the landscape of Mars, or even perhaps the Moon. I love life. I do not want the Earth turned barren. I think that those who are dreaming of a world returned to its wilderness state are lovely, naive romantics – dangerous ones. Imagine 100 Chernobyl's spewing indelible death. Imagine a landscape over-run with desperate and starving humans, wiping out one ecosystem after another. Imagine endless tribal wars where there are no restraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons. Imagine a failing industrial infrastructure seeping massive quantities of deadly toxins into the air, water and soil. This is not a picture of primitive liberation, of happy post-civilized life working the organic farm on Salt Spring Island.

**\*\*TERROR K\*\***

**AT TERROR K: TERRORISM IS A REAL THREAT**

**Terrorism is a real threat – ignoring that reality risks annihilation.**

**Peters, 6** (Ralph, retired Army Officer, The Weekly Standard, "The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs; Fashionable thinking about defense ignores the great threats of our time," 2-6-2006, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/649qrsob.asp>, AFM)

Living in unprecedented safety within our borders and lacking firsthand knowledge of the decay beyond, honorable men and women have convinced themselves that Osama bin Laden's professed goals of driving the United States from the Middle East and removing corrupt regional governments are what global terror is all about. They gloss over his ambition of reestablishing the caliphate and his calls for the destruction of Israel as rhetorical effects--when they address them at all. Yet, Islamist fanatics are more deeply committed to their maximalist goals than to their lesser ones--and their unspoken ambitions soar beyond logic's realm. Religious terrorists are committed to an apocalypse they sense within striking distance. Their longing for union with god is inseparable from their impulse toward annihilation. They seek their god in carnage, and will go on slaughtering until he appears to pat them on the back. A dangerous asymmetry exists in the type of minds working the problem of Islamist terrorism in our government and society. On average, the "experts" to whom we are conditioned to listen have a secular mentality (even if they go to church or synagogue from habit). And it is a very rare secular mind that can comprehend religious passion--it's like asking a blind man to describe the colors of fire. One suspects that our own fiercest believers are best equipped to penetrate the mentality--the souls--of our Islamist enemies, although those believers may not be as articulate as the secular intellectuals who anxiously dismiss all possibilities that lie outside their theoretical constructs.

**Terrorism is inherently evil—the war on terror is correct**

**Schultz 04** (William F, *executive director of Amnesty International USA*, "Human rights and the evil of terrorism", UU World, February, [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qa4071/is\\_200402/ai\\_n9347594/?tag=content;col1](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4071/is_200402/ai_n9347594/?tag=content;col1))

Nothing can excuse atrocities such as these. No appeal to cultural differences can excuse the husband. No pursuit of a political agenda can explain away the actions of the minister. Evil is real, and it is very important to call it by its name. When President Bush labeled those who terrorized Americans on September II, 2001, "evildoers," he was absolutely right, and his instinct to avenge their deaths was, too. Human rights are designed to make the world a safer place and to help stop people from doing evil things. Terrorists may sincerely think that what they are doing is good, but advocates of human rights have no problem agreeing with the president: Terrorist acts are evil, and terrorists must be punished.

AT TERROR K: WAR ON TERROR GOOD

**Terrorist ideology is the root cause, not language—only the war on terror solves.**

**Epstein 05** (Alex, analyst at the Ayn Rand Institute, BA in Philosophy from Duke University, "Fight the Root of Terrorism With Bombs, Not Bread", San Francisco Chronicle, 8/14, [http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=11243&news\\_iv\\_ctrl=1021](http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=11243&news_iv_ctrl=1021))

In light of the recent suicide bombings in London, and the general inability of the West to prevent terrorist attacks, there is much talk about fighting the "root cause" of terrorism. The most popular argument is that terrorism is caused by poverty. The United Nations and our European and Arab "allies" repeatedly tell us to minimize our military operations and instead dole out more foreign aid to poor countries--to put down our guns and pick up our checkbook. Only by fighting poverty, the refrain goes, can we address the "root cause" of terrorism. The pernicious idea that poverty causes terrorism has been a popular claim since the attacks of September 11. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has repeatedly asked wealthy nations to double their foreign aid, naming as a cause of terrorism "that far too many people are condemned to lives of extreme poverty and degradation." Former Secretary of State Colin Powell agrees: "We have to put hope back in the hearts of people. We have to show people who might move in the direction of terrorism that there is a better way." Businessman Ted Turner also concurs: "The reason that the World Trade Center got hit is because there are a lot of people living in abject poverty out there who don't have any hope for a better life." Indeed, the argument that poverty causes terrorism has been central to America's botched war in Iraq--which has focused, not on quickly ending any threat the country posed and moving on to other crucial targets, but on bringing the good life to the Iraqi people. Eliminating the root of terrorism is indeed a valid goal--but properly targeted military action, not welfare handouts, is the means of doing so. Terrorism is not caused by poverty. The terrorists of September 11 did not attack America in order to make the Middle East richer. To the contrary, their stated goal was to repel any penetration of the prosperous culture of the industrialized "infidels" into their world. The wealthy Osama bin Laden was not using his millions to build electric power plants or irrigated canals. If he and his terrorist minions wanted prosperity, they would seek to emulate the United States--not to destroy it. More fundamental, poverty as such cannot determine anyone's code of morality. It is the ideas that individuals choose to adopt which make them pursue certain goals and values. A desire to destroy wealth and to slaughter innocent, productive human beings cannot be explained by a lack of money or a poor quality of life--only by anti-wealth, anti-life ideas. These terrorists are motivated by the ideology of Islamic Fundamentalism. This other-worldly, authoritarian doctrine views America's freedom, prosperity, and pursuit of worldly pleasures as the height of depravity. Its adherents resent America's success, along with the appeal its culture has to many Middle Eastern youths. To the fundamentalists, Americans are "infidels" who should be killed. As a former Taliban official said, "The Americans are fighting so they can live and enjoy the material things in life. But we are fighting so we can die in the cause of God." The terrorists hate us because of their ideology--a fact that filling up the coffers of Third World governments will do nothing to change. What then, can our government do? It cannot directly eradicate the deepest, philosophical roots of terrorism; but by using military force, it can eliminate the only "root cause" relevant in a political context: state sponsorship of terrorism. The fundamentalists' hostility toward America can translate into international terrorism only via the governments that employ, finance, train, and provide refuge to terrorist networks. Such assistance is the cause of the terrorist threat--and America has the military might to remove that cause. It is precisely in the name of fighting terrorism at its root that America must extend its fist, not its hand. Whatever other areas of the world may require U.S. troops to stop terrorist operations, we must above all go after the single main source of the threat--Iran. This theocratic nation is both the birthplace of the Islamic Fundamentalist revolution and, as a consequence, a leading sponsor of terrorism. Removing that government from power would be a potent blow against Islamic terrorism. It would destroy the political embodiment of the terrorists' cause. It would declare America's intolerance of support for terrorists. It would be an unequivocal lesson, showing what will happen to other countries if they fail to crack down on terrorists within their borders. And it would acknowledge the fact that dropping bombs, not food packages, is the only way for our government to attack terrorism at its root.

## AT TERROR K: UNIQUENESS – HEG SOLVING TERRORISM

### **We control uniqueness—History shows a trend away from the amorphous violence they critique**

**Tomkins 06** (Richard, consumer industries editor of the Financial Times, “Goodbye, cruel world”, Financial Times, 2/4, <http://search.ft.com/nonFtArticle?sortBy=datearticle&page=77&queryText=egypt&y=0&javascriptEnabled=true&id=060204001016&x=0>)

### Is it possible that children in today's western, developed world are growing up among people who are kinder, more considerate, more tolerant and more peaceable towards one another?

Are we actually becoming, well, nicer? This may seem an odd thing to ask considering the nastiness of recent events: September 11, the carnage in Iraq, the sadistic and degrading treatment meted out by US guards to prisoners at Abu Ghraib and the al-Qaeda bombings around the world. And never mind the big, headline-hitting news. At an everyday level, many of us may find ourselves complaining about the decline in good manners and the growth of rudeness: the door not held open or the refusal to give up a bus seat to those in need. Or we may argue that capitalism's emphasis on the pursuit of self-interest has led to an increase in selfish individualism, as in the reluctance to take care of elderly relatives or pay higher taxes to help the poor. Plus, why is there still so much crime? Perhaps some offences have recently declined but in Britain, as in other countries, the number of police officers employed and people in prison keeps increasing. Meanwhile, our lives are made miserable by the seemingly remorseless rise in petty crime and anti-social behaviour: the litter, graffiti, vandalism and abusive language. How nice is that? If you take the long view, however, you would surely have to acknowledge that people have become a lot less violent towards one another than they once were. In the developed world, we no longer engage in human sacrifice, heretics are no longer burned at the stake and rulers are no longer able to have people beheaded at will. Civil war, slavery, torture and capital punishment, all once prevalent in the west, have become unusual or have disappeared. More recently, western society has witnessed enormous progress towards equality for people who were once the victims of oppression or discrimination; notably women, racial minorities and homosexuals. Sexism, racism, homophobia and other such discriminatory attitudes may not yet have been eliminated but the fact that they are now widely seen as repugnant shows how much society has changed since the days, not so long ago, when such attitudes were regarded as perfectly normal. On a related theme, possibly because of women's increasing power and participation in public life, western society has become more feminised; that is to say, stereotypical male attributes such as aggressiveness, stoicism and cold, hard reason are out of favour, while stereotypically female qualities such as empathy, nurturing and intuitiveness are in. We see this in corporate culture where companies once happy to be feared as corporate bullies now try to outdo one another in showing how considerate and caring they are; we see it in the way the interests of scientific and industrial progress are increasingly measured against the welfare of people, animals, plants and the environment; we see it in the demise of the stiff upper lip and the rise of therapy culture with its emphasis on expressing one's feelings. And we see it in people's much greater kindness to children, which is where we came in. At 86, the British philosopher Mary Midgley has probably been around long enough to note any recent signs of moral progress, at least in Britain. Does she think people are getting nicer? "There have been ups and downs, but I think it is true that there has been an improvement in what one may call humane common sense about prejudice: that people are finding themselves more able to deal with people unlike themselves." She thinks this has been particularly evident in the past 50 years, partly because of the great social shake-up of the second world war which brought people from different jobs and social backgrounds together and which afterwards led to a sense that the world must be changed for the better. Still, ideas about equality and tolerance go back much further than that, Midgley says. Many were products of the Enlightenment and have just taken time to broaden beyond the educated elite. "Damn it, a lot of it is Christianity," she says. "These are old ideals. Some of them were there with the Greeks. They were terribly keen on equality so long as it was only the equality of the male Athenian citizen, but they did a great job of giving that fellow equality." "It's a long, long process, but the extension it has made in the past half century - from the intellectuals to everybody else - is what we are struck by now."

### **We control uniqueness—violence is declining due to interconnectedness and creation of non-zero sum global systems**

**Tomkins 06** (Richard, consumer industries editor of the Financial Times, “Goodbye, cruel world”, Financial Times, 2/4, <http://search.ft.com/nonFtArticle?sortBy=datearticle&page=77&queryText=egypt&y=0&javascriptEnabled=true&id=060204001016&x=0>)

Science writer Matt Ridley, whose books include *The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Co-operation*, says it has often occurred to him that human beings seem to be on a one-way ratchet to greater intolerance of cruelty, whether to people or animals. While once we had slavery and gladiators, he notes, people now gasp "Oh, the poor thing!" if you say you are going to shoot a rabbit in your garden. "But I suspect that in our everyday office politics, we're just as bitchy or political as we ever were," Ridley says. "The difference is that my office politics ends up in a frightful row and me getting steamed up whereas the office politics of Henry VI ended up with a lot of people dead in [the Battle of] Wakefield. In that sense, we're getting nicer. But instinctually, we're just as nasty. We're just not allowed to express it as violently." Can we even go as far as agreeing we are less outwardly violent? By the end of the 20th century, with its two world wars, the Holocaust, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the totalitarianism of Stalin and Mao, it would have been easy to believe that, in modern times, human beings had only grown in their propensity to kill. But James L. Payne, a political scientist and writer in the US who has made a study of the history of human violence, insists we are less savage than we were. In his self-published book, *A History of Force*, Payne argues that, over time, we have become far less inclined to use the sword, the gallows or the torture chamber to get what we want out of other people. We only think the 20th century was bloodier than the ones that went before because it is fresher in our collective memory and we have the shocking statistics to tell us how many lives were lost. But war and other violence killed a far larger percentage of the world's population in earlier centuries, when nearly every country believed its duty was to expand through military conquest, and new rulers routinely slaughtered defeated peoples. So, if we really are becoming less violent, yet evolution is not the reason, what should take the credit? Religion? Well, as Ridley points out, people may say Christianity is about being nice but in the beginning it was extraordinarily brutal and intolerant. Just look at all the violence and vengefulness in the Old Testament with its approving accounts of people smiting and slaughtering one another. Indeed, according to the Bible, some of the most horrifying massacres were carried out in the name of God: ("And it came to pass, that at midnight the Lord smote all the firstborn in the land of Egypt..." Exodus 12:29) R. Elisabeth Cornwell, an evolutionary psychologist who divides her time between the University of Colorado and Scotland's University of St Andrews, says: "It wasn't religion that made the difference. It was the philosophical reasoning of the Enlightenment that made the huge change and increased the 'nice' behaviour of human beings, and then religion just had to follow. That's what happened in the west, and in places where the Enlightenment did not occur, you didn't have that big change in religion." For his part, Payne believes violence is declining because people around the world have gradually been grasping the truth that it does not pay. For example, as the British radicals Richard Cobden and John Bright argued in the 19th century, a country that needs copper can acquire it from abroad much more cheaply through trade than through military conquest and occupation. "The fact is, the use of force tends to be an inefficient and counter-productive way of achieving your goals." Payne says - a notable exception being when you have to use it in self-defence. This idea seems to echo a core proposition of Nonzero: *The Logic of Human Destiny*, by science writer Robert Wright. In this book, Wright explores the idea that the peoples of the world are becoming increasingly interdependent because they are engaged in so-called non-zero-sum games. Unlike zero-sum games where one person's victory is at someone else's expense, non-zero-sum games do not have winners and losers. Instead, as in economic exchanges that benefit both parties, these games produce win-win outcomes in which both parties gain - or, in cases such as nuclear warfare, lose-lose outcomes in which both sides end up worse off. Thanks to developments in transport and information technology, Wright says, peoples around the world have increasingly been drawn into networks of exchange that produce win-win outcomes. "We have been forced by the dynamics of history to become more tolerant of, and concerned about, people farther and farther away from ourselves geographically, culturally, ethnically and religiously because, more and more, our fortunes are intertwined with theirs." Wright says. To that extent, niceness is a product of enlightened self-interest.

## AT TERROR K: VIOLENCE GOOD – SOLVES TERRORISM

**Terrorists are inherently evil—The war on terror and spread of democracy are the only ways to prevent extinction**  
Neyanatu 02 (Binyamin, Prime Minister of Israel, 4/27, <http://www.aish.com/ci/s/48898622.html>)

Do not be fooled by the apologists of terror. These apologists tell us that the root cause of terrorism is the deprivation of national and civic rights, and that the way to stop terror is to redress the supposed grievances that arise from this deprivation. But the root cause of terrorism, the deliberate targeting of civilians, is not the deprivation of rights. If it were, then in the thousands of conflicts and struggles for national and civil rights in modern times we would see countless instances of terrorism. But we do not. Mahatma Gandhi fought for the independence of India without resorting to terrorism. So too did the peoples of Eastern Europe in their struggle to bring down the Berlin Wall. And Martin Luther King's campaign for equal rights for all Americans eschewed all violence, much less terrorism. If the deprivation of rights is indeed the root cause of terrorism, why did all these people pursue their cause without resorting to terror? Put simply, because they were democrats, not terrorists. They believed in the sanctity of each human life, were committed to the ideals of liberty, and championed the values of democracy. But those who practice terrorism do not believe in these things. In fact, they believe in the very opposite. For them, the cause they espouse is so all-encompassing, so total, that it justifies anything. It allows them to break any law, discard any moral code and trample all human rights in the dust. In their eyes, it permits them to indiscriminately murder and maim innocent men and women, and lets them blow up a bus full of children. There is a name for the doctrine that produces this evil. It is called totalitarianism. Indeed, the root cause of terrorism is totalitarianism. Only a totalitarian regime, by systemically brainwashing its subjects, can indoctrinate hordes of killers to suspend all moral constraints for the sake of a twisted cause. That is why from its inception totalitarianism has always been wedded to terrorism -- from Lenin to Stalin to Hitler to the ayatollahs to Saddam Hussein, right down to Osama bin Laden and Yasser Arafat. Those who fight as terrorists rule as terrorists. It is not merely that the goals of terrorists do not justify the means they choose, it is that the means they choose tell us what their true goals are. Osama bin Laden is not seeking to defend the rights of Muslims but to murder as many Americans as possible, and ultimately to destroy America. Saddam Hussein is not seeking to defend his people but to subjugate his neighbors. Arafat is not seeking to build a state but to destroy a state; the many massacres of Jews he sponsors tells us what he would do to all the Jews of Israel if he had enough power. Those who fight as terrorists rule as terrorists. People who deliberately target the innocent never become leaders who protect freedom and human rights. When terrorists seize power, they invariably set up the darkest of dictatorships -- whether in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan or Arafatistan. In short, the reason why some resort to terror and others do not is not any absence of rights, but the presence of a tyrannical mindset. The totalitarian mind knows no limits. The democratic mind sets them everywhere. The essential steps to defeat international terrorism are being courageously undertaken by President Bush. By declaring that terrorism is never justified, and by deterring or destroying those regimes that support terror, President Bush has bravely charted a course that will lead the free world to victory. But to assure that this evil does not re-emerge a decade or two from now, we must not merely uproot terror but also plant the seeds of freedom. Only under tyranny can a terrorist mindset be widely cultivated. It cannot breed in a climate of democracy and freedom. The open debate of ideas and the respect for human life that are the foundation of all free societies are a permanent antidote to the poison that the terrorists seek to inject into the minds of their recruits. That is why it is imperative that once the terrorist regimes in the Middle East are swept away, the free world, led by America, must begin to build the institutions of pluralism and democracy in their place. This will not happen overnight, and it is not likely to result in liberal, Western-style democracies. But given an option between Turkish-style freedom and Iranian-style tyranny, the choice is clear. We simply can no longer allow parts of the world to remain cloistered by fanatic militancies. Such militancies, once armed with nuclear weapons, could destroy our civilization. We must begin immediately to encourage the peoples of the Arab and Islamic world to embrace the idea of pluralism and the ideals of freedom -- for their sake, as well as ours.



**AT TERROR K: VIOLENCE GOOD – SOLVES TERRORISM**

**Criticism is useless at this time – we must confront terrorists that are determined to destroy us.**

**Peters, 04** (Ralph, retired U.S. Army intelligence officer, Parameters, "In Praise of Attrition." Summer, [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0IBR/is\\_2\\_34/ai\\_n6082901/pg\\_1 AFM](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_2_34/ai_n6082901/pg_1 AFM))

Trust me. We don't need discourses. We need plain talk, honest answers, and the will to close with the enemy and kill him. And to keep on killing him until it is unmistakably clear to the entire world who won. When military officers start speaking in academic gobbledygook, it means they have nothing to contribute to the effectiveness of our forces. They badly need an assignment to Fallujah. Consider our enemies in the War on Terror. Men who believe, literally, that they are on a mission from God to destroy your civilization and who regard death as a promotion are not impressed by elegant maneuvers. You must find them, no matter how long it takes, then kill them. If they surrender, you must accord them their rights under the laws of war and international conventions. But, as we have learned so painfully from all the mindless, leftwing nonsense spouted about the prisoners at Guantanamo, you are much better off killing them before they have a chance to surrender. We have heard no end of blather about network-centric warfare, to the great profit of defense contractors. If you want to see a superb--and cheap example of "net-war," look at al Qaeda. The mere possession of technology does not ensure that it will be used effectively. And effectiveness is what matters.

**Militaristic solutions foster long term peace – only killing terrorists can solve terrorism**

**Peters, 04** (Ralph, retired U.S. Army intelligence officer, Parameters, "In Praise of Attrition." Summer, [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0IBR/is\\_2\\_34/ai\\_n6082901/pg\\_1 AFM](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBR/is_2_34/ai_n6082901/pg_1 AFM))

It is not enough to materially defeat your enemy. You must convince your enemy that he has been defeated. You cannot do that by bombing empty buildings. You must be willing to kill in the short term to save lives and foster peace in the long term. This essay does not suppose that warfare is simple: "Just go out and kill" era." Of course, incisive attacks on command networks and control capabilities, well-considered psychological operations, and humane treatment of civilians and prisoners matter profoundly, along with many other complex factors. But at a time when huckster contractors and "experts" who never served in uniform prophesize bloodless wars and sterile victories through technology, it's essential that those who actually must fight our nation's wars not succumb to the facile theories or shimmering vocabulary of those who wish to explain war to our soldiers from comfortable offices. It is not a matter of whether attrition is good or bad. It's necessary. Only the shedding of their blood defeats resolute enemies. Especially in our struggle with God-obsessed terrorists--the most implacable enemies our nation has ever faced there is no economical solution. Unquestionably, our long-term strategy must include a wide range of efforts to do what we, as outsiders, can to address the environmental conditions in which terrorism arises and thrives (often disappointingly little--it's a self-help world). But, for now, all we can do is to impress our enemies, our allies, and all the populations in between that we are winning and will continue to win. The only way to do that is through killing. The fifth edition of the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines to "attrit" as to "wear down in quality or quantity by military attrition." That sounds like the next several years, at least, of the War on Terror. The same dictionary defines "attrition" as "the gradual wearing down of an enemy's forces in sustained warfare." Indeed, that is exactly what we shall have to do against religious terrorists. There is no magic maneuver waiting to be plotted on a map. While sharp tactical movements that bring firepower to bear will bring us important successes along the way, this war is going to be a long, hard slog. The new trenches are ideological and civilizational, involving the most fundamental differences human beings can have--those over the intentions of God and the roles of men and women. In the short term, we shall have to wear down the enemy's forces; in the longer term, we shall have to wear down the appeal of his ideas. Our military wars of attrition in the 21st century will be only one aspect of a vast metaphysical war of attrition, in which the differences between the sides are so profound they prohibit compromise. As a result of our recent wars and lesser operations, we have the best-trained, best-led, best-equipped, and most experienced ground forces in the world in our Army and Marine Corps. Potential competitors and even most of our traditional allies have only the knowledge of the classroom and the training range, while we have experience of war and related operations unparalleled in our time. We have the most impressive military establishment, overall, in military history. Now, if only we could steel ourselves to think clearly and speak plainly: There is no shame in calling reality by its proper name. We are fighting, and will fight, wars of attrition. And we are going to win them.

## AT TERROR K: VIOLENCE GOOD – SOLVES TERRORISM

**Terrorists aren't going to give up – pacifism only invites aggression****Hawks, 1** (Chuck Hawks, political scientist, "How To Defeat Terrorism: Pacifism Or Guns?" October.[http://www.chuckhawks.com/defeat\\_terrorism.htm](http://www.chuckhawks.com/defeat_terrorism.htm))

After some thought I have concluded that for pacifist tactics to succeed, at the minimum, the following conditions must pertain. One, the pacifist's opponents must be rational (capable of understanding the logic of the pacifist's position). Two, the opponents must have moral values and ideals that are not inimical to the pacifist's. Three, the opponents must respect basic human rights. And four, the pacifist's opponents must not necessarily equate non-violence with weakness. Looking at our historical pacifist models, Jesus was a rabbi saving souls and teaching people in the (Jewish) culture in which he was raised. Dr. King was a Christian minister leading a movement for the rights of his people in the (American) culture in which he was raised. And Gandhi was leading his people in their struggle for independence from the British (a rational and moral people with a long democratic tradition of self-rule). The fundamental ingredients for successful pacifism were in place in all three instances. Of the three historical examples, I am most familiar with the American Civil Rights movement of the 1950's and early 1960's, because it took place during my lifetime, and because I gave it my support. In that case, the American population was literate and well educated, basically rational, and had a long democratic tradition. Furthermore, all of the participants were Americans and were raised in the same culture, there was widespread respect for human rights, the Judeo/Christian ethic was the cultural norm, and virtually no one wanted violence. Also, in that case, the vast majority of Caucasian Americans had (and have) no desire to oppress Negro Americans. All of the conditions required for successful pacifism were indeed fulfilled.

Unfortunately, at least one (and usually more) of the required conditions are always missing when opposing totalitarian regimes (due to the nature of totalitarian regimes). Nor can they be present in any struggle against international terrorism (the fundamental tenets of terrorism preclude points two and three). In fact, none of the requisite conditions for successful pacifism are fulfilled in the present struggle against Islamic terrorists. Throughout history, pacifism and non-violence has encouraged those with a totalitarian bent (whether religious or secular) to ever-greater crimes against their own people, their neighbors, and the rest of humanity. They have historically interpreted it as weakness, which they invariably attempt to exploit for their own demented purposes. This is clear from the writings and statements of modern totalitarian leaders. For example: The vast majority of European Jews responded non-violently to the Nazi pogrom. They went peacefully to the concentration camps, and ultimately to their deaths, a fact that has puzzled historians for years. This pacifistic approach did nothing to slow down the "Final Solution," and in fact increased its efficiency. Which is the history behind the slogan popular in modern Israel: "Never again!" Another example: Non-violence was simply not a viable option when the forces of the Imperial Japanese Empire attacked the US, the UK, and their allies in December of 1941. Had the Western Allies not resisted with armed force, the Japanese would clearly have gone on to occupy, and exploit by force, all of Southeast Asia and the entire Pacific basin, as well as China. Had they not been opposed by armed force Germany, Japan, and the other Axis nations would have eventually built a power base that made them literally unstoppable. War was the only viable way to prevent this and, with 20-20 hindsight, clearly the correct decision. (Paradoxically, had the Axis succeeded in world domination, international terrorism would probably not be a problem today. Axis [state] terrorism would have systematically executed all of the dissidents in the occupied territories, and long since crushed the independent states of the Middle East. The entire region would be under the boot heel of the Axis, and the people there would be slaves. Terrorism is effective only where there are moral and innocent people to terrorize.) The United States of America had, until the events of 11 September 2001, largely ignored terrorism. This was especially true during the 8 years of the Clinton Administration. You could even make the argument that the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 were, at least in part, the result of President Clinton's legacy of inaction. The Clinton Administration took no effective action when the al Qaeda terrorist organization attacked the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people, and again did nothing when al Qaeda attacked the United States Ship *Cole*. Both of those assaults were *ipso-facto* declarations of war, acts that historically *require* a declaration of war from the aggrieved state. But the Clinton Administration chose not to take decisive action. At the end of his administration, in a move cynically designed to garner Puerto Rican votes for Hillary Clinton's senate bid, President Clinton *pardoned 16 terrorists convicted of bombing attacks against New York city*, over the vociferous objections of the entire law enforcement community. President Clinton evidently believed that terrorists would leave America alone if America did not respond to, even forgive, terrorist provocation. Clearly, American restraint did not convince the al Qaeda terrorists to leave America alone. (Neither, for that matter, did America's repeated attempts to save Moslem people from violence and starvation in various parts of the world.) The leaders and members of al Qaeda did not become more amenable to reason, their ethics and morality did not improve, they steadfastly rejected the concept of human rights, and they did not abandon violence. (Unlikely in any case, as their "culture" views pacifism as weakness.) Instead, they were emboldened to greater acts of terrorism, which resulted in the suicide attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These fanatics have stated that, If they could, they would kill everyone in America and every American anywhere in the world to achieve their goals. (Interestingly, this would include almost all American Muslims, who are not proper "fundamentalists" by al Qaeda standards.) The notorious al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, among others, has made this clear in his speeches and recent statements. So have the leaders of the totalitarian theocracy in Afghanistan known as the Taliban, who support al Qaeda and international terrorism. Personally, I have serious reservations about the practicality of any "war" against intangibles, whether poverty, drugs, or terrorism. But, one way or another, I am convinced that international terrorists and the regimes that support them must be rooted out and brought to justice-- which means killed--because they will not stop killing us.

**AT TERROR K: VIOLENCE GOOD – SOLVES TERRORISM**

**Their argument and framework actually creates a reality where terrorism flourishes. The affirmative is the logical ally of Islamist extremists – it is utopian and absolutely incapable of countering terrorism**

**Peters, 06** (Ralph, retired Army Officer, The Weekly Standard, "The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs; Fashionable thinking about defense ignores the great threats of our time," 2-6-2006,

<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/649qrsob.asp> AFM)

Many of us have struggled to grasp the unreasonable, even fanatical anti-Americanism in the global media--including the hostility in many news outlets and entertainment forums here at home. How can educated men and women, whether they speak Arabic, Spanish, French, or English, condemn

America's every move, while glossing over the abuses of dictators and the savagery of terrorists? Why is America blamed even when American involvement is minimal or even nonexistent? How has the most beneficial great power in history been transformed by the international media into a villain of relentless malevolence?

There's a straightforward answer: In their secular way, the world's media elites are as unable to accept the reality confronting them as are Islamist fundamentalists. They hate the world in which they are forced to live, and America has shaped that world.

It isn't that the American-wrought world is so very bad for the global intelligentsia: The freedom they exploit to condemn the United States has been won, preserved, and expanded by American sacrifices and America's example. The problem is that they wanted a different world, the utopia promised by socialist and Marxist theorists, an impossible heaven on earth that captured their imagination as surely as visions of paradise enrapture suicide bombers. The global media may skew secular, but that doesn't protect them against alternative forms of faith. Europeans, for example, have discarded a belief in God as beneath their sophistication--yet they still need a Satan to explain their own failures, just as their ancestors required devils to explain why the milk soured or the herd sickened. Today, America has replaced the horned, cloven-footed Lucifer of Europe's past; behind their smug assumption of superiority, contemporary Europeans are as superstitious and irrational as any of their ancestors: They simply believe in other demons.

One of the most perverse aspects of anti-Americanism in the global media and among the international intelligentsia is that it's presented as a progressive, liberal movement, when it's bitterly reactionary, a spiteful, elitist revolt against the empowerment of the common man and woman (the core ethos of the United States). Despite their outward differences, intellectuals are the logical allies of Islamist extremists--who are equally opposed to social progress and mass freedom. Of course, the terrorists have the

comfort of religious faith, while the global intelligentsia, faced with the death of Marxism and the triumph of capitalism, has only its rage. Human beings are hard-wired for faith. Deprived of a god, they seek an alternative creed. For a time, nationalism, socialism, Marxism, and a number of other-isms appeared to have a chance of working--as long as secular intellectuals rejected the evidence of Stalin's crimes or Mao's savagery (much as they overlook the brutalities of Islamist terrorists today). The intellectuals who staff the global media experienced the American-made destruction of their secular belief systems, slowly during the Cold War, then jarringly from 1989 to 1991. The experience has been as disorienting and infuriating to them as if we had proved to Muslim fanatics that their god does not exist.

America's triumph shames the Middle East and Europe alike, and has long dented the pride of Latin America. But the brotherhood of Islamist terrorists and the tribe of global intellectuals who dominate the media are the two groups who feel the most fury toward America. The terrorists dream of a paradise beyond the grave; intellectuals fantasized about utopias on

earth. Neither can stomach the practical success of the American way of life, with its insistence on individual performance and its resistance to unearned privilege. For the Islamists, America's power threatens the promises of their faith. For world-intellectuals, America is the murderer of their most precious fantasies. Is it any wonder that these two superficially different groups have drifted into collusion?

The suicide bomber may be the weapon of genius of our time, but the crucial new strategic factor is the rise of a global information culture that pretends to reflect reality, but in fact creates it. Iraq is only the most flagrant example of the disconnect between empirical reality and the redesigned, politically inflected alternative reality delivered by the media. This phenomenon matters far more than the profiteers of the revolution in military affairs can accept--the global information sphere is now a decisive battleground.

Image and idea are as powerful as the finest military technologies. We have reached the point (as evidenced by the first battle of Falluja) where the global media can overturn the verdict of the battlefield. We will not be defeated by suicide bombers in Iraq, but a chance remains that the international media may defeat us. Engaged with enemies to our front, we try to ignore the enemies at our back--enemies at whom we cannot return fire. Indeed, if anything must be profoundly reevaluated, it's our handling of the media in wartime. We have no obligation to open our accounts to proven enemies, yet we allow ourselves to be paralyzed by platitudes.

This doesn't mean that all of the media are evil or dishonest. It means we need to have the common sense and courage to discriminate between media outlets that attempt to report fairly (and don't compromise wartime secrets) and those whose track records demonstrate their hostility to our national purposes or their outright support for terrorists.

We got it right in World War II, but today we cannot count on patriotism among journalists, let alone their acceptance of censorship boards. Our own reporters pretend to be "citizens of the world" with "higher loyalties," and many view patriotism as decidedly down-market. Obsessed with defending their privileges, they refuse to accept that they also have responsibilities as citizens. But after journalistic irresponsibility kills a sufficient number of Americans, reality will force us to question the media's claim that "the public has a right to know" every secret our government holds in wartime.

**AT TERROR K: LANGUAGE KEY TO WIN WOT**

**Labeling terrorist as such is key to fighting the war on terror.**

**Ganor, 01** (Boaz, Director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism “Defining Terrorism,” <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm>, May 16)

We face an essential need to reach a definition of terrorism that will enjoy wide international agreement, thus enabling international operations against terrorist organizations. A definition of this type must rely on the same principles already agreed upon regarding conventional wars (between states), and extrapolate from them regarding non-conventional wars (between organization and a state). The definition of terrorism will be the basis and the operational tool for expanding the international community’s ability to combat terrorism. It will enable legislation and specific punishments against those perpetrating, involved in, or supporting terrorism, and will allow the formulation of a codex of laws and international conventions against terrorism, terrorist organizations, states sponsoring terrorism, and economic firms trading with them. At the same time, the definition of terrorism will hamper the attempts of terrorist organizations to obtain public legitimacy, and will erode support among those segments of the population willing to assist them (as opposed to guerrilla activities). Finally, the operative use of the definition of terrorism could motivate terrorist organizations, due to moral or utilitarian considerations, to shift from terrorist activities to alternative courses (such as guerrilla warfare) in order to attain their aims, thus reducing the scope of international terrorism. The struggle to define terrorism is sometimes as hard as the struggle against terrorism itself. The present view, claiming it is unnecessary and well-nigh impossible to agree on an objective definition of terrorism, has long established itself as the “politically correct” one. It is the aim of this paper, however, to demonstrate that an objective, internationally accepted definition of terrorism is a feasible goal, and that an effective struggle against terrorism requires such a definition. The sooner the nations of the world come to this realization, the better.

**\*\*THREAT CON GOOD\*\***

**THREAT CONSTRUCTION: PEACE**

**Debates about threats in the academic world result in better policy-making—real threats can be confronted and risks can be weighed.**

**Walt 91** – Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago – 1991 (Stephen, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, p. 229-30)

A recurring theme of this essay has been the twin dangers of separating the study of security affairs from the academic world or of shifting the focus of academic scholarship too far from real-world issues. The danger of war will be with us for some time to come, and states will continue to acquire military forces for a variety of purposes. Unless one believes that ignorance is preferable to expertise, the value of independent national security scholars should be apparent. Indeed, history suggests that countries that suppress debate on national security matters are more likely to blunder into disaster, because misguided policies cannot be evaluated and stopped in time. As in other areas of public policy, academic experts in security studies can help in several ways. In the short term, academics are well placed to evaluate current programs, because they face less pressure to support official policy. The long-term effects of academic involvement may be even more significant: academic research can help states learn from past mistakes and can provide the theoretical innovations the produce better policy choices in the future. Furthermore, their role in training the new generation of experts gives academics an additional avenue of influence.

**Risk in the international system is inevitable—the goal should be to weigh the impacts of action vs inaction in the face of a particular threat.**

**Harvard Nuclear Study Group 83** (*Living with Nuclear Weapons*, p.16-7)

When President John F. Kennedy was shown irrefutable evidence of the Soviet missile emplacement – U-2 photographs of the missile bases in Cuba – he and his advisors discussed the matter for six days before deciding on an American response to the challenge. The decision, to place a naval blockade around the island, was not a risk-free response. This, Kennedy honestly admitted to the nation the night of October 22, 1962: My fellow citizens, let no one doubt this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take... But the great danger of all would be to do nothing. Why did the president believe that “to do nothing” about the missiles in Cuba would be an even greater danger than accepting the “difficult and dangerous” course of the blockade? He accepted some risk of war in the long run, by discouraging future Soviet aggressive behavior. Inaction might have led to an even more dangerous future. This the president also explained that night in his address to the nation: [This] sudden, clandestine decision to station weapons for the first time outside Soviet soil – is a deliberate provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted by either friend or foe. The 1930’s taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. The American government managed the 1962 crisis with skill and restraint – offering a compromise to the Soviets and giving them sufficient time to call back their missile-laden ships, for example – and the missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. The president carefully supervised American military actions to ensure that his orders were not misunderstood. He did not push his success too far or ignore the real risks of war. The point here is not, to make the blockade a model for American action in the future: different circumstances may call for different policies. Rather the point is to underline the persistence of risk in international affairs. Every proposed response to the Soviet action – doing nothing, enforcing the blockade, or invading Cuba – entailed some risk of nuclear war. Kennedy’s task – and we think his success – was to weigh accurately the risks entailed in each course and decide on policy accordingly.

**THREAT CONSTRUCTION: PREVENTS ESCALATION**

**Confronting threats early prevents escalation—WWII proves.**

**Yoon 03** – Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University; former Foreign Minister of South Korea – 2003 (Young-Kwan, “Introduction: Power Cycle Theory and the Practice of International Relations”, International Political Science Review 2003; vol. 24; p. 7-8)

In history, the effort to balance power quite often tended to start too late to protect the security of some of the individual states. If the balancing process begins too late, the resulting amount of force necessary to stop an aggressor is often much larger than if the process had been started much earlier. For example, the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland showed how non-intervention or waiting for the “automatic” working through of the process turned out to be problematic. Power cycle theory could also supplement the structure-oriented nature of the traditional balance of power theory by incorporating an agent-oriented explanation. This was possible through its focus on the relationship between power and the role of a state in the international system. It especially highlighted the fact that a discrepancy between the relative power of a state and its role in the system would result in a greater possibility for systemic instability. In order to prevent this instability from developing into a war, practitioners of international relations were to become aware of the dynamics of changing power and role, adjusting role to power. A statesperson here was not simply regarded as a prisoner of structure and therefore as an outsider to the process but as an agent capable of influencing the operation of equilibrium. Thus power cycle theory could overcome the weakness of theoretical determinism associated with the traditional balance of power. The question is often raised whether government decision-makers could possibly know or respond to such relative power shifts in the real world. According to Doran, when the “tides of history” shift against the state, the push and shove of world politics reveals these matters to the policy-maker, in that state and among its competitors, with abundant urgency. (2) The Issue of Systemic Stability Power cycle theory is built on the conception of changing relative capabilities of a state, and as such it shares the realist assumption emphasizing the importance of power in explaining international relations. But its main focus is on the longitudinal dimension of power relations, the rise and decline of relative state power and role, and not on the static power distribution at a particular time. As a result, power cycle theory provides a significantly different explanation for stability and order within the international system. First of all, power cycle theory argues that what matters most in explaining the stability of the international system or war and peace is not the type of particular international system (Rosecrance, 1963) but the transformation from one system to another. For example, in the 1960s there was a debate on the stability of the international system between the defenders of bipolarity such as Waltz (1964) and the defenders of multi-polarity such as Rosecrance (1966), and Deutsch and Singer (1964). After analyzing five historical occasions since the origin of the modern state system, Doran concluded that what has been responsible for major war was not whether one type of system is more or less conducive to war but that instead systems transformation itself led to war (Doran, 1971). A non-linear type of structural change that is massive, unpredicted, devastating to foreign policy expectation, and destructive of security is the trigger for major war, not the nature of a particular type of international system.

**THREAT CONSTRUCTION: THREATS REAL**

**Some states are genuine threats.**

**Kydd 97** – Professor of Political Science of California, Riverside, SECURITY STUDIES, Autumn 1997 p. 154

As for the Second World War, few structural realists will make a sustained case the Hitler was genuinely motivated by a rational pursuit of security for Germany and the other German statesmen would have responded in the same way to Germany's international situation. Even German generals opposed Hitler's military adventurism until 1939; it is difficult to imagine a less forceful civilian leader overruling them and leading Germany in an oath of conquest. In the case of the cold war, it is again difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union was indeed expansionist before Gorbachev and not solely motivated by security concerns. The increased emphasis within international relations scholarship on explaining the nature and origins of aggressive expansionists states reflects a growing consensus that aggressive states are at the root of conflict, not security concerns.



**THREAT CONSTRUCTION: REPS IRRELEVANT**

**Representations of state action cannot change realism, and even if they could, we have no way of knowing if they new system would be any better.**

**Mearsheimer, 95** – Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago – 1995 (John, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, p. 91-2)

The most revealing aspect of Wendt's discussion is that he did not respond to the two main charge leveled against critical theory in "False Promise." The first problem with critical theory is that although the theory is deeply concerned with radically changing state behavior, it says little about how change comes about. The theory does not tell us why particular discourses become dominant and other fall by the wayside. Specifically, Wendt does not explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in world politics for well over a thousand years, although I explicitly raised the question in "False Promise" (p. 42). Moreover, he shed no light on why the time is ripe for unseating realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful, communitarian discourse, although I explicitly raised both questions. Wendt's failure to answer these questions has important ramifications for his own arguments. For example, he maintains that if it is possible to change international political discourse and alter state behavior, "then it is irresponsible to pursue policies that perpetuate destructive old orders [i.e., realism], especially if we care about the well-being of future generation." The clear implication here is that realists like me are irresponsible and do not care much about the welfare of future generations. However, even if we change discourses and move beyond realism, a fundamental problem with Wendt's argument remains: because his theory cannot predict the future, he cannot know whether the discourse that ultimately replaces realism will be more benign than realism. He has no way of knowing whether a fascistic discourse more violent than realism will emerge as the hegemonic discourse. For example, he obviously would like another Gorbachev to come to power in Russia, but a critical theory perspective, defending realism might very well be the more responsible policy choice.

**\*\*VIOLENCE K\*\***

**AT VIOLENCE K: VIOLENCE IS INEVITABLE**

**Violence is inevitable – it's inherent in nature**

**Saunders, 98** (Cat Saunders, PhD in psychotherapy, "Violence, Pacifism, and War." October, <http://drccat.org/dchh/html/violence.htm> AFM)

Like it or not, violence is part of nature and it's a part of human nature. Frankly, our puny human outbursts—and even our wars—are minor in comparison to earthquakes, volcanoes, sunspot eruptions, and supernova explosions. Nature is full of violence! It dances at every level of existence. Conception, for instance, is a violent act. The sperm *violates* the integrity of the egg in order to merge with it and create life. Another more obvious act of violence is eating. All of us, vegetarians included, must kill to survive. As Thich Nhat Hanh says in *Present Moment, Wonderful Moment*: This plate of food, so fragrant and appetizing, also contains much suffering. It's futile to deny that violence is necessary for life. It makes more sense to be aware of this fact and to be responsible in relation to it. Unfortunately, there is so much fear of *irresponsible* violence that all violence is often judged to be wrong. As a result, many people think that part of their own primal nature is wrong—the part that could kill if one's life is threatened. No part of human nature is wrong, even the violent or destructive part. Everyone has the *capacity* to be violent and destructive. Everyone! One of my heroes, Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, tells the story of Golda, who survived Maidanek, one of Hitler's most notorious death camps. Kübler-Ross visited Maidanek after World War II, in the hope of gaining some understanding of the horrors committed there.

**AT VIOLENCE K: VIOLENCE GOOD – SOLVES TERRORISM, IRAN & NORTH KOREA**

**Blanket calls to end the “cycle of violence” merely fuel it – only violence can deal with threats like terrorism, Iran and North Korea**

**Sowell, 6** (Thomas Sowell, Senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, “A ‘cycle’ of nonsense,” 7-18-2006, <http://jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell071806.asp> AFM)

Now that Israel has responded to rocket attacks and the abduction of its soldiers by terrorists by making military strikes into areas controlled by those terrorists, much of our media are deploring another "cycle of violence" in the Middle East.

For reasons unknown, some people seem to regard verbal equivalence as moral equivalence — and the latter as some kind of badge of broadmindedness, if not intellectual superiority.

Therefore, when Palestinian terrorists ("militants" in politically correct Newspeak) attack Israel and then Israel responds with military force, that is just another "cycle of violence" in the Middle East to some people.

The "cycle" notion suggests that each side is just responding to what the other side does. But just what had Israel done to set off these latest terrorist acts? It voluntarily pulled out of Gaza, after evacuating its own settlers, and left the land to the Palestinian authorities.

Terrorists then used the newly acquired land to launch rockets into Israel and then seized an Israeli soldier. Other terrorists in Lebanon followed suit. The great mantra of the past, "trading land for peace," is now thoroughly discredited, or should be.

But facts mean nothing to people who are determined to find equivalence, whether today in the Middle East or yesterday in the Cold War.

Since all things are the same, except for the differences, and different except for the similarities, nothing is easier than to create verbal parallels and moral equivalence, though some people seem to pride themselves on their ability to do such verbal tricks.

Centuries ago, Thomas Hobbes said that words are wise men's counters but that they are the money of fools.

Regardless of fashionable rhetoric, there is no Middle East "peace process" any more than trading "land for peace" has been a viable option. Nor is a Palestinian "homeland" a key to peace.

During all the years when Arab countries controlled the land now proposed for a Palestinian homeland, there was no talk about any such homeland. Only after Israel took control of that territory as a result of the 1967 war was it suddenly sacred as a Palestinian homeland.

There is no concession that will bring lasting peace to the Middle East because the terrorists and their supporters are not going to be satisfied by concessions. The only thing that will satisfy them is the destruction of Israel.

Pending that, they will inflict as much destruction and bloodshed on the Israelis as they can get away with at any given time. This brutal reality is not going to vanish through verbal sleight of hand.

The terrorists have spoken in words and in deeds, including suicide bombers. They have what Churchill once described in the Nazis as "currents of hatred so intense as to sear the souls of those who swim upon them."

We saw that on 9/11 — or should have seen it. But many, especially among the intelligentsia, are determined not to see it.

Of all the Western democracies, only two have no choice but to depend on their own military forces for their survival — the United States and Israel. The rest have for more than half a century had the luxury of depending on American military forces in general and the American nuclear deterrent in particular.

People who have long been sheltered from mortal dangers can indulge themselves in the belief that there are no mortal dangers. Nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran or North Korea — and, through them, in the hands of hate-filled terrorists — may be all that will finally wake up such people. But that may be tragically too late.

Those who keep calling for an end to the "cycle of violence" are what make such violence more likely. "World opinion" in general and the United Nations in particular can always be counted on to counsel "restraint" in response to attacks and "negotiations" in response to lethal threats.

What that means is that those who start trouble will have a lower price to pay than if those they attacked were free to go all out in their counter-attack. Lowering the price to be paid by aggressors virtually guarantees more aggression.

## AT VIOLENCE K: VIOLENCE GOOD – SOLVES IRAN

**Militaristic solutions are the only way to contain Iran – complacency only delays an inevitable war with more casualties**

**Podhoretz, 07** (Norman Podhoretz, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Case for Bombing Iran.” Commentary Magazine, June 2007,

<http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.html?id=10882&page=all> AFM)

It was thanks to Munich that “appeasement” became one of the dirtiest words in the whole of our political vocabulary. Yet appeasement had always been an important and entirely respectable tool of diplomacy, signifying the avoidance of war through the alleviation of the other side’s grievances. If Hitler had been what his eventual victims imagined he was—that is, a conventional statesman pursuing limited aims and using the threat of war only as a way of strengthening his bargaining position—it would indeed have been possible to appease him and thereby to head off the outbreak of another war.

But Hitler was not a conventional statesman and, although for tactical reasons he would sometimes pretend otherwise, he did not have limited aims. He was a revolutionary seeking to overturn the going international system and to replace it with a new order dominated by Germany, which also meant the political culture of Nazism. As such, he offered only two choices: resistance or submission. Finding this reality unbearable, the world persuaded itself that there was a way out, a third alternative, in negotiations. But given Hitler’s objectives, and his barely concealed lust for war, negotiating with him could not conceivably have led to peace. It could have had only one outcome, which was to buy him more time to start a war under more favorable conditions. As most historians now agree, if he had been taken at his own word about his true intentions, he could have been stopped earlier and defeated at an infinitely lower cost.

Which brings us back to Ahmadinejad. Like Hitler, he is a revolutionary whose objective is to overturn the going international system and to replace it in the fullness of time with a new order dominated by Iran and ruled by the religio-political culture of Islamofascism. Like Hitler, too, he is entirely open about his intentions, although—again like Hitler—he sometimes pretends that he wants nothing more than his country’s just due. In the case of Hitler in 1938, this pretense took the form of claiming that no further demands would be made if sovereignty over the Sudetenland were transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany. In the case of Ahmadinejad, the pretense takes the form of claiming that Iran is building nuclear facilities only for peaceful purposes and not for the production of bombs.

But here we come upon an interesting difference between then and now. Whereas in the late 1930’s almost everyone believed, or talked himself into believing, that Hitler was telling the truth when he said he had no further demands to make after Munich, no one believes that Ahmadinejad is telling the truth when he says that Iran has no wish to develop a nuclear arsenal. In addition, virtually everyone agrees that it would be best if he were stopped, only not, God forbid, with military force—not now, and not ever.

But if military force is ruled out, what is supposed to do the job?

Well, to begin with, there is that good old standby, diplomacy. And so, for three-and-a-half years, even pre-dating the accession of Ahmadinejad to the presidency, the diplomatic gavotte has been danced with Iran, in negotiations whose carrot-and-stick details no one can remember—not even, I suspect, the parties involved. But since, to say it again, Ahmadinejad is a revolutionary with unlimited aims and not a statesman with whom we can “do business,” all this negotiating has had the same result as Munich had with Hitler. That is, it has bought the Iranians more time in which they have moved closer and closer to developing nuclear weapons.

Then there are sanctions. As it happens, sanctions have very rarely worked in the past. Worse yet, they have usually ended up hurting the hapless people of the targeted country while leaving the leadership unscathed. Nevertheless, much hope has been invested in them as a way of bringing Ahmadinejad to heel. Yet thanks to the resistance of Russia and China, both of which have reasons of their own to go easy on Iran, it has proved enormously difficult for the Security Council to impose sanctions that could even conceivably be effective. At first, the only measures to which Russia and China would agree were much too limited even to bite. Then, as Iran continued to defy Security Council resolutions and to block inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it was bound by treaty to permit, not even the Russians and the Chinese were able to hold out against stronger sanctions. Once more, however, these have had little or no effect on the progress Iran is making toward the development of a nuclear arsenal. On the contrary: they, too, have bought the Iranians additional time in which to move ahead.

Since hope springs eternal, some now believe that the answer lies in more punishing sanctions. This time, however, their purpose would be not to force Iran into compliance, but to provoke an internal uprising against Ahmadinejad and the regime as a whole. Those who advocate this course tell us that the “mullocracy” is very unpopular, especially with young people, who make up a majority of Iran’s population. They tell us that these young people would like nothing better than to get rid of the oppressive and repressive and corrupt regime under which they now live and to replace it with a democratic system. And they tell us, finally, that if Iran were so transformed, we would have nothing to fear from it even if it were to acquire nuclear weapons.

Once upon a time, under the influence of Bernard Lewis and others I respect, I too subscribed to this school of thought. But after three years and more of waiting for the insurrection they assured us back then was on the verge of erupting, I have lost confidence in their prediction. Some of them blame the Bush administration for not doing enough to encourage an uprising, which is why they have now transferred their hopes to sanctions that would inflict so much damage on the Iranian economy that the entire populace would rise up against the rulers. Yet whether or not this might happen under such circumstances, there is simply no chance of getting Russia and China, or the Europeans for that matter, to agree to the kind of sanctions that are the necessary precondition.

At the outset I stipulated that the weapons with which we are fighting World War IV are not all military—that they also include economic, diplomatic, and other nonmilitary instruments of power. In exerting pressure for reform on countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, these nonmilitary instruments are the right ones to use. But it should be clear by now to any observer not in denial that Iran is not such a country. As we know from Iran’s defiance of the Security Council and the IAEA even while the United States has been warning Ahmadinejad that “all options” remain on the table, ultimatums and threats of force can no more stop him than negotiations and sanctions have managed to do. Like them, all they accomplish is to buy him more time.

In short, the plain and brutal truth is that if Iran is to be prevented from developing a nuclear arsenal, there is no alternative to the actual use of military force—any more than there was an alternative to force if Hitler was to be stopped in 1938.

Since a ground invasion of Iran must be ruled out for many different reasons, the job would have to be done, if it is to be done at all, by a campaign of air strikes. Furthermore, because Iran’s nuclear facilities are dispersed, and because some of them are underground, many sorties and bunker-busting munitions would be required. And because such a campaign is beyond the capabilities of Israel, and the will, let alone the courage, of any of our other allies, it could be carried out only by the United States.\* Even then, we would probably be unable to get at all the underground facilities, which means that, if Iran were still intent on going nuclear, it would not have to start over again from scratch. But a bombing campaign would without question set back its nuclear program for years to come, and might even lead to the overthrow of the mullahs.

AT VIOLENCE K: VIOLENCE GOOD – SOLVES IRAN

**Iran will eat up the affirmative's approach to the world – soft approaches will result in war**

**Rubin, 07** (Michael Rubin, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, "Don't Blink, Don't Back Down," 7-2-2007, [http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all.pubID.26420/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all.pubID.26420/pub_detail.asp) AFM)

It may be comforting to believe that, with diplomacy, Washington and Tehran can resolve their differences. But it is dangerous and naïve. Democracy in Iran is a charade, and factionalism between hard-liners and reformers is a sideshow. Iranians elect a president, but absolute power resides with the supreme leader who rules for life. Because sovereignty resides not with the people, but with God, popular will is irrelevant. What the parliament believes doesn't matter. The Revolutionary Guards, chosen for their loyalty and discipline, answer to the supreme leader. His appointees crush dissent. What should Washington do? It should not engage. Diplomacy absent Iranian sincerity is dangerous. Between 2000 and 2005, the height of Iran's reformist period, European Union trade with Tehran tripled. Rather than reform, the regime invested the hard currency into its ballistic missile and covert nuclear program. Today, Iran uses engagement to spin its centrifuges and run the clock. The United States wants Tehran to stop its nuclear program. Iranians want democracy, not theocracy. Here, interests converge. Although military action can delay Tehran's nuclear program, it cannot stop it. The real danger isn't Iran's bomb, however, but the regime that would wield it. While Europe embraces the China model of trade and dialogue, the Supreme Leader looks to Tiananmen Square. So should Washington. Rather than fund outside groups, Washington should invest in a template for change. No one knew ahead of time the Chinese student who stopped a line of tanks; the important thing was he had the space to emerge. U.S. policy should create such space. Independent labor would make the regime more accountable to its people. Unions could force the regime to invest in schools, not centrifuges. Independent media and communications could let a real civil society to emerge. This takes money. Those denouncing U.S. funding are not the imprisoned student and labor activists, but reformists loyal to theocracy, and gullible pundits. Tehran's crackdown on dissent predates U.S. support for civil society. And the Iranian overreaction shows both its vulnerability and the efficacy of U.S. pressure.

**Iranian proliferation causes nuclear terrorism**

**Podhoretz, 07** (Norman Podhoretz, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The Case for Bombing Iran." Commentary Magazine, June 2007, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.html?id=10882&page=all> AFM)

As in the realm of foreign affairs, if this much can be accomplished under present circumstances, what might not be done if the process were being backed by Iranian nuclear blackmail? Already some observers are warning that by the end of the 21st century the whole of Europe will be transformed into a place to which they give the name Eurabia. Whatever chance there may still be of heading off this eventuality would surely be lessened by the menacing shadow of an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, and only too ready to put them into the hands of the terrorist groups to whom it is even now supplying rockets and other explosive devices. And the United States? As would have been the case with Finlandization, we would experience a milder form of Islamization here at home. But not in the area of foreign policy. Like the Europeans, confronted by Islamofascists armed by Iran with nuclear weapons, we would become more and more hesitant to risk resisting the emergence of a world shaped by their will and tailored to their wishes. For even if Ahmadinejad did not yet have missiles with a long enough range to hit the United States, he would certainly be able to unleash a wave of nuclear terror against us. If he did, he would in all likelihood act through proxies, for whom he would with characteristic brazenness disclaim any responsibility even if the weapons used by the terrorists were to bear telltale markings identifying them as of Iranian origin. At the same time, the opponents of retaliation and other antiwar forces would rush to point out that there was good reason to accept this disclaimer and, markings or no markings (could they not have been forged?), no really solid evidence to refute it.

AT VIOLENCE K: A2: DETERRENCE SOLVES IRAN

**Iran won't be deterred from war – ideology overwhelms self-interest**

**Podhoretz, 07** (Norman Podhoretz, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Case for Bombing Iran.” Commentary Magazine, June 2007, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.html?id=10882&page=all> AFM)

But listen to what Bernard Lewis, the greatest authority of our time on the Islamic world, has to say in this context on the subject of deterrence:

MAD, mutual assured destruction, [was effective] right through the cold war. Both sides had nuclear weapons. Neither side used them, because both sides knew the other would retaliate in kind. This will not work with a religious fanatic [like Ahmadinejad]. For him, mutual assured destruction is not a deterrent, it is an inducement. We know already that [Iran's leaders] do not give a damn about killing their own people in great numbers. We have seen it again and again. In the final scenario, and this applies all the more strongly if they kill large numbers of their own people, they are doing them a favor. They are giving them a quick free pass to heaven and all its delights.

Nor are they inhibited by a love of country:

We do not worship Iran, we worship Allah. For patriotism is another name for paganism. I say let this land [Iran] burn. I say let this land go up in smoke, provided Islam emerges triumphant in the rest of the world.

These were the words of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who ruled Iran from 1979 to 1989, and there is no reason to suppose that his disciple Ahmadinejad feels any differently.

Still less would deterrence work where Israel was concerned. For as the Ayatollah Rafsanjani (who is supposedly a “pragmatic conservative”) has declared:

If a day comes when the world of Islam is duly equipped with the arms Israel has in possession. . . application of an atomic bomb would not leave anything in Israel, but the same thing would just produce damages in the Muslim world.

AT VIOLENCE K: A2: IRAN STRIKES → RETALIATION

**Iranian aggression is inevitable – stemming their nuclear programs should take precedent**

**Podhoretz, 07** (Norman Podhoretz, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Case for Bombing Iran.” Commentary Magazine, June 2007, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.html?id=10882&page=all> AFM)

The opponents of bombing—not just the usual suspects but many both here and in Israel who have no illusions about the nature and intentions and potential capabilities of the Iranian regime—disagree that it might end in the overthrow of the mullocracy. On the contrary, they are certain that all Iranians, even the democratic dissidents, would be impelled to rally around the flag. And this is only one of the worst-case scenarios they envisage. To wit: Iran would retaliate by increasing the trouble it is already making for us in Iraq. It would attack Israel with missiles armed with non-nuclear warheads but possibly containing biological and/or chemical weapons. There would be a vast increase in the price of oil, with catastrophic consequences for every economy in the world, very much including our own. The worldwide outcry against the inevitable civilian casualties would make the anti-Americanism of today look like a love-fest.

I readily admit that it would be foolish to discount any or all of these scenarios. Each of them is, alas, only too plausible. Nevertheless, there is a good response to them, and it is the one given by John McCain. The only thing worse than bombing Iran, McCain has declared, is allowing Iran to get the bomb. And yet those of us who agree with McCain are left with the question of whether there is still time. If we believe the Iranians, the answer is no. In early April, at Iran’s Nuclear Day festivities, Ahmadinejad announced that the point of no return in the nuclearization process had been reached. If this is true, it means that Iran is only a small step away from producing nuclear weapons. But even supposing that Ahmadinejad is bluffing, in order to convince the world that it is already too late to stop him, how long will it take before he actually turns out to have a winning hand? If we believe the CIA, perhaps as much as ten years. But CIA estimates have so often been wrong that they are hardly more credible than the boasts of Ahmadinejad. Other estimates by other experts fall within the range of a few months to six years. Which is to say that no one really knows. And because no one really knows, the only prudent—indeed, the only responsible—course is to assume that Ahmadinejad may not be bluffing, or may only be exaggerating a bit, and to strike at him as soon as it is logistically possible.



AT VIOLENCE K: VIOLENCE GOOD – SOLVES WAR

**Resisting war is useless – military deterrence provides an opportunity to expand peace**

**Futterman, 95** (J.A.H., Researcher at Lawrence Libermore Lab, Obscenity and Peace : Mediations on the Bomb

<http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html> AFM)

Internationally, peace requires empowerment of some groups that seem eager to earn the hatred of the civilized world— like the Palestinians. Now that nuclear deterrence and economic necessity have combined to bring about more freedom, empowerment, and therefore peace in Europe, the Middle East is one of the next hot-spots for triggering a nuclear war. In order to have peace, the world must empower the Palestinians to determine their political and economic destiny, while at the same time it must deter them from warring with Israel. Such empowerment and deterrence will require the active involvement of the Islamic nations who thus far have been unwilling to empower the Palestinians to engage in much beyond stone-throwing and terrorism. May the Palestinians awaken to how they have been used by their brethren. So we need to make peace, at home and abroad. Before you demonstrate to make your town a nuclear-free zone or to stop nuclear testing, [12] consider what you can do to enlarge someone's freedom, or to help them obtain the power to determine a better life for themselves. In other words, rather than fight against nuclear weapons or even against war, try making peace. Meanwhile, I do what I can to make waging unlimited war dangerous, and preparation for it expensive. I can provide palliative treatment, but you, physicians/patients, must heal yourselves. Or to put it more bluntly, as long as we continue to express our human nature in disenfranchising, disempowering ways, we will cling to armament -- nuclear or worse -- to distance ourselves from our own nearness to war.

**The threat of nuclear annihilation is necessary to avert war. Realism means nations will ALWAYS reach for the most destructive weaponry**

**Futterman, 95** (J.A.H., Researcher at Lawrence Libermore Lab, Obscenity and Peace : Mediations on the Bomb

<http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html> AFM)

Some people argue that the goal of civilization is to raise our children so that wars don't happen. Unfortunately, we've had civilization for six thousand years, and our history has been as dysfunctional as our families. The only thing that's ever made us pause in our societal "addiction" to war is nuclear weaponry, and the realization that the next big war may kill us all. But if war is humanity's heroin, nuclear weaponry is its methadone. That is, the treatment has potentially dangerous side effects. I am partly referring to the doctrine of deterrence by Mutual Assured Destruction, MAD. It is MAD, because it is intrinsically unstable, as those who lived through the Cuban Missile Crisis may recall. The Strategic Defense Initiative, (or Star Wars) was an attempt to move toward something more stable, and its successor, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), may in time succeed, provided it is managed as a research program rather than as a political football. But even a successful BMD will not make the world stable against massively destructive war -- it will merely make it more stable than it is now. BMD is a technical fix that does not address the real cause of the instability. As long as war is the ultimate arbiter of international disputes, nations will arm themselves with ultimate weapons. And that means, that if something worse than nuclear weapons can be discovered and developed, it will be. And then we will find something worse than that, and so on perhaps until we, ourselves, prematurely punctuate the end of our universe with as big a bang as the one which began it. Nuclear weapons may actually be giving us a chance to learn to get along with each other before we get something really dangerous, a kind of world-historical warning shot.[8] The problem is not nuclear weapons, the problem is war. Yes I know -- I sound like the NRA, "Guns don't kill people. People kill people." I'm making a different argument. If you take a gun from a homicidal individual, he or she will usually not invent and build something worse. Nations will, whether or not you take away their nuclear weapons.

AT VIOLENCE K: VIOLENCE GOOD – PREVENTS GREATER WARS LATER

**The U.S. must be heavy handed in dealing with the world's problems – the alternative is worse militarism in other areas and violence of a comparatively greater magnitude**

**Hanson, 01** (Victor Davis, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, Ph.D. from Stanford, "At War – What are we made of?" National Review Magazine, October 1.

<http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson100101.html>. AFM)

The United States finally entered the First World War because of the nation's lingering outrage over a few hundred floating bodies from the sunken ocean liner Lusitania, which was torpedoed during Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare. More than two decades later, we declared war against the Japanese Empire after 2,400 of our sailors were surprised and killed on a Sunday morning at Pearl Harbor. In the aftermath of each attack, the United States did not seek the sanction of world opinion. Instead, it unleashed the dogs of war, precipitously so against countries that had promised and delivered death to our people. In the days after Pearl Harbor, a dazed American public saw newsreels of victorious Japanese shouting "Banzai!" with arms outstretched on conquered American outposts. What terrible foes, we thought, to hate us so-so adroit at surprising us, so successful at killing despite our defenses. Yet the generation of our fathers was not impressed by either images or rhetoric. In response, a rather innocent and unprepared nation in less than 60 months left both Germany and Japan in smoldering ruins. Both fascism and Japanese militarism were incinerated and have not plagued the world for over a half-century. On September 11, the United States was attacked in a similar way. The only difference between Pearl Harbor and the assaults on the Pentagon and World Trade Center is one of magnitude. Ours now is the far greater loss. No enemy in our past, neither Nazi Germany nor Imperial Japan, killed so many American civilians and brought such carnage to our shores as the suicidal hijackers who crashed the very citadels of American power in our nation's two greatest cities. It may well be that more Americans died on the 11th than fell at Gettysburg or Antietam, or in fact on any other single day in American history. Surely, by any fair measure, we should now be at war. But are we, and shall we be? This generation of Americans is now at a crossroads. We must decide whether we shall continue to be the adolescent nation that frets over the trivial and meaningless while our enemies plot death under our very noses, or our fathers' children-who accept the old, the sad truth that "the essence of war is violence, and moderation in war is imbecility." The voices of our therapeutic culture will be heard. Indeed, they already have. We all know the old litany of inaction and self-loathing. Such seething hatred is inevitable, we are told, given our world swagger, and is the bothersome price of global activism. Should not we look inward, others will remind us, to examine why so many despise us so much?-as if people who practice neither democracy nor religious tolerance nor equality are our moral superiors. And are not these isolated terrorists emissaries of a new war that we do not understand and for which we are ill equipped?-as if we, the greatest military power in the history of civilization, cannot fathom the unchanging and eternal nature of blood and iron. Is not our support of democratic Israel the source of our calamity?-as if we should abandon the only democratic island in a sea of fanaticism and autocracy. As in the case of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the Lockerbie airliner downing, the slaughter of our servicemen in Saudi Arabia, and so on, we know well the vocabulary of prevarication practiced by our political and media pundits. We shall "track down and punish" the terrorists; we must "bring to justice the perpetrators," who can "run but not hide"; we will "act swiftly and deliberately," but of course at all times "soberly and judiciously." Etc. Then will follow the old nostrums: Europe must be consulted, moderate Arab states entreated, the U.N. petitioned. Few will confess that we are in our own outright bloody war against tyranny, intolerance, and theocracy, an age-old fight against medieval foes who despise modernity, liberalism, and freedom, and all the hope that they bring. But Americans now must ignore the old lie, because at last they also know the new truth: Despite the braggadocio of past years, we have in fact done nothing-and so invited war onto our shores. Worse still, we have disguised that nothing in the rhetoric of the criminal-justice system, as if these enemy warriors were local misguided felons to be handed over to our courts. Our diplomatic experts could keep us in comfortable stasis with the usual whispers about the consequences of "polarizing" the Arab world or "radicalizing" moderate societies-folk perhaps such as the Palestinians who were celebrating on the 11th in their streets over news that thousands of bodies lay strewn in ours. Worse even still, after the launching of a few impotent cruise missiles, we could go on cloaking that nothing in the immoral vocabulary that we are too civilized to punish evil, or perhaps too comfortable or too sophisticated to kill killers. And so Americans die; they are forgotten; and we do nothing-hoping that our enemies will at least do their awful work on our distant ships or barracks rather than at our doorsteps. Yes, we are at a great juncture in American history. We can go to battle, as we did in the past-hard, long, without guilt, apology, or respite, until our enemies are no more. It was our fathers who passed on to us that credo and with it all that we hold dear. And so just as they once did, we too must confront and annihilate these killers and the governments that have protected and encouraged them. Only that way can we honor and avenge our dead and keep faith that they have not died in vain. Only with evil confronted and crushed can we ensure that our children might still some day live, as we once did, in peace and safety.

**AT VIOLENCE K: VIOLENCE GOOD – SAVES THE MOST LIVES**

**Violent solutions are the only way to save the most lives**

**Carter, 01** (Laren, part-time free-lance writer and Producer Advocate, October 4, "Pacifism Empowers Terrorism." Capitalism Magazine. <http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?id=1128>. AFM)

Pacifists think that by pretending that violence doesn't exist, eventually it won't. This is not just silly; it is a vicious, deadly lie. **Aggression cannot be defeated by rewarding it.** Organizers of "Don't turn tragedy into a war" rallies across the country would have Americans believe that the proper response to the murder of thousands of innocent lives is a candlelight vigil and impromptu poetry readings. This is mass suicide. It is an invitation to the Hitlers, the Stalins, the Attilas, and the Bin Ladens of the world to **slaughter the American people and to gut their corpses.** Implicit in the pacifist's drivel is the implication: "may the worst man win." Only two types of people can accept a philosophy like this: a fiend or a fool. A fiend hates everyone, including himself, and so doesn't care if the "worst man" wins. A fool believes that if he smiles sheepishly at Adolf Hitler, Hitler will suddenly change his mind and decide to take-up knitting. They are both wrong, and they are both evil, [because in both cases such a policy can only lead to the destruction of the good.]

AT VIOLENCE K: VIOLENCE GOOD – SOLVES HUMAN RIGHTS

**Pacifism appeases evil – violent solutions are critical to solve widespread violation of human rights**

**Root, 01** (Damon W. Root, contributing writer at the Objectivist Center, "Against Pacifism.")

<http://www.objectivistcenter.org/showcontent.aspx?ct=420&h=54> AFM)

In 1941, with Hitler's war machine furiously hacking Western civilization to bits, George Orwell famously observed that "objectively, the pacifist is pro-Nazi." Today, as Islamic fascists like Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban struggle to bring the world under another yoke of vicious, anti-Semitic totalitarianism, our own anti-war activists inform anyone who will listen that "an eye for an eye makes the world go blind." Since these folks would apparently rather see Islamic fascism run free than have America vigorously engage her enemies, let's consider just what sort of world the modern pacifist is objectively in favor of. Afghanistan, under the Taliban, is literally a hell on earth. Women and girls are deprived of every imaginable civil, social, political, and economic liberty. Their humanity itself is under brutal attack, every minute of every day. According to Human Rights Watch, Taliban officials "beat women on the streets for dress code violations and for venturing outside the home without the company of a close male relative." Amnesty International reports that "women who wear nail varnish could have their fingers chopped off." Forbidden to speak with or visit any male who is not a close relative (including doctors and dentists), women and girls regularly go without basic medical attention. In addition, the Taliban have banned music, films, television, playing cards, and other forms of entertainment. Musical instruments and books have been seized and burned. Civil liberties like freedom of speech and religion are repressed by force. For example, the punishment for converting to Christianity or Judaism, professing these religions, or distributing their literature, is death. Amnesty International describes how two men convicted of sodomy "were placed under a wall of dried mud which was bulldozed upon them." In Kabul, an unmarried man convicted of premarital sex received 100 lashes with a leather strap. Had he been married, "the punishment would have been death by stoning," the report states. With each passing day, similar accounts of misogyny and oppression come pouring in. Kim Candy, President of the National Organization for Women, observes that "when such extremism is allowed to flourish anywhere in the world, none of us is safe." Confront the moral relativists who infest our college campuses and progressive institutions with these unspeakable events, however, and they respond with juvenile slogans like "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." In New York City, popular graffiti artist and left-wing dissident De La Vega has a statement hanging in his gallery that reads "Osama, whether right or wrong, is a fighter for freedom." Following the logic of this idiocy, we should elevate Hitler's holocaust and South Africa's apartheid into noble ideals simply because some illiterate thugs were willing to shed blood on their behalf. Thankfully, we do nothing of the sort. Just what sort of freedom do people like De La Vega think bin Laden and the Taliban are fighting for? Freedom to throw acid in the faces of unveiled women? Freedom to torture and murder gays, Jews, and atheists? Anyone suggesting a similarity between the values of Martin Luther King and Mullah Omar ought to put down the placard, quit the protest, and hide their head in shame. The Islamic fascists have brought nightmare to life in their own lands, while their ideology calls for its export. To profess pacifism in the face of such horror is to appease evil itself.

AT VIOLENCE K: NON-VIOLENCE COULD NOT SOLVE THE HOLOCAUST

**Examples of non-violent resistance to the Nazis too small scale to be considered as an effective historical example.**  
**Futterman, 91** (JAH, Livermore lab researcher, 1995, Mediation of the Bomb, online,  
<http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke0.html>)

The Nazis, who with their "Master Race" ideology admitted only so-called "Aryans" to the category of human, provide an example counter to that of the British. There were some successful acts of non-violent confrontation against the Nazis, like King Christian of Denmark's public declaration that he would wear the yellow star if it were introduced in his country. He did so in response to the Nazi practice of ordering Jews to wear yellow-starred armbands so that the Nazis could more easily isolate them from their surrounding society. That many Danes followed their king's example helped camouflage many Jews until they could escape to Sweden in fishing boats. [5] Now this resistance worked partly because the Nazis considered the Danes to be "Aryans" like themselves. Had the Poles tried the same thing, the Nazis would have been perfectly happy to use the event as an excuse for liquidating more Poles. Rather than awaken the Nazis' moral sense, non-violent confrontation on the part of the Poles would probably have enabled the Nazis to carry out their agenda in Poland more easily. The other reason these acts succeeded was that overwhelming violence of the Allies had stretched the Nazi forces too thin to suppress massive action by a whole populace, and eventually deprived the Nazis of the time they needed to find other ways to carry out their "final solution." In other words, non-violence resistance alone would have been very slow to work against the Nazis, once they had consolidated their power. And while it slowly ground away at the evil in the Nazi soul, how many millions more would have died, and how much extra time would have been given to Nazi scientists trying to invent atomic bombs to go on those V-2 rockets? The evil of Nazism may well have expended itself, but perhaps after a real "thousand-year Reich," leaving a world populated only by blue-eyed blondes. In other words, if the world had used non-violence alone against the Nazis, the results may have been much worse those of the war.[6]

**AT VIOLENCE K: VIOLENCE KEY TO PEACE**

**Non violence does not work against most enemies—genocide and mass murder will result.**

**Rummel, 81** (R.J., professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, The Just Peace, <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/TJP.CHAP.10.HTM>)

Now, peacemaking is not necessarily the best and most immediate response to conflict. Doubtlessly, some conflicts are unnecessary, some needlessly intense and long-lasting. But some also are a real and unavoidable clash, the only means through which one, as a partisan, can protect or further vital interests and achieve a more satisfactory and harmonious just peace. For example, war against Hitler's Germany from 1939 to 1945 cost millions lives, but it prevented the greater misery, the terror, the executions, the cold-blooded murders which probably would have occurred had Hitler consolidated his control of Europe and subjugated the Soviet Union. We always can end a conflict when we want by surrender. But some ideas are more important than peace: Dignity. Freedom. Security. That is, peace with justice—a just peace. There is another relevant qualification. The term "peacemaking" is well established, and I used it accordingly. Unfortunately, the verb "make" can imply that peace is designed and constructed, as a house is planned and erected brick by brick or a road engineered and built. This implication is especially seductive in this age when society is seen as manmade (rather than having evolved),<sup>9</sup> and many believe that communities should be centrally planned and managed. But peace is not constructed like a bridge. Peace emerges from the balancing of individual mental fields. What the leaders of a group or nation honestly believe, actually want, truly are willing to get, are really capable of achieving are unknown to others—and perhaps only partially to themselves. Nonetheless only they can best utilize the information available to them to justly satisfy their interests. For a third party to try to construct and enforce an abstract peace imposed on others is foolhardy. Such a peace would be uncertain, forestall the necessary trial-and-error balancing of the parties themselves, and perhaps even create greater conflict later. The best peace is an outcome of reciprocal adjustments among those involved. At most, peacemaking should ease the process. A final qualification. Pacifists believe that violence and war cannot occur if people laid down their arms and refused to fight. But this ignores unilateral violence. Under threat, a state or government may try to avoid violence by submission. The result may be enslavement, systematic execution, and elimination of leaders and "undesirables." The resulting genocide and mass murder may ultimately end in more deaths than would have occurred had people fought to defend themselves. I agree that in some situations nonviolence may be an effective strategy for waging conflict,<sup>10</sup> as in the successful Black civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s in America; or the successful nonviolent, civil disobedience movement for Indian independence from Britain begun by Mahatma Gandhi in 1922. In some situations refusal to use violence may avoid unnecessary escalation and ease peacekeeping. However, there are also conflicts, especially involving actual or potential tyrants, despots, and other such oppressors, in which nonviolence cannot buy freedom from violence by others or a just resolution of a dispute. Then a down payment on such a peace requires public display of one's capability and a resolve to meet violent aggression in kind.

**\*\*ZUPANCIC\*\***

**AT ZUPANCIC: ETHICAL ACTION IMPOSSIBLE**

**Zupancic makes ethical action impossible: individuals may change their “symbolic coordinates” but ethics are about our interactions with the world outside of the self—something she claims is impossible.**

**Thormann, 01** (Janet, <http://www.psychomedia.it/jep/number12-13/thormann.htm>, J E P - Number 12-13 - Winter-Fall 2001, Alenka Zupancic, *The Empty Ethics of Drive: Review of The Ethics of the Real* (London and New York: Verso, 2000) ), (Professor, College of Marin).

It is the case that Lacan describes the end of psychoanalysis as the act of crossing through the fantasm, leading the subject to recognize the object that has determined his or her desire and, therefore, his or her history, and issuing thereby in a new symbolic configuration. Zupancic and Zizek apparently take this act of crossing the fantasm as the model for the ethical act but stoop and short circuit the process, so that identification with the object, outside of self-division, is made the end, which would give in inhuman subject, beyond castration, precisely ascephalous. When Zupancic does acknowledge the relation of the subject to the Symbolic, the claim that the subject redefines what counts as "Good" (understood presumably as "ethical") is hyperbolic: The subject of a completed analysis will indeed change his or her symbolic coordinates, and the ethical subject may offer or represent a new ethical position, but by itself, on its own, the autonomous subject doesn't change anything "in reality," outside itself. Only in a relation to a given political system, social organization, or symbolic configuration does the subject affect anything. That is why the civil disobedient, what Antigone is traditionally taken to represent, accepts punishment: to take up a position within the social symbolic in order to change it by engaging with language and the law. Only the subject of the Symbolic can be ethical, and political action has an effect on the Real because it takes place in the Symbolic. The ethics and politics of the Real is in warfare or terrorism. It is telling that Zupancic gives no examples of ethical action in the political or social field outside of literature. It is equally telling that Zizek concludes a recent discussion of the contemporary political field by awaiting "a new form of Terror" and dismissing traditional forms of political action: "The only 'realistic' prospect is to ground a new political universality by opting for the impossible . . . with no taboos, no a priori norms ('human rights', 'democracy') . . . if this radical choice is decried by some bleeding-heart liberals as Links fascism, so be it!" (CHU, 326). Neither Zupancic nor Zizek delineates any particular course of political action or explains what specific social practices would exemplify an ethics of the Real.

**Zupancic's claim that reality is only awareness of the self makes her notion of ethical becoming impossible.**

**Michels, 04** Assistant Professor of Political Science at Sacred Heart University) 04 (<http://www.lacan.com/shadowaz.htm> Nietzsche, Interrupted, A review of Alenka Zupancic, *The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Two*, Steven).

Zupancic's analysis of Nietzsche turns then to the doctrine of eternal return. For Zupancic, eternity is not an endless circle, but "those rare moments when this circularity appears, becomes tangible for us in the encounter of two temporalities – the encounter that distinguishes the event as such" (21). While this is a perfectly defensible interpretation of Nietzsche, it does not seem to be consistent with Zupancic's emphasis on becoming. If circularity is not constant, **then becoming cannot be either.** Here, Zupancic introduces, albeit inadvertently, an element of being and temporality into her otherwise atemporal account of Nietzsche. This is also evident in her emphasis on "the Noon," the subject of the second half of the book. The book takes its title from the Nietzsche's depiction of midday, where the sun casts no shadow and things cast shadows only upon themselves. "The 'great midday' is conceived by Nietzsche as a kind of ultimate perspective," Zupancic writes. "Its singularity resides in the fact that it is not a point of view, but the point of the gaze" (23). Yet Nietzsche preferred the image of midday to emphasize the illusive and temporal nature of truth. The section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra called "At Noon," for example, depicts the title character napping, hardly at the height of his philosophic or creative prowess. What for Nietzsche is only a moment, Zupancic makes into an eternity.



AT ZUPANCIC: ALTERNATIVE DESTROYS ETHICS

**Zupancic's alternative is self-referential and vacuous – destroys ethics and politics**

**Thormann, 01** (Janet, <http://www.psychomedia.it/jep/number12-13/thormann.htm>, J E P - Number 12-13 - Winter-Fall 2001, Alenka Zupancic, *The Empty Ethics of Drive: Review of The Ethics of the Real* (London and New York: Verso, 2000) ), (Professor, College of Marin).

The unconditional form of the act suspends any judgment of the particular content of the act, which in this case may be understood to be the illegitimate exercise of power of a person in authority over someone who is a child and a student. However, Zizek, like Zupancic, claims that the ethical act is sufficient in itself to establish what is ethical: One should insist on the uniqueness, the absolute idiosyncrasy, of the ethical act proper-such an act involves its own inherent normativity which 'makes it right'; there is no neutral external standard that would enable us to decide in advance, by a simple application to a single case, on its ethical status. (TS, 386) **To claim that an extreme act, an uncompromised desire, "involves its own inherent normativity" is a tautological refusal of any possible ethical action.** An ethical act cannot be based on "its own inherent normativity" precisely because the structure of the act involves no normativity, that is, it cannot give an ethics. Ethics of the Real is in line with Miller's and Zizek's formulations, even while it avoids their celebrations of fascinating feminine subjectivity, but it explicitly develops the argument to reach the troubling impasse that ethics cannot give an ethics: "we thus propose to assert explicitly that diabolical evil, the highest evil, is indistinguishable from the highest good, that they are nothing other than the definitions of an accomplished (ethical) act" (92). Zupancic's analysis is so honest and thorough that it has to admit that the structure of the act-Kant's form as its own content-cannot provide an ethics; it can only tell what subjectification is. But the effort to move beyond that concession leads to contradiction. She concedes that "the Real and the Event are not in themselves ethical categories" (236) but at the same time asserts that "the Real, or the Even, is the heart of all ethics" (237-8). What then is specifically ethical in drive or in subjectification in the drive? If, as Zizek argues, "the moral law does not follow the Good-it generates a new shape of what counts as 'Good'" . . . so that "there are no antecedent universal rational criteria that one 'applies' when one accomplishes an act" (Totalitarianism, 170), nothing can count as good beside the act of establishing good, which is just the point here. But there is no reason that such an act should be good; it may be no more than an expression of power. The description of the act of subjectification in drive as ethical substitutes description for norm. The act in itself is not ethical, and there is no reason its description should be anything more than self-referential. The rigor of her development leads Zupancic to the paradox that there is no ethical basis of ethics: "The heart of all ethics is something which is not in itself 'ethical' (nor is it 'non-ethical')-that is to say, it has nothing to do with the register of ethics" (235)-this heart is the Real for Lacan, the event for Badiou. **It is, precisely, not ethical.** For Lacan, the Real is what is prohibited in an ethics of desire. Ethics derive from an exclusion of the Real. What Ethics of the Real finally demonstrates is that the Real cannot give an ethics and that a politics of jouissance is not politics.

AT ZUPANCIC: MISREADS NIETZSCHE AND FAILS

**Zupancic misreads Nietzsche by ignoring that he did allow for values and did not want his ideas to be used as a foundational attack on all other thinkers.**

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Scholars all too frequently disregard Nietzsche's bombastic ad hominem attacks or treat them as mere opinions. Zupancic claims; and in the process, a great harm is done to understanding the "event Nietzsche" (4). Zupancic seems unaware or unconcerned that Nietzsche is responsible for inspiring the very trend she argues against. Nietzsche, we recall, (re)defined philosophy as the love of one's own particular truths, and his "philosophers of the future" are characterized by their ability to create values. Treating philosophic truths as opinions is a testament to Nietzsche's success, not to the failing of the academy to come to terms with Nietzsche's philosophy. Nietzsche is an event, writes Zupancic, insofar as philosophy is the "process of truth" in which "the Real" is revealed through declaration and the duality, or redoubling, that distinguishes the event from its pronouncement (9). How, we might ask, would this work with an emotion such as love? "The Real here is the very ground on which we stand when we are declaring it," she contends, "and this is what redoubles the declaration of love at its core" (12). It is not his rejection of ontology or embrace of "multiplicity" – what some have called perspectivism – that distinguishes Nietzsche from other philosophers; rather, it is his invention of the "figure of the Two." This element introduces a temporality or "time loop" into Nietzsche's notion of truth. That truth is temporal means that truth "becomes what it is" (13). The image of "Dionysus and the Crucified," a central theme in many of Nietzsche's writings, epitomizes duality, temporality, and becoming; and Nietzsche himself is the point where these two events coincide. Her own creativity notwithstanding, Zupancic misses Nietzsche's repeated statements where he equates himself with Dionysus. In the penultimate aphorism of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche claims to be "the last disciple and initiate" of the philosopher-god Dionysus; and in his other writings, Nietzsche refers to himself as "The Antichrist" and depicts Christianity as a religion hostile to philosophy and truth. By emphasizing the concept of "the Two," Zupancic does great harm to the positive elements of Nietzsche's philosophy, including his embrace of Dionysus and Greek high culture. Moreover, Zupancic glosses over the radicalism of Nietzsche's epistemology. Focusing on the duality of event and declaration – or even a "double declaration" (19) – might reveal a hitherto underappreciated aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy, but it does so by ignoring the goal Nietzsche set for his philosophy. Zupancic is correct that, through the act of declaration, truth is inherently connected to the will; but she is too inattentive the nature and purpose of the declaration. Much of Nietzsche's writings, especially his later works, take the matter of rank and order seriously. Nietzsche is no teleologist; there is no decisive goal or single aim in his writings. But a process that lacks any goals is one that he would reject.

AT ZUPANCIC: NIETZSCHE TURNS APPLY

**Our Nietzsche turns apply to Zupancic. What she calls “asceticism” or “desire” is really just a re-wording of the will to power**

**Michels, 04** Assistant Professor of Political Science at Sacred Heart University) 04 (<http://www.lacan.com/shadowaz.htm>) Nietzsche, Interrupted, A review of Alenka Zupancic, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Two, Steven).

Zupancic makes the same mistake in her, rather material, understanding of asceticism. She presents a Nietzsche overly concerned with enjoyment and comfort. Zupancic exaggerates the likely egoism of the ascetic – going so far as to liken it to Freud's superego – and overlooks the fact that Nietzsche saw the ascetic primarily as a barrier to instinct and a proper appreciation of human nature. For Nietzsche, asceticism had little to do with "the pleasure principle," and everything to do with the harm that it did to the philosophic process. (It is for this reason that Nietzsche suggests solitude to replace asceticism as a means to philosophy.) The author is right to distinguish this element in Nietzsche's philosophy, but **she should call it what Nietzsche calls it: the will to power.** Zupancic stumbles onto this realization during her treatment of Nietzsche's typology of nihilism, but she fails to appreciate how it affects her study. We might also wonder whether Zupancic's Nietzsche too closely resembles the "Last Man" that Nietzsche found so nauseating. One of the more original pronouncements in The Shortest Shadow is Zupancic's contention that master morality remains, for the most part, uncorrupted by the change in morality. The victory of slave morality does not "in the least subvert or abolish the topography of mastery," she writes (45). While Zupancic is correct – nowhere does Nietzsche indicate a change in the nature of mastery – she once again misses the larger implications of Nietzsche's project: an appeal to masters and would-be masters. Slave morality may be perfect in the modern world, but Nietzsche's aim is to restore master morality as a just form of rule.